CourtListener 10585113•People v. Guerra CA2/3
Texto completo
Filed 5/15/25 P. v. Guerra CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B330857
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA090160)
v.
MONOLITO ALEXANDER GUERRA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Nicholas Seymour, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, David E. Madeo and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
A jury convicted Monolito Alexander Guerra of various
assault crimes based, in relevant part, on his shooting at a car
with a family of four inside and, in a separate incident, shooting
at Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputies, injuring
one.
On appeal, Guerra challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain one of his convictions for assault on a Sheriff’s
deputy. Alternatively, Guerra contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial on this
count. We reject both arguments, concluding the evidence is
sufficient to sustain the conviction and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial.
Guerra further asserts that the trial court erred in its
application of the multiple victim exception to Penal Code
section 654 regarding the counts relating to shooting into the
vehicle.1 The People agree, as do we. We therefore reverse and
remand for purposes of resentencing and application of
section 654. We additionally direct the trial court to correct
several clerical errors in the abstract of judgment.
Finally, Guerra asks us to review the sealed transcript of
the in camera hearing conducted on his motion under Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We have done so
and find no error.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
November 24, 2017 Vehicle Incident
On November 24, 2017, Carlos Vasquez was driving with
his wife and two children in the car. When they came to a stop
sign, Guerra was standing nearby. He pointed a gun at Vasquez.
Vasquez immediately drove away while his wife called 911.
Guerra got into a car and chased Vasquez, firing two shots into
the Vasquez family’s car. No one was injured, but Vasquez later
found a bullet on his six-month-old daughter’s blanket. The car’s
exterior had a visible bullet hole.
November 28, 2017 Apartment Complex Incident
On November 28, 2017, Guerra was outside his apartment
complex in the City of Newhall. He pointed a gun at a neighbor,
Jacqueline Moreno. Moreno called the police.
Deputies Albert White, Tanner Sanchez, Robert Garcia,
and Christopher Martin responded to the call, along with other
deputies. Because of the nature of the 911 call, some of the
officers responded with their lights and sirens on.
White and Sanchez arrived together in a marked Sheriff’s
vehicle and parked on Bottletree Lane. Garcia and Martin
arrived together in a separate marked Sheriff’s vehicle. The
responding officers parked two patrol vehicles, bumper-to-
bumper, on Bottletree Lane. Opposite the patrol cars were
several cars parked in a row of marked parking spaces. The
parking spaces were perpendicular to a sidewalk and in front of a
bank of mailboxes, and ended near a cinderblock wall that
concealed a dumpster. One of the parked cars was a white Ford
Fusion. Guerra was hiding inside.
White and three other deputies were gathered by the
dumpster when White volunteered to check the cars parked near
3
the mailboxes. Garcia and Martin were also in the “immediate
area.” White discovered Guerra hiding in the backseat of the
Ford Fusion. Guerra was holding a gun.
1. White’s Testimony
White opened the door to the Ford Fusion and told Guerra
not to move. He then “yell[ed]” for his partners. White lifted his
face over the vehicle so that he could project his voice loudly
enough for his partners to hear him.
After calling to his partners, White saw Guerra move his
hands towards Guerra’s gun, so White attempted to pin Guerra’s
hands down. Guerra shot White at close range. White fired his
gun at Guerra, then heard a second shot go off behind him.
Injured, White ran to the two patrol cars parked across from the
Ford Fusion, where he had last seen Garcia and Martin. White
saw Garcia stand up from behind one of the patrol cars and shoot
once. He heard a “barrage of gunfire” coming from the direction
of the Ford Fusion.
2. Garcia’s Testimony
Just before White’s interaction with Guerra, Garcia had
been standing close enough to see White checking the parked
vehicles. He heard White command, “ ‘Show me your hands,’ ” or
something to that effect, two or three times. Garcia headed
towards White. He heard gunshots and saw a gun’s muzzle flash.
