People v. Montgomery CA6

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Filed 5/7/25 P. v. Montgomery CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051993
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23CR001662)

v.

RYAN VINCENT MONTGOMERY,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Ryan Vincent Montgomery challenges the trial court’s denial of his
request for mental health diversion. After his diversion request was denied, he pleaded
no contest to various charges and was granted probation. He argues the court abused its
discretion in denying diversion on the grounds that he would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community, given that the conditions of
defendant’s probation would also require treatment in the community. Finding a valid
waiver of appeal, and no abuse of discretion in any event, we will affirm the order
denying his diversion request.
I. BACKGROUND
Our factual summary of the charges against defendant is based on the preliminary
hearing transcript, which the trial court considered in ruling on the diversion request and
which the parties rely on in their briefing.
1. Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7
On January 4, 2023, a motorist reported being threatened by the driver of a white
truck registered to defendant. The truck passed the victim’s car on the highway, then
“slammed on its brakes” and continued “brake checking” the car “for several minutes.”
The driver of the truck was honking his horn and “flipping off” the other driver. As the
truck was exiting the highway, it pulled alongside the car. The car’s driver and passenger
looked at the truck and “saw a black handgun pointed directly at them out the driver[’s]
window.”
On January 31, 2023, another motorist reported being threatened by the driver of
the same truck. According to the victim, the truck “was tailgating him and then went
around him and got in front of him and brake checked him.” The victim saw the driver of
the truck “holding up a firearm, a pistol, in the back window, flashing it at him.”
CHP officers obtained a warrant and searched defendant’s home on February 1,
2023. They found and seized multiple guns, including an assault rifle, ammunition, and
an extended magazine. On the same day, another CHP officer carried out a traffic stop of
the white truck registered to defendant. Defendant was driving and there was an
unregistered loaded handgun on the passenger seat.
Defendant later appeared at the CHP office several times. Defendant told the
officer from the traffic stop that he wished he had pulled his gun out during the stop, so
that the officer would have killed him. After defendant left the office, officers observed
him flip off a patrol unit in the parking lot, get into his truck, and begin “punching the
ceiling” of the truck. He then “sped out of the parking lot and down the street,”
apparently following directions to the district attorney’s office.
On February 6, 2023, a motorist reported a hit-and-run incident involving
defendant’s truck. The truck was “tailgating” him and the driver gave him the middle
finger. At one point, the victim’s car was in the left lane and the truck was next to it in
the right lane. The truck swerved left, “hit the right front” of the car and damaged it, then
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drove away without stopping. A passenger from the car identified defendant as the driver
of the truck.
Defendant was charged with two counts of brandishing a firearm at a person in a
motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 417.3; counts 1 and 2), possession of an assault weapon
(Pen. Code, § 30605, subd. (a); count 3), carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle (Pen.
Code, § 25850, subd. (a); count 4), and misdemeanor hit-and-run driving (Veh. Code,
§ 20002, subd. (a); count 7). After defendant visited the CHP office and the district
attorney’s office in an attempt to reclaim his guns, CHP and the district attorney obtained
a gun violence restraining order against defendant.
2. Counts 5 and 6
In July 2023, defendant walked into the district attorney’s office and was greeted
by an investigator stationed in the lobby. Defendant “looked angry” and “had a very
intense look to his eyes.” His brow was furrowed, his jaw was clenched, and he “was
speaking louder than normal” with a stern tone of voice. He was holding a piece of paper
with something printed on it and told the investigator that he had been “wronged by the
State of California and Monterey District Attorney’s Office.” When the investigator
responded with follow-up questions, defendant appeared to get angrier and “began
waving his hands wildly about.” The investigator suggested that defendant seek legal
counsel. Defendant “became more agitated,” demanded that the investigator agree his
rights had been violated, and left the building angrily.
About an hour later, defendant “reentered the public lobby, appearing more
agitated than he was the first time.” He again showed the investigator a piece of paper
and insisted the investigator affirm “that he had been wronged and that his rights had
been violated.” Defendant pointed at the piece of paper and said something to the effect
that, “if law enforcement ever comes to his house to enforce this order,” they should
“wear all the body armor that God can afford them.” The investigator asked defendant
what he meant, at which point defendant “became silent” and “proceeded to leave.” As
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he walked out of the building, defendant told the investigator to “fuck off” and said
something to the effect of, “I hope you die in a hole alone or alone in a hole.” Defendant
was charged with making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a); count 5) and
resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69; count 6).
3. Defendant’s Application for Mental Health Diversion
Defendant applied for mental health diversion in January 2024 (Pen. Code,
§ 1001.36), which the prosecution opposed. Defendant’s application included a
