People v. Mix CA1/2

CourtListener 10425743Calctapp30 de abr. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 4/30/25 P. v. Mix CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172570
v.
DAVID MIX, (Riverside County Super. Ct.
Defendant and Appellant. No. RIF2100970)

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In 2024, a jury convicted defendant David Mix of five felony offenses
arising out of his ongoing sexual assault of a minor, his ex-girlfriend’s
granddaughter, A.B. At sentencing, the court declined to strike any of Mix’s
strike prior convictions2 and sentenced him to 75 years to life plus 5 years
and 4 months in state prison. Mix now appeals, arguing that the trial court
improperly admitted evidence of Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome (CSAAS) and, in the alternative, Mix was prejudiced by counsel’s
ineffective assistance in failing to sufficiently object to this evidence. Mix

1 This case is appropriate for resolution by memorandum opinion

because it raises “no substantial issues of law or fact.” (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1; see People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847.)
2 Pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

(Romero).

1
further contends the court erred in declining to strike his prior strike
convictions on the basis of remoteness. We disagree with these contentions
and affirm.
BACKGROUND3
A.B. met defendant Mix when she moved to her grandmother’s house in
Perris, California, to attend high school. During the school week, A.B. would
live with her grandmother, her grandmother’s two adopted daughters, and
Mix; on weekends A.B. would return home to live with her mother and
stepfather in Riverside. Mix had been in a “past relationship” with A.B.’s
grandmother, with whom he had grown up, and was a “grandfather figure” to
A.B. and a “father figure” to A.B.’s mother. At the time of trial in 2024, Mix
was 61 years old.
One day during her freshman year of high school, when A.B. was 14,
she was riding in Mix’s car and Mix asked if she was a virgin. When A.B.
answered affirmatively, Mix said, “he would be willing to change that.” A few
months later, on April 20, 2019, Mix took A.B., who was then 15, to a hotel
room in San Bernadino or Redlands. Mix asked A.B. if she wanted to have
sex and gave her marijuana and vodka. They smoked “two joints” and drank
“like, half a pint, maybe”; “foreplay started, and then sex came after that.”
“Sex” included vaginal intercourse, Mix putting his finger in A.B.’s vagina,
and oral sex. A.B. testified the interactions were consensual, “I felt like I was
being appreciated.” She clarified, “I wouldn’t say that I thought that it was
okay back then. I kind of still knew that it was bad. I just, I guess, was, like,
feeling lonely, and he was making me feel better about myself in that way at
the time.” A.B. had just moved to a new school, “didn’t have any friends,

3 This summary background is taken from the evidence introduced at

trial.

2
really,” and so would spend most of the time at her grandmother’s house
where “he was always there.” A.B. considered Mix to be one of her best
friends; she loved him.
For the next year, Mix and A.B. would have some kind of sexual
interaction, “between two to four times a week.” They would go to different
hotels and engage in “the same chain of events”; there was “foreplay, . . . he
put his fingers in [A.B.’s] vagina, . . . there was oral sex, and then vaginal
intercourse.” About half the time, A.B. would perform oral sex on Mix; “most
of the time” Mix would perform oral sex on A.B. and put his fingers in her
vagina. They would smoke marijuana and drink alcohol, “pretty much every
time.” A.B. felt like she was “under the influence.” These sexual interactions
also took place at A.B.’s grandmother’s house, in the room her grandmother
shared with Mix.
In 2020, A.B. turned 16 and moved back to Riverside; it was during
COVID and she engaged in independent studies. The sexual relationship
continued at hotels every two weeks and in the living room or A.B.’s bedroom
at the Riverside house about once a month. On two separate occasions, Mix
started to have anal intercourse with A.B. but stopped “because it hurt.”
Another time, Mix proposed “a threesome” with one of A.B.’s grandmother’s
former foster children, A.B. texted the former foster child, whose mother saw
the text and “confronted” A.B.’s mom; when A.B.’s mom followed up, A.B.
denied any kind of sexual relationship with Mix, as did Mix.
On March 6, 2021, when A.B. was 17, Mix came to the Riverside house
to pick up “a part for a car . . . , but he also came to have sex” with A.B. Mix
and A.B. “were drinking alcohol and watching [the movie] Training Day, and
then . . . had sex after.” They stopped because they did not know when A.B.’s
parents were going to come home. A.B. did not have any clothes on. Mix

