Perez v. L'Abri Management CA2/1

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Filed 4/28/25 Perez v. L’Abri Management CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DESIREE PEREZ, B339831

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STCV18655)
v.

L’ABRI MANAGEMENT, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kenneth R. Freeman, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Parker, Milliken, Clark, O’Hara & Samuelian, Gary
Ganchrow and Gary Tokumori for Defendant and Appellant.
Payne Nguyen, Cody Payne and Kim Nguyen for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
_________________________
INTRODUCTION
L’Abri Management, Inc. (L’Abri) appeals from the denial
of its motion to compel arbitration of claims asserted by its
former employee Desiree Perez. The trial court concluded that
the parties had not entered into a binding arbitration agreement
because only Perez, and not L’Abri, had signed the agreement at
issue when she was onboarded.
But “the presence or absence of a signature [is not]
dispositive; it is the presence or absence of evidence of an
agreement to arbitrate which matters.” (Banner Entertainment,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 361.) Because a
signature is but one form of such evidence, “the writing
memorializing an arbitration agreement need not be signed by
both parties in order to be upheld as a binding arbitration
agreement.” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235
Cal.App.4th 165, 176.)
Here, L’Abri manifested its assent to the arbitration
agreement by presenting it to Perez when it hired her under
circumstances indicating L’Abri intended to be bound by the
agreement if Perez also agreed. Under standard principles of
contract formation, L’Abri made an offer to Perez when it
presented her with the arbitration agreement in connection with
onboarding her as an employee. Perez accepted the offer by
signing the document, and at that point the parties had entered a
valid agreement.
Thus, the trial court erred in denying L’Abri’s motion to
compel arbitration based on the lack of an agreement to
arbitrate. The court did not consider Perez’s arguments that the
agreement should not be enforced because its terms are
unconscionable, and the parties have not addressed that issue on

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appeal. Therefore, we reverse and remand with directions for the
trial court to consider whether the arbitration agreement is
unconscionable.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Perez Is Hired and Signs an Arbitration Agreement
During L’Abri’s Onboarding Process
On October 3, 2022, Perez started working for L’Abri,
which is a property management company.
On Perez’s first day of work, L’Abri provided her with
electronic access to various onboarding paperwork, including an
employment agreement and a separate arbitration agreement.
Perez signed the employment agreement on her first day of work,
and L’Abri also signed it. Perez signed the arbitration agreement
four days later. L’Abri never signed the arbitration agreement,
even though it contained a signature block for a company
representative.
The employment agreement provided that it, “along with
the Company’s Agreement to Arbitrate, constitutes the entire
agreement between [L’Abri] and [Perez] pertaining to the matters
addressed in it” with certain exceptions not relevant here. The
arbitration agreement provided, in relevant part, that L’Abri
“and all of its related entities and subsidiaries, (hereinafter
‘Company’) and Perez . . . (‘Employee’) voluntarily agree to the
resolution by arbitration of all claims, disputes, and/or
controversies (collectively ‘claims’), whether or not arising out of
Employee’s employment or the termination of employment, that
Company may have against Employee or that Employee may
have against Company . . . .”
The arbitration agreement also included a “[c]lass and
[r]epresentative [a]ction [w]aiver,” which provided, “Employee

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and Company expressly intend and agree that each will forego
pursuing any covered dispute on a class, collective, or
representative basis and will not assert class, collective, or
representative action claims against the other in arbitration or
otherwise. Employee and Company shall only submit their own,
individual claims in arbitration. Employee and Company shall
be entitled to seek dismissal of any class, collective, or
representative claims that the other party attempts to bring and
may assert this Agreement as a defense in any proceeding in
which class, collective, or representative actions are brought.”
The agreement excluded from this waiver “representative actions
under the California Private Attorneys General Act [(PAGA)] or
any class, collective, or representative claims that cannot be
waived as a matter of law.”
The arbitration agreement indicated that Perez was not
required to enter it as a condition of employment. Right after the
provision explaining the agreement was voluntary, the
agreement stated that, “EMPLOYEE UNDERSTANDS THAT BY
SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, COMPANY AND EMPLOYEE
HAVE BOTH WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AND
THEIR RIGHT TO ASSERT CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ACTION
CLAIMS WITH RESPECT TO ALL CLAIMS COVERED BY
THIS AGREEMENT,” followed by a place for the employee alone
to initial (which Perez did).

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B. Perez’s Employment Ends and She Sues for Alleged
Wage Violations
Perez’s employment with L’Abri lasted about two weeks.
The record does not disclose whether Perez or L’Abri terminated
the employment.
On August 7, 2023, Perez sued L’Abri, asserting various
wage claims individually and on behalf of a would-be class of
current and former L’Abri employees. On January 25, 2024,
Perez filed a first amended complaint.1
C. L’Abri Seeks to Compel Arbitration
1. L’Abri’s Motion
On February 23, 2024, L’Abri filed a motion to compel
arbitration, stay all court proceedings, and dismiss Perez’s class
action claims. Based on the arbitration agreement, L’Abri argued
that Perez was required to arbitrate her individual claims and
was precluded from asserting class claims. L’Abri submitted a
copy of the arbitration agreement signed only by Perez; L’Abri’s
human resources/payroll manager authenticated the agreement
and averred, “Once an employee signs an arbitration agreement,
we [sic] that signed agreement into the employee’s personnel file
and maintain that agreement in the normal course of its [sic]
business.”
2. Perez’s Opposition
In her opposition, Perez contended that the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable because it was procedurally and

1 The first amended complaint included a PAGA claim
under Labor Code section 2698 et seq., which had not been
asserted in the original complaint.

