CourtListener 10382848•People v. Macias CA4/3
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Filed 4/23/25 P. v. Macias CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062802
v. (Super. Ct. No. 19HF0749)
JOSE ANTONIO MACIAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly K. Menninger, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Michael J. Patty, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jose Antonio Macias appeals from his conviction of 18 counts of
sexual crimes against five of his grandchildren. He contends: (1) insufficient
evidence supported his convictions of forcible lewd acts in counts 2 and 3; (2)
the jury instruction regarding Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome
(CSAAS) testimony was improper; (3) the trial court erred when it permitted
the jury to consider charged offenses as propensity evidence for the other
charged sexual offenses; (4) the trial court did not recognize its discretion to
impose concurrent sentences on counts 2 and 3; and (5) his sentence
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
We reject Macias’s challenges to his conviction. With respect to
his claim of sentencing error, however, the Attorney General concedes the
trial court incorrectly concluded that consecutive sentences on counts 2 and 3
were mandatory. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court to
determine the appropriate sentence on counts 2 and 3 but otherwise affirm.
FACTS
We relate only those facts relevant to Macias’s challenges to his
conviction.
When Macias’s granddaughter J.M. was nine years old, she spent
one night sharing a bed with her brother, grandmother, and Macias. When
she got up to use the bathroom, her grandmother and brother were gone.
Macias grabbed J.M.’s wrists and pulled her back onto the bed. She explained
that Macias “kind of threw [her] down.” Macias touched J.M. several times
after he pulled her down. First, he touched her thigh, which was charged as
Count 2. Second, he touched her breast, which was charged as Count 3.
Macias then put his other hand inside her shorts to touch her vagina. J.M.
told Macias to stop, pushed his hands away, and ran to the bathroom. A sixth
grandchild testified as to additional uncharged sexual crimes. The charges
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included 15 counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14
(Pen. Code1 § 288, subd. (a), counts 1, 5–13, 15–19); one count of attempting
to commit a lewd or lascivious act with a child under the age of 14
(§§ 664/288, subd. (a); count 14); two counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child
(§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 2 and 3); and one count of oral copulation or sexual
penetration of a child 10 years or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); count 4).
At trial, the court admitted, over Macias’s objection, expert
testimony by Dr. Jody Ward, a clinical and forensic psychologist. She
explained CSAAS evidence is used to describe and explain five characteristic
behaviors commonly found in children who have been sexually abused: (1)
secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed,
conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction. CSAAS is a tool to
understand why children who have allegedly been sexually abused behave as
they do because their behaviors might otherwise seem counterintuitive or
evidence of untruthfulness.
The trial court instructed the jury with a slightly modified
CALCRIM No. 1193: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Jody Ward
regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that may be
present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the accommodation
syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of
child sexual abuse. [¶] Dr. Jody Ward’s testimony about child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed any
of the crimes or allegations charged against him or any conduct or crimes
1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
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witness [A.M.] testified to with which he was not charged. [¶] You may
consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not witnesses referred to
in Counts 1–19’s conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone who has
been molested, and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.”
The prosecution argued to the jury that it could consider the
charged crimes as propensity evidence to support Macias’s conviction of the
other charged offenses in the same case. The trial court instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 1191B: “The People presented evidence that the
defendant committed the crimes of: [¶] Lewd Act Upon a Child Under 14 as
charged in Counts 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19; [¶] Forcible
Act on a Child Under 14 as charged in Counts 2 and 3; [¶] Penetration With a
Child 10 Years or Younger as charged in Count 4; [¶] Attempted Lewd Act
Upon a Child Under 14 as charged in Count 14; [¶] If the People have proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed one or more of these
crimes, you may, but are not required to, conclude from the evidence that the
defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on
that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit the
charged crimes, lesser included offenses and allegations in this case. [¶] If
you find that the defendant committed one or more of these crimes, that
conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It
is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of another
crime. The People must still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”
A jury found Macias guilty of all counts except count 16. The jury
also found true the multiple victim allegation (§ 667.61, subds. (e)(4) & (j)(2))
for each of the counts other than the attempt conviction in count 14.