3
began performing oral sex on A.B. again, “and then in the middle of that, my
mom walked in the door.” A.B.’s mother testified she saw Mix’s head
between her daughter’s legs, “his face was doing something it shouldn’t have
been doing, too close to my daughter’s vagina in the room naked with her. . . .
Performing oral sex.” A.B.’s mom “starts going ballistic,” and Mix repeated,
“Oh shit, oh shit” over and over and ran out of the house. A.B.’s mother
called 911 while her husband chased Mix. Mix was ultimately detained by
police.
When the police came, A.B. did not want to talk to them, told them
anything that had happened was consensual, and refused to participate in a
medical exam. She testified, “at the time, I didn’t want anything bad to
happen to him. . . . I just wasn’t comfortable, and I felt, like, I was . . .
something bad, even though I wasn’t. . . . Because I knew that he would get
in trouble, and I didn’t—at the time, I didn’t want him to get in trouble. . . . I
cared for him.” On March 20, detectives interviewed A.B. again, and this
time A.B. told the interviewing officer, “it was really hard to be talking about
it. She was forthcoming with information, but I wouldn’t say she was, you
know, extremely detailed.” A.B. said she was “conflicted about whether or
not she wanted him to get in trouble” and felt like Mix, “robbed her of her
innocence.”
At trial, Mix testified that the March 6 incident was “a
misunderstanding.” Mix had gone to A.B.’s parents’ house to pick up some
tools. He had talked to A.B.’s stepfather beforehand, knew they were out,
and expected them to be home soon. When Mix arrived, A.B. “was acting
kind of funny.” Mix “decided just to go to the liquor store and go straight
back to the house and wait for [A.B.’s stepfather] to get there.” Mix backed
his car into the driveway, entered the house through the back door, and

4
heard the front door open. Mix went to the front of the house and testified, “I
seen a guy running around the corner.” Mix went back inside the house and
asked A.B. who had been there and warned, “I’m going to let [your parents]
know what’s going on.” Mix then tried to leave but A.B. was “trying to keep
me from leaving and begging me not to tell. . . . [S]he was up on me, and I
pushed her off of me.” Mix testified A.B. was “trying to hug on me and
saying, please, don’t tell. Please, don’t tell. I’ll lose all of my privileges.” A.B.
“jumped on” Mix, “trying to hold [him] down.” A.B. had Mix “in a headlock
from the front. She was hugging on me . . . . She had both her hands around
my neck.” A.B. and Mix “tumbled to the bed.” Mix “pushed up off of her, and
that’s when the front door opened.” A.B.’s mother was right there. Mix left
to look for the person he assumed had been in the room. Mix tried to run
from police because he “was still focused on finding who was in the room.”
Mix denied having a sexual relationship with A.B.; he treated her like a
granddaughter or a daughter. Mix and A.B. were “best friends”; A.B.
“confided in [Mix] a lot.” Mix was “sort of that special person to [A.B.]
because . . . when she got into a fight with her parents, she would give [Mix] a
call and sort of vent . . . about what happened.” But A.B. would give him the
“cold shoulder” when he tried to talk to her about her alcohol and marijuana
use. Also, there was “friction” whenever he tried to talk to A.B. about the
attitude she had with her grandmother and her parents.
Mix testified he would not have had sex with A.B. because he thought
she had herpes.4 He did not give her drugs or alcohol or take her to any

4 Mix had previously told the investigating detective he thought A.B.

was a virgin and had not mentioned herpes or any sexually transmitted
disease. Nor did Mix explain he was running because he thought someone
else had been in the house.

5
hotels, which would not have been possible because of his work schedule; Mix
was a UPS supervisor.5
Ultimately, the jury convicted Mix of the five counts charged: (1) oral
copulation of a child under the age of 16 (Pen. Code6 § 287, subd. (b)(2)); (2)
sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 16 (§ 261.5, subd. (d)); (3),
penetration with a foreign object on a child under the age of 16 (§ 289,
subd. (i)); (4) sodomy on a child under the age of 18 (§ 286, subd. (b)(1)); and
(5) oral copulation of a child under the age of 18 (§ 287, subd. (b)(1)). Mix
admitted his strike prior convictions and waived his right to a jury on the
factors alleged in aggravation, which the trial court found to be true.7 At the
subsequent sentencing, the court denied Mix’s renewed Romero motion,8
declining to strike any of Mix’s strike prior convictions. The court then
sentenced Mix to three consecutive terms of 25 years to life on the first three
counts, a consecutive mid-term doubled for 4 years on the fourth count, and a
consecutive one-third the mid-term for 1 year and 4 months on the fifth count

