People v. Donel CA2/2

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Filed 4/25/25 P. v. Donel CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B333202

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA071328)
v.

CRESPIN DONEL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Affirmed.

Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Crespin Donel (defendant)
appeals from the judgment resentencing him pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.75.1 He contends the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to dismiss sentence enhancements
imposed at his 2008 sentence. We conclude defendant has failed
to demonstrate an abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND
In 2008, a jury convicted defendant of false imprisonment
by violence (§ 236; count 1), corporal injury to a spouse,
cohabitant, or child’s parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and discharge of a
firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3; count 5).2 The jury found
true the allegation in count 3 that defendant personally
discharged a firearm. Defendant admitted suffering two prior
felony convictions alleged as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 pursuant to
sections 1170.12 and 667, subdivision (b), the “Three Strikes”
law. Defendant also admitted two prior convictions alleged as to
all counts pursuant to sections 667, subdivision (a)(1) (prior
serious felony enhancements) and 667.5, subdivision (b) (prior
prison term enhancements). On March 13, 2008, the court
sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 158 years to life in
prison, comprised of consecutive third strike terms of 25 years to
life as to each count, plus 10 years for two prior serious felony
enhancements for each count, two years for two prior prison term

1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2 Count 4 was dismissed prior to sentencing.

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enhancements for each count, and a 10-year firearm
enhancement as to count 3.
On direct appeal, this court struck one of the two prior
prison term enhancements as to each count, and otherwise
affirmed the judgment, leaving four prior prison term
enhancements, one on each count; eight prior serious felony
enhancements, two on each count; and a 10-year firearm
enhancement, thus reducing defendant’s sentence by four years
to 100 years to life plus 54 years. (People v. Donel (Oct. 1, 2009,
B206806) [nonpub.opn.].)
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as an inmate
potentially entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75. The
trial court appointed counsel, who filed a resentencing
memorandum. On August 22, 2023, at the resentencing hearing,
the parties submitted the matter on the sentencing memorandum
in which defendant asked the court to strike the four prior prison
term enhancements and one of defendant’s prior strike
convictions, and to resentence him to 34 years. In addition,
defendant and his niece, Melissa Aguilar, each wrote a letter to
the court. In his letter, defendant wrote he regretted not taking a
plea offer in 2008, took full responsibility for his “mistakes,”
claimed he had changed, and would like the chance to prove it.
Aguilar wrote about her close relationship with defendant
that she maintained, although she had not seen him in years.
She reported defendant was raised by a single mother and his
older sister, that he came from a poor family, that defendant’s
behavior in prison was due to prison culture, and that defendant
had the support of his family despite his “shortcomings” and poor
“decisions in the face of survival.”

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At the section 1172.75 hearing, the trial court considered
the memorandum, both letters, and defendant’s prison file. The
court noted an early plea and early acceptance of responsibility
might have helped defendant then, but not 15 years later. The
court also observed that though defendant claimed in his letter
that he has done better for himself in prison, his prison file
indicated otherwise. Between 2016 and 2021 defendant had been
involved in at least seven violent incidents, engaging in fights,
starting fights, and beating inmates; defendant had possessed a
weapon, a blade or “shank”; was disciplined several times for
noncompliance of rules, including refusing to take or failing a
drug test by testing positive for methamphetamine. Based on the
prison record, the court found defendant’s “violent behavior
continues beyond the case to the time in prison during the last, at
least the last ten years.”
As to Aguilar’s letter, the court noted that instead of
placing the blame for the offenses on defendant, Aguilar placed it
on “society, on being poor,” and on having a single mother. The
court said, “There are a lot of poor people that don’t commit the
crimes that he did.” The court also took exception to Aguilar’s
reference to defendant’s “shortcoming.” The court said, “I find
that rather disturbing that the family sees this, you know,
horrific, heinous crime as a shortcoming of his conduct. It is not
a shortcoming, it is criminal conduct.”
After describing defendant’s violent incidents and rule
violations in prison, the court concluded it could not find that
defendant had changed his behavior in prison during the last 10
years. The court also noted that defendant had served prison
terms prior to this case. For these reasons the court denied
defendant’s motion to strike the prior serious or violent felony

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convictions for which defendant was sentenced under the Three
Strikes law, but treated count 2 as a second strike. The trial
court also found defendant had not demonstrated any reason to
strike the prior serious felony enhancements imposed under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) but struck all of the prior prison
term enhancements as required by law.3 The court exercised its
discretion to impose consecutive sentences because the offenses
were committed at different times.
On August 22, 2023, the trial court resentenced defendant
to a total term of 75 years to life plus 46 years. As to each of
counts 1, 3, and 5, the trial court imposed 25 years to life plus 10
years for the two prior serious felony enhancements, and on count
3, an additional 10 years for the firearm enhancement. On count
2, the court imposed the middle term of three years doubled to six
years, plus 10 years for the two prior serious felony
enhancements.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment.

DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion
when it declined to dismiss defendant’s prior serious felony

3 Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term enhancement to
prior terms for sexually violent offenses. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) made the changes implemented by Senate Bill No. 136
retroactive to final cases by adding section 1171.1 (subsequently
renumbered section 1172.75) to the Penal Code.

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enhancements because the court failed to weigh the mitigating
circumstances listed in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2).
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “Notwithstanding
any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in
the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” Section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) lists factors in mitigation and states: “In
exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one
or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.”
However, “‘if the court does not conclude that dismissal
would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances
strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the
court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of
justice. This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the
presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the
sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal
of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’” (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036 (Walker).)

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A court’s discretion will be upheld if it is neither arbitrary
nor capricious and exercised according to fixed legal principles.
(People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) A
court’s sentencing choices under section 1385 are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, which will be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
376.) “‘The burden is on the party complaining to establish an
abuse of discretion, and unless a clear case of abuse is shown and
unless there has been a miscarriage of justice a reviewing court
will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of
its discretionary power.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 566.)
The particular factors listed in section 1385 that defendant
claimed the trial court should have considered are “(B) Multiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all
enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.
[¶] (C) The application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement
shall be dismissed. [¶] . . . [¶] (H) The enhancement is based on
a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(B), (C) & (H).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C) does not apply to those
serving a term under the Three Strikes law. (People v. Burke
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243–244.) Furthermore, the statutory
phrase “shall be dismissed” in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)
and (C) is directive, not mandatory. (See People v. Mazur (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 438, 445.) “[R]ead in the context of the statute as
a whole[, the phrase] only requires the court to dismiss the
enhancement if it first finds that dismissal is ‘in the furtherance
of justice.’” (Ibid.; see § 1385, subd. (c)(1).)

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Defendant argues the court abused its discretion for several
reasons: the court failed to make an express finding that striking
the enhancements would endanger public safety; the court failed
to give great weight to the mitigating circumstances as required
by section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), which he claims created a
presumption in favor of dismissing the enhancements; and the
trial court applied the wrong legal standard or based its decision
on implied factual findings that were not supported by
substantial evidence.
Quoting Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at page 1034, defendant
acknowledges the weight to be given the evidence of mitigating
factors refers to “‘the trial court’s evaluation of the defendant’s
evidence in the first instance.’” (Italics added.) “Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.”
(§ 1385, subdivision (c)(2), italics added.) Thus, “consideration of
the mitigating factors in section 1385(c)(2) is not required if the
court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287,
297.) Moreover, it would then be “‘hard to see how dismissal
would further the interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the
applicability of any mitigating factors identified in subdivision
(c)(2).” (Walker, supra, at p. 1033, quoting Mendoza, supra, at
p. 297, fn. 6.) If the court does not find that dismissal would
endanger public safety, it nevertheless “retains the discretion to
impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns
significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances
when they are present.” (Walker, supra, at p. 1029.) And “‘if it is

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in the furtherance of justice to do so.’” (Id. at p. 1033, quoting
§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)
We reject defendant’s claim that section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) creates a presumption in favor of dismissing enhancements.
“[T]he plain language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not
erect a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can only
be overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public safety.”
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.) Section 1385, subdivision
(c)(1) states that “‘the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is
in the furtherance of justice to do so.’ . . . [This] inquiry ‘requires
a trial court’s ongoing exercise of ‘discretion’ [citation]. Thus,
notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial
courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on
circumstances ‘long deemed essential to the “furtherance of
justice” inquiry.’” (Walker, at p. 1033, citations omitted and
quoting People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099.)
We also reject defendant’s claim that because the trial
court did not express its findings on the record, it failed to
properly weigh evidence of the risk of danger to the public or give
appropriate weight to the mitigating circumstances defendant
deems relevant in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). First, we agree
with the People defendant failed to preserve this issue for review
by failing to raise it below. (See People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th
363, 406; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [“Routine
defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented
and corrected if called to the court’s attention.”].) In addition, we
reject the claim “section 1385 expressly requires a statement of
reasons for a dismissal.” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036,
fn. 6, italics added; see § 1385, subd. (a).) A statement of reasons

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for declining to dismiss a prior conviction is not required. (See In
re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560.)
Nor was the trial court required to make an express finding
that striking the enhancements would endanger public safety.
“‘The trial court is not required to state reasons for declining to
exercise its discretion under section 1385’ [citations], and ‘is
presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the
absence of an affirmative record to the contrary’ [citation].”
(People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) “Absent
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew
and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1390.)
“Moreover, ‘it is settled that: “A judgment or order of the
lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which
the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. . . .”’”
(People v. Ruiz (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1081, review granted
Mar. 12, 2023, S283504 (Ruiz), disapproved on another point in
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768–769, and quoting
Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Rejecting
an argument similar to defendant’s, the Ruiz court held it cannot
be assumed that “‘[b]ecause the record makes no mention of the
specific [mitigating] factors enumerated in section 1385’” the
court did not consider them. (Ruiz, supra, at p. 1081.)
Here, as in Ruiz, the evidence supported a reasonable
inference “that the court found ‘that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).)” (Ruiz, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1081, review granted.)
In Ruiz the trial court inferred this finding from evidence the
defendant had “‘engaged in unprovoked violent conduct under

