People v. Dean CA3

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Filed 4/24/25 P. v. Dean CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

THE PEOPLE, C098126

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos.
STKCRFE19930006815 &
v. SC056619A )

ANTHONY LAMAR DEAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Anthony Lamar Dean appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing
after an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d).1 He
contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he is guilty of felony murder beyond a

1 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 as
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
statute. Although defendant filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we cite the
current section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

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reasonable doubt. We agree. As we explain, because the personal use of a firearm
allegations were dismissed and functioned as an acquittal of those allegations, we are
precluded from considering facts that defendant used a gun that day or was the actual
killer. Accordingly, defendant’s participation in the armed robbery consisted of sharing
his gun with codefendant Tim Jones but, when a struggle ensued between the victim and
codefendant, defendant ran away before the murder. Apart from the threat of violence
inherent to any armed robbery, there is no evidence that defendant’s participation in the
felony supports a conclusion that he knowingly created and then disregarded a grave risk
of death. (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins).) In short, this encounter
was a “garden variety armed robbery” and defendant is entitled to be resentenced. (See
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 617 (Clark).)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant of murder (§ 187) and second degree robbery (§ 211)
and found true the special circumstance allegation of felony-murder (§ 190.2). The jury
was unable to reach a finding on whether defendant personally used a firearm in the
commission of both crimes (§ 12022.5), and the court struck those allegations. The trial
court sentenced defendant to life without parole on the murder and three concurrent years
on the robbery. After defendant appealed, we affirmed his conviction and modified his
sentence to stay the three-year robbery term. (People v. Dean, C019620, May 28, 1996
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2020, defendant filed the instant petition under section 1172.6. The trial court
issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the
prosecution submitted its own partially complete copies of trial transcripts and two audio
recordings of police interviews, through which the following was adduced.
In November 1992, a 20-year-old man (victim) cashed his paycheck and went to
buy beer at a liquor store. Because he was underage, victim asked defendant and
codefendant to buy the beer for him. Defendant, who “needed some money,” and

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codefendant saw the cash in victim’s wallet and decided to rob him. During the robbery,
one of the perpetrators shot victim. Both defendant and codefendant fled. Victim died
from a single .32 caliber gunshot wound to the chest. Fingerprints from both defendant
and codefendant were found at the scene.
Defendant went to his aunt’s home. His cousins (cousin 1 and cousin 2) were
there. He was scared, out of breath, and asked cousin 1 to dispose of the shirt he had
been wearing. Defendant put on a different shirt and hat and said, “You ain’t seen me and
you ain’t heard from me.” Cousin 1 cut up and burned defendant’s shirt in the fireplace
because it was “evidence.”
After the shooting, defendant’s friend (friend) was in a car with defendant and
codefendant and overheard defendant ask codefendant why codefendant shot victim when
all he had to do was get the money. Codefendant said he had to shoot victim so victim
would not get the gun and shoot him. Defendant thought he saw more in victim’s wallet
than codefendant said he took, and codefendant thought he should get more because he
shot victim and defendant ran away. Defendant said he ran away because he saw victim
knock the gun out of codefendant’s hand. Friend saw a gun in codefendant’s waistband
and it looked like defendant’s black .38 or .32 caliber gun. About a month prior to the
shooting, defendant’s cousin (cousin 3) saw defendant with a .32 caliber “black short and
a .357 magnum.”
Defendant left the state.
At trial, defendant’s mother provided a recording of codefendant admitting he
robbed and shot victim. She received several threats from someone incarcerated with
codefendant warning her that no one should testify against codefendant. She heard that
codefendant was associated with a gang and she was afraid of retaliation.
Aunt was also afraid of codefendant. When asked if codefendant was “pretty
violent,” she responded, “ugly.” Codefendant also threatened to shoot cousin 3 if he said
anything to the police.

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Cousin 1, who had seen defendant with a chrome-plated gun a day or two before
the shooting, was afraid of defendant. Another witness said she was threatened against
testifying about defendant at trial.
The trial court found that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference in the armed
robbery of victim, which led to his murder.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
Twenty-five years after defendant was sentenced, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) “ ‘to more equitably sentence
offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448.) “Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the
intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were ‘major participant[s] in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of . . . [s]ection 190.2’—that is, the statute defining the felony-murder
special circumstance. ( . . . § 189, subd. (e)(3).)” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708.) After defendant’s conviction became final, People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522) “substantially clarified the law governing findings
under . . . section 190.2, subdivision (d): Banks elucidated what it means to be a major
participant and, to a lesser extent, what it means to act with reckless indifference to
human life, while Clark further refined the reckless indifference inquiry.” (Strong, at
pp. 706-707.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for defendants with eligible
murder convictions to seek retroactive relief under the amended law. (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Under section 1172.6, if a petitioner makes a prima facie showing