5 On cross-examination, Mix clarified that he had worked as a Lyft or

Uber driver when A.B. lived with him in Perris and set his own schedule. He
began working for UPS after A.B. moved back to Riverside and worked the
night shift.
6 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

7 The aggravating factors included the following California Rules of

Court violations: the victim was particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3));
defendant took advantage of a position of trust and confidence (rule
4.421(a)(11)); defendant’s prior convictions are numerous and increasing in
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)); and defendant had a prior prison term (rule
4.421(b)(3).
8 Prior to being assigned out for trial, Mix had made a Romero motion

in the calendar department, which the court denied without prejudice.

6
for a total sentence of 75 years to life plus 5 years and 4 months. Mix timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mix contends the trial court erred in permitting testimony
concerning CSAAS and in declining to strike one of Mix’s strike priors. We
disagree.
I. CSAAS
To start, we reject Mix’s request that we ignore settled California law
and “join the well-reasoned decisions of . . . other jurisdictions and hold that
CSAAS evidence is inadmissible for all purposes, or at least for very limited
ones.” Mix acknowledges our Supreme Court has held that “CSAAS
testimony is necessary to rebut public misconceptions” (citing People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300 (McAlpin)), but asserts the Supreme
Court “has not directly held that CSAAS evidence is admissible in
California.” He distinguishes appellate decisions following McAlpin as
“wrongly decided” because they are “no longer an accurate reflection of
current understandings of how children respond to abuse.” (See, e.g., People
v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias) [“While CSAAS
evidence is not relevant to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is well
established in California law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited
purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual
abuse”]; People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 472 [declining a similar
invitation to reject McAlpin and instead concluding “the vast majority of
jurisdictions and many of the jurisdictions Munch highlights have rendered
decisions that are consistent with McAlpin”].)
This blanket assertion made without citation to authority minimizes
the growing body of California law that continues to approve the admission of

7
CSAAS testimony when warranted by the particular circumstances of a case.
For example, “[e]xpert testimony on CSAAS has long been held admissible in
California for the limited purposes of dispelling commonly held myths or
misconceptions about child sexual abuse and aiding the jury in ‘evaluating
the credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse.’ ” (People v. Sedano
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 474, 479, citing Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 171; McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1301; People v. Bowker (1988)
203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393–394.) Similarly, “ ‘[i]t has long been held that in a
judicial proceeding presenting the question whether a child has been sexually
molested, CSAAS is admissible evidence for the limited purpose of disabusing
the fact finder of common misconceptions it might have about how child
victims react to sexual abuse.’ ” (People v. Flores (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 438,
455–456, review den. June 18, 2024, citing In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 418.)
Recognizing our obligation to follow precedent9 and finding no legal
basis to rule differently, particularly here, where the evidence showed years
of “consensual” sexual misconduct not reported until witnessed by the
victim’s mother, we decline Mix’s request to hold CSAAS evidence

9 See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,

455 (“Under the doctrine of stare decisis, all tribunals exercising inferior
jurisdiction are required to follow decisions of courts exercising superior
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the doctrine of stare decisis makes no sense. The
decisions of this court are binding upon and must be followed by all the state
courts of California”); People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 216
(“Defendant’s references to decisions from other jurisdictions that reached a
different position do not affect the binding nature of the McAlpin decision”).