The trial court sentenced Macias under the One Strike law to a
term of 125 years to life plus 18 months, consisting of consecutive terms of 25
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years to life on counts 2, 3, 10, 17, and 19 and a consecutive low term of 18
months on count 14. At sentencing, the trial court stated it was “aware that
both count 2 and 3 are mandatory consecutive.” Macias did not object to
imposition of the consecutive terms on counts 2 and 3 at sentencing. The
remaining counts were ordered to run concurrently.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE CONVICTIONS
Macias contends the evidence of force or duress was insufficient
to support his convictions of forcible lewd acts on a child under age 14 in
counts 2 and 3. We conclude substantial evidence showed the crimes were
committed by use of force.2
Section 288 makes it a crime to “willfully and lewdly commit[ ]
any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member
thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of
that person or the child . . . .” (§ 288, subd. (a).) The punishment is increased
if the crime is committed “by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury . . . .” (§ 288, subd. (b)(1).)
The “force” necessary to support a conviction need only be
physical force that is “‘substantially different from or substantially greater
than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.’” (People v. Soto (2011)
51 Cal.4th 229, 242 (Soto).) “‘[A]n act is forcible if force facilitated the act
rather than being merely incidental to the act.’” (People v. Morales (2018) 29
We need not address whether the evidence was also sufficient
2
to show duress.
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Cal.App.5th 471, 480 (Morales).) “[A]cts of grabbing, holding and restraining
that occur in conjunction with the lewd acts themselves” are sufficient to
support a finding that the lewd act was committed by means of force. (People
v. Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005.)
“When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, the appellate court reviews the entire record to see
‘“whether it contains substantial evidence—i.e., evidence that is credible and
of solid value—from which a rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”’”(People v. Cochran (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 8, 12–13, disapproved on other grounds in Soto, supra, 51
Cal.4th at p. 248, fn. 12.) “We view the facts in the light most favorable to the
judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in its support.” (Cochran, at p.
13.)
J.M.’s trial testimony was substantial evidence of force. J.M.
testified that, when she attempted to get out of the bed in which she was
sleeping with Macias, he yanked her back down onto the bed by her wrists.
He then touched her breasts, thigh, and vagina. J.M. was eventually able to
push Macias off and run to the bathroom. The act of pulling J.M. down by her
wrists to restrain her and prevent her from getting off the bed was
“substantially different from or substantially greater than that necessary to
accomplish” the lewd touching itself. (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 242.)
Pulling J.M. by her wrists onto the bed ‘“facilitated the act rather than being
merely incidental to the act.’” (Morales, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 480.)
II.
THE CSAAS EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
Macias contends the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No.
1193 because it improperly allowed the jury to use the expert’s testimony
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regarding CSAAS as evidence of his guilt. Macias further contends that the
jury instruction violated his federal right to due process because it lessened
the prosecution’s burden of proof. We find no error.
CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to prove that the complaining
witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such
witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct
after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation.” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289,
1300–1301 (McAlpin).) Thus, CSAAS is relevant solely for the limited
purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged child victim. (People v.
Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069.)
We review instructional error claims under a de novo standard of
review. (People v. Fiore (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378.) “The proper test
for judging the adequacy of instructions is to decide whether the trial court
‘fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law . . . .’” (People v. Martin
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111.) Courts generally presume that a jury “can
and will dutifully follow the instructions they are given, including
instructions that limit a jury’s consideration of evidence for certain purposes
or against certain parties.” (People v. Washington (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19,
26 (Washington).)
First, Macias contends it was practically impossible for the jury
to use the CSAAS testimony to evaluate the victims’ credibility without also
using it as proof that he committed the charged crimes. We disagree.
Courts reviewing this issue have concluded that CALCRIM No.
