CourtListener 10587374•People v. Hosley CA5
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Filed 5/20/25 P. v. Hosley CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087967
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 1251412)
v.
DASHEME KAREEM HOSLEY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Robert B.
Westbrook, Judge.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneria,
and Eric L. Christoffersen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
Dasheme Kareme Hosley (appellant) shot and killed his mother’s boyfriend. In
2011, a jury convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189,
subd. (a))1 with enhancements for discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personally using a firearm (§ 12022.5 subd. (a)). The
trial court found true allegations appellant suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)), and served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced
appellant to 75 years to life plus five years in state prison.
In 2023, appellant was recalled for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3) (Senate Bill 483) because his
judgment included a now invalid prior prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
At resentencing, the trial court struck the prior prison term enhancement, but denied
appellant’s requests to dismiss the prior strike, the prior serious felony enhancement, and
the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enactment.
This appeal is taken from resentencing. Appellant claims the trial court
erroneously failed to consider and give appropriate weight to evidence of his mental
health issues and childhood trauma. He contends this error infected the court’s
assessment of his request to dismiss enhancements pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c), and its determination of the appropriate sentence in accordance with
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A). We conclude no abuse of discretion occurred. We
affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background.
The facts underlying appellant’s 2011 conviction are set forth in detail in our prior
opinion affirming judgment. (People v. Hosley (May 20, 2014, F065500) [nonpub.
opn.].) In brief, the evidence at trial established appellant drove from the Bay Area to his
mother’s residence in Modesto after she told him over the phone she had been involved
in a domestic dispute with her boyfriend, the victim. When appellant arrived at the
residence, the victim answered the door. Appellant pointed a revolver at the victim. He
begged appellant not to kill him. Appellant shot the victim once in the abdomen. The
victim fell to the ground. Appellant pointed the revolver at his head and pulled the
trigger, but the gun jammed. The victim later died from his injuries.
II. Appellant’s 2011 Conviction and Sentence.
As detailed above, appellant was convicted of first degree murder (§§ 187,
subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)) with two firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d);
12022.5, subd. (a)) and found to have suffered a prior strike conviction (§§ 667,
subd. (d)(1)), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)),
and served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced appellant to 75 years to life plus five years in state prison
as follows. On the first degree murder conviction, the court imposed an indeterminate
term of 25 years to life, doubled to 50 years to life based on his prior strike conviction.
(§§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) As to the enhancement for discharging a
firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), the court imposed an
additional consecutive term of 25 years to life. For the prior serious felony conviction
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), the court imposed an additional determinate term of five
years. Sentences on the use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and the prior
prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)) were ordered stayed.
3.
III. Resentencing Proceedings.
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
identified appellant as a person in their custody serving a prison term for a judgment that
included a now invalid prior prison term enhancement. The trial court appointed counsel
and set the matter for a resentencing hearing.
Appellant filed a resentencing brief contending the trial court must dismiss the
prior prison term enhancement because it is no longer legally valid. (See § 1172.75,
subd. (a).) He also requested the court exercise its discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), to dismiss the prior strike conviction, the prior serious felony
enhancement, and the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement. In a
supplemental brief, appellant further requested the court dismiss the enhancements
pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), based on his mental illness and exposure to
childhood trauma and abuse. In support of these requests, appellant detailed his personal
history, including his mental health issues and exposure to childhood abuse and trauma.2
He also provided records showing his completion of educational and rehabilitative
programing while incarcerated in state prison.
The People filed an opposition, contending relief was not warranted given the
circumstances of the crime, appellant’s prior criminal history, and his postconviction
conduct. The People submitted CDCR records showing appellant was sanctioned for
several rule violations, including participation in a riot and distribution of controlled
substances.
2 Appellant attached a copy of this court’s opinion affirming his 2011 conviction.
(People v. Hosley, supra, F065500.) The opinion includes a summary of the trial
testimony of a licensed psychologist who evaluated appellant. She concluded that
appellant’s exposure to trauma at a young age warranted a childhood diagnosis of
posttraumatic stress disorder, which continued to impact him as adult. She also
diagnosed him with dissociative disorder. She opined that these conditions may have
affected appellant’s behavior at the time of the murder.
4.
The trial court dismissed the prior prison term enhancement in accordance with
section 1172.75, subdivision (a). However, the court declined to dismiss any of the other
findings or enhancements, stating:
“With regard to the remaining requests for relief, the Court is not
going to grant the requested relief today. The Court will find that to do so
would present a danger. The circumstances of this crime weigh heavily in
that analysis.
“It just -- I recognize the factors contained in 1385 that might apply
here, including the possibility that the actions were related to childhood
trauma, PTSD, whatever. I recognize that, but the fact is that [appellant]
could not be deterred once the plan was set in motion…. He shot an
unarmed man who was begging for his life at the time. He could not even
be deterred from that and then I guess misfired when he attempted to shoot
the victim once more.