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of entitlement to relief, the trial court must issue an order to show cause (§ 1172.6, subd.
(c)) and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving
“beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder”
under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
We review a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition for substantial
evidence. (People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 42.) We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence,
whether direct or circumstantial. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022;
see also Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 610.)
II
Dismissal of Firearm Allegations
Defendant contends he was functionally acquitted of the personal use of a firearm
allegations and, accordingly, the trial court was precluded from considering evidence that
he used a gun or was the actual killer. We agree.
Section 1385 dismissals should not be construed as an acquittal for legal
insufficiency unless the record clearly indicates the trial court applied the substantial
evidence standard. (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271, 273.) If the jury was
not able to reach a verdict and the trial court rules the evidence is insufficient as a matter
of law to sustain a conviction, the ruling bars retrial even if the ruling is patently
erroneous or the court has no statutory authority to make it. (Id. at pp. 270-271.) “The
court’s stated reason for dismissing the allegation ‘is the strongest evidence of the
grounds for the dismissal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hampton (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1092,
1105.)
Here, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on allegations that defendant
personally used a firearm and the prosecutor filed a memorandum requesting the court
strike the allegations for insufficiency of the evidence. A minute order states “pursuant to
a memorandum received . . . it is hereby ordered that allegations pursuant to 12022.5 be

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stricken.” Contrary to the People’s argument, the record indicates the basis for the trial
court’s ruling. Because the order specifically references the memorandum, and the
memorandum itself requested striking the allegations for insufficiency of the evidence,
we conclude this was a dismissal based on the insufficiency of the evidence, which acts
as the functional equivalent of an acquittal. (See People v. Hampton, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106 [the original trial court’s dismissal of a special circumstances
allegation for “insufficiency of the evidence” acted as the equivalent of an acquittal for
purposes of resentencing eligibility considerations under section 1172.6].)
Accordingly, because we are precluded from considering evidence that defendant
personally used a firearm during the robbery, we have omitted the facts supporting such a
conclusion. (Cf. People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 465 [“If the jury has made a
factual finding, and it is issue preclusive under the principles described above, a court
must give effect to that finding”]; see also People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003,
1017-1020 [jury’s not true finding on the allegation that the defendant personally used a
firearm barred the court from concluding in a section 1172.6 resentencing proceeding that
she did use a firearm].)
III
Felony Murder
Defendant contends that, at most, the evidence shows he participated in a
spontaneous armed robbery, but the evidence does not show that his participation was
major or that he harbored a willingness to kill to achieve a distinct aim and thus does not
satisfy the elements of felony murder. We need not decide whether defendant was a
major participant because we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support that
he exhibited reckless indifference to human life. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 611.)
A. Additional Background
The resentencing court found that when victim asked defendant and codefendant
to buy beer for him, they “became aware of the large sum of money that was in [victim’s]

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wallet and decided to rob him” and defendant agreed to the plan. The court inferred that
codefendant had defendant’s gun on the night of the shooting. The court also stated,
“with regard to the awareness of the particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime,
there [were] a lot of statements made after the events with regarding [codefendant], his
propensity for violence,” including a discussion regarding codefendant’s association with
a prison gang. The court also found defendant’s post-robbery conduct significant,
including running away after the shooting, obtaining a new shirt and hat, directing his
cousins to destroy his shirt and pretend that they hadn’t seen him, and splitting the money
with codefendant before leaving town. The court expressly and repeatedly assumed
defendant was not the actual killer.
B. Analysis
Reckless indifference to human life is “ ‘implicit in knowingly engaging in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 616.) It “encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a
distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome
of his actions.” (Id. at p. 617.) In this context, recklessness has both a subjective and an
objective component. (Ibid.) Subjectively, “ ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and
willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’
and he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions
create.’ [Citation].” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Objectively, recklessness is
determined by whether defendant’s conduct “ ‘involved a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the actor’s situation would observe.’ ”
(Clark, at p. 617.)
We consider a number of factors in determining whether the evidence is sufficient
to establish reckless indifference: (1) the use and number of weapons and the defendant’s
knowledge of them, (2) the defendant’s physical presence at the scene of the killing and
opportunities to stop the crime or aid the victim, (3) the duration of the felony,

