CourtListener 10582268•People v. Grande CA5
Texto completo
Filed 5/12/25 P. v. Grande CA5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087832
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF177639A)
v.
GUDELIO GUTIERREZ GRANDE, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Kenneth C.
Twisselman II, Judge.
Charles M. Bonneau, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Erin Doering, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Gudelio Gutierrez Grande challenges his conviction for two counts of
first degree murder with a special circumstance resulting in two consecutive sentences of
life without possibility of parole. He argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury
on aider and abettor liability and conspiracy to commit murder, that there is insufficient
evidence to support the finding he personally discharged a firearm, that the People
presented argument which shifted the burden of proof onto him, and that it was error for
the jury to return two multiple-murder special circumstance findings. We will strike one
of the multiple-murder special circumstance findings but will otherwise affirm the
judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 11, 2021, the Kern County District Attorney’s office filed an
information charging Grande with two counts of first degree murder for the murders of
Marbeli Garcia and Emilio Diaz Chavez (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)).
As to both counts, it was further alleged Grande personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm in the commission of the murder in violation of § 12022.53, subdivision (d), and
that he committed multiple murders within the meaning of section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(3).
On October 26, 2023, a jury found Grande guilty of both counts of murder in the
first degree, and as to each count, found true he committed multiple murders and
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during the commission of the murders.
On March 19, 2024, the trial court sentenced Grande to two consecutive terms of life
without the possibility of parole for the murders and consecutive sentences of 25 years to
life for each of the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancements.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Marbeli Garcia worked at a packing company with L.R.C. In July of 2019, Garcia
called L.R.C. crying. Garcia told her that she and Grande, her boyfriend, had gotten into
a fight and she asked L.R.C. to pick her up as she did not want to go back to him.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
When L.R.C. picked up Garcia, Garcia told her she had picked up Grande’s phone
and became upset when she saw another woman had called him. Garcia said this angered
Grande and he “threw her and hit her.” L.R.C. invited Garcia to stay with her for the
night.
The following day, Friday, July 19, 2019,2 L.R.C. invited Garcia to go dancing
and Garcia agreed. L.R.C. bought Garcia new clothes, and took her, L.R.C.’s boyfriend,
and the boyfriend’s cousin, Emilio Diaz Chavez, to a nightclub. The group returned to a
hotel early Saturday morning, then went out dancing again Saturday night. In the early
hours of Sunday, July 21, the group returned to L.R.C.’s house in Bakersfield. Garcia
accompanied L.R.C. because she was planning on staying with L.R.C. for about a week
until Garcia’s friend returned from Mexico. After helping L.R.C. move some furniture,
Garcia and Chavez left to get some food. That was the last time L.R.C. saw either of
them alive.
On July 21 at approximately 11 p.m., Kern County Sheriff Senior Deputy Cody
Johnson was called to a homicide scene at Rexland Acres Park. During a walkthrough of
the scene, Deputy Johnson located Garcia’s body near a picnic table with a small
fireplace. Northbound along a path leading away from Garcia, Deputy Johnson observed
blood droplets, and Chavez’s body. Garcia suffered gunshot wounds in the middle
center-left side of her back and the top of her head. Chavez suffered a gunshot wound in
the upper-right chest area, a grazing gunshot wound to his right cheek, and two bullet
wounds in his head.
Deputy Johnson testified that when a semiautomatic handgun fires, the casing that
housed the bullet ejects from the firearm. Conversely, a revolver would continue to
house the spent shell casing within its cylinder and nothing would be ejected. Deputy
2 References to dates are to dates in 2019 unless otherwise stated.
3.
Johnson did not find any shell casings at the scene, which led him to believe that the
firearm was not a semiautomatic weapon.
Mark Chambless was working for the Kern County Sheriff’s Department at the
time of the murder and was assigned as lead detective in the case. Detective Chambless
was able to obtain surveillance footage from around the time of the murder from a nearby
school. One video from a north-facing camera showed two subjects – one appearing on
the path, and one coming from behind the trees, then a flash of light. Detective
Chambless testified the flash was consistent with a muzzle flash and occurred at
approximately 9:54 p.m. and 42 seconds on July 21.3 The individuals appeared, and the
muzzle flash occurred, approximately 20 to 30 feet from where officers later discovered
Chavez’s body.