psychiatric report. According to that report, CHP officers confiscated defendant’s cell
phone and two of his guns on the day of his February 2023 arrest. Defendant believed
that law enforcement was not entitled to continue holding his property, and he visited
both a CHP office and the district attorney’s office numerous times trying to reclaim it.
When he visited the district attorney’s office in July 2023, he told an investigator that “he
had a ‘slam dunk case’ to get his firearms back.” Defendant also told the investigator,
“who he believed was a Christian, that he was committing a sinful act and that
[defendant] was protected by armor.”
Defendant reported having been hit in the head with a rock by a classmate when
he was 13 years old. He asked the school principal to “press charges” but “nothing was
done” and he believed his rights and safety had not been adequately protected. The
incident continued to bother defendant. He estimated sleeping only four to five hours per
night because his sleep was frequently “interrupted by unpleasant memories” such as the
rock assault, which he believed had “almost caused his death.” Defendant had not sought
formal treatment for his mental health problems because no one had helped him when he
was hit with a rock and he did not believe anyone would help him now either.
According to defendant, his parents used drugs while his mother was pregnant
with him. Defendant was raised by both parents until they divorced when he was six
years old. His parents then shared custody of him until he was 10 years old, when his
mother moved to another city. After that, defendant saw his mother about three times per
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year during breaks in the school calendar. Defendant attended schools that he perceived
as “gang ridden” and described being “targeted by gang members” because he was white.
He then attended San Jose State University for over four years, but was not on track to
graduate within five years. He transferred to another campus in the East Bay, where he
was a junior at the time of his arrest and working on a sheep farm. Defendant had “some
friends” and was “connected with one of them.” He had no romantic relationships.
Defendant believed his mother had been avoiding him and his sister since 2018.
He was upset when he learned his mother was pregnant, as he believed she was trying to
replace him with a new child. His father had also started a new romantic relationship that
produced a child. Defendant felt “betrayed” by his father, who he believed was also
trying to replace him. He lived with his father and got along well with his half-sister, but
not with his father’s girlfriend. They lived in North Monterey County, which defendant
described as an “unpleasant environment.” Defendant reported having guns brandished
at him “12 to 16 times” and being “shot at about three times while driving.”
The psychiatrist interviewed defendant’s father, who described defendant as
“overly emotionally sensitive.” Defendant’s father said defendant had “been extremely
emotional since the divorce,” which happened when defendant was eight years old.
Defendant holds grudges against his father and “cannot let go of any issue.” His father
recalled defendant being hit with a rock in school and confirmed that defendant still
spoke about the incident frequently. According to his father, defendant had “problems
with road rage” but “no history of violence.”
Defendant’s sister said defendant had never adjusted to their parents’ divorce and
had refused to seek psychological treatment despite her encouragement. She believed
defendant “cannot tolerate actual or imagined rejection” and “obsesses about it.”
Defendant’s mother said she had explained to defendant that she had to move away for
financial reasons, and she was not abandoning him, but he did not believe her. She and
defendant’s father had both encouraged defendant to attend therapy, but he had refused.
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The psychiatrist diagnosed defendant as having a paranoid personality disorder
and a depressive disorder. In the psychiatrist’s opinion, defendant’s paranoid personality
disorder “underlies his behavior in the criminal offenses and his social functioning.”
Defendant had a “sensitive paranoid personality disorder subtype” and his “primary
dysfunction” was “feeling ostracized and alienated.” People with disorders of his
subtype “perceive that people dislike them” and “interpret the comments and actions of
people as rejecting them.” They “have difficulty establishing interpersonal relations
because they fear being abandoned.” The charges against defendant were consistent with
his personality disorder in that they stemmed from his perceived mistreatment, and in that
defendant “is easily irritated and personalizes trivial situations such as other motorists
impeding his driving.”
With respect to possible treatment, the psychiatrist opined that defendant’s
condition was treatable. Although defendant had believed in the past that seeking
treatment would be futile, he was “not resistant to treatment.” The psychiatrist
recommended a minimum of two years of individual or small-group cognitive behavioral
therapy, as well as treatment with anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medications.
Defendant’s “risk of dangerousness to the community” would be “low” if he complied
with the treatment plan and was “not allowed to own firearms or have access to them.”
4. The Prosecution’s Opposition and the Court’s Ruling
The prosecution argued defendant’s diversion request should be denied because he
would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if diverted” and his proposed
treatment plan was too vague. The court agreed that defendant’s proposed treatment plan
was not fully developed, but said its ruling was “not going to be based on that element”
because defendant had not had an opportunity to arrange treatment while in custody.
Instead, the court denied defendant’s diversion request based on a finding that he would
pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if the request were granted.

