People v. Jenkins CA5

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Filed 5/13/25 P. v. Jenkins CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088068
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR-22-013512)
v.

DANNY PAUL JENKINS, JR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*†
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Carrie M.
Stephens, Judge.
Conness A. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Galen N. Farris,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Peña, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Fain, J.†
† Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Defendant, Danny Paul Jenkins, Jr., contends on appeal that his sentence must be
vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings, including resentencing, because
the terms of his plea agreement were violated when the trial court imposed the upper term
on count 1 without the prosecution first presenting circumstances in aggravation to the
court. The People agree. We vacate defendant’s sentence on count 1 and remand for
resentencing in conformity with the plea agreement. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On December 20, 2022, the Stanislaus County District Attorney filed a complaint
charging defendant with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1)1 and
misdemeanor shoplifting (§ 459.5, subd. (a); count 2). The information further alleged
defendant suffered three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (d); 1192.7, subd. (c)).
On December 27, 2022, defendant entered into a plea agreement with a Cruz2
waiver. Defendant pled no contest to count 1, and admitted one of the prior strike
allegations, with the remaining count and allegations dismissed in connection with the
plea. Pursuant to the Cruz waiver, defendant was released on his own recognizance
pending the sentencing hearing. The plea agreement with the Cruz waiver provided that
if he appeared at the subsequent sentencing hearing and did not commit any new law
violations, he would be sentenced to the low term (doubled pursuant to the prior strike) of
two years eight months. However, it provided that if defendant failed to appear at
sentencing or committed a new law violation, the prosecution would present
circumstances in aggravation and defendant would be sentenced to an upper term
(doubled pursuant to the prior strike) for a total of six years.
On September 29, 2023, defendant failed to appear at the sentencing hearing.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2 People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247.

2.
On May 9, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant on count 1 to six years (the
upper term, doubled pursuant to the prior strike).
On May 17, 2024, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION3
Defendant contends the terms of his plea agreement were violated when the trial
court imposed the upper term on count 1 because the upper term was imposed without the
prosecution first presenting circumstances in aggravation, as contemplated by the plea
agreement. The People agree, as do we.
A. Background
At the change of plea hearing, the trial court stated the terms of the plea agreement
for the record:

“And [defendant], it’s my understanding you want to resolve your
case today by entering a plea to [c]ount 1, the felony second degree
burglary charge, and admitting one of the [section] 667[, subdivision] (d)
strike priors with the understanding that the second and third strike prior
would be stricken today and [c]ount 2 would be dismissed; and as well as—
that’s it for you. And that would be with the understanding that you
wouldn’t be sentenced today, and instead of being sentenced, you will be
released on your [own recognizance]. And you will come back for
sentencing on—it should be on a Friday, not a middle of the week of a trial
week.”
The trial court further stated:

“So sentencing will be put over to March 3, and if you come back
like you’re supposed to and don’t pick up any new law violation, then
you’ll be sentenced to the mitigated term of 16 months on [c]ount 1. It will
be doubled for the [section] 667[, subdivision] (d) prior for a total of
32 months.

“If you don’t come back like you’re supposed to, or if you were to
pick up some new law violation, then the understanding is the People
would present circumstances in aggravation at the time of sentencing and
you would be sentenced to state prison for the aggravated term of

3 We omit the underlying facts, as they are irrelevant to defendant’s appeal.

3.
three years which would be doubled for the [section 667, subdivision] (d)
prior for a total of six years [in] state prison.

“Is that what you want to do to resolve your case today?”
Defendant responded, “Yeah,” and entered his plea.
Defendant then failed to appear at sentencing on September 29, 2023. At the
sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

“The case is on for sentencing. [Defendant] entered his plea back
[o]n December 27, 2022, before [another judge]. A Cruz waiver has been
entered, continued a number of times, until finally [defendant] didn’t
appear. [The prior judge] is no longer available to preside over this
case .…”
The following exchange then occurred between the trial court and counsel:

“[PROSECUTION]: Your Honor, I don’t know if we addressed—there was
a Cruz waiver in this case.

“THE COURT: I know.

“[PROSECUTION]: Okay.

“THE COURT: [Defendant is] going to get six years, which—

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Actually, that might be an issue. Because I
don’t think [defendant] ever admitted to any aggravating factors in this
case.

“THE COURT: Well, I—that plea was entered in 202[2]. I don’t know
whether [defendant] admitted the aggravating factors or not, but by
agreeing to the Cruz waiver, I think it’s implied that he’s in agreement to
this disposition.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Our position is unless there’s an agreement or
finding as to the aggravating factor that he cannot be sentenced to the
upper term. But that’s our position, Your Honor.