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substantively unconscionable. As relevant here, Perez argued
that the agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it
was not executed by L’Abri and therefore L’Abri had not
manifested its assent.
In a declaration, Perez averred she was rushed to sign “a
large number of documents” which L’Abri provided her
electronically, and L’Abri’s human resources/payroll manager
“t[o]l[d] [Perez] that [Perez] was not able to start until all the
documents were completed and received.” Perez also averred she
“believed that if [she] did not sign the documents, [she] would
lose [her] job.”
3. L’Abri’s Reply
In reply, L’Abri asserted that, even though it had not
physically signed the arbitration agreement, it was bound
because “[t]he agreement clearly identifies L’Abri in the text,
contains a signature block for L’Abri, and . . . was provided to
[Perez] along with other L’Abri on-boarding documents.”
D. The Trial Court Denies L’Abri’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration
Before the hearing on the motion, the court issued a
tentative ruling to deny the motion on the ground the arbitration
agreement was not enforceable because L’Abri’s signature block
was blank. The court reasoned that “there has been no outward
manifestation or expression of acceptance by [L’Abri]. Absent
this information, there has objectively been no mutual assent,
and therefore, [L’Abri] has not demonstrated a valid arbitration
agreement exists.”
At the hearing L’Abri argued that it had manifested assent
to the arbitration agreement by indicating in the employment
agreement that it was part of the parties’ overall contract, and by

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presenting the arbitration agreement to Perez as part of its
“onboarding process.” Perez argued that the arbitration
agreement indicated the parties would assent to the agreement
by signing the document, and, thus, L’Abri’s failure to sign was
dispositive. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the
matter under submission.
The court later denied the motion on the ground L’Abri had
not shown the parties had entered into an arbitration agreement
for the reasons set forth in the tentative ruling. The court did not
address Perez’s arguments that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable. This order is appealable (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1294, subd. (a)), and L’Abri timely sought review.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“Under ‘both federal and state law, the threshold question
presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is
an agreement to arbitrate.’ [Citation.]” (Cruise v. Kroger Co.
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 390, 396, italics omitted.) “The party
seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence an agreement to arbitrate a
dispute exists. [Citations.]” (Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120.)
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed and, thus, we
assess de novo whether a valid agreement to arbitrate was
formed. (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC, supra, 235
Cal.App.4th at p. 173.)
B. L’Abri Established a Valid Arbitration Agreement
Applying the standard rules of contract formation
(Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 244

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[standard rules of contract formation apply to arbitration
agreements]), we conclude that L’Abri manifested its assent to
the arbitration agreement when it presented the agreement to
Perez as part of the employee onboarding process and requested
that she sign it. In short, L’Abri made an offer to enter the
arbitration agreement which Perez accepted by signing.
An essential element of any contract is mutual consent.
(Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565.) “ ‘Mutual assent usually is
manifested by an offer communicated to the offeree and an
acceptance communicated to the offeror. [Citation.] “ ‘ “An offer
is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so
made as to justify another person in understanding that his
assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” ’
[Citations.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Lopez v. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.
(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230.) “In order for acceptance of a
proposal to result in the formation of a contract, the proposal
‘must be sufficiently definite, or must call for such definite terms
in the acceptance, that the performance promised is reasonably
certain.’ [Citation.]” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811.)
“ ‘[W]hether a particular communication constitutes an
operative offer, rather than an inoperative step in the
preliminary negotiation of a contract, depends upon all the
surrounding circumstances. [Citation.] The objective
manifestation of the party’s assent ordinarily controls, and the
pertinent inquiry is whether the individual to whom the
communication was made had reason to believe that it was
intended as an offer. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Lopez v. Charles
Schwab & Co., Inc., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.)

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Here, viewed objectively, the circumstances show both
parties understood that L’Abri intended the arbitration
agreement as an offer. The agreement, as presented to Perez,
was complete, with no terms left for future negotiation or
otherwise missing. In other words, it was “ ‘sufficiently definite
. . . that the performance promised is reasonably certain.’
[Citation.]” (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick, supra, 60
Cal.App.4th at p. 811.) Moreover, the circumstances show that
L’Abri was willing to be bound by the agreement. The terms of
the agreement imposed mutual obligations on Perez and L’Abri.
L’Abri presented the arbitration agreement to Perez for her to
sign as part of L’Abri’s standard hiring process. Although the
parties may dispute whether Perez had a choice to enter the
agreement—the arbitration agreement indicated that it was not
required as a condition of employment, but Perez averred she
“believed” that she was required to sign all the documents
presented to her—there is no dispute that L’Abri expressed its
willingness to enter the agreement. Lastly, there is no evidence
that L’Abri proposed the agreement as a draft contract whose
final terms would still need to be negotiated; indeed, Perez
averred that she was not “given the option . . . to request or make
any modifications to any of the documents [she] signed.”
Therefore, by presenting the arbitration agreement L’Abri
made a contractual offer to Perez, which Perez accepted by
signing the agreement. As a result, the trial court erred in
concluding that L’Abri had not manifested its assent. (See
Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 919, 933
[although an employer did not sign an arbitration agreement,
“[it] certainly assented to its own arbitration agreement—the
agreement that it drafted and required [the employee] to sign and