8
inadmissible for all purposes and instead turn to Mix’s more specific
contentions.
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Its Admission of “Statistical
Evidence”
Allowing for the admissibility of certain CSAAS evidence, Mix asserts
error in the admission of what he characterizes as “inadmissible statistical
evidence,” citing People v. Julian (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 878, 886 (Julian) and
People v. Wilson (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 559, 568, 570–571 (Wilson), which
both found error in the courts’ admission of statistical probability evidence
concerning the veracity of complaining witnesses.
A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (Lapenias, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 170, citing People v. Brooks (2017)
3 Cal.5th 1, 43.) “An appellate court cannot reverse a judgment based on the
erroneous admission of evidence unless the admitted evidence ‘resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Lapenias, at p. 170; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (b).)
“In a criminal case, a miscarriage of justice can only be found when the
reviewing court determines it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have been reached had the trial court
excluded the erroneously admitted evidence.” (Lapenias, at p. 170, citing
People v. Lazarus (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 787, fn. 53 and People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
Here, clinical and forensic psychologist and CSAAS expert Dr. Jody
Ward testified that CSAAS is a “pattern of behaviors that many children
exhibit who have been sexually abused within an ongoing relationship.”
Specifically, “children who have been abused within an ongoing relationship,
respond very differently than children who have been molested by a
stranger.” These children “don’t tend to report the abuse right away out of
love and loyalty toward the abuser.” In response to a question from the

9
prosecution about “delayed or nondisclosure,” Dr. Ward explained, “[t]he
research would say that only a very small minority of people report sexual
abuse, at least, to the authorities, that something can be done about it. And
then of those who do report, two thirds wait until adulthood to report the
sexual assault. So only one third report during childhood, and even within
those reporting in childhood, there’s a significant delay most of the time.”
These general statements that “a very small minority” of people report
sexual abuse and “two thirds wait until adulthood . . . only one third report
during childhood” are not the kind of statistical probabilities prohibited in
Julian and Wilson, which focused on the veracity of complaining witnesses,
thereby invading the province of the jury. The CSAAS expert in Julian
specifically testified that false allegations by children “ ‘don’t happen very
often.’ ” (Julian, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 885.) Rather, they occur in “ ‘as
low as one percent of cases to a high of maybe 6, 7, 8 percent of cases.’ ”
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that where the jury had to decide between
the credibility of the complaining witness and the defendant, this “92 to 99
percent probability evidence invited jurors to presume Julian was guilty
based on statistical probabilities, and not decide the evidence properly
introduced in the case.” As such, “[t]his statistical probability evidence
deprived Julian of his right to a fair trial.” (Id. at p. 886.)
Similarly in Wilson, the CSAAS expert10 testified that false allegations
of child sexual abuse occur “ ‘very infrequently or rarely.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 33
Cal.App.5th at p. 568.) He referred to a Canadian study that was “one of the
best available” and found sexual assault allegations were determined to be
false in “ ‘about 4% of cases,’ ” and in none of those cases did the child make

10 The same expert testified in Julian and Wilson. (See Julian, supra,
34 Cal.App.5th at p. 886; Wilson, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 568.)

10
the false allegations, somebody else had, “such as a parent disputing
custody.” (Ibid.) He also testified that “12 to 15 other studies” found there to
be false allegations “in between 1 and 6 percent of the cases.” (Ibid.) The
Court of Appeal concluded this testimony “had the effect of telling the jury
there was at least a 94 percent chance that any given child who claimed to
have been sexually abused was telling the truth,” which had the practical
result of suggesting to the jury that there was “an overwhelming likelihood”
the victims’ testimony was truthful. (Id. at pp. 570–571.) This testimony
therefore “invaded the province of the jury, whose responsibility it is to ‘draw
the ultimate inferences from the evidence.’ ” (Ibid., citing People v.
Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744.)
Here, by contrast, Dr. Ward offered no testimony concerning false
allegations or the veracity of complaining witnesses, nor did she offer
“statistical evidence.” She had not met A.B. or Mix, had not reviewed the
police report, and testified “just based off of [her] research” on CSAAS.
Dr. Ward explained on direct and cross-examination that “[n]ot all children
exhibit all of these behaviors” associated with CSAAS, “sometimes there’s
false allegations,” and you cannot use the patterns or behaviors described by
CSAAS “to determine whether a report of sexual abuse is true or false.” Her
reference to “two thirds [of child victims] wait until adulthood” made no
conclusions about A.B., who did not report the misconduct; it was discovered
by A.B.’s mother who walked in on one assault. As such, there is no error in
the admission of Dr. Ward’s generalized statements.
But even if one considers the expert’s two-thirds and one-third
references to be the sort of statistical evidence disapproved of in Julian and
Wilson, any error is harmless. Mix asserts the admission of this improper
statistical evidence “amounted to a denial of state and federal due process

