CourtListener 10384476•People v. Juarez CA2/1
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Filed 4/24/25 P. v. Juarez CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B335513
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A037924)
v.
ALEX JUAREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, James D. Otto, Judge. Affirmed.
California Appellate Project, Nancy Gaynor and Sydney
Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 1987, then 18-year-old Alex Juarez pleaded guilty to one
count of second degree murder for his role in aiding and abetting
the killing of Sandra La Fountain. The trial court sentenced Juarez
to 15 years to life in prison.
More than 30 years later, Juarez filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6. After
appointing counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial
court denied the petition. We affirmed the denial on appeal.
(People v. Juarez (Nov. 30, 2021, B311226) [nonpub. opn.] (Juarez).)
Juarez then filed another section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.
The court denied this second petition without appointing counsel or
holding a hearing, concluding that Juarez was “abus[ing] . . . the
petition process.”
Juarez now asks us to reverse the summary denial of his
second resentencing petition. The Attorney General concedes the
trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel for Juarez, but urges
the error was harmless because the doctrine of collateral estoppel
bars Juarez’s successive petition. (See People v. Farfan (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 942, 956 (Farfan) [error in summarily denying
section 1172.6 petition is harmless unless the petitioner
demonstrates “a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the proceeding would have been . . . different had the . . . court
appointed counsel”].)
Juarez counters that collateral estoppel does not apply here
because (1) the prosecution produced key evidence in the case—
a recording of detectives’ interview of Daniel Saucedo, allegedly
an eyewitness to the murder—only after the hearing on Juarez’s
first resentencing petition, and (2) after the court denied Juarez’s
first petition, the substantive law governing youthful offenders in
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
section 1172.6 proceedings changed. Juarez contends further
that applying collateral estoppel principles in this case would
run counter to public policy considerations by “incentiviz[ing]
the withholding of damaging evidence.”
We conclude, however, that Juarez has not met his burden
of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the court would
not have denied his second petition had it appointed counsel and
received argument against application of the collateral estoppel
doctrine. (See Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 956.) The
prosecution produced a police report summarizing the Saucedo
interview years before the hearing on Juarez’s first resentencing
petition, and Juarez attempts no showing that the recording of
the Saucedo interview differs in any material respect from the
police report’s summary. The changes in substantive law to which
Juarez points concern only implied malice, whereas the court here
determined, in its order denying Juarez’s first resentencing petition
after a hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), that
Juarez harbored express malice. And we are not persuaded that
public policy considerations counsel against the application of
collateral estoppel in Juarez’s case.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
In September 1987, the district attorney charged Juarez
with the murder of La Fountain (§ 187, subd. (a)). At Juarez’s
preliminary hearing, investigating detective Roland Drouin testified
that he had conducted recorded interviews of two eyewitnesses to
the murder: Daniel Saucedo and Julio Garcia.
2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
3
According to Detective Drouin, Saucedo stated during
his interview that he saw La Fountain in her car near the
corner of 254th Street and Petroleum Avenue in Harbor City.
As La Fountain approached the corner, she waved money in the
air, attracting the attention of a group of young men. The group,
which included Juarez, surrounded the car and attempted to take
the money. Saucedo told Detective Drouin that he saw Juarez
stab La Fountain once or twice, and that another man, Clemente
Estrada, then fired one round from a handgun at La Fountain.
Detective Drouin testified that Garcia had provided a substantially
identical description of the murder.
During his testimony, Detective Drouin refreshed his
recollection with two police reports (one corresponding to each
eyewitness) documenting his interviews with Saucedo and Garcia.
On cross-examination, Officer Drouin conceded that the police
reports do not consist of verbatim transcriptions of the interview
recordings, but testified that the reports do reflect the “main
ingredients” of the interviews.
The prosecution also called Saucedo and Garcia to testify
at the preliminary hearing. Each denied witnessing the murder
or participating in any interviews with law enforcement.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties stipulated
that La Fountain’s autopsy established she had suffered a single,
nonfatal stab wound to the back and a fatal gunshot wound to the
left side of her chest. The prosecutor argued that the evidence
demonstrated that Juarez was guilty of La Fountain’s murder
“under an aider and abettor theory,” arguing further that an
“aider’s and abettor’s liability extend[s] to the natural and
reasonable consequences of acts he knowingly and intentionally
aided or encouraged.” The trial court held Juarez to answer on the
murder charge.
4
In October 1987, Juarez pleaded guilty to one count of
second degree murder. Juarez’s counsel stipulated to a factual
basis for the plea “based upon [his] reading of the police reports
and preliminary hearing transcript[ ].” In addition, Juarez
personally agreed at the plea hearing that he had aided and
abetted La Fountain’s murder:
“[Prosecutor]: Mr. Juarez, is it true on August 2, 1987, you
aided and abetted in the crime of murder; that is, the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought, that being
Sandra La Fountain . . . , a human being? Is that true, sir?
“[Juarez]: Yes.”