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In making its ruling, the court referenced considerations including the facts of the
charged offenses; defendant’s statement to the court “that he needed his firearms for
purposes of self-defense”; the psychiatrist’s assessment that defendant “grossly
overreacts to everyday interactions and then obsesses over them”; defendant’s continuing
belief that his rights were being violated and he was entitled to possess guns; and the
unpredictability of defendant’s behavior.
On the same day his diversion request was denied, defendant then pleaded no
contest to counts 3, 4, and 6 in a negotiated disposition. Defendant also admitted he had
been convicted of crimes for which consecutive sentences could be imposed. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(a)(7).) In the written plea form, defendant had agreed to waive all
appellate rights including the right to appeal his “conviction, the judgment, and any other
orders previously issued” by the trial court. Defendant and defense counsel confirmed in
writing that they had reviewed the form together, and defendant confirmed at the change
of plea hearing that he understood its contents. At that hearing, the court stated: “So it is
my understanding that as part of the agreement you’re giving up your right to federal and
state writs and appeals. That includes, but is not limited to, your right to appeal the
conviction, the judgment and any other orders issued by this court. [¶] Do you give up
your right to appeal the conviction?” Defendant answered, “Yes.”
The remaining charges were dismissed and the court ultimately placed defendant
on two years’ probation, including conditions that defendant take all psychotropic
medications prescribed by his healthcare provider; undergo assessment and treatment by
Monterey County Behavioral Health; participate in counseling programs deemed
necessary by the court or probation officer; and complete an “assaultive behavior
program” within one year. After the court placed defendant on probation, it granted a
certificate of probable cause relating to its denial of the request for mental health
diversion.

