In re D.M. CA3

CourtListener 10381305Calctapp18 de abr. de 2025

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Filed 4/18/25 In re D.M. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

In re D.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile C100772
Court Law.

SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES (Super. Ct. Nos. STK-JD-DP-
AGENCY, 2023-0000369, STA-FL-CU-
SJ-2024-0002160)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.E.,

Defendant and Appellant.

The mother of minor D.M. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders granting father
full legal and physical custody, issuing a two-year restraining order, and terminating
dependency jurisdiction. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 213.5, 304, 395.)1 Mother contends

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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that (1) the restraining order must be vacated for failure to provide her with proper notice
of the request; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion in discontinuing visitation with
the minor upon termination of the dependency; and (3) the San Joaquin County Human
Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry
requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
Disagreeing, we shall affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case originated in Calaveras County. A prior dependency case was opened
there in September 2019, due to concerns regarding ongoing verbal and physical
domestic violence between mother and father, mother’s unstable mental health, and
mother’s use of methamphetamine. The minor, born in October 2017, has special needs
and is particularly vulnerable. The dependency was terminated in November 2021, with
the minor in the care and custody of both parents.
In May 2022, law enforcement officers responded twice to domestic violence
incidents between the parents. Mother disclosed multiple unreported domestic violence
incidents and admitted using methamphetamine that father had reportedly purchased for
her.
On June 15, 2022, a social worker found the family home unsanitary. That same
day, father filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order as well as full custody
of the minor, alleging mother had “lost her mind to drugs,” and was harassing him.
Father told the social worker that mother was delusional and using methamphetamine
daily. The following day, a temporary restraining order (TRO) protecting father from
mother was granted, but father’s request for full custody was denied. A protective
custody warrant was issued for the minor and, upon executing the warrant, the social
worker found a methamphetamine pipe and knife within the minor’s reach.
On June 20, 2022, Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency (CHHS)
filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minor based on the parents’ ongoing domestic

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violence, mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues, the unsafe condition of the
home, and father’s failure to protect the minor from mother’s substance abuse and mental
health issues. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations in the petition, noting the parents’ long
history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and failure to protect the minor, which was
not only ongoing, but intensifying. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court
adjudicated the minor a dependent, ordered her removed from the parents, and ordered
reunification services (§ 361, subd. (c)). Services for mother were to include counseling,
psychological evaluation, parenting education, random drug testing, a substance use
program, and a 12-step program.
Mother failed to comply with the service plan, continued using methamphetamine,
and by the time of the six-month review hearing she was in a new abusive relationship.
Father had made some progress in his service plan but not enough to return the minor to
his care. Reunification services were continued.
At the July 2023, 12-month review hearing, the court continued father’s
reunification services and terminated mother’s services, reducing her supervised
visitation.
In September 2023, CHHS recommended the minor be returned to father’s
custody with maintenance services and the matter be transferred to San Joaquin County
where father resides. Father was engaged in his case plan activities and demonstrating
healthy behavioral changes. Mother continued to demonstrate emotional and mental
instability and to send father concerning messages. In the two months since the review
hearing, eight police reports were generated regarding mother, including physical
altercations with her roommate. CHHS requested the juvenile court enter a no-contact
order protecting father, the minor (except during authorized visits) and the paternal
grandmother.

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On October 3, 2023, the juvenile court returned the minor to father with family
maintenance services. The court transferred the case to San Joaquin County and issued a
no-contact order, telling mother, “you’ll need to stay away from [father], his mother and
[minor] except for the arranged visitations.” The San Joaquin County Superior Court
accepted transfer in. Mother requested that her visits be increased and continue to occur
in Calaveras County. The court gave the Agency discretion to hold the visits in Calaveras
County but ordered the visits remain supervised once a month for one hour.
On January 31, 2024, father filed a section 388 petition for modification
requesting the juvenile court terminate its jurisdiction over the minor. On February 14,
he filed a request for a restraining order on form JV-245 in the now-current San Joaquin
County dependency case. The court issued a TRO and set the hearing to coincide with
the February 26, 2024, review hearing and the hearing on father’s petition for
modification. Both parents were ordered to attend the hearing.
Mother did not appear at the hearing. The juvenile court granted father’s request
for a restraining order protecting father and the minor from mother, terminated
dependency jurisdiction, and entered exit orders granting father full physical and legal
custody and denying mother visitation.
Mother appealed. This matter was fully briefed on December 31, 2024.
DISCUSSION
I
Issuance of Restraining Order
A juvenile court may issue two different types of restraining orders: TRO’s, which
may be issued without notice and hearing and can remain in effect for up to 25 days
(§ 213.5, subd. (c)(1)); and restraining orders issued “upon notice and a hearing” that can
remain in effect for up to three years (id., subd. (d)(1)). Mother challenges the juvenile
court’s issuance of the two-year restraining order on the basis that she was not provided
the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard. We conclude that mother had sufficient