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(4) defendant’s knowledge that his criminal partner was likely to kill, and (5) the
defendant’s effort to minimize the risk of the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-
623.) As with the major participant factors, “ ‘[n]o one of these considerations is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’ ” (Id. at p. 618.) “Since Clark,
courts have discerned an additional factor that may be relevant to the reckless
indifference analysis — the defendant’s youth.” (People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
546, 558.)
Applying the Clark factors here, the evidence supports the inference that
defendant had knowledge of the single firearm used in the armed robbery and even, at
some point, shared it with codefendant. About a month before the shooting, defendant
had a black gun that was the same caliber firearm that killed victim and, after the
shooting, codefendant had a black firearm in his waistband that looked like defendant’s
gun. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 626 [we must accept reasonable inferences].)
The use of a firearm during an armed robbery is an important consideration but, as the
Supreme Court in Clark stated, there must be something “in the plan that one can point to
that elevated the risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed robbery” to
show reckless indifference for human life. (Id. at p. 623.) We do not have elevating
circumstances here, particularly where the robbery was spontaneous and short-lived.
“Proximity to the murder and the events lea ding up to it may be particularly
significant where . . . the murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of several
intermediate steps, or where the participant who personally commits the murder exhibits
behavior tending to suggest a willingness to use lethal force.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 619.) Although defendant was present at the start of the robbery, defendant said he
ran away when he saw victim knock the gun out of defendant’s hand.2 This evidence

2 Because defendant was functionally acquitted of personal use of a firearm, we do
not consider cousin 3’s statement that he saw defendant shoot the victim.

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demonstrates he was not present to intervene with codefendant’s later use of lethal force.
(Compare Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620 [facts supported a lack of reckless
indifference where the defendant was not present during the shooting and there was no
evidence to suggest he instructed use lethal force and had no opportunity to prevent the
victim’s killing] with People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 594 [the defendant’s
act of robbing the victim while the victim lay bleeding unambiguously showed
indifference].) Thus, the resentencing court’s finding that defendant ran away after the
shooting is not supported by the evidence. Indeed, the People appear to concede this
point.
Further, to the extent the trial court relied on codefendant’s dangerousness as
evidence that defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death by participating in the
robbery with him, that is unsupported by substantial evidence. Although the evidence
showed that codefendant or his associates threatened witnesses against implicating him at
trial, the record does not disclose any reason why codefendant should have been
considered dangerous apart from those warnings not to testify. The nature and timing of
those warnings sheds little light on whether codefendant was dangerous at the time of the
robbery. And although aunt described codefendant as “ugly” when asked if he was
“pretty violent,” no context is provided for aunt’s description. Nor is there any evidence
defendant knew of codefendant’s “ugl[iness]” or evidence regarding the nature of
defendant’s relationship with codefendant such that we can infer defendant’s knowledge
when he agreed to rob victim. Even if defendant had knowledge codefendant was prone
to some degree of violence, “[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to satisfy the reckless indifference to
human life element. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 682.) Here, not even codefendant’s
admissions show proclivity to violence as he explained that he shot victim so that he
would not be shot.

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Similarly, the evidence does not establish that defendant himself was dangerous
such that his participation in the armed robbery demonstrated disregard of a grave risk of
death created by his actions. Cousin 1 admitted she was afraid of defendant, but there is
no evidence as to why. Although another witness said she was threatened and warned not
to testify against defendant, there is no evidence that defendant instigated these threats,
was aware of them, or had the inclination to carry them out.
As to defendant’s post-robbery actions, the evidence does not shed any light on
whether defendant knowingly created then disregarded a grave risk of death. (Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679.) To be sure, he changed his clothes, ordered the destruction of
evidence, divided the proceeds of the robbery with codefendant, and left town. Yet even
viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling, this evidence shows an after-the-fact
consciousness of guilt for the robbery that resulted in a killing. We do not ascertain any
indication of defendant’s knowledge that the violent manner in which the robbery would
be committed carried a grave risk of death. (See People v. Guiffreda (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 112, 130; see also In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559 [behavior
after the fact may reveal indifference to the victim’s death, while reprehensible, does not
show he acted with reckless disregard to the risk to human life posed by the felony].)
Indeed, after the shooting, defendant expressed surprise, asking codefendant why he shot
victim when all he had to do was get the money.
Our Supreme Court explained that the phrase “garden variety armed robbery”
applies when “the only factor supporting reckless indifference to human life is the fact of
the use of a gun.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617, fn. 74.) The circumstances of this
case fit that definition. The shooting was unplanned and happened after the gun fell
during a struggle when victim resisted during the robbery. As defendant fled before the
use of lethal force and there was no other indicia of dangerousness, defendant’s actions
do not demonstrate a willingness to kill to achieve the robbery. (Id. at p. 618.)

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In light of our conclusion that defendant is entitled to be resentenced, we need not
address his remaining arguments.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The case is remanded to the trial court to vacate defendant’s
murder conviction and resentence him accordingly.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
MAURO, J.

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