Garcia ran along Bottletree Lane, using the two parked
patrol vehicles as cover, towards the shooting. White ran
towards him. Garcia helped White into one of the two Sheriffs’
vehicles. Garcia continued to use both vehicles as cover. Martin
came and helped White, who was injured, get away from the
immediate area.
4
Garcia positioned himself between Martin and White and
one of the patrol vehicles, facing the Ford Fusion and the area
where he had seen the shots fired. Guerra stood up from behind
the Ford Fusion. Garcia saw his shoulders and arms move
upward. Garcia was approximately 15 to 20 feet from Guerra.
Believing Guerra was about to fire at him, Garcia fired a
single round at Guerra. Guerra immediately dropped back down
behind the Ford Fusion. At approximately the same time that
Garcia fired at Guerra, he heard gunshots coming from his left
and right, which he assumed were from other deputies. However,
he did not see who fired those shots. Garcia then heard
Benjamin Sanchez,2 another responding officer, say, “ ‘He’s
down.’ ” Garcia and Benjamin Sanchez approached Guerra
together. They found him injured and lying on his side on the
sidewalk behind the row of parked cars, with a gun just out of his
reach.
3. Sanchez’s Testimony
Around the time that White discovered Guerra hiding in
the Ford Fusion, Sanchez was looking for Guerra elsewhere in
the apartment complex. He heard three gunshots and ran
towards Bottletree Lane. At Bottletree Lane, he saw White
running towards the two parked Sheriffs’ vehicles, holding his
neck and shouting, “ ‘I’m hit. I’m hit.’ ” Sanchez was
approximately 50 feet from White.
Sanchez heard more gunshots and took a position of cover
by the engine block of one of the two Sheriffs’ vehicles. He then
saw Guerra stand up from behind the Ford Fusion in a stance
2 Because Tanner Sanchez and Benjamin Sanchez have the
same last name, we refer to Benjamin Sanchez by his full name
for clarity.
5
like a baseball catcher, looking over the trunk of the car. Guerra
was in an “assaultive” position. He was looking left and did not
appear to see Sanchez; however, Guerra’s body was oriented
towards Sanchez. While Sanchez was in Guerra’s peripheral
view, Guerra was nonetheless in a position to see Sanchez.
Sanchez fired his weapon at Guerra while Guerra was still
looking away.
4. Investigation
Investigating detectives recorded interviews with Guerra
on December 3 and 10, 2017. Guerra said he hid when “the cops
showed up.” He admitted shooting White twice. After he got out
of the Ford Fusion, he was “trying to duck away from the cops”
and run away. However, he was “getting shot. Boom, boom. So
then I was forced to really shoot . . . .” When the detectives
inquired whether, after Guerra shot White the second time, other
deputies had shot at him, he said, “Yes.” That “forced [him] to
fucken [sic] shoot back.” He continued, “I don’t think I hit him,
but – but I just shot back.”
A forensics investigation determined that Guerra fired four
bullets during the encounter. Garcia fired one round and
Benjamin Sanchez three. Sanchez and White had also fired
multiple rounds.
Charges and Trial
On November 30, 2020, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed a 14-count information against Guerra. In the
counts relevant to this appeal, Guerra was charged with the
premeditated attempted murder of peace officers White, Sanchez,
and Garcia. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 1, 2, & 3.) He was also
charged with assault with a firearm as to Vasquez, Vasquez’s
wife, and each of the two children, and with shooting at an
6
occupied vehicle. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(2), 246; counts 5, 6, 7, 8, & 9.)
The information further charged Guerra with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 10.) He was
also charged with the premeditated attempted murder of
Vasquez. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 15.)3 The information
alleged multiple special allegations relating to three prior strikes,
prior serious felony convictions, prior prison terms, and firearm
allegations.
A jury trial took place in April and May 2023. At the end of
the People’s case, the trial court granted Guerra’s motion to
dismiss the attempted murder counts regarding Sanchez and
Garcia (counts 2 & 3) pursuant to section 1118.1. The People
then moved to amend to conform to proof by adding counts 16, 17,
and 18, each alleging assault on a peace officer in violation of
section 245, subdivision (d)(1), and related firearm allegations.