1193 “accurately informs the jury on the limited use of CSAAS evidence” and
does not, as Macias argues, “improperly allow an alleged minor victim of
sexual abuse to corroborate her own testimony.” (See, e.g., People v. Lapenias
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(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 175.) Here, the instruction properly limited the
jury’s consideration of the CSAAS evidence, explicitly informing the jury that
it could only use the CSAAS testimony to evaluate the victims’ credibility, not
as evidence of Macias’s guilt. We presume the jury understood and followed
the trial court’s instructions. (Washington, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 26.)
Accordingly, we find that the instruction was not internally inconsistent and
did not permit an improper inference of Macias’s guilt. (People v. Gonzales
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 (Gonzales).)
Next, Macias contends the jury instruction violated his federal
right to due process. Generally, a court’s compliance with the rules of
evidence does not violate a defendant’s due process rights. (People v. Hall
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834–835.) In particular, “introduction of CSAAS
evidence does not by itself deny [Macias] due process.” (People v. Patino
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1747.)
Nor did the jury instruction lessen the prosecution’s burden to
demonstrate Macias’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. CALCRIM No. 1193
instructs the jury that the CSAAS evidence cannot be considered as evidence
of the defendant’s guilt. Thus, the prosecution must still meet its burden of
proof regardless of the admission of CSAAS testimony. (Gonzales, supra, 16
Cal.App.5th at pp. 503–504.)
III.
THE PROPENSITY EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
Macias contends that his federal due process rights were violated
when the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1191B, which
allows a jury to rely on currently charged sexual offenses to find that the
defendant had the propensity to commit other charged sexual offenses in the
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same case. Because our Supreme Court has previously rejected Macias’s
argument, we find no instructional error.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) states: “Except as
provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and 1109, evidence
of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form
of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or
her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.”
An exception to the prohibition on admission of character
evidence is found in Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a), which
provides, “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or
offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”
Macias’s due process argument is foreclosed by People v. Villatoro
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1168–1169, in which our Supreme Court held that
Evidence Code section 1108 allows the use of both uncharged and charged
sexual offenses in the same case in which the defendant is currently on trial
as propensity evidence, and that CALCRIM No. 1191B does not violate a
defendant’s right to due process. As Macias concedes, we are bound by the
decisions of the state’s highest court.3 (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
3 Macias raised this claim solely to preserve his right to present
the issue in federal court.
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IV.
THE COURT MUST EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION WHEN SENTENCING
ON COUNTS 2 AND 3
Macias contends, and the Attorney General concedes, the trial
court erred in concluding that consecutive sentences for the forcible lewd acts
against victim J.M. in counts 2 and 3 were mandatory. We therefore vacate
the sentences on counts 2 and 3 and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings.
California’s One Strike law “mandates an indeterminate sentence
of 15 or 25 years to life in prison when the jury has convicted the defendant of
a specified felony sex crime (§ 667.61) and has also found certain factual
allegations to be true (§ 667.61, subds. (d), (e)).” (People v. Anderson (2009) 47
Cal.4th 92, 102.)
Consecutive sentences are mandatory “if the crimes . . . involve
the same victim on separate occasions.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(1).) When
determining whether the crimes occurred on separate occasions, the court
shall consider whether “the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect
upon the defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed.” (§ 667.6, subd.
(d)(2).) But if “the crimes involve the same victim on the same occasion,” the
decision whether to impose consecutive sentences is discretionary. (§ 667.6,
subd. (c).) The court may impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences.
(People v. Dearborne (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250, 265–267.)
““‘Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the
exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court. [Citations.] A
court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more
exercise that ‘informed discretion’ than one whose sentence is or may have
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been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s
record.’”“ (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.) The appropriate
remedy in such cases “is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly
indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion ‘even
if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 (Gutierrez).)