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II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying mental health
diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 (unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code). (See People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795 [ruling on
diversion request reviewed for abuse of discretion].) That statute allows trial courts to
grant pretrial diversion to qualifying defendants. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) As relevant
here, one requirement is that the defendant will “not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) Section 1170.18 defines “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as
an unreasonable risk that the defendant will commit one of certain enumerated violent
felonies such as homicide, attempted homicide, or assault with a machine gun on a peace
officer. (§ 1170.18, subd. (c); see § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) In determining diversion
eligibility, courts “may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a
qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the
defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other
factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
We are not persuaded by defendant’s position for two reasons. First, we agree
with the Attorney General that defendant waived his right to challenge the trial court’s
ruling on appeal. Appellate waivers contained in plea agreements are generally
enforceable if entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. (People v. Panizzon
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80.) Here, as part of his negotiated plea, defendant agreed to waive
appellate rights including his right to appeal any orders issued by the trial court before the
time of the plea. The trial court’s order denying his diversion request falls within the
scope of that waiver.
Defendant contends his waiver of the right to challenge the denial on appeal was
not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because the trial court asked him only whether he
would waive his “right to appeal the conviction” and the court later issued a certificate of
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probable cause relating to the diversion request. But both the written plea form and the
court’s oral advisement at the change of plea hearing were clear that defendant was
“giving up your right to federal and state writs and appeals. That includes, but is not
limited to, your right to appeal the conviction, the judgment and any other orders issued
by this court.” (Cf. People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1662 [“general waiver
of the right of appeal did not include error occurring after the waiver because it was not
knowingly and intelligently made”].) That the trial court later issued a certificate of
probable cause does not suggest defendant’s waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary at the time it was made. Nor does the certificate of probable cause itself
invalidate the waiver. (See People v. Espinoza (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 794, 803
[certificate of probable cause allows defendant to argue waiver is not enforceable on
appeal]; People v. Shults (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 714, 719 [“the issuance of a certificate
of probable cause does not operate to enlarge the grounds on which an appeal may be
taken”].)
Even assuming the unenforceability of defendant’s appellate waiver with respect
to the issue, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of diversion. The
essence of defendant’s argument is that because the court went on to place defendant on
probation (which would entail his treatment in the community), it could not have
reasonably determined that he would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) We disagree that denying mental health diversion yet granting probation
inherently constitutes an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Pacheco (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 207, 214 (Pacheco) [affirming denial of mental health diversion based on
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety because “diversion may provide some
motivation for remaining drug free and compliant with treatment for mental illness” but
felony probation and the threat of prison “will provide even more motivation”].)

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Defendant urges us to reject Pacheco in favor of the reasoning in People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138 (Whitmill). We do not read Whitmill as
inconsistent with Pacheco, and it is distinguishable from this case. Whitmill experienced
a substance abuse relapse following a relative’s cancer diagnosis and “negligently fired a
single shot in the air away from those nearby and then threw the gun away and turned
himself in … with ‘no incident.’ ” (Whitmill, at pp. 1151–1152, 1155.) The trial court
denied his request for mental health diversion based in part on the fact that he had
previously received a suspended sentence, stating: “ ‘[W]hat I have here is a defendant
who had three years in the county jail suspended. And that’s designed to create a strong
disincentive to commit any new crime. That does not give me great confidence.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1155.) The Whitmill court accepted the Pacheco court’s premise that diversion may be
less motivating than felony probation, but noted that the theory “would necessarily apply
in every case in which diversion is under consideration and, if applied in every case,
moot the statute.” (Ibid.) The court went on to explain that Whitmill’s actions in
“running away from further confrontation, throwing away his firearm, and peacefully
complying with law enforcement’s request that he come forward and (presumably) be
arrested” presented an “unusual scenario” under which it could not be concluded he was
“likely to commit a super-strike offense in the future.” (Id. at p. 1151.)
Defendant presents no such “unusual scenario.” Quite the contrary, over a period
of several months, he brandished a gun in multiple road rage incidents; repeatedly
confronted law enforcement for the purpose of reclaiming his guns, including an assault
rifle; and made comments that were reasonably interpreted as threatening gun violence
against law enforcement. His repeated conduct provides substantial evidence to support
the trial court’s conclusion that he would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety if granted mental health diversion and treated in the community. (Cf. Whitmill,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155 [where defendants do not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety and are not otherwise ineligible or unsuitable for diversion,
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“courts cannot override that determination just because a grant of probation in the past
has not ‘motivated’ defendants to overcome symptoms of mental illness which contribute
to violations of the law”].)
Defendant has validly waived his right to challenge the trial court’s denial of
mental health diversion on appeal. But even considering the merits of his appeal, the trial
court reasonably exercised its discretion to deny diversion on this record.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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____________________________________
Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Wilson, J.

H051993
The People v. Montgomery

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