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that it now is trying to enforce”], review granted Aug. 9, 2023,
S280256; Cruise v. Kroger Co., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 397-
398 [employer intended to be bound by an arbitration provision in
its employment application despite not signing the application].)
Perez contends that, under the language of the arbitration
agreement stating “EMPLOYEE UNDERSTANDS THAT BY
SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, COMPANY AND EMPLOYEE
HAVE BOTH WAIVED” jury trial and class/collective action
rights (underlining added), the agreement did not become binding
until both parties signed it. Perez further reasons, as did the
trial court, that the presence of signature blocks at the end of the
agreement for both Perez and a representative of L’Abri also
indicates that L’Abri could only manifest its assent by signing.
We are not persuaded. The arbitration agreement nowhere
provides that it would not be effective unless it was signed by a
L’Abri representative. The contractual language on which Perez
relies is an acknowledgment by Perez that she understands the
rights she is waiving, and is directly followed by a place for her,
and only her, to initial. It does not state that there is no
agreement unless both parties sign the document. Likewise, the
general presence of a signature block, a common feature of
contracts, cannot reasonably be interpreted to contradict the
objective signs that L’Abri intended to be bound by the
arbitration agreement if Perez also agreed.
Were the situation reversed and it was Perez seeking to
enforce the arbitration agreement, we would interpret the
agreement to bind L’Abri for the reasons discussed. “We see no
reason to reach a different result when [L’Abri] is the one seeking
arbitration.” (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
1462, 1473.) Indeed, the interpretation urged by Perez would

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create pernicious incentives. L’Abri could in effect reserve for
itself the option to accept the agreement, reject it, or possibly
wait to decide, even while requiring the employee to manifest
their assent. Such a result would violate the principles that we
should construe a contract to “make it lawful, operative, definite,
reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect” (Civ. Code,
§ 1643) and to “avoid an interpretation which will make a
contract extraordinary, harsh, unjust, or inequitable” (Strong v.
Theis (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 913, 920; see generally Barroso v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1013
[relying on these interpretive principles to reject construction of
contract under which “[the defendant loan servicing company]
would have sole control over the formation of the contract despite
[the borrower]’s full performance, simply by refusing to return a
signed copy [of the contract] to [the borrower]”]).
In theory, an employee could avoid this unfair and
unreasonable result by retracting their assent, because under
Perez’s interpretation the employee would in effect be making an
offer which he or she could withdraw. However, the employee
would have no reason to know that was an option unless the
contract conveyed that L’Abri was not bound absent its signature,
which this agreement does not. Thus, we decline to adopt Perez’s
interpretation. (See Angell v. Rowlands (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d
536, 542 [concluding husband was bound by a sales contract
despite a blank signature block for his wife because “a contract is
invalid if not signed by all parties purportedly bound only when it
is shown, either by parol or express condition, that the contract
was not intended to be complete until all parties had signed”
(second italics added)].)

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Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 62
Cal.App.4th 348, which the trial court cited and upon which
Perez relies, does not compel a different result. As previously
noted, the Banner court recognized that “the presence or absence
of a signature [is not] dispositive” when determining whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate. (Id. at p. 361.) Banner involved
instead an arbitration provision in a draft agreement. That draft
agreement was proposed in a cover letter that stated, “this
agreement when signed by the parties hereto will constitute a
legal and binding obligation of the parties,” after which the
parties continued to negotiate the terms of their agreement and
did not sign the prior draft agreement. (Id. at p. 354.)
Unsurprisingly, the Banner court found this did not evince an
agreement to arbitrate. (Id. at p. 361.)
The facts here are quite different. The arbitration
agreement between L’Abri and Perez was final, not a draft. The
parties did not continue negotiating after the arbitration
agreement was sent to Perez. And finally, the arbitration
agreement does not provide that L’Abri is bound only if its
representative signs the agreement, nor is there any evidence of
any communication between L’Abri and Perez during the
employee onboarding process indicating that L’Abri would not be
bound by the arbitration agreement unless its representative
signed the agreement.
In conclusion, the trial court erred in finding that the
parties’ arbitration agreement was not enforceable because
L’Abri had not manifested its assent. The court did not consider
Perez’s arguments that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because it was unconscionable, and the parties

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have not addressed this issue in this appeal. Accordingly, we
remand for the court to consider Perez’s unconscionability claims.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order denying L’Abri’s motion
to compel arbitration, with directions for the trial court to
consider Perez’s claim that the parties’ arbitration agreement is
unconscionable. L’Abri is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

M. KIM, J.

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