A second, south to southwest facing camera showed a subject walking at around
9:53 p.m. and 20 seconds toward the direction of the picnic table where Garcia’s body
was found. At 9:53 p.m. and 40 seconds, an individual is seen running away from the
picnic table area. At 9:54 p.m. and 20 seconds, a second individual is seen running from
the same direction.
A third video showed a suspect entering the park, and then a victim being chased
by a suspect. The video also showed E.H., a bystander who was yelling for help and
asking people to call 911.4
On July 25, Grande voluntarily went to the Kern County Sheriff’s office with his
daughter and Garcia’s aunt to ask about the investigation. Officer Daniel Perez asked
him some questions about Garcia and Chavez, and Grande stated that he had spoken to
Garcia, and that Chavez had proposed to Garcia and given her flowers, but she declined
3 The video denoted time in military time; the exact frame was marked 21:54:42.
4 Although E.H. gave two statements to the officers, he did not testify and his
statements were not admitted into evidence.
4.
his offer. Grande did not mention anything about Rexland Acres Park, where Garcia and
Chavez were found murdered.
On July 26, Officer Perez received call detail records for Grande’s cell phone.
Grande confirmed in a later interview that he was the sole possessor of his phone and
number. He had owned the phone for about a year. The records indicated that Grande’s
phone utilized a tower in the area of Rexland Acres Park at the time of the homicide. The
phone then returned to Grande’s apartment at about 10:30 p.m. on July 21 before heading
to Lamont, where the phone utilized towers between 11:24 p.m. and 11:40 p.m.
Call detail records pertaining to Garcia’s phone indicated it was in the location of
Rexland Acres Park on July 21 when Garcia was murdered. The phone was taken from
the park and utilized a tower near Grande’s apartment at around 10:40 p.m. that night,
and finally the phone utilized a tower in Lamont, California between 11:28 p.m. and
11:30 p.m.
Grande was arrested on August 1 at his apartment in Bakersfield. A search of the
apartment revealed mail addressed to “Gudelio Gutierrez.” Officers also searched the
apartment of Grande’s brother, located in Lamont, California.
Detective Chambless and Detective Perez interviewed Grande. When he was
brought in, he was placed in an interview room and left alone while the detectives
prepared some items. At the time, Grande was wearing a work shirt with two patches on
his chest – one with a company name and logo, and one indicating a name. The name on
the shirt was “Angel.” While Grande was alone in the interview room, he ripped the
company patch off of his shirt and dropped it in the trash wrapped in a tissue. He
attempted to conceal his actions by coughing and turning away from the camera.
Grande denied multiple times being at Rexland Acres Park, even after confronted
with the information that his phone utilized a tower at the park near the time of the
murder. He told the officers they should “look into it more.”
5.
Detective Christopher Wong conducted a search of the locker belonging to
“Angel” at the business named on Grande’s recovered shirt patch. The locker contained
a Rexio .38 Special revolver wrapped in a towel, and .38 special ammunition. There
were also three pieces of mail inside the locker addressed to Grande’s apartment in
Bakersfield, with the recipients listed as either “Gudelio Gutierrez Grande” or “Angel
Ponce Martinez.”
DNA evidence found on the revolver indicated Grande was the most likely
contributor of DNA found on the trigger but was excluded as a potential contributor of
the DNA found on the handgrip. There were at least two different profiles of DNA on
the trigger. A forensic analysis of the bullets found in Garcia’s and Chavez’s bodies
confirmed the bullets came from the revolver found in Grande’s locker.
At trial, Grande presented an expert who opined that Grande’s prior injury – a
bullet wound – is the type of injury to cause permanent mobility issues. Therefore, the
expert concluded Grande could not have been one of the individuals running in the
surveillance video. In rebuttal, the People called a detective who was involved in
Grande’s arrest. The detective stated that during the arrest, when ordered to get on the
ground, Grande ran at “full sprint” across a parking lot, a distance of approximately 30
yards.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err Instructing the Jury on Aider and
Abettor and Conspiracy Liability and Not Sua Sponte Instructing on
Third Party Culpability
Grande argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on aider and abettor
liability, including an instruction on uncharged conspiracy, because Grande did not
receive notice of the People’s intention to utilize those theories at trial. He further argues
the trial court erred when it did not sua sponte give an instruction on third party
culpability. We find the trial court properly instructed the jury on aider and abettor
6.
liability and uncharged conspiracy and did not err when it did not sua sponte instruct the
jury on third party culpability.