11
because it allowed the jury to make the unreasonable inference that, because
[A.B.] acted in ways that children who have been molested act, as described
by Dr. Ward, she was a credible witness, despite evidence to the contrary.”
We follow our colleagues’ direction in Julian and Wilson, applying the Watson
standard11 and disagree. (Wilson, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 572 [“ ‘The
erroneous admission of expert testimony only warrants reversal if “it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error” ’ ”].)
Here, there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have
reached a different result if the challenged “statistical evidence” was
excluded. As stated, Dr. Ward repeatedly testified that not all sexual assault
victims will exhibit the patterns of behavior associated with CSAAS. She
made no conclusions about A.B. or the circumstances in this case. While the
jury could have considered her testimony concerning the tendency of child
victims to disclose their abuse long after the fact or not at all in assessing
A.B.’s credibility, that was properly within their purview: “CSAAS testimony
is permitted ‘ “to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s
seemingly self-impeaching behavior,” ’ such as delayed disclosure of the
abuse.” (People v. Sedano, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.) “When a victim’s
credibility is placed at issue due to ‘paradoxical behavior, including a delay in
reporting,’ CSAAS testimony is admissible to disabuse a jury of
misconceptions about how a child reacts to molestation.” (People v. Flores,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at pp. 455–456.)
Further minimizing any chance of prejudice, this jury did not have to
evaluate only the testimony of A.B. as compared to that of Mix; they also had
the opportunity to consider the testimony of A.B.’s mother who directly

11 Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836.

12
observed one of the assaults. Accordingly, “we see no reasonable probability
defendant would have achieved a more favorable result in the absence of the
challenged testimony.” (Wilson, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 572.)
B. Counsel Was Not Ineffective.
In the alternative, Mix argues he was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because
defense counsel “failed to specifically articulate that CSAAS evidence is
unreliable because it always supports a conclusion that the abuse actually
occurred” and did not object to the admission of the allegedly improper
statistical evidence at the time it was introduced at trial. We disagree.
In deciding ineffective assistance, “we determine whether counsel’s
failure to object fell below the standard required for reasonably competent
attorneys and whether counsel’s performance was prejudicial to the
defendant’s case.” (Julian, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 888, citing Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686–692.) A reviewing court “defers to
counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel
acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. It is
particularly difficult to prevail on an appellate claim of ineffective assistance.
On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only
if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason
and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
Here, we find neither below-standard performance nor prejudice.
Defense counsel appropriately objected to the prosecution’s requested
introduction of CSAAS evidence in limine, arguing it “invades the province of
the jury.” The court granted the People’s motion despite this objection;
defense counsel had no reason or apparent legal basis to re-raise the objection

13
during Dr. Ward’s testimony; and nothing in the record suggests that if
defense counsel had specifically argued CSAAS testimony was “unreliable”
the court would have ruled differently. (See, e.g., People v. Anderson (2001)
25 Cal.4th 543, 587 [“Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections”].)
Turning to Mix’s complaint that counsel did not specifically object to
the arguably improper “statistical evidence” at the time of its introduction,
there remains the preliminary question whether the one-third and two-thirds
testimony qualifies as the type of statistical evidence that is impermissible.
That said, for the same reasons previously discussed, defense counsel’s
failure to object did not prejudice Mix, particularly in the context of counsel’s
targeted cross-examination of Dr. Ward that clarified multiple key points
that favored the defense.
For example, during cross-examination, Dr. Ward agreed, CSAAS “is
not a tool to determine whether or not abuse occurred.” CSAAS instead
“gives a laundry list of patterns and behaviors that you would see, you might
see, in a sexual abuse situation.” But one cannot say, “because these
symptoms are here, that means sexual abuse,” because “[t]hat would be
improper.” In response to defense counsel’s questioning, Dr. Ward further
clarified, “Because any behavior—no behavior, after the fact, can be used to
look back and determine whether sexual abuse occurred. That would be
improper. If we know that a child has been sexually abused, then these
behaviors are helpful in understanding a child’s reaction to that abuse. But
we can’t use them to look back and say, oh, just because they disclosed late or
had this or that, therefore, they’ve been sexually abused. That is improper.
That is not accurate.” She continued, “there can be patterns that match
CSAAS patterns and there can still not be sexual abuse. And sometimes
there are also false allegations, even when there are patterns consistent with

