Mehr v. Korbin CA2/4

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Filed 4/25/25 Mehr v. Korbin CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

TINA MEHR, B335052

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCP03391)
v.

JORDANA KORBIN,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Lia Martin, Judge. Reversed and Remanded.
Tina Mehr, in pro. per.; Pine Tillett, Norman Pine, Neo Khuu and
Scott Tillett for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Pyle Sims Duncan & Stevenson and Susan C. Stevenson for Defendant
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Tina Mehr (Mehr) and respondent Jordana Korbin (Korbin)
agreed to arbitrate an attorney fee dispute. At Korbin’s request, the trial
court entered judgment confirming the award. Over a year later, Mehr
moved to set aside the judgment pursuant to the court’s equitable power to
correct extrinsic mistakes. The court denied the motion, reasoning its
equitable power was limited only to the default context. We hold the court’s
equitable power is not so limited, and remand for the trial court to determine
whether Mehr has met the required elements for relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
From 2017 to 2020, Mehr represented Korbin in multiple employment
litigation matters. In 2020, Korbin reached a global settlement, resolving her
claims in exchange for $375,000.
Korbin received a net amount of $7,904.141 from those funds, and Mehr
received a net amount of $188,563.38, with the remainder held in Mehr’s
client trust account pending resolution of a dispute between Korbin and Mehr
over Mehr’s bill. Mehr claimed fees and costs amounting to $367,095.86, but
Korbin claimed the correct total was $146,898.77—less than Mehr had
already received.

1 $7,904.14 represents the amount of the settlement ($375,000) minus
Mehr’s claimed fees and costs ($367,095.86). It is not clear from the record
exactly to whom or in what increments the settlement funds were paid out.
However, disbursements were made to both Mehr and Korbin, and the
amount of Mehr’s net receipt ($188,563.38) plus the amount in the trust
account ($178,532.48) equals Mehr’s total bill of $367,095.86.

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I. Arbitration
The parties agreed to submit their dispute to binding arbitration before
a three-arbitrator panel, which was held in June 2021. Both parties claimed
entitlement to all the funds remaining in the trust account, and Korbin
claimed Mehr should disgorge some of the fees that had already been paid.
The arbitrators issued their award on August 31, 2021. They awarded Mehr
the fees she had already received and divided the remaining funds between
the parties: $17,853.25 to Mehr, for a total fee and cost award of $206,416.63,
and $160,679.23 to Korbin. Mehr was to disburse Korbin’s share from the
client trust account, and Korbin was to pay the arbitration filing fee.

II. Court Judgment
On October 12, 2021, Mehr filed a petition to vacate the award,
asserting the award was obtained by unfair means, the award exceeded the
arbitrators’ authority, there was arbitrator misconduct, the arbitrators
refused to hear evidence, and the arbitrators failed to make required
disclosures. On October 21, 2021, Korbin filed a response requesting
confirmation of the award.
On November 29, 2021, Korbin filed a petition to confirm the award.
On December 1, 2021, Korbin filed an ex parte application seeking to advance
the hearing date for her petition. Mehr did not respond to the application or
make an appearance. The trial court granted the application and scheduled a
hearing on Korbin’s petition for January 5, 2022.
Mehr did not respond to Korbin’s petition, nor did she appear at the
hearing. The court granted the petition to confirm the award and set a
“Default Prove Up Hearing for determination of cost and fees” for January
12, 2022. Korbin filed a request for fees and costs incurred on the petition to

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confirm; Mehr did not respond and did not appear at the hearing. On
January 12, 2022, the court entered judgment in favor of Korbin, awarding
the $160,679.23, plus prejudgment interest and Korbin’s requested fees and
costs. Korbin served notice of entry of judgment by mail the next day,
January 13, 2022.

III. Motion to Set Aside
On June 30, 2023, Mehr filed a motion to set aside the judgment, which
she amended shortly thereafter. The motion rested on two alternate grounds:
Code of Civil Procedure section 473.52 and the equitable doctrine of mistake.
Mehr argued she was prevented from responding to Korbin’s petition, or
appearing at the hearing, by an incident of domestic violence and resulting
medical issues. She contended she had been diligent in moving for relief as
soon as her medical condition and other practicalities allowed, and she had a
meritorious case to present.
Korbin opposed the motion, arguing it was untimely under section
473.5, and section 473.5 did not apply anyway because the judgment entered
against Mehr was not a default judgment. Korbin also claimed that Mehr’s
assertions regarding a meritorious defense were moot, that Mehr had notice
of the hearing on the petition to confirm the award, and that the judgment
was no longer subject to appeal. Korbin’s opposition did not address the
equitable doctrine of mistake, nor did it directly dispute Mehr’s statements of
fact.
The trial court heard and denied the motion on August 23, 2023. The
court ruled section 473.5 did not apply because the judgment against Mehr

2 All future statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure,
unless otherwise stated.

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was not a default judgment. It ruled the equitable doctrine of mistake did
not apply for the same reason. It observed that relief was unavailable under
section 473, subdivision (b) because the time limit for relief under that
subdivision had run. Finally, the court suggested Mehr could have made a
motion for reconsideration under section 1008, but found that such a motion
would also have been untimely.
Mehr timely appealed.3

DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mehr abandons her argument regarding section 473.54 and
focuses instead on her argument that the court should have granted
equitable relief based on extrinsic mistake. We agree that the trial court
erred in deciding equitable relief is limited only to situations where default or
default judgment has been entered. Therefore, we remand to allow the court
to determine in the first instance whether Mehr has satisfied the required
elements for equitable relief based on extrinsic mistake.