The named victims were White (count 16), Sanchez (count 17),
and Garcia (count 18).
On counts 17 and 18, assault on a peace officer as to
victims Sanchez and Garcia, the jury found Guerra guilty only of
the lesser included offense of assault with a firearm. (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2).) On the remaining counts, the jury found Guerra
3 The remaining counts in the information involved other
incidents not at issue on appeal: assault with a firearm on
Jacqueline Moreno (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 4); corporal injury
on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 11); battery on a custodial
officer, David Apodaca (§ 243, subd. (c)(1); count 13); and
resisting an executive officer, Jonathan Barrera (§ 69, subd. (a);
count 14). The information did not contain a count 12. Counts
11, 13, and 14 pertained to an unrelated incident, and the trial
court granted Guerra’s motion to sever them. The trial court
subsequently dismissed counts 11, 13, and 14 under section 1385.
7
guilty as charged and the enhancements true. Guerra admitted
the prior conviction allegations.
Guerra moved for a new trial on counts 17 and 18 under
section 1181, subdivision (6), contending there was no evidence
that Guerra assaulted either Sanchez or Garcia. The trial court
granted the motion as to Garcia (count 18), but denied it as to
Sanchez (count 17). The trial court dismissed count 18 on its own
motion pursuant to section 1385.
The trial court sentenced Guerra to an indeterminate
prison term of 95 years to life, consecutive to a determinate term
of 34 years and 4 months.4
Guerra filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conviction for
Assault with a Firearm on Deputy Sanchez
(Count 17)
A. Standard of review and applicable legal
principles
In considering whether the evidence is sufficient to support
a criminal conviction, “we review the entire record in the light
most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We evaluate
whether substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible
evidence of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of
fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820.) “ ‘The test for evaluating a sufficiency
of evidence claim is deferential: “whether, on the entire record, a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] We must “view the evidence in the
4 The trial court dismissed two of Guerra’s three prior strikes
as to counts 4 and 17 only.
8
light most favorable to the People” and “presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” [Citation]. We must also
“accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from
the circumstantial evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Baker
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1102–1103 (Baker).) Therefore, we do not
reverse unless we conclude “ ‘ “ ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the
jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th
126, 142.)
“An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.”
(§ 240.) It is well established “that assault is a general intent
crime.” (People v. Chance (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1164, 1167 (Chance).)
“[A] specific intent to injure is not an element of assault because
the assaultive act, by its nature, subsumes such an intent.”
(People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 786 (Williams).)
Therefore, the “ ‘mens rea [for assault] is established upon proof
the defendant willfully committed an act that by its nature will
probably and directly result in injury to another, i.e., a battery.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 782.) “[A]ssault only requires an
intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to
establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly
result in the application of physical force against another.” (Id.
at p. 790; accord, People v. Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th 776, 786.)
Thus, the proper focus is on the “ ‘violent-injury-producing nature
of the defendant’s acts . . . .’ ” (Williams, at p. 785.)
The “present ability” component of section 240 is “satisfied
when ‘a defendant has attained the means and location to strike
immediately.’ [Citations.] In this context, however,
9
‘immediately’ does not mean ‘instantaneously.’ It simply means
that the defendant must have the ability to inflict injury on the
present occasion. Numerous California cases establish that an
assault may be committed even if the defendant is several steps
away from actually inflicting injury, or if the victim is in a
protected position so that injury would not be ‘immediate,’ in the
strictest sense of that term.” (Chance, supra, 44 Cal.4th at
p. 1168, fn. omitted.)
Our high court’s opinions in Williams and Chance illustrate
these principles. In Williams, the defendant fired a self-described
“ ‘warning shot’ ” at the tire of the victim’s truck, knowing the
victim was approximately a foot and a half away. (Williams,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 782; see id. at p. 783.) A jury found
Williams guilty of assault on the victim.5 (Williams, at p. 783.)