14
CSAAS.” With these tactical clarifications, defense counsel appropriately
limited the jurors’ use of the CSAAS testimony in a manner likely more
effective than a simple objection. And again, considering the totality of the
evidence presented including the direct witness testimony of A.B.’s mother,
there is no reasonable probability a differently formulated objection would
have resulted in an outcome more favorable to Mix.
II. Romero
The operative amended information alleged 10 strike prior robbery
convictions: one from 1985 and nine from 1996. (§ 211.) In considering Mix’s
Romero motion to strike the strike prior convictions, the trial court clarified it
had reviewed the filed motions and opposition, as well as the sentencing
report prepared by probation and the evidence presented at trial. Neither
counsel offered additional argument, leading to the court’s ruling: “I believe
in order to grant the defense’s request and impose a—ultimately impose a
determinate term, the court will be required to strike, I believe, nine strikes.
The defendant, I believe, has ten strike priors, and nine of them, he was
sentenced at the same period of time. I believe it’s a period of 28 years, or so,
in state prison. [¶] He went to state prison as a relatively young man for a
very significant period of time, came out, and then started to, almost
immediately, commit the sex offenses in this case. I do think he comes within
the spirit of the three strikes law, and I am going to deny the request to
strike any of the strikes.”
Mix argues the court abused its discretion in denying the Romero
motion because of the remoteness of Mix’s prior convictions: “the strike from
1985 was over 38 years old at the time of sentencing, and the second set from
1996 was over 27 years old at the time of sentencing.” Mix argues that “the
fact that [Mix’s] triggering convictions are non-violent statutory rape offenses

15
. . . is a mitigating factor.” He further contends that recent sentencing
reforms mean that the definition of “the interests of justice” is changing and
evolving, and so should what it means to be “outside the spirit” of the “Three
Strikes” law. Because the trial court’s decision not to strike any strike priors
purportedly “falls outside the bounds of reason” (citing People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663), the sentence should be reversed. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s decision not to dismiss a prior conviction
under “the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371 (Carmony).) Because there is a strong
presumption that a sentence conforming to the Three Strikes law is “both
rational and proper,” a trial court will generally only be found to have abused
its discretion in “limited circumstances” such as where the court was
unaware of its discretion to dismiss a strike or considered impermissible
factors in declining to dismiss. (Carmony, at p. 378.)
The Three Strikes law was “intended to restrict courts’ discretion in
sentencing repeat offenders.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528.) To this
end, it “ ‘does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other
sentencing laws, but establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in
every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless the
sentencing court “conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme should be made
because, for articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny for abuse, this
defendant should be treated as though he actually fell outside the Three
Strikes scheme.” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
In determining whether a prior strike conviction should be dismissed,
“ ‘the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects,

16
the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at p. 377.) But the circumstances under which a defendant can be deemed to
fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law must be “extraordinary.” (Id.
at p. 378.) And in considering these circumstances, “ ‘ “ ‘[a]n appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for
the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 377.)
Here, no extraordinary circumstances exist, and the court’s ruling and
the evidence relied on demonstrates its decision was neither arbitrary nor
capricious. For his 1985 robbery conviction, Mix was sentenced to 180 days
in jail and 3 years of probation, which was extended for a total of 5 years, not
terminating until 1990. In 1996, Mix was sentenced to 28 years in state
prison in connection with 9 additional robbery convictions. He was paroled in
2015 and discharged from parole in December of 2017. Less than a year
later, Mix was living with A.B. and her grandmother, commenting on 14-
year-old A.B.’s virginity. In March of 2019, Mix gave A.B. marijuana and
alcohol and had sexual intercourse with her for the first time. Mix continued
his sexual abuse of A.B. until March 2021, when it was interrupted by A.B.’s
mother. Mix then denied the misconduct, explaining he would not have
wanted to have sex with A.B., who he thought had herpes, and asserted that
any misunderstanding was A.B.’s fault for sneaking another boy into the
house. Rather than demonstrate remoteness worthy of being stricken, this
timeline demonstrates the notably short period of time between the
termination of Mix’s parole and his commission of the triggering offenses
here. That these offenses were not strikes themselves or do not involve
“violence” is of no moment. As such, it was reasonable for the trial court to

17
conclude that Mix did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law such
that any of his 10 prior strike convictions warranted dismissal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

18
_________________________
DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

_________________________
STEWART, P. J.

_________________________
MILLER, J.

People v. Mix (A172570)

19

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.