A. Background
Aider and Abettor Liability
Throughout this case, the People’s primary theory of liability was that Grande was
the actual killer and personally used a firearm to shoot and kill Garcia and Chavez. The
complaint filed August 5 charges Grande as the killer and alleges that he personally
discharged a firearm in the commission of the crime. At the preliminary hearing held
August 10, 2021, the People presented evidence indicating Grande was the killer, and
argued,
“With regard to identity, [Grande] had a motive, given
that Marbeli Garcia was planning to leave him, that Marbeli
Garcia had been out dancing with another man and was out
apparently having dinner at a park with another man where
they were found together. And the other man happens to be
the same one who was shot and killed.
That the firearm linked to the murders was found in
the work locker of [Grande] with his DNA on it, and that
when he was speaking with police, he tried to hide the fact of
where he worked, indicating that he had a consciousness of
guilt, knowing the police were on to him and knowing that
they would find the murder weapon at his place of work.
With those facts, I think it’s substantial to show that
[Grande] did commit both first-degree murders with special
circumstances.”
In their trial brief, the People did not request any instructions addressing aiding
and abetting liability or conspiracy as a theory of the murders.
At trial, Grande’s primary defense was that he was not at the park and could not
have been one of the people depicted in the surveillance footage. In his opening
7.
statement, he argued that his prior injuries would affect his mobility and would have
prevented him from moving like the individuals in the surveillance footage.
In closing arguments, the People argued,
“Let’s say – suspend disbelief for just a moment and
say that was another person on the video. That means
[Grande] got someone else to do it. That’s all that means,
because he was there and he had the murder weapon and
those were targeted killings. Now, is that really true? No.
That’s not the case here. He personally killed them both. My
point is if what the Defense says is true and that wasn’t him
on the video, he’s guilty of first-degree murder on both
Counts 1 and 2 anyway because he’s either aiding and
abetting or he’s part of a conspiracy to commit murder.”
Grande objected to CALCRIM numbers 400 and 401, the aiding and abetting
instructions, and CALCRIM number 416, the uncharged conspiracy instruction. The trial
court overruled the objections, finding the evidence supported giving those instructions,
and invited the People to respond.
The People stated,
“With regard to substantial evidence, the People do not
believe that aiding and abetting or conspiracy are valid
theories, per se, because the People do not believe that the
Defense’s evidence should be believed, i.e. that [Grande] was
not the person on the video. However, because evidence was
admitted to suggest that [Grande] was not the person on the
video, the jury could very well decide that evidence was
credible and decide [Grande] was not the person on the video.
That begs the question, then, why was [Grande] at the
location, why was he in possession of the murder weapon
after the fact and why did he show a guilty conscience in a
number of different ways? I think the most reasonable
response to that is he either aided and abetted the murder or
conspired to commit the murder with an unknown other, and
that is the explanation for Defense’s evidence rather than
acquittal being the result.”
8.
Third Party Culpability
Grande argues the following facts support his theory that there was substantial
evidence presented showing the participation of a third party in the shooting.
Grande’s brother lives in Lamont and was present when the address was searched.
Grande’s phone records show his phone utilized a tower in Lamont on July 21 at
7:30 p.m., then traveled to Rexland Acres Park, utilizing a tower in the area around the
time of the shooting. Two individuals were seen in the surveillance footage running from
the area where Garcia’s body was found, but the video does not show if either of the
individuals was responsible for the muzzle flash. Grande’s phone utilized a tower near
his Bakersfield apartment, then later proceeded to utilize a tower in Lamont.5 At least
two people contributed to DNA found on the murder weapon, and while Grande was a
highly likely contributor to the DNA found on the trigger guard, no DNA sample was
taken from Grande’s brother.
Grande did not request CALCRIM number 373, or any other third party
culpability instruction at trial.
B. Analysis
Aider and Abettor and Conspiracy Instructions
“ ‘The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a fundamental right to
be clearly informed of the nature and cause of the charges in order to permit adequate
preparation of a defense. [Citations.] “A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court —
are basic in our system of jurisprudence.” ’ ” (People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115,
189.)