Thirty years later, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1437) “ ‘to amend
the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not
act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959
(Lewis).) As a result, except as permitted under the felony murder
doctrine (see § 189), “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal
in a crime shall act with malice aforethought,” which “shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The Legislature, however, left intact
liability for directly aiding and abetting another in committing
murder with express malice. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 462.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also added section 1172.6, which
provides a procedure whereby “convicted murderers who could not
be convicted under the law as amended” may petition to have their
convictions vacated and be resentenced on any remaining counts.
5
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) If a section 1172.6 petition
contains all the required information, including “[a] declaration
by the petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for relief,” the trial
court must appoint counsel, if requested (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(1)(A)
& (b)(3)); the prosecutor must “file and serve a response” to the
petition, to which the petitioner may reply (§ 1172.6, subd. (c));
and “[a]fter the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings,
the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.)
If the petitioner has demonstrated a prima facie case, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder under California law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (d)(1) & (d)(3).)
In January 2019, Juarez filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel to
represent Juarez, and the prosecution filed an opposition to the
petition.
In addition to the section 1172.6 petition, Juarez filed
a discovery request for “[a]ll reports and witness statements,
and recordings prepared relating to the [murder]”—including
the recordings of the Saucedo and Garcia interviews, which the
prosecution had not previously disclosed. (Boldface omitted.) The
trial court granted the motion. At the discovery compliance hearing
on October 27, 2020, the prosecution did not produce the recordings
and reported it could not locate any further discovery responsive to
Juarez’s request.
On February 22, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on
Juarez’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition and determined that
he had made a prima facie case for relief. That same day, the court
6
held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The prosecution
presented no new evidence at the hearing, relying instead on the
record of conviction.
Juarez testified on his own behalf. He said that on the night
of the murder, he and several others approached La Fountain’s car,
expecting she would want to buy drugs. La Fountain appeared
“jittery,” as if she were under the influence of drugs, and was
leaning forward toward the steering wheel. She asked, “Can I get
something for 50?” Someone else said, “Where is the money at?”
La Fountain asked to see the drugs before she produced her money.
At that point, a glass bottle hit La Fountain’s car. La Fountain
jerked backwards into Juarez’s pocketknife, which he had been
holding “inside of the car.” Someone pulled Juarez away from the
car, and he walked away from the scene. Juarez testified that he
did not hear a gunshot and was not aware that La Fountain had
been killed until he was arrested.
The court took the matter under submission and denied the
petition in a subsequent written ruling, explaining that it “did not
find much of [Juarez’s] testimony credible.” The court concluded
further that it was “persuaded that the People have proved and
could have proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that [Juarez]
was guilty of murder as a ‘major participant’ who acted with
‘reckless indifference to human life’ and that [Juarez] harbored an
intent to kill when he aided and abetted the murder of Sandra La
Fountain.” It therefore denied Juarez’s section 1172.6 resentencing
petition. On appeal, we affirmed the denial. (See Juarez, supra,
B311226.)
Following the denial of his resentencing petition, Juarez,
representing himself, filed a habeas petition again seeking
discovery from the prosecution. At the November 9, 2022 hearing
on the habeas petition, the prosecutor gave all discovery in the
7
possession of his office and the Los Angeles Police Department—
including the recording of detectives’ interview with Saucedo—to
Juarez’s representative.3 The court advised Juarez at the hearing:
“If you wish to, based on the new discovery, try and make a case for
it or file some other resentencing petition or habeas petition, you
have to file it. Okay? We don’t have anything pending.”
On September 5, 2023, Juarez filed a second section 1172.6
petition. The petition consisted only of a preprinted form on
which Juarez had checked boxes attesting to his eligibility for
section 1172.6 relief. Thus, although facially valid, the petition
failed to identify any purportedly new facts or changed conditions
that might support Juarez’s filing of a new resentencing petition.
The court summarily denied this second section 1172.6
petition without appointing counsel for Juarez, explaining:
“After . . . [an] evidentiary hearing[,] this court [previously] found
that . . . [Juarez] was guilty of murder as a ‘major participant’ who
acted with ‘reckless indifference to human life’ and that [Juarez]
harbored an intent to kill when he aided and abetted the murder
of Sandra La Fountain. Accordingly, [Juarez’s first section 1172.6]
petition was denied. [Juarez] . . . seeks to take a second bit[e] at
the apple without showing any basis for such. This is an abuse of
the petition process.”
Juarez timely appealed.
3 The parties do not explain, and the record does not disclose,
why the Saucedo interview recording was not previously produced
to Juarez. According to a declaration from the Los Angeles Police
Department detective assigned to collect the discovery, no copy of
the Garcia interview recording could be located.
8
DISCUSSION
The parties agree, as do we, that the trial court erred by
failing to appoint counsel for Juarez before denying his second
section 1172.6 petition. (See § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) [“if the petitioner
has requested counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent
the petitioner” in connection with a facially valid petition].) The
parties dispute, however, whether the error was prejudicial.
(See People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1239
(Beaudreaux) [failure to appoint counsel in section 1172.6
proceedings subject to harmless error review].)