Our high court considered the requisite mental state for assault.
The court held that assault does not require a specific intent to
cause injury, but only necessitates that “a defendant guilty of
assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable
person to realize that a battery would directly, naturally and
probably result from his conduct. He may not be convicted based
on facts he did not know but should have known. He, however,
need not be subjectively aware of the risk that a battery might
occur.” (Id. at p. 788, fn. omitted.) Although a jury instruction
given in the case was potentially ambiguous, any error was
harmless on the facts of the case. The defendant loaded his
shotgun, knew the victim was crouched on the far side of the
5 The jury deadlocked on charges of assault on the victim’s
two sons, who were getting into the truck at the time of the shot;
the defendant testified that he never saw the sons before he fired.
(Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 783.)
10
truck, and he fired the warning shot even though he knew the
victim was “in the near vicinity.” (Id. at p. 790.) “In light of
[those] admissions, [the] defendant undoubtedly knew those facts
establishing that his act by its nature would directly, naturally
and probably result in a battery.” (Ibid.)
In Chance, our high court upheld a conviction of assault
with a firearm on a peace officer where an officer was attempting
to apprehend an armed defendant who was running away.
(Chance, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1168.) The defendant ran
around the front of a trailer and hid. The officer went around the
back of the trailer and saw the defendant facing towards the
front, away from the officer, holding a gun with his arm
extended. (Ibid.) The officer told the defendant to drop the gun.
The defendant looked over his shoulder at the officer. He then
brought the gun “toward[s] the center of his body, then flipped it
behind him,” but did not fire and began to run. (Id. at p. 1169;
see id. at p. 1168.)
The Chance court reasoned that the evidence established
the defendant had the present ability to inflict injury, even
though he was aiming in the opposite direction, and the officer
would have shot him first had the defendant fired at him.
(Chance, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1173.) The defendant’s “mistake
as to the officer’s location was immaterial. He attained the
present ability to inflict injury by positioning himself to strike on
the present occasion with a loaded weapon. This conduct was
sufficient to establish the actus reus required for assault.” (Id. at
p. 1176.)
People v. Raviart (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 258 (Raviart), also
provides helpful context. In Raviart, the defendant aimed a gun
at two police officers, one of whom was at least partially hidden
11
behind a wall. The defendant contended there was insufficient
evidence to support a conviction for assault on the officer who
was behind a wall, claiming he only pointed his gun at the officer
standing directly in front of him. The Court of Appeal upheld
assault convictions for both officers because “the jury could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that when defendant was
confronted by the two police officers outside the motel, he drew a
loaded handgun from his waistband with the intent to shoot both
officers, but he only managed to point it at one of the officers
before they both shot him. By drawing the gun with the intent to
shoot the officers, defendant performed an overt act sufficient to
constitute an assault on both of them. Defendant did not have to
perform the further act of actually pointing the gun directly at
Officer Wagstaff to be guilty of assaulting Wagstaff. It was
enough that defendant brought the gun into a position where he
could have used it against Wagstaff if the officers had not shot
him first.” (Id. at p. 266; see id. at pp. 261–262, 264–265, 267.)
B. Substantial evidence supports the conviction
Guerra contends there is insufficient evidence to support
his assault with a firearm conviction as to Sanchez because there
is no evidence he pointed a firearm in Sanchez’s direction, or
intended to do so, and no evidence he was even aware of
Sanchez’s presence. We disagree.
There is substantial evidence that Guerra knew there were
multiple deputies on the scene. He told the investigating
detectives that the “cops showed up.” The deputies arrived in
marked cars, at least one of which was employing lights and
sirens. Guerra hid in a car near where the deputies parked two
marked cars. After White commanded Guerra not to move,
White yelled to other deputies for backup. Guerra then shot in
12
White’s direction twice, and White ran towards the parked patrol
cars, shouting that he had been hit.