5 Grande argues that on July 21 his phone went from the crime scene to his
apartment and stayed there. The testimony presented at trial indicates that his phone
went from Lamont to the crime scene, to his apartment, before returning to Lamont.
9.
“[T]he definition of a principal has historically included those who aid and abet
(§ 971), and notice as a principal is sufficient to support a conviction as an aider or
abettor.” (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 776, fn. 12.) “In California one may
be convicted of aiding and abetting without the accusatory pleading reciting the aiding
and abetting theory so long as defendant is charged in that pleading as a principal to the
substantive offense and thus receives notice of the charge against him.” (People v.
Greenberg (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 181, 188.)
We review questions of constitutional law and mixed questions which are
predominantly legal, de novo. (People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 70
(Quiroz).)
It is well established “that under this state's statutory scheme, an accusatory
pleading charging a defendant with murder need not specify the theory of murder on
which the prosecution intends to rely.” (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 557.)
While there may be some situations in which the United States Constitution may require
greater specificity, “generally the accused will receive adequate notice of the
prosecution’s theory of the case from the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing
or at the indictment proceedings.” (Ibid.)
“It is unsettled whether California's short-form pleading practice, without more,
confers constitutionally adequate notice of the People’s decision to proceed on an
implicitly charged alternative legal theory.” (Quiroz, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 70.)
Nonetheless, courts have deemed “notice of a new theory to be constitutionally sufficient
when the defendant is further alerted to the theory by the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing [citations], or by the People’s express mention of that theory before
or during trial sufficiently in advance of closing argument [citations]. What due process
will not tolerate is the People affirmatively misleading or ambushing the defense with its
theory.” (Id. at pp. 70-71.)
10.
It is true that in this case, the People did not argue aiding or abetting, or uncharged
conspiracy until closing argument. However, Grande was clearly alerted to the theory by
the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and trial. He argued he was not present
at the scene and could not have been one of the people depicted on the surveillance video
due to his prior injuries. This argument was presented for the first time in his opening
statement, following the conclusion of the People’s case in chief.
Grande’s argument, in conjunction with the remaining body of inculpatory
evidence, reflected his awareness of the fact that even were the jury to believe he was not
physically present at the shooting, he could nonetheless be culpable pursuant to an
alternate theory of liability such as aiding and abetting or conspiracy to commit murder.
Neither was the People’s delay in asserting the aiding and abetting and conspiracy
theories of murder liability “prosecutorial gamesmanship.” (Quiroz, supra,
215 Cal.App.4th at p. 71.) The People consistently presented a single theory of liability
throughout the case, starting at the preliminary hearing – that Grande was the actual killer
and personally shot the victims. Nonetheless, the People told the trial court they felt
compelled to request the instruction due to Grande’s defense theory, although they
maintained it was not a valid theory per se because Grande was the actual killer and
personally shot the victims. The record does not reflect an intent by the People to
“ambush” Grande, but rather to respond to the theory of the case he himself presented at
trial.
Additionally, “in cases where a new theory is introduced late in the game for
reasons other than prosecutorial gamesmanship, courts have employed a harmless error
test. That test looks to whether the late notice ‘unfairly prevented [defense counsel] from
arguing his or her defense to the jury or ... substantially mislead [counsel] in formulating
and presenting arguments.’ ” (Quiroz, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 71.)
Because we find no prosecutorial gamesmanship in the instant case, we look to
whether error, if any, was harmless. Grande argues that had he been aware of the
11.
People’s intent to introduce aider and abettor and conspiracy liability, he could have
investigated the alternative defense of third party culpability more thoroughly or sought
more comprehensive DNA testing.
However, the video evidence which showed two suspects running from the area
where Garcia’s body was found was introduced at the preliminary hearing. The DNA
evidence, including that there were at least two, and potentially three, DNA profiles on
the trigger guard of the murder weapon, was also introduced at the preliminary hearing.
Even prior to trial, Grande was aware that there was some evidence of multiple
potential suspects and was likewise aware of his intent to argue he was not involved in
the killing and not present at the park. He posits there is evidence his brother is
culpable – this was also information known to him which he could have chosen to
investigate further. Therefore, the People’s late introduction of the alternate theories of
murder liability did not “substantially mislead” Grande’s counsel from formulating and
presenting arguments about third party culpability. (Quiroz, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at
p. 71.) Grande had sufficient information at the preliminary hearing to investigate and
potentially uncover the identities of the alleged third parties at the park or the sources of
the other DNA profiles on the murder weapon. The trial court did not infringe upon his
constitutional rights when it gave the CALCRIM numbers 400, 401, and 416 instructions,
and error, if any, was harmless.