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circumstances that indicate that he is a serious danger to
society.’” (Ibid.) Similarly here, the trial court described
defendant’s “violent behavior [which] continue[d] beyond the case
to the time in prison during the last, at least the last ten years,”
including numerous violent acts and prison rule violations. And
the court disbelieved the suggestions in both letters submitted to
it that defendant was ready to take responsibility for his crimes
or had changed his tendency toward violent behavior, and
defendant did not submit other evidence to show otherwise.
Defendant points out section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does
not ask whether a defendant would present a danger to public
safety, but whether dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety. Defendant concludes the plain language
indicates he is entitled to this determination as to each five-year
prior enhancement, “especially given his already imposed life-
sentence.” Defendant appears to argue the evidence that
defendant would present a danger to public safety was
insufficient because the requirement of section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2) is to show dismissal of the enhancements would present a
danger to public safety. Defendant concludes that as the trial
court’s finding was not express, the court must have found only
the defendant could present a danger. Defendant’s point is
unclear, lacks logic, and he cites authority only for the general
proposition that a court’s discretion is abused if “it applies the
wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.”
Defendant cites no authority for his suggestion that
evidence of defendant’s past and current violent conduct and
criminal record cannot provide evidence from which a court may
infer dismissing enhancements could present a danger to public

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safety. For example, it is appropriate to consider circumstances
of the defendant’s crimes and whether they involved “‘incredibly
harmful and dangerous conduct.’” (People v. Mendoza, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 299 [discharged firearm during home invasion
robbery with victims present].) We find nothing arbitrary or
capricious in the consideration of defendant’s record of violent
convictions and violent behavior in prison for the current offenses
to find dismissal of the enhancements would endanger the public.
Nor do we find the court failed to exercise its discretion according
to fixed legal principles. (See People v. Superior Court (Alvarez),
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977.)
Defendant provides no authority requiring any other
category of evidence. However, he points out he was 55 years old
at the time of his resentencing and claims he will not live to see a
release date under current laws. Citing section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2), he concludes striking the additional 40 years’ worth of
enhancements, or even a portion of 40 years, would not endanger
public safety. Defendant’s point is unclear. The People
understand defendant as arguing that dismissal of the
enhancements could not endanger public safety because even if
the court had dismissed them, defendant’s sentence would still be
so long that he could not possibly serve it in his lifetime; and they
point out that a defendant in this circumstance would be entitled
to dismissal of all enhancements whenever the resulting sentence
exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy. Again, defendant cites
no authority for either proposition. We have found no authority
for the requirement of dismissing an enhancement whenever the
resulting sentence exceeds a defendant’s life expectancy
regardless of whether it would or would not be in furtherance of
justice.

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Nor has defendant shown that no substantial evidence
supported the trial court’s declining to dismiss the
enhancements. In his reply brief defendant acknowledges
Walker’s holding in essence that if the court does not find a
danger to public safety, the court may still determine dismissal is
not in furtherance of justice if it “finds substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance . . . .’” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.) As
the People observe, substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors is found defendant’s prison file, which
reflects that between 2016 and 2021 he was involved in
numerous violent incidents: several batteries, possession of
weapons, and drug use, including methamphetamine. The
People point to defendant’s criminal history reflected in his
probation report that was before the trial court, noting it also
provided substantial evidence that defendant had several
sustained petitions as a juvenile; was convicted of several
offenses as an adult, including the 1989 robbery conviction and
2001 assault convictions that were the basis of the prior serious
felony enhancements; that defendant served numerous jail terms
and four prison terms; and that he committed the current
offenses when he was on parole.
The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that defendant
continues to be a violent person, has made little or no progress
toward rehabilitation in more than 16 years in custody, and is
unlikely to do so in the future, such that the trial court could
reasonably conclude that it would not be in furtherance of justice
to dismiss his enhancements.

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Defendant takes issue with the People’s claim that if the
trial court erred, it was harmless, thus implying that it was
prejudicial. “‘[B]ecause the error is purely one of state law, the
Watson harmless error test applies.’” (People v. Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 811.) Thus, it is defendant’s burden to demonstrate
a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a more
favorable result under the test for prejudice of People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Hernandez (2011) 51
Cal.4th 733, 746.) Defendant makes no effort to show or even
present an argument regarding prejudice, he has not met his
burden. In any event, given the overwhelming evidence
supporting the trial court’s exercise of discretion, we find no
reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a
more favorable result if the trial court had expressly considered
the section 1385 factors in mitigation, detailed its reasoning, and
enunciated its ruling orally on the record.
Defendant also claims he was denied due process, but as he
made no constitutional argument below, and makes none here,
we have found no error, and we do not reach that claim. (See
People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 443–444; People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435–439.)

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:

LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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