“The fact that he could not be deterred suggests to this court that
reducing the sentence would present a danger to the community. The fact
that he’s continuing rule violations in prison, some of which do implicate
violence, particularly participating in a riot in prison also suggests to the
Court that reducing the sentence would not be in the interest of justice in
this case.
“I’m declining to strike the prior conviction, the strike prior and the
(a) prior, and similarly I’m declining to strike the enhancement pursuant to
12022.53.”
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Background - Senate Bill 483.
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill 483 added section 1171.1, later renumbered
section 1172.75, to the Penal Code. Subdivision (a) of that section provides that
5.
effectively any prior prison term enhancement “imposed prior to January 1, 2020, … is
legally invalid.”3 4
Section 1172.75 also sets forth a procedure for defendants serving a sentence with
a prior prison term enhancement to obtain relief. First, the CDCR must identify such
defendants and notify the court that sentenced them. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Next, the
sentencing court must review the judgment of each identified defendant and determine
whether it includes a qualifying prior prison term enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
If so, the sentencing court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. (Ibid.)
“By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that
the trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.” (People v. Monroe (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402; see § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) Thus, section 1172.75 authorizes
the resentencing court to “revisit all prior sentencing decisions.” (People v. Valenzuela
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425.) The court may also consider “postconviction factors,”
including “the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that
3 The only exception to this provision is for prior prison term enhancements
“imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in
subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (a).)
4 People v. Rhodius, which is currently pending before the Supreme Court, held that
section 1172.75 does not apply to prior prison term enhancements that were imposed and
stayed. (People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 39, 49, review granted Feb. 21, 2024,
S283169.) Several other appellate courts have rejected this conclusion. (See People v.
Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1278, review granted Mar. 12, 2014, S283547;
People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 317, fn. 9, review granted Feb. 21,
2024, S283189; People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 674–676, review
granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853.) Because respondent does not rely on People v.
Rhodius, nor contend appellant is ineligible for resentencing because his prior prison term
enhancement was ordered stayed, we need not address this issue.
6.
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Appellant’s Request
to Dismiss Enhancements Pursuant to Section 1385, Subdivision (c).
Appellant contends the trial court erroneously failed to “consider and afford great
weight” to evidence of his mental health issues and childhood trauma in accordance with
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). We conclude the record shows the court considered
these factors, but it was not required to afford them “great weight” in the exercise of its
discretion because it found dismissal of the enhancements would “endanger public
safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
A. Applicable law – section 1385, subdivision (c).
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) amended section 1385 to add subdivision (c), which provides,
in part:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.
“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant
to prove that any of the [listed] mitigating circumstances … are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(1)–(2).)
Appellant claims the following two enumerated mitigating circumstances listed in
section 1385, subdivision (c) are applicable here and warranted dismissal of the
enhancements: section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(D) provides: “The current offense is
connected to mental illness;” section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E) provides: “The current
offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma.”
7.
In People v. Walker, our high court explained that “section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)’s mandate to give ‘great weight’ to enumerated mitigating
circumstances requires a sentencing court to ‘engage[] in a holistic balancing with special
emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors.’ ” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024, 1034.) Accordingly, “if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger
public safety, … the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally
result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors.” (Id. at p. 1036.) The court emphasized,
however, that “in most cases ‘if the trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement
would endanger public safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal would further the
interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any mitigating factors identified
in subdivision (c)(2).” (Id. at p. 1033.)
B. Standard of review.
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision not to dismiss an
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c). (People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) Such an abuse occurs where the court “is unaware of its
discretion, fails to consider a relevant factor that deserves significant weight, gives
significant weight to an irrelevant or impermissible factor, or makes a decision so
arbitrary or irrational that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (In re White (2020)
9 Cal.5th 455, 470.)
The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to demonstrate an abuse of
discretion occurred. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)
“To meet this burden, the [appellant] must ‘affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court
misunderstood its sentencing discretion.’ ” (People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861,
866.) “Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied
the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390; see People v.
8.
Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“The court is presumed to have considered all of
the relevant factors”].)
C. The Trial Court’s Finding that Dismissal of Enhancements Would Endanger
Public Safety Obviated the Requirement to Afford Great Weight to the
Mitigating Factors Enumerated in Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2). The
Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Dismiss the
Enhancements.
We begin by observing appellant’s claim the trial court did not consider evidence
of appellant’s mental health issues and childhood trauma is belied by the record. The
court expressly recognized that “the factors contained in [section] 1385[, subdivision
(c)(2)] might apply here, including the possibility that the actions were related to
childhood trauma [or] PTSD.”
Despite the potential applicability of these factors, the trial court declined to
dismiss the enhancements, finding dismissal would endanger public safety.5 Because the
court made this finding, it was not required to “afford great weight” to the mitigating
factors set forth in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), including evidence of appellant’s
mental health issues and childhood trauma. (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th
9, 18; see People v. Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 337.) In this regard, the statutory
language is clear: “Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs
greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2), italics added.)