Third Party Culpability Instructions
“ ‘A criminal defendant may introduce evidence of third party culpability if such
evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, but the evidence must consist of direct
or circumstantial evidence that links the third person to the crime. It is not enough that
another person has the motive or opportunity to commit it.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2009)
45 Cal.4th 789, 824 (Gutierrez).)
“[A] trial court has a duty to instruct sua sponte ‘on those general principles of law
that are closely and openly connected with the facts before the court and necessary for the
12.
jury’s understanding of the case.’ ” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 143.) “ ‘[A]
trial court has a sua sponte duty to give instructions on the defendant’s theory of the case,
including instructions “as to defenses ‘ “that the defendant is relying on ..., or if there is
substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with
the defendant’s theory of the case.” ’ ” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 824.)
However, the defendant bears the burden of requesting a pinpoint instruction.
(Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “ ‘Such instructions relate particular facts to a
legal issue in the case or “pinpoint” the crux of a defendant’s case, such as mistaken
identification or alibi. [Citation.] They are required to be given upon request when there
is evidence supportive of the theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte.” ’ ”
(Ibid.) “ ‘[S]uch a pinpoint instruction does not involve a “general principle of law” as
that term is used in the cases that have imposed a sua sponte duty of instruction on the
trial court.’ ” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 669.)
Grande did not request a third party culpability instruction or argue third party
culpability at trial. On that basis alone, we find the trial court did not err.
Grande argues that the evidence in this case is sufficient to link his brother as a
third party culpable for the killings. He relies on People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th
318 and People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 to support his proposition. However, in
both cases, the defense affirmatively presented evidence of third party culpability which
was denied by the trial court. In this case, Grande made no such request or showing.
Regardless, error, if any, was harmless. Grande argues the trial court should have
sua sponte given CALCRIM number 373,6 or a custom instruction he formulated which
reads:
6 CALCRIM number 373 reads “The evidence shows that (another person/other
persons) may have been involved in the commission of the crime[s] charged against the
defendant. There may be many reasons why someone who appears to have been
involved might not be a codefendant in this particular trial. You must not speculate about
13.
“The evidence shows that (another person/other
persons) may have been involved in the commission of the
crime[s] charged against the defendant. There may be many
reasons why someone who appears to have been involved
might not be a codefendant in this particular trial. You must
consider whether the other person acted without the
defendant’s shared knowledge and intent. If the other person
acted without the defendant’s knowledge or intent, you must
consider whether the defendant is not guilty of murder or
whether he is guilty of a lesser offense.”
“An instruction that does no more than affirm that the prosecution must prove a
particular element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt merely duplicates the
standard instructions defining the charged offense and explaining the prosecution’s
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, a trial court is required to
give a requested instruction relating the reasonable doubt standard of proof to a particular
element of the crime charged only when the point of the instruction would not be readily
apparent to the jury from the remaining instructions.” (People v. Bolden (2002)
29 Cal.4th 515, 558-559.)
In this case, the jury received complete and accurate instructions on the People’s
burden of proof on the elements of murder, including the requirement that the People
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Grande committed the acts that caused the deaths
of Garcia and Chavez.7 Grande’s proposed instruction merely explains the prosecution’s
burden to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, rendering error, if any, harmless.
whether (that other person has/those other persons have) been or will be prosecuted.
Your duty is to decide whether the defendant on trial here committed the crime[s]
charged.”
7 Or aided and abetted the perpetrator or conspired with the perpetrator to commit
the acts.
14.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding Grande Personally
Discharged the Firearm
Grande argues that his later possession of the revolver, and his DNA on the trigger
guard, show only that he had possession of the revolver at some time, not necessarily at
the time of the shooting. He concludes there is insufficient evidence he personally
discharged the firearm during the commission of the murders. We find sufficient
evidence supports the jury’s findings that Grande personally discharged the firearm.