With this knowledge that more than one deputy was in the
area, Guerra shot in the direction of the marked patrol cars.
Garcia, sheltering behind the patrol cars, fired once at Guerra.
Sanchez also fired shots from behind one of the two patrol cars
parked in a line. Guerra admitted that he shot back: “I was
getting shot at, boom, boom, boom. So, and that forced me to . . .
shoot back.” Ballistics evidence also showed that Guerra fired
two shots in addition to the two he fired at White.
Guerra contends this evidence was insufficient because it
did not establish he was aware of Sanchez or attempted to injure
him. However, even if Guerra did not see Sanchez, or point a gun
directly at him when he returned fire, “[t]hat degree of
immediacy is not necessary.” (Chance, supra, 44 Cal.4th at
p. 1176.) Guerra simply needed to have “actual knowledge of
those facts sufficient to establish that the offending act by its
nature,” namely his act of shooting twice in the direction of the
gunshots coming from behind the patrol cars, “would probably
and directly result in physical force being applied to another.”
(Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 784.)
Guerra knew there was at least one deputy in addition to
White present (to whom White was calling for backup and yelling
that he was hurt, and because there were at least two cars where
he was aiming). The jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Guerra intended to shoot the deputies who were behind the
patrol cars and were shooting at him. (Raviart, supra, 93
Cal.App.4th at p. 267.)
Guerra was not required to fire a shot at each victim to
complete the assault. (Raviart, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 267
13
[gun only aimed at officers; no shots fired]; see People v. Perez
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 222, 225 [one shot towards seven officers and a
civilian “endangered the lives of every individual in the group
into which he fired the single shot” and supported convictions on
seven assault counts].) In general, “displaying a gun and/or
firing it in the general direction of others is sufficient to provide
the mens rea for an assault charge where there is animus
between the defendant and the targeted party and/or the
surrounding circumstances are fraught.” (People v. Cruz-Partida
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197, 210.) A reasonable jury could have
concluded that, by shooting in attempt to return the fire that was
coming from behind the two marked patrol vehicles, and with the
knowledge that more than one deputy was present, Guerra
committed an assault on Sanchez.
Guerra attempts to distinguish Chance and Raviart on the
ground that in those cases the defendant was aware of the person
he assaulted, but, here, he did not know Sanchez was present.
Guerra also asserts Raviart is distinguishable because in that
case the second officer was within several feet of the first officer.
These arguments are not persuasive. As in Raviart, the jury here
could reasonably infer that Guerra knew there were at least two
deputies present. Sanchez and Garcia were behind the two
marked Sheriffs’ vehicles, parked in a line, bumper-to-bumper,
when Guerra fired “back.” Even if the two deputies were at the
very opposite ends of the vehicle formation, they were still
relatively near each other.6
6 Sanchez testified that when he first saw White running
across Bottletree Lane, White was approximately 50 feet away
from him. At that moment, Sanchez had run from between an
14
Sanchez testified that although he was in Guerra’s
“peripheral view,” and Guerra was not looking directly at him,
Guerra appeared to be in a combative posture, scanning for
“additional targets.” Accepting all logical inferences from the
evidence (Baker, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 1102–1103), we
conclude there is substantial evidence to support the conviction
for assault on Sanchez. (See People v. Lee Kong (1892) 95 Cal.
666, 670 [defendant knew police officer was on the roof and shot
from inside at the spot where he believed officer would be; officer
was some distance away and was not injured; defendant’s
“mistake as to the policeman’s exact location upon the roof” did
not make the act any “less an assault”].)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
Denying the Motion for a New Trial on Count 17
Guerra next contends the trial court erred when it denied
his motion for a new trial pursuant to section 1181,
subdivision (6), on the count for the assault of Sanchez. We find
no abuse of discretion.