The Attorney General contends that the court’s failure to
appoint counsel was harmless because the doctrine of collateral
estoppel4 bars Juarez’s second section 1172.6 petition. (See
Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1239 [collateral estoppel
principles, which prohibit “ ‘ “ ‘relitigat[ion of] identical issue[s],’ ” ’ ”
barred the defendant’s resentencing petition].) As a result, the
Attorney General urges, there is no “reasonable probability that
the outcome of the proceeding would have been . . . different had the
[trial] court appointed counsel.” (Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 956.)
Juarez does not contest the Attorney General’s assertion that
the threshold requirements for application of the collateral estoppel
doctrine are met here. (See Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1240.) He contends, however, that the doctrine nonetheless
does not apply, in light of (1) the newly available Saucedo
interview recording, and (2) appellate decisions postdating his first
4 Although the modern term for collateral estoppel is issue
preclusion, we refer to the doctrine as collateral estoppel to be
consistent with the terminology used by the parties. (See People v.
Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 997, fn. 3.)
9
resentencing hearing “recognizing the relevance of a defendant’s
youth to the determination whether he acted with malice.”
(See United States Golf Assn. v. Arroyo Software Corp. (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 607, 616 (Arroyo) [“[c]ollateral estoppel does not apply
where there are changed conditions or new facts [that] did not exist
at the time of the prior judgment, or where the previous decision
was based on different substantive law”].) Juarez contends further
that applying collateral estoppel principles in this case would run
counter to public policy considerations.
We do not find Juarez’s contentions persuasive. First,
Juarez fails to demonstrate that the belated disclosure of the
Saucedo interview recording constitutes a “new fact[ ]” or “changed
condition[ ]” sufficient to preclude application of collateral estoppel.
(See Arroyo, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) Juarez concedes that
he possessed a copy of the police report summarizing the Saucedo
interview prior to the hearing on his first resentencing petition, and
Juarez does not assert that the recording of the interview differs in
any material respect from the police report’s summary. Nor has
Juarez requested that we receive the recording—which is not part
of the trial court or appellate records—as evidence on appeal, to
enable us to review the recording ourselves in evaluating his claim
of prejudice. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(c)(1) [“[a] party
may move that the reviewing court take evidence”].) All that is
available to us in the appellate record is an image of a compact disc
labeled “Daniel Saucedo.” Juarez thus has not met his burden of
demonstrating a reasonable probability that, if the trial court had
appointed counsel and heard argument concerning the Saucedo
interview recording, the court would not have summarily denied the
second resentencing petition. (See Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 956.)
10
Second, the recent appellate authorities to which Juarez
points discuss the relevance of a defendant’s youth in section 1172.6
proceedings only with respect to whether the defendant acted
with (1) reckless indifference to human life, or (2) implied malice—
i.e., with disregard for life and with knowledge that the conduct
endangers the life of another. (See Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1007; People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 413.)5
These decisions reason that a trial court should consider a
defendant’s age in determining whether the defendant harbored
one of the aforementioned mental states because “youth is relevant
to a criminal defendant’s ability to perceive [the] risk[s] and
consequences” of his or her conduct. (Pittman, supra,
96 Cal.App.5th at p. 417; see Jimenez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1003–1004 [discussing Pittman with approval].)
Here, however, the trial court found in its order denying
Juarez’s first section 1172.6 petition that Juarez acted with express
5 Juarez also cites to People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834,
846 [noting the Legislature’s consideration of scientific evidence
that neurological development continues into a person’s mid-20s],
Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 465 [“mandatory life
without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel
and unusual punishments’ ”], and People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1361 [“Miller requires a trial court, in exercising
its sentencing discretion, to consider the ‘distinctive attributes
of youth’ and how those attributes ‘diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile
offenders’ before imposing life without parole on a juvenile
offender”].) None of these authorities, however, involves a
section 1172.6 resentencing proceeding. And Juarez has forfeited
any argument premised on Miller or Gutierrez, as those decisions
predated the filing of his first resentencing petition by several
years.
11
malice—i.e., the intent to kill. Because a defendant who acts
with express malice intends that his or her conduct result in death,
a finding of express malice does not clearly implicate the same
concerns that arise when evaluating whether a youthful defendant’s
perception of risk supports a finding of implied malice. Juarez
points to no authority requiring a court to consider youth when
determining whether a defendant acted with express malice. And
in the absence of such authority, we decline to extend the reasoning
in Pittman and Jimenez to the court’s finding of express malice
here.
Third, and finally, we are not persuaded that public policy
considerations counsel against application of the collateral estoppel
doctrine in this case. (See Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 950
[“[a]pplication of collateral estoppel is not automatic, but is subject
to public policy considerations”].) Juarez urges that applying
the doctrine here, where the prosecution belatedly produced the
Saucedo interview recording, would “incentivize[ ] the withholding
of damaging evidence.” But as set forth, ante, Juarez has not
attempted any showing that the Saucedo interview recording
differs materially from the timely disclosed summary of that
interview. The record therefore does not support that this case
involves an effort by the prosecution to withhold damaging
evidence.
Accordingly, Juarez demonstrates no prejudice from the trial
court’s summary denial of his second section 1172.6 petition. We
therefore affirm.
12
DISPOSITION
The September 14, 2023 order denying Juarez’s second
section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
M. KIM, J.
13
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