I. Governing Standard
“One ground for equitable relief is extrinsic mistake—a term broadly
applied when circumstances extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost a
party a hearing on the merits.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975,
981.) “‘[T]he ground of relief is not so much the fraud or other misconduct of

3 The third volume of appellant’s appendix contains records of a motion
to compel arbitration brought by Mehr in the trial court, and denied by that
court, after this appeal was filed. That proceeding has not been directly
placed at issue here and we express no opinion about it.

4 For this reason, we need not discuss Korbin’s arguments concerning
compliance with section 473.5.

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the defendant as it is the excusable neglect of the plaintiff to appear and
present his claim or defense.’” (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 471
(Kulchar), quoting 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1st ed. 1954) p. 2128.) It may
apply, among other situations, “when the complaining party was disabled at
the time the judgment was entered.” (Id. at p. 472.)
“[T]he party seeking equitable relief on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
or mistake must show three elements: (1) a meritorious defense; (2) a
satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense in the first place; and
(3) diligence in seeking to set aside the . . . judgment once discovered.”
(Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 742, 750.) We review the trial
court’s decision to award or deny equitable relief for abuse of discretion. (Id.
at p. 749.) “[The] failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion.”
(Riskin v. Downtown Los Angeles Property Owners Association (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 438, 445 (Riskin).)

II. Analysis
Parties may seek equitable relief from any final judgment. (See In re
Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342.) Korbin cites no case for the
proposition, and does not argue, that equitable relief is limited to the context
of defaults. In her opening brief, Mehr cites a series of cases that applied
equitable relief in contexts other than default or default judgment. (See, e.g.,
Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1025
[acknowledging trial court’s ability to vacate a vexatious litigant
designation]; Aldrich v. San Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170
Cal.App.3d 725, 737–741 [vacating order of dismissal].)
As already noted, Korbin’s brief in the trial court did not discuss the
issue of equitable relief. In the absence of such briefing, the court relied on

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Bae v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89 (Bae) in
determining that equitable relief was limited to default cases. The cited
portion of Bae says, “courts have the inherent authority to vacate a default
and default judgment on equitable grounds such as extrinsic fraud or
extrinsic mistake.” (Id. at p. 97.) However, the panel in Bae was discussing a
default case. (Id. at p. 93.) Bae held equitable relief applied to the default
case then at hand; it did not thereby limit equitable relief to default cases.
Tacitly conceding Mehr was entitled to seek equitable relief here,
Korbin argues Mehr cannot obtain that relief for other reasons.5 First,
Korbin argues the arbitration was a hearing on the merits of Mehr’s claim,
and therefore Mehr has “fully litigate[d]” her position. This ignores the
difference between a hearing on the merits of Mehr’s claim for fees and a
hearing on the merits of a petition to confirm or vacate the arbitration award.
Mehr has not had the latter.
Next, Korbin argues Mehr’s illness does not constitute a “mistake” that
would entitle Mehr to equitable relief. However, as noted above, one of the
examples of “mistake” listed by the California Supreme Court in Kulchar is
when a party is kept from appearing by disability. (Kulchar, supra, 1 Cal.3d
at p. 472, citing Watson v. Watson (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 35 [respondent in a

5 Before reaching this issue, Korbin argues Mehr’s appeal is barred by
California Rules of Court, rules 8.104 and 1615(d). As Mehr points out, one
of these citations is in error: former rule 1615(d) has been renumbered as rule
3.828 and applies only to judicial arbitration initiated under section 1141.10.
(§§ 1141.10 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.810; see also Porreco v. Red
Top RV Center (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 113, 118–119 [general arbitration and
judicial arbitration follow separate and mutually exclusive statutory
schemes].) The other citation, to rule 8.104, which establishes the time to
appeal from a judgment, is irrelevant; a final judgment can be challenged in
equity even after the time for appeal has expired. (Westphal v. Westphal
(1942) 20 Cal.2d 393, 397.)

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divorce action was pregnant and without support in California].) Korbin
further argues Mehr’s sworn declaration was not sufficient to establish any
mistake because it was self-serving. But Korbin has forfeited this argument
by failing to cite supporting legal authority. (See City of Santa Maria v.
Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287.) Korbin briefly asserts that the
mistake here was intrinsic to the proceedings, not extrinsic, relying on a
block quote from Westphal v. Westphal, supra, 20 Cal.2d 393, and no other
analysis. Because she has not developed this argument, it has also been
forfeited. (Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555.)
Finally, Korbin argues Mehr failed to meet one of the required
elements for equitable relief—diligence. But this presents a factual question
for the trial court to decide in the first instance. (See Bombardier
Recreational Products, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Canada ULC (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 591, 605.) The trial court did not decide this question because it
believed its equitable powers were restricted to a default context. That
failure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion. (See Riskin,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.)
“We are neither authorized nor inclined to substitute our judgment for
the judgment of the trial court.” (In re Marriage of Baker (1992) 3
Cal.App.4th 491, 498.) Korbin did not brief the issue of equitable relief for
the trial court. Nor did the trial court have a proper chance to evaluate
Mehr’s evidence. We will not attempt to evaluate that evidence here, or
resolve any other factual question for the first time on appeal. Therefore, we
remand so the trial court may exercise its discretion, which includes the
power to order or accept additional briefing if necessary or appropriate.

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DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court denying appellant’s motion to set aside the
judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Appellant shall recover her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MORI, J.

DAUM, J.*

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article IV, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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