In re I.B. CA2/5

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Filed 5/16/25 In re I.B. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re I.B., a Person Coming B336302
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
18CCJP00047B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Conditionally reversed
and remanded.
Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________________

I. INTRODUCTION

Mother L.P. (mother) appeals from an order terminating
dependency jurisdiction and ordering a guardianship of I.B. (the
child). Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile
court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) failed to comply with their initial
inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes
(Cal-ICWA; Welf. & Inst. Code1, § 224 et seq.). We conditionally
reverse for further ICWA inquiry of maternal relatives.

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2
II. BACKGROUND2

In December 2021, the Department received a referral
alleging general neglect of the child by mother and emotional
abuse of the child by the child’s father I.B., Sr. (father).
On February 22, 2022, mother advised the Department
that neither she nor father had any Indian ancestry.
On February 24, 2022, the Department filed a section 300
petition alleging that mother and father engaged in domestic
violence in front of the child, and that mother had a history of
substance abuse.3
On March 1, 2022, mother submitted an ICWA-020 form,
Parental Notification of Indian Status (ICWA-020), in which she
denied having any Indian ancestry.
In March 2022, the Department spoke with maternal
grandmother in order to determine whether her home was
suitable for placement of the child. Maternal grandmother
reported that she, maternal aunt L.P.1, maternal aunt T.P., a
maternal uncle (who was then incarcerated), two maternal
cousins, and a maternal great-uncle also lived in the home. The
record does not reflect that the Department asked maternal
grandmother whether the child may be an Indian child.

2 Because the sole issue on appeal concerns compliance by
the juvenile court and the Department with ICWA and Cal-
ICWA, we limit our recitation of facts to those relevant to that
compliance issue, except as is necessary for context.

3 The Department also alleged that the child’s siblings were
prior dependents of the court and received permanent placement
services.

3
On March 1, 2022, the juvenile court found it “does not
have a reason to know that [the child] is an Indian Child[.]”
On March 15, 2022, the Department filed a jurisdiction and
disposition report stating that, according to mother, she had 11
siblings and had been raised by maternal grandmother. Mother
again denied any Indian ancestry. The Department could not
locate father for an interview and therefore referred to a 2016
social study regarding the child’s older sibling. That social study
reflected that father had been raised by paternal grandmother,
who was deceased. Paternal grandfather, who was then
incarcerated, had never lived with father. Father also previously
lived with a paternal great-grandmother, who was deceased, and
a paternal great-aunt. A paternal aunt, R.B., lived with paternal
great-grandfather.
On May 4, 2022, the Department spoke with paternal aunt
R.B., who denied any Indian ancestry.
On June 6, 2022, the Department interviewed father.
Father reported having six siblings but declined to provide any
contact information for any paternal relatives. He denied having
a permanent telephone number and declined to provide his
address to the Department. Father denied having Indian
ancestry.
On August 5, 2022, father submitted an ICWA-020,
denying Indian ancestry.
On September 9, 2022, the juvenile court sustained the
domestic violence allegations in the section 300 petition.
On October 6, 2022, the juvenile court declared the child a
dependent of the court, removed him from the parents’ custody,
and bypassed reunification services for both parents. The court
then set the matter for a permanent planning hearing. The court

4
again found there was no reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.
On October 26, 2022, father again denied having any
Indian ancestry.
On December 7, 2022, paternal great-aunt T.B. filed a
Relative Information, form JV-285, which included her contact
information.
On February 12, 2023, the Department interviewed
maternal aunt K.J., who denied any Indian ancestry. K.J. stated
that she “maintain[ed] family connections with her siblings and
their children.”
On May 9, 2023, the Department interviewed maternal
aunt W.J., who denied Indian ancestry.
On May 26, 2023, mother submitted a declaration, in which
she provided the addresses and phone numbers of maternal
aunts L.P.2 and E.S.
On June 27, 2023, mother again reported to the
Department that she did not have any Indian ancestry.
On July 17, 2023, the juvenile court ordered the child
placed with maternal aunt K.J., who was the legal guardian for
the child’s three siblings. Maternal aunt K.J.’s adult daughter
A.G. also lived in the home.
On January 16, 2024, mother filed a section 388 petition
requesting additional reunification services and custody of the
child.
On February 1, 2024, the juvenile court denied mother’s
petition. The court ordered a permanent plan of legal
guardianship for the child, appointed K.J. as the guardian, and
terminated dependency jurisdiction. Mother timely appealed.