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the court “afforded great weight” to these factors
because it was not required to do so.
Appellant contends the trial court failed to conduct a “forward-looking inquiry”
into how dismissal of the enhancements would affect his potential release date and parole
5 Although th7e trial court used the phrase “present a danger to the community,” we
conclude this was equivalent to a finding that dismissal would “endanger public safety.”
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Appellant does not claim otherwise.
9.
eligibility. He relies on People v. Gonzalez, which held the trial court misinterpreted
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) as only requiring it “to decide whether the defendant
‘currently at the time of sentencing represent[s] a danger to society.’ ” (People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 227.) Gonzalez explained that sentencing courts
must not only consider current dangerousness, but also how dismissal of enhancements
would impact the length of the defendant’s sentence or parole eligibility, because a
defendant “who has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly” may pose less
of a risk to public safety. (Id. at p. 228.)
Nothing in the instant record indicates the trial court misinterpreted section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) in the manner rejected by Gonzalez, or limited its assessment to
whether appellant is currently dangerous. Rather, the court expressly found that
“reducing the sentence” would endanger public safety based on the circumstances of the
current offense and appellant’s continued acts of violence and misconduct in prison. This
demonstrates the court considered how dismissal would impact the length of appellant’s
sentence, and concluded he would pose a danger to society if released at such earlier date.
To the extent appellant claims the court did not also assess how dismissal would impact
his parole eligibility, nothing in the record suggests the court did not take this into
consideration.6 Absent any contrary indication, we presume the court “considered all of
the relevant factors.” (People v. Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.)
Lastly, appellant claims the trial court “ignored” his completion of educational and
rehabilitative programming since his conviction. But the court specified at the outset of
the resentencing hearing that it had read appellant’s resentencing briefs, which detailed
6 Appellant asserts that under his current sentence he will be eligible for parole
consideration under the Elderly Parole Program (§ 3055) in approximately 15 years.
However, section 3055, subdivision (g) specifies that elderly parole does not apply to
persons, like appellant, who were sentenced under the “Three Strikes” law. (See In re
Brown (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 969, 977.)
10.
appellant’s programming while incarcerated. Moreover, nothing in the record
affirmatively demonstrates the court did not consider said programming, and as we
explained above, the court is presumed to have considered all relevant factors. (See
People v. Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310.) Thus, the record indicates the court
considered appellant’s educational and rehabilitative programing, but concluded it was
outweighed by other factors. Given the circumstances of the current offense, which
showed appellant’s capacity for extreme violence, and his continued acts of violence and
criminal behavior in prison, the court’s finding that dismissal of the enhancements would
endanger public safety was not arbitrary or irrational. (See In re White, supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 470.)
To conclude, the trial court appropriately found dismissal of the enhancements
would endanger public safety, and therefore was not required to afford great weight to
evidence of appellant’s mental health issues and childhood trauma. Accordingly,
appellant fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion occurred, and this claim lacks merit.
III. Section 1170, Subdivision (b)(6)(A) Is Inapplicable to Appellant’s Sentence.
Appellant claims the trial court was also required to consider his mental health
issues and childhood trauma in determining whether to impose a reduced sentence
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A).
“Section 1170, subdivision (b), describes the sentencing court’s discretion to
choose an aggravated, middle, or lower determinate term based on its consideration of
mitigating and aggravating factors.” (People v. Estrada (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 839,
843.) Subdivision (b)(6)(A) creates a presumption in favor of the lower determinate term
where the defendant’s “psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” was a
“contributing factor to the commission of the offense.” (§ 1170, subds. (b)(6), (b)(6)(A).)
Because section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) concerns only determinate sentences
imposed under subdivision (b), it is inapplicable to the indeterminate portions of
11.
appellant’s sentence. (See People v. Estrada, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 843
[indeterminate sentences are not subject to the determinate sentencing law].) Even if it
did apply, first degree murder and the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement are only punishable by one possible term.7 (§§ 190, subd. (a), 12022.53,
subd. (d).) Thus, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A)’s lower term presumption would be
irrelevant because the applicable statutes do not authorize a lower term.
For similar reasons, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) is inapplicable to the
determinate portion of appellant’s sentence. This five-year term was imposed pursuant to
section 667, subdivision (a), which provides for “a five-year enhancement” for each prior
serious felony conviction. The lower term presumption has no effect because there is
only one possible term. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in failing to apply section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A), and we reject this claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
7 The jury also found true the use of a firearm enhancement under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a), which provides for three possible determinate terms. Sentence for this
enhancement was ordered stayed. (See § 12022.53, subd. (f) [section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) enhancement cannot be imposed where a section 12022.53 enhancement
is imposed on the same crime].) Because appellant does not address this aspect of his
sentence, we do not consider it in our analysis.
12.
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