Section 1181, subdivision 6, permits a trial court to modify
the verdict when a “verdict or finding is contrary to law or
evidence.” “In reviewing a motion for a new trial, the trial court
must weigh the evidence independently. [Citation.] It is,
however, guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of
the verdict and proceedings supporting it. [Citation.] The trial
court ‘should [not] disregard the verdict . . . but instead . . .
apartment building and pool to Bottletree Lane and was in front
of a building. After Sanchez saw White, he heard more gunshots
and took cover behind the patrol vehicles. The evidence does not
indicate that Sanchez was approximately 50 feet from Garcia
when they were both behind the patrol cars.
15
should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence
and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient
credible evidence to support the verdict.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 523–524 (Davis).) “The court
extends no evidentiary deference in ruling on a section 1181(6)
motion for new trial. Instead, it independently examines all the
evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to prove each
required element beyond a reasonable doubt to the judge, who
sits, in effect, as a ‘13th juror.’ [Citations.]” (Porter v. Superior
Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 133.)
A trial court has “broad discretion in ruling on a motion for
a new trial, and there is a strong presumption that it properly
exercised that discretion.” (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 524.)
“ ‘ “The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so
completely within the court’s discretion that its action will not be
disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion
clearly appears.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also People v. Alfaro
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1335.)
Guerra contended a new trial was warranted because
Sanchez testified Guerra had not seen him before Sanchez fired
his weapon, and Sanchez had not seen Guerra’s hands or weapon
before firing. Guerra further argued that the only evidence to
support the assault conviction was Guerra’s statement that he
fired back towards deputies after he was shot at, but that he
clarified that he only shot twice, both times at White.7
In denying the motion for a new trial on the count of
assault against Sanchez, the trial court provided two reasons.
7 This statement was contradicted by Guerra’s statement
that he returned fire after the incident with White and the
ballistics evidence at trial showing that he shot four bullets.
16
First, it reasoned that Guerra fired four shots, and “we know for
sure that there were two shots fired at Deputy White, and that
leaves two shots unaccounted for.” Second, the trial court stated
that Sanchez “did credibly testify that he sensed that shots were
fired in his direction.” It found this evidence constituted
“substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”
On appeal, Guerra contends this ruling was an abuse of
discretion because Sanchez did not testify that he sensed shots
were fired in his direction and there is no evidence Guerra fired
in Sanchez’s direction. The trial court does appear to have
misstated the evidence when it said Sanchez testified he sensed
shots were fired in his direction. However, the trial court’s first
basis for its ruling was accurate. Ballistics evidence established
that Guerra fired four shots, thus two shots in addition to those
he fired at White. As described above, even if Guerra did not see
Sanchez, or point a gun directly at him when he returned fire,
“[t]hat degree of immediacy is not necessary.” (Chance, supra, 44
Cal.4th at p. 1176.) Moreover, as the People point out, the trial
court subsequently confirmed its view that by the time the
assault against Sanchez took place, Guerra was “almost firing
randomly,” and “[t]here would be no evidence to support the
allegation that Deputy Sanchez was an intended victim if not for
the fact that Deputy White described the attack to him as
involving two or three shots and there were four shots missing
from the defendant’s gun.” We thus find no manifest and
unmistakable abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of
Guerra’s motion for a new trial.
17
III. One of the Sentences Related to the Vasquez Family
Shooting Must Be Stayed Pursuant to Section 654
For the five counts relating to Guerra’s act of shooting at
the Vasquez family in their vehicle, the trial court imposed the
following sentences: (1) 25 years to life for the attempted murder
of Vasquez (count 15); (2) 25 years to life for shooting at an
occupied vehicle (count 5; concurrent); (3) 25 years to life for the
assault on Vasquez’s wife (count 7; concurrent); (4) 25 years to
life for the assault on Vasquez’s son (count 8; concurrent); and
(5) 25 years to life for the assault on Vasquez’s daughter (count 9;
concurrent). As to counts 7, 8, and 9, the court also imposed
concurrent middle terms of three years for firearm enhancements
pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivisions (a) and (d). The court
stayed a sentence for the assault on Vasquez (count 6) pursuant
to section 654. Thus, the court imposed unstayed sentences on
five counts arising out of the incident involving the Vasquez
family.