On appeal, the reviewing court “ ‘must determine whether a reasonable trier of
fact could have found the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) We
“examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
The record shows that Grande was in Rexland Acres Park at the time of the
shooting. His phone utilized a tower in the area of the park within minutes of the
shooting, and he told detectives he was the only one who possessed and used his phone.
After the shooting, his and Garcia’s phones followed the same path from Rexland Acres
Park to his apartment, then to Lamont. When he was arrested and interviewed, he tried to
hide information pertaining to his place of employment when he ripped a patch with the
name and logo of the company where he worked off of his shirt and put it in the trash.
He also attempted to conceal his actions, from which the jury could reasonably infer a
consciousness of guilt. In his work locker, officers found the murder weapon, and his
DNA was on the trigger guard.
Grande also had a personal relationship with Garcia, who was his girlfriend.
Garcia had left him several days earlier due to his alleged abuse and perceived infidelity.
Garcia was at the park with Chavez, another man who Grande claimed had proposed to
15.
Garcia. A jury could reasonably infer Grande acted out of jealousy and anger as motives
to shoot Garcia and Chavez.
Taken together, there is evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value
such that a trier of fact could find Grande personally discharged the revolver, killing
Garcia and Chavez. The section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancements are supported
by substantial evidence.
III. The People Did Not Improperly Shift the Burden Of Proof Onto
Grande During Closing Argument
Grande contends, in closing argument, the People erroneously questioned his
decision not to cross examine one of the witnesses on a factual issue Grande subsequently
challenged in closing argument, shifting the burden of proof onto Grande and violating
his due process rights. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his
claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
A. Background
At trial, Kern County District Attorney Investigator Darren Wonderly testified
regarding the cell phone data received during the investigation of this case. As part of his
testimony, he presented a demonstrative slide show summarizing some of the relevant
information for the jury. As to one slide, Investigator Wonderly testified,
“Slide 10, again, on 7/21/2019, from 8:20 to 8:22 p.m.,
there were three different transactions recorded through the
network. And those transactions used a tower here north of
Lamont for the 8:20 p.m. data usage, and we know that by
these little symbols on the side. The little circles will show a
globe and that’s going to be data usage. There’s two globes
and there’s a symbol of a telephone. That will actually be a
call. The other tower that was used for two of the
transactions is…south of East Panama Lane, east of South
Dr. Martin Luther King Junior Boulevard. That was one data
usage, and then also that telephone call. I put an extra text
box at the bottom of that to represent what that telephone call
is.”
16.
The slide Investigator Wonderly referenced was designated slide number 10. The
text box Investigator Wonderly referenced was titled “Call Details,” and indicated a date
of July 21 at 8:22 p.m. and 33 seconds, and a call type of “voice.” The calling number
was previously identified as Grande’s number, and the number called was Garcia’s.
Grande did not cross examine Investigator Wonderly.
In closing argument, defense counsel stated,
“I want to talk about something else. You remember
Mr. Wonderly – Officer Wonderly… Very Agreeable expert,
very knowledgeable. He did a slideshow. He showed this is
where this phone number was at this certain time and the
other. That slideshow, you’re not going – it’s not going to be
in the evidence. Demonstrative evidence, but it’s not in any
of these disks. It’s something he created. He created that
after they had subpoenaed the phone records from a certain
phone number and there’s the raw data.
I want to show you the raw data. Here’s titled CDR
People’s Number 32, CDR, DCP4. If you want to look at it,
this is where it’s going to be. You open that up and you have
this A19. Remember he talked about the CDR. Remember
all the locations that he was able to locate because of the
CDR, because of the raw data. This is what is in the
evidence, one page. One page of data. There’s also the
NELOS that he talked about. He talked about the NELOS,
about a – separate from the CDR. That was his second part of
his testimony. And the NELOS record is much more
extensive than a CDR. He went through these records and he
made his testimony.
[¶] … [¶]
Now I want to draw your attention to what
Mr. Wonderly testified to. This is an extraction that he said
was from the CDR, but we know that the underlying CDR is
only one page. I don’t know how he got it. You don’t have
the information, but this is his testimony.
17.