5
III. DISCUSSION

A. ICWA Inquiry

“The California Supreme Court recently addressed
‘whether a child welfare agency’s failure to make the statutorily
required initial inquiry under California’s heightened ICWA
requirements constitutes reversible error.’ (In re Dezi C. (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125.) It ‘conclude[d] a judgment must be
conditionally reversed when error results in an inadequate ICWA
inquiry.’ (In re Kenneth D.[ (2024)] 16 Cal.5th [1087,] 1094; see
In re Dezi C., [supra, 16 Cal.5th] at p. 1125.)
“‘ICWA establishes minimum standards for state courts to
follow before removing Indian children from their families and
placing them in foster care or adoptive homes and does not
prohibit states from establishing higher standards.’ (In re Dezi
C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1129; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 1902, 1921; In re
Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551; In re T.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 275, 287.) ‘[W]hen ICWA applies, “the Indian child’s
tribe shall have a right to intervene at any point” in a proceeding
involving the removal of an Indian child from their family.’ (In re
Dezi C., [supra, 16 Cal.5th] at p. 1129; see also 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8.)
“To ensure tribes have the opportunity to exercise their
rights in dependency proceedings, an investigation of a family
member’s belief a child may have Indian ancestry must be
undertaken and notice provided, where appropriate, to the
relevant tribes. (See § 224.2, subd. (a) [imposing on the court and
child protective services agencies ‘an affirmative and continuing
duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child’].)

6
“The duty to inquire ‘“begins with initial contact (§ 224.2,
subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective
agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the
child may be an Indian child.”’ (In re Rylei S. (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 309, 316; see § 224.2, subds. (a)–(c).) The duty of
inquiry also extends to the juvenile court, which is required to
‘ask each participant present in the hearing whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.’ (Former § 224.2, subd. (c); see also 25 C.F.R.
§ 23.107(a) [‘[s]tate courts must ask each participant in an
emergency or voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding
whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the
child is an Indian child’].)
“The Department’s duty of ‘[i]nquiry includes, but is not
limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian
custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest
in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.’ (Former
§ 224.2, subd. (b)[4]; see [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 5.481(a)(1) [the

4 The current version of section 224.2, subdivision (b)
provides: “(1) The duty to inquire begins for a county when first
contacted regarding a child, including, but not limited to, asking
a party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has
any information that the child may be an Indian child, and upon
a county department’s first contact with the child or the child's
family, including extended family members as defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 224.1. At the first
contact with the child and each family member, including
extended family members, the county welfare department or
county probation department has a duty to inquire whether that
child is or may be an Indian child.

7
Department ‘must ask the child, if the child is old enough, and
the parents, Indian custodian, or legal guardians, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and
where applicable the party reporting child abuse or neglect,
whether the child is or may be an Indian child’]; In re Y.W.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551–552.)
“ICWA and Cal-ICWA define ‘extended family member,’ if
not separately defined by the law or custom of the Indian child’s
tribe, as ‘a person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is
the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see § 224.1, subd. (c)
[providing ‘extended family member’ follows definition stated in
ICWA].)” (In re T.R. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 206, 218–219.)

“(2) If a child is placed into the temporary custody of a
county probation department pursuant to Section 307, or received
and maintained in temporary custody of a county welfare
department pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of
Section 306, or taken into or maintained in the temporary
custody of a county welfare department pursuant to paragraph
(2) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or if they were initially taken
into protective custody pursuant to a warrant described in
Section 340, the county welfare department or county probation
department has a duty to inquire whether that child is an Indian
child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.” (See Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 3, eff.
Sept. 27, 2024.)

8
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not
apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1134.) We will “review[] for substantial evidence whether
there is reason to know a minor is an Indian child, and review[] a
finding of due diligence and proper inquiry for abuse of
discretion.” (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1101; but
see ibid. [“some courts have applied a standard substantial
evidence test, ‘which requires us to determine if reasonable,
credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s’ ICWA
finding”].)
“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an
inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a
quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a
deferential standard of review. [Citations.] ‘“On a well-developed
record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine
whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly
diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less
developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes.”’ [Citations.] [¶] If, upon review, a juvenile court’s
findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA
does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence
and record documentation as required by California law ([Cal.
Rules of Court, ]rule 5.481(a)(5)), there is no error and conditional
reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did not
inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child. On the
other hand, if the inquiry is inadequate, conditional reversal is
required so the agency can cure the error and thereby safeguard

9
the rights of tribes, parents, and the child.” (In re Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)5

B. Analysis

Mother contends that the Department’s ICWA inquiry was
inadequate. According to mother, the Department unreasonably
failed to ask maternal grandmother, maternal aunt L.P.2, and
maternal aunt E.S. about possible Indian ancestry. It also failed
to gather additional information about maternal aunts L.P.1 and
T.P., who were mentioned in the record, and did not interview a
maternal uncle, maternal cousins, and a maternal great-uncle.
Mother also contends the Department failed to conduct an