“THE COURT: I understand that, [defense counsel], but I’m—
[prosecution], what is your position[?]

“[PROSECUTION]: I’m just checking one thing real quick. [¶] … [¶]

4.
“[PROSECUTION]: I would just note that the aggravating factor is the
defendant has served a prior prison term. I’ll submit that.

“THE COURT: There could be aggravating factors that exist. I don’t know
whether—I don’t know the transcript of the plea. I do not know whether or
not there was an agreed-upon aggravating factor. I do know there was an
agreement and a Cruz waiver entered that this defendant would be
sentenced to this amount of time if he did not abide by the terms of the
Cruz waiver. I’m not going to disrupt that. If there’s an issue on appeal,
there’s an issue on appeal.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We’re just stating for the record the position.

“THE COURT: And your objection is noted.”
Defense counsel then stated,

“I wasn’t the attorney who conducted this plea. But absent specific
evidence that he either admitted to the aggravating factors or a jury found
him—that the aggravating factors were true, I don’t think the Court has the
authority to sentence him to the upper term.…”
The trial court then sentenced defendant on count 1 to six years, the upper term,
doubled pursuant to the prior strike conviction, “[p]ursuant to the terms of the plea
agreement.”
B. Law
“ ‘[A] negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted
according to general contract principles.’ ” (People v. Vargas (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
644, 647.) The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting. (Civ. Code,
§ 1636.) The language of a contract is used to govern its interpretation if the language is
clear and explicit. (Civ. Code, § 1638.) However, “ ‘ “ ‘[i]f the terms of a promise are in
any respect ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted in the sense in which the
promisor believed, at the time of making it, that the promisor understood it.’ [Citations.]”
[Citation.] “The mutual intention to which the courts give effect is determined by
objective manifestations of the parties’ intent, including the words used in the agreement,

5.
as well as extrinsic evidence of such objective matters as the surrounding circumstances
under which the parties negotiated or entered into the contract; the object, nature and
subject matter of the contract; and the subsequent conduct of the parties.” ’ ” (People v.
Rabanales (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 494, 502–503.) Accordingly, a judgment contrary to
the terms of the plea bargain may not be imposed absent an opportunity to withdraw the
plea, and when a defendant otherwise succeeds in attacking it, counts dismissed pursuant
to a plea bargain may be restored. (People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 214–216;
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 705–709.)
C. Analysis
Here, at the time defendant entered his plea, the trial court stated that under the
terms of the plea agreement, if defendant did not “come back like [he was] supposed to,
or if [he] were to pick up some new law violation, then the understanding [was] the
People would present circumstances in aggravation at the time of sentencing and
[defendant] would be sentenced to state prison for the aggravated term of three years
which would be doubled for the [section 667, subdivision] (d) prior for a total of six years
in state prison.” Accordingly, under the terms of the plea agreement, defendant agreed to
a Cruz waiver,4 but included the caveat that in the event he failed to appear or violated
the law in another way, the prosecution would “present circumstances in aggravation at
the time of sentencing and [defendant] would be sentenced to state prison for the
aggravated term ….”

4 A Cruz waiver permits a defendant to enter a limited waiver of section 1192.5 with
the agreement of both parties to the plea, and agree to a sentence in excess of the term
that was bargained for if he or she willfully fails to appear for sentencing or violated
other agreed-upon conditions. (People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1254, fn. 5.) A
defendant may expressly agree to a greater sentence as a sanction for engaging in certain
behavior as long as his waiver is contained in the plea bargain itself. (People v. Masloski
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 1212, 1221–1222; People v. Vargas (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1107,
1113.)

6.
Accordingly, the plea agreement contemplated that the prosecution would present
circumstances in aggravation before the trial court imposed an upper term sentence on
count 1. Thus, pursuant to the plea agreement, the court was required to permit the
prosecution to present circumstances in aggravation before it imposed the upper term
sentence on count 1. Further, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), as amended by Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3), was in effect at the time
defendant was sentenced, which states, “[t]he court may impose a sentence exceeding the
middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2); see People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038–1039.)
Further, while the prosecution noted at sentencing “that the aggravating factor is
[defendant] has served a prior prison term,” it is unclear what records the prosecution was
relying on to establish that factor. The trial court stated it was not making any findings
on aggravating factors and sentenced defendant solely on the “agreement” and the Cruz
waiver that had been entered. Consequently, we agree with the parties that the upper
term sentence on count 1 must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new sentencing
hearing at which the prosecution can present circumstances in aggravation in accordance
with the plea agreement and defendant can thereafter be sentenced.
DISPOSITION
We vacate the sentence on count 1 and remand the matter for resentencing in
conformity with the plea agreement. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

7.

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