I want to try to draw your attention to his testimony, if
you remember it. I don’t know if you took notes. I don’t
know if you can see it. I’m going to walk closer to it. This
here is 9:26:39. It’s a text message, 9:30:30. There’s two
things here. There’s a missed call at 9:41. There’s a phone
call at 9:41. It’s something early. I do recall that Officer
Wonderly testified that there’s like a long conversation, like a
14-minute talk that lasted long that was around this area.8
What is that conversation? What is that evidence? We don’t
know, but there’s a way to interpret it[.]
If the People are taking the position that this is
[Grande’s] telephone, that he’s in contact with Ms. Garcia
and you’re convinced by that, you believe that they’ve proven
that beyond a reasonable doubt. We know that before the
homicide that occurred at 9:54:10 … immediately before that
there was a conversation, and there are other conversations. I
would say we don’t know what transpired during that
conversation, but we do know that the homicide occurred
close in time to that conversation.
[¶] … [¶]
I submit to you that the phone records are incomplete.
We don’t know this belongs to the telephone of [Grande], that
they’re relying on hearsay evidence. They haven’t proven
that.”
In response, the People argued in closing,
“We know that’s the defendant’s number because he
said that was his number. We know that’s the defendant’s
DNA because it’s clearly the defendant’s DNA. We know
that’s his locker because his stuff was in it. It was his name
on the gun with his DNA, the gun that was used to kill his
8 Grande appears to be referencing another page of Investigator Wonderly’s
PowerPoint presentation, slide 15. This page shows activity for Grande’s phone number
between 08:57:52 p.m. and 10:30:17 p.m. on July 21. This slide also has a call details
text box, dated July 21 at 09:26:39 p.m., with a call type of “text.” The calling number is
Grande’s number, and the number called was Garcia’s. Additionally, the call detail
records in the slide show two calls on July 21 at 9:41:01 p.m., one of which appears to be
a missed call demarcated by a phone symbol and highlighted in red.
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girlfriend. All of these things come together and show you a
picture of a murderer. You can’t take one at a time and say if
we make believe and if we pretend this is really something
that it isn’t, then there’s doubt[.]
[Trial counsel] does not have a burden of proof, yet he
stood up here and he said that Investigator Wonderly’s
presentation doesn’t make any sense because there’s not
enough evidence on the exhibit. That’s kind of odd because,
if I remember correctly, Investigator Wonderly is sitting right
here and the presentation was right over there. And when I
got done asking questions, [the trial court] looked over at
[trial counsel] and asked if he had any questions. Now if the
exhibit didn’t support what Investigator Wonderly was
saying, well, then, there’s some pretty big questions to ask,
aren’t there?”
Grande objected to improper burden shifting, and the trial court held a side bar.
Upon resuming proceedings on the record, the court denied the objection, and reminded
the jurors that the only burden of proof to prove anything is on the People, to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court commented, “[t]he Defense has no burden to …
prove that [Grande’s] innocent, for example. The burden of proof is solely on the
People.”
The People continued,
“In Investigator Wonderly’s presentation if there was
some problem with the evidence, if the evidence didn’t
support what he was saying, wouldn’t that be the time to
bring it up? Because if it had been brought up, then I would
have the chance to ask him more questions. Well, we’ve seen
there’s only one page here. What does that mean? If you
don’t ask any questions and you just wait until the end of the
trial and now Investigator Wonderly is not on the stand, I
can’t ask these questions and we don’t get to hear from him.
Come on. If that exhibit didn’t actually support what
Investigator Wonderly had done, it would have been pointed
out immediately.
[Trial counsel] is a skilled examiner … The questions
that he’s asking, they’re pointed. No questions for
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Investigator Wonderly. That is [Grande’s] cell phone number
because that’s what the evidence says.”
Subsequently, Grande renewed his burden shifting objection. The trial court
stated, “I’m confirming my ruling. Although I will point out that after we had our sidebar
with regard to your objection about burden shifting, I once again admonished the jury
that you have no burden to prove anything or to produce evidence. You don’t have to
prove your client is innocent, that the only burden is on the People. But I’m familiar with
case law that relates to what’s proper during closing argument, and the case law is pretty
clear that an attorney is permitted to comment on the other attorneys’ failure to produce
evidence that was available to them, and I think that’s consistent with what [the People
were] doing. If there’s evidence that’s available to you and you chose not to produce it,
then [the People] can make comment on that. That’s my ruling.”