The Attorney General argues that Macias waived this claim by
failing to object below, citing People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353. We
find Scott distinguishable because Macias is not challenging the way in which
the trial court exercised its sentencing discretion but rather its apparent
misunderstanding of its sentencing authority. (See, e.g., People v. Panozo
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840.) Accordingly, Macias has not waived this
claim.
The Attorney General concedes Macias’s claim has merit if not
waived: “[T]he trial court did not make a finding as to whether the forcible
lewd acts [Macias] perpetrated against [J.M.] occurred on separate occasions.
Accordingly, the trial court’s statement that it was required to impose
consecutive sentences suggests that it was unaware of its sentencing
discretion.”
The Attorney General further notes remand is appropriate
because “there is no clear indication in the record that the trial court would
have imposed consecutive sentences on counts 2 and 3 even if it had been
aware of its discretion.” The Attorney General concludes “it is unclear how
the trial court would have imposed the terms for counts 2 and 3 had it known
it was free to impose concurrent or consecutive terms.” (See, e.g., Gutierrez,
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391 [remand required unless the record “clearly
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indicate[s]” how the court would sentence]; People v. Koback (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 912, 928.)
We agree the trial court should have the opportunity to make an
express finding regarding whether counts 2 and 3 occurred on separate
occasions and then exercise its sentencing discretion.
V.
THE SENTENCE IS NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
Macias contends his sentence of five consecutive terms of 25
years to life plus 18 months is cruel and unusual under both the United
States and California constitutions.
We conclude that this claim is waived for failure to object below.
“A claim a sentence is cruel and unusual is forfeited on appeal if it is not
raised in the trial court, because the issue often requires a fact–bound
inquiry.” (People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)
Even if the claim were properly raised, however, Macias has not
met his “considerable burden” to demonstrate that the sentence violated
either the federal or state constitutions. (People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d
169, 174.) The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that life sentences, even
for low-level theft and drug offenses, are not cruel and unusual under the
federal Constitution. (See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 77
[consecutive sentences of 25 years to life for two petty theft with prior
convictions did not violate the Eighth Amendment]; Ewing v. California
(2003) 538 U.S. 11, 18-20 [sentence of 25 years to life for stealing three golf
clubs].)
Compared to the life sentences for these less serious crimes,
Macias’s sentence of five consecutive terms of 25 years to life for 18 separate
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counts of sexual abuse is not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
offenses.
Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution also proscribes
cruel or unusual punishment. A prison sentence violates article I, section 17,
if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks
the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re
Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in People v. Caddick (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 46, 51.) To determine
whether a sentence is disproportionate under our state Constitution,
California courts generally weigh the following factors: a) the nature of the
offense and the offender, including the danger posed by both; b) the
punishment imposed compared to punishments for other offenses; and c) the
punishment imposed compared to other jurisdictions’ punishments for the
same offense. (Id. at pp. 425–429.)
The first Lynch factor weighs against Macias. Macias’s crimes are
“repugnant” and some of the “most serious”; he committed multiple sex
crimes against six of his grandchildren, some as young as age nine. (Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition (2002) 535 U.S. 234, 244.) The trial court found that
the victims were particularly vulnerable, and Macias took advantage of a
position of trust as their grandfather. Given these serious circumstances,
Macias’s lack of a prior criminal record “is not determinative.” (People v.
Christensen (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 781, 807.)
The second Lynch factor also weighs against Macias. A sentence
of 25 years to life is proportionate when compared with other crimes that
mandate similar sentences, e.g., 25 years to life for failure to register as a sex
offender. (People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1071–1072.)
Furthermore, the “penalties for single offenses . . . cannot properly be
13
compared to those for multiple offenses . . . .” (People v. Crooks (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 797, 807.)
Regarding the third Lynch factor, Macias made “no effort to
compare his sentence with . . . punishments in other states for the same
offense,” which we take “as a concession that his sentence withstands [that]
constitutional challenge . . . .” (People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th
1219, 1231.)
DISPOSITION
We reverse and remand the case to the trial court to consider
whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences on counts 2 and 3.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
MOTOIKE, J.
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