Under section 654, a court may not impose multiple
punishments where “a course of conduct . . . violates more than
one statute but nevertheless constitutes an indivisible
transaction.” (People v. Hairston (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 231,
240.) However, section 654 does not prohibit multiple
punishments where the act is a crime of violence against multiple
victims. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1212.) The
multiple-victim exception “is applicable as long as each violent
offense involves at least one different victim.” (People v. Felix
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1618, 1631.) It “permits one unstayed
sentence per victim of all the violent crimes the defendant
commits incidental to a single criminal intent. Where one person
is the victim of both a shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and
18
a simultaneous assault, the trial court can impose an unstayed
sentence for one or the other, but not for both. [Citations.] . . .
[T]his is equally true where the same persons are the victims of a
shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and of simultaneous
assaults: the trial court can impose an unstayed sentence for the
shooting, based on any given victim, or for the assault on that
victim, but not for both.” (People v. Garcia (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th
1756, 1784.)
Guerra contends, and the People concede, that because
there were only four victims in the vehicle, the trial court erred
by imposing five sentences relating to the shooting under the
multiple-victim exception to section 654. We accept the People’s
concession and agree that reversal as to the sentence and remand
is necessary to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to
determine as to which count it will stay the sentence pursuant to
section 654. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.)
IV. Abstract of Judgment
The parties contend, and we agree, that two errors in the
abstract of judgment must be corrected. (People v. Codinha
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 985.)
First, the abstract of judgment describes count 15 as
“attempted murder of a peace officer,” but it in fact related to the
attempted murder of Vasquez, a civilian. The abstract must be
corrected for count 15 to reflect “attempted murder.”
Second, the sentence imposed as to count 4 is the principal
term of the determinate sentences in the abstract of judgment.
(§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) The abstract of judgment incorrectly
indicates the term of six years was a subordinate consecutive
sentence of one third of the midterm. The abstract must be
corrected to reflect that count 4 is the principal term.
19
V. Pitchess Review
Before trial, Guerra filed a motion under Pitchess, supra,
11 Cal.3d 531. He sought personnel records from Deputies
White, Garcia, Benjamin Sanchez, Sanchez, Martin, and nine
other officers who were involved or witnesses to the November
28, 2017 shooting.
The court granted the motion as to all 14 officers, agreeing
to inspect the records as to: “excessive force, dishonesty, and the
new grounds that are listed in the statutes regarding the failure
to report excessive force as to Deputy White, Deputy Benjamin
Sanchez, Deputy Tanner Sanchez, and Deputy Robert Garcia.”
Regarding the other deputies “not directly involved in the actual
shootings in this case,” the trial court granted the motion as to
“dishonesty, . . . broadly defined, including false police reports
and the new ground for failing to report uses of excessive force.”
On June 23 and 27, 2022, the court reviewed the records in
camera and found discoverable information.
Guerra now requests our independent review of the in
camera portion of the trial court’s Pitchess proceeding to
determine whether the trial court properly evaluated
discoverability or abused its discretion. (See People v. Mooc
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216.) The People do not object. We have
reviewed the sealed reporter’s transcripts and conclude the court
fulfilled its obligations under Pitchess.
20
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to
the trial court solely for purposes of resentencing. The trial court
is directed to stay the sentence under Penal Code section 654 on
one of counts 5, 7, 8, 9, or 15. The trial court is additionally
directed to correct the abstract of judgment by 1) deleting the
reference to attempted murder of a peace officer as to count 15
and correcting the description to reflect merely “attempted
murder”; and 2) correcting the notation as to count 4 to reflect
that the sentence imposed is the principal term. The trial court
is directed to forward a new, corrected abstract of judgment to
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In
all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
21
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.