5 Four California Supreme Court justices also agreed that
section 224.2, subdivision (b) does not “requir[e] that an initial
Cal-ICWA inquiry be made of every member of a child’s extended
family, including every first and second cousin, every single niece
and nephew, all aunts and uncles, all siblings-in-law, plus every
other person who has an interest in the child. [Citation.] Such a
reading is ‘absurd at best and impossible at worst’ [citation] and
‘creates an open-ended universe of stones, the rule ostensibly
empowers the party to obtain a remand to question extended
family members, then a second remand to question the family
babysitter, and then a third remand to question longtime
neighbors, and so on and so on.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] The better
reading is that the ‘“includes, but is not limited to”’ language tells
us that these are ‘examples of the categories of people a social
services agency or court should inquire of.’ [Citations.]” (In re
Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1167–1168, fn. omitted (dis. opn.
of Groban, J.); id. at p. 1153 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.) [“I write
separately, however, to express my agreement with part II. of the
dissenting opinion on the threshold question of what constitutes
an adequate initial inquiry under Cal-ICWA”].)

10
adequate inquiry of paternal relatives as it did not attempt to
contact five of father’s siblings, paternal grandfather, or paternal
great-aunt.6
We reject mother’s contention that the Department did not
conduct an adequate inquiry of paternal relatives. Father and
paternal aunt R.B. both denied Indian ancestry, and father
refused to provide any contact information for paternal
grandfather or father’s other siblings. “Where, as here, a parent
largely fails to cooperate with [the Department] or to provide
names and contact information for extended family members,
[the Department’s] ability to conduct an exhaustive ICWA
inquiry necessarily is constrained.” (In re Q.M. (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082.)
We agree, however, with mother’s contention that the
Department failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry of
maternal relatives. Although maternal aunt K.J., maternal aunt
W.J., and mother all denied Indian ancestry, the Department
also had contact with, but failed to ask, maternal grandmother
whether the child had Indian ancestry. The Department
contends that because maternal aunt K.J. “maintained family
connections with her siblings,” the Department was not required
to undertake any further inquiry of maternal relatives, including
maternal grandmother. We disagree. Although the Department
was not required to interview every extended family member
referenced in the record (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1141), here, it should have asked maternal grandmother about
possible Indian heritage. Even though K.J. maintained contact

6 Maternal great-uncle and paternal great-aunt are not
“extended family members” for purposes of ICWA inquiry. (See
25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)

11
with her siblings, it is reasonable to assume that maternal
grandmother had more information about her own heritage than
did K.J. or maternal grandmother’s other children. Accordingly,
the juvenile court’s implicit finding that the Department
conducted an adequate ICWA inquiry of maternal relatives is not
supported by substantial evidence. (Cf. id. at pp. 1126–1127
[inadequate ICWA inquiry when Department failed to inquire
with, among others, paternal and maternal grandparents, despite
speaking with them while investigating allegations underlying
dependency petitions].)7

7 The Department also argues, and mother agrees, that a
conditional reversal of the order terminating dependency
jurisdiction does not require a conditional reversal of the order
appointing maternal aunt K.J. as legal guardian of the child. We
agree. Under the terms of the guardianship order, mother’s
parental rights have not been terminated, and the guardianship
remains within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, even after the
termination of dependency jurisdiction. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A)
[“If the court finds that adoption of the child or termination of
parental rights is not in the best interest of the child . . . , the
court shall order that the present caretakers or other appropriate
persons shall become legal guardians of the child”]; see Dora V. v.
Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 987, 1003, fn. omitted
[“The Legislature created a different statutory procedure for legal
guardians appointed by the juvenile court. Such guardianships
established pursuant to sections 366.26 or 360 remain within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court even after dependency
jurisdiction has been terminated”].)

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IV. DISPOSITION

The order terminating dependency jurisdiction is
conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile
court with instructions to order the Department to make
reasonable efforts to interview maternal grandmother about the
child’s possible Indian ancestry and to report to the court the
results of those efforts. Nothing in this disposition precludes the
court from ordering additional inquiry of others having an
interest in the child. Based on the information reported, if the
court determines that no additional inquiry or notice to tribes is
necessary, the order terminating dependency jurisdiction is to be
reinstated. If additional inquiry or notice is warranted, the court
shall make all necessary orders to ensure compliance with ICWA
and Cal-ICWA.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

I concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

13
In re I.B.
B336302

BAKER, J., Dissenting

I would affirm the order terminating dependency
jurisdiction. Under the deferential standard of review that
applies, there is adequate support for the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the Los Angeles County Department of Children
and Family Services undertook an inquiry that was adequate to
reach a reliable conclusion that Cal-ICWA did not apply. (In re
Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1141 [a “juvenile court’s fact-
specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and
duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’
[citation] subject to a deferential standard of review”]; see also id.
at 1153 (conc. opn. of Kruger, J.), 1168 (dis. opn. of Groban, J.); In
re E.W. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 314, 323.)

BAKER, J.

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