On February 13, 2024, Grande filed a motion for a new trial on the basis that the
People’s closing argument improperly shifted the burden of proof onto him. The motion
was heard on March 19, 2024. The trial court ruled, “[h]aving considered the arguments,
the points and authorities – the Court itself heard the closing arguments and the evidence
in the case – I do not find that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct under
all the circumstances. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that he did, I do not find
that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [Grande] would have
occurred had the district attorney refrained from the comments he made during closing
argument. Again, [the People do] correctly highlight some of the very strong evidence,
which is pretty compelling, supporting the guilty verdict in this case.”
B. Analysis
“As a general principle, prosecutors may allude to the defense’s failure to present
exculpatory evidence. For example, the prosecutor may comment on the defense’s
failure to call logical witnesses or introduce material evidence. [Citation.] … A
prosecutor may call attention to the defense’s failure to put on exculpatory evidence, but
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only if those comments are not aimed at the defendant’s failure to testify and are not of
such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily interpret them to be a
comment on the failure to testify.” (People v. Guzman (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1289
(Guzman).) “[A] prosecutor is free to give his opinion on the state of the evidence, and in
arguing his case to the jury, has wide latitude to comment on both its quality and the
credibility of witnesses.” (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 945, overruled on
other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800.)
“ ‘A prosecutor’s conduct violates a defendant’s constitutional rights when the
behavior comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects “ ‘the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citation.]”
[Citation.] The focus of the inquiry is on the effect of the prosecutor’s action on the
defendant, not on the intent or bad faith of the prosecutor. [Citation.] Conduct that does
not render a trial fundamentally unfair is error under state law only when it involves
“ ‘ “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court
or the jury.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 920 (Hamilton).)
“ ‘To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury,
the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In
conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging
rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ” (People v.
Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1337 (Seumanu).)
We review the trial court’s rulings on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 792-793.)
Grande argues the prosecutor’s statement that the data supporting Investigator
Wonderly’s demonstrative slideshow must exist, was improper and shifted the burden of
proof in violation of due process. We do not find the People’s argument to be burden
shifting. The People argued that Grande had failed to utilize his opportunity to cross-
21.
examine Investigator Wonderly to determine the exact basis for the information in the
demonstrative exhibit. The People concluded that the cell phone number referenced in
the call records was Grande’s “because that’s what the evidence says.” This argument
was in response to defense counsel arguing in closing that “the phone records are
incomplete” and “[w]e don’t know this belongs to the telephone of [Grande.]”
The People were commenting on Grande’s “failure to introduce material
evidence,” something the People are permitted to do in closing argument. (Guzman,
supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1289.) And multiple times throughout the argument, the jury
was nonetheless admonished that Grande did not have a burden of proof, and the People
bore the entire burden to prove every element of the charged offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding no prosecutorial misconduct.
The People’s argument was not “the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods” to
persuade and did not “infect” the trial with unfairness. (Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 920.) The People’s brief comments pointed out Grande’s decision not to cross
examine Investigator Wonderly in response to Grande’s own closing argument calling
into question Investigator Wonderly’s testimony.
And even if the People’s comments during closing arguments amounted to
prosecutorial misconduct, the trial court did not abuse its discretion finding error, if any,
was harmless. Grande has not shown there is a reasonable probability the jury applied
the complained-of comments in an inappropriate manner. (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 1337.) As the trial court noted, there was strong, compelling evidence supporting the
verdict in this case.
IV. One of the Two Multiple-Murder Special Circumstances Must Be
Stricken
Grande argues only one multiple-murder special circumstance is authorized, and
the duplicate finding must be stricken. The Attorney General agrees.
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Grande is correct. “[W]hen a defendant kills two persons the People should allege
only one multiple-murder special circumstance; the use of two such special circumstance
allegations artificially inflates the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.” (People v.
Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1148.) In these circumstances, the appropriate remedy is
for the court to strike the superfluous finding, and conclude the defendant suffered no
prejudice. (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 422.) The Attorney General is
also correct in pointing out that the special circumstance findings are not included in the
abstract of judgment. Therefore, remand in this case is unnecessary. Accordingly, we
strike the second multiple-murder special circumstance finding and otherwise affirm the
judgment.
DISPOSITION
The second multiple-murder special-circumstance finding is stricken. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
FAIN, J.*
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
LEVY, J.
* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
23.
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