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notice prior to the issuance of the restraining order and was provided (and availed herself
through counsel) the opportunity to be heard on the application. Thus, any error in
service was harmless.
A. Restraining Order Background
Prior to transferring the matter to San Joaquin County, the Calaveras County
Superior Court issued a no-contact order, prohibiting mother from contacting father and
the minor, but allowing for court-ordered, monthly, supervised visits. The Agency
provided copies of this order to the court and counsel and mother was present in court
when the order was issued. At the January 17, 2024, hearing in San Joaquin County, the
juvenile court explained that a restraining order would be necessary if father wanted law
enforcement to be able to enforce the no-contact order.
At that same hearing, father requested the matter be set for a review hearing and
consideration of his request that the court terminate dependency jurisdiction and award
him full custody. When a hearing date of February 8, 2024, was discussed, counsel for
the Agency expressly asked whether a restraining order request would be filed before the
hearing, so as to provide mother with notice of the request. The juvenile court
emphasized that if father was going to request a restraining order, he should file the
request immediately and set it for hearing on February 8, 2024. The court ordered, with
mother present, both parents to attend the February hearing, and explained the hearing
would proceed even if they were absent.
Mother was not present at the February 8, hearing. Her attorney requested a
continuance, stating mother had gone to the hospital for a medical emergency. The social
worker was also ill. Finding good cause, the juvenile court continued the matter to
February 26, 2024, again ordering both parents present, and again stating the hearing
would proceed if they failed to appear. The court ordered mother’s counsel to provide
mother with notice of the hearing and noted that father’s petition for modification (filed
January 31, 2024, seeking termination of dependency jurisdiction with full custody to

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father) and request for restraining order would be heard contemporaneously with the
review hearing.
On February 14, 2024, father filed a request for restraining order on a form JV-245
in the present San Joaquin County dependency case. The request represented that he had
notified mother’s counsel of the request in open court on February 8, 2024, and served on
her the domestic violence restraining order from Calaveras County. The request sought
no contact, no abuse, and stay away orders protecting father and the minor based on
mother’s abusive behavior, domestic violence, threats and harassment. The request
attached documentary evidence, including the previous request and domestic violence
restraining order from Calaveras County.
That same day, the juvenile court issued a TRO and set the hearing on the
restraining order request for February 26, 2024. As to service, the court checked the box
reading: “[X] The person in [2] must be personally served with a copy of this order and
Request for Juvenile Restraining Order (form JV-245), if form JV-245 was filed by
(date):____________[.]” No date appeared.
Mother failed to appear at the February 26, 2024, hearing. The juvenile court
called the matter on calendar for a contested review, as well as a restraining order. When
asked if counsel was ready to proceed, mother’s counsel responded that he had advised
mother of the court date and told her that she needed to be present. He had not heard
from her as to why she was not present.
Counsel represented that mother did not object to the dismissal, but she did object
to the restraining order. Counsel had discussed the request for restraining order filed in
Calaveras County with mother. He had advised her that he did not represent her in
Calaveras County, but that the Calaveras County court had issued a TRO against her.
Mother objected to a restraining order, believing insufficient evidence supported it.
Mother’s counsel represented that mother said she never talked to father or made any
comments directed to him. Counsel also objected to the restraining order based on

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incomplete notice, citing the court’s order that mother be served with the restraining order
request. Counsel remarked that he had received the restraining order request three or four
days before the hearing, while the juvenile court’s order said mother was to be personally
served five days before the hearing. The court interjected, noting that mother had been
ordered present in court for the previous hearing but had not appeared because she was
ill. The court then proceeded with the hearing on the request for a restraining order.
Mother’s counsel argued the evidence did not support issuing a restraining order,
noting he had received the 200-page request electronically three days earlier. The
juvenile court emphasized that mother had been ordered present for the hearing and
revisited with her attorney the question of whether mother knew the restraining order was
to be decided at the present hearing. Counsel noted that the request for restraining order
had not yet been filed at the time of the February 8, 2024, hearing. The court then asked
him whether he had informed mother that the restraining order was on calendar for the
present hearing. Counsel answered that he told mother that father’s attorney was asking
for a restraining order and the court may hear that request, and he told her to be present.
He also advised her of the Calaveras County request for a restraining order and gave her
the date for that hearing. Father’s counsel said he believed mother knew of the request
for a restraining order because she had discussed it with the Agency’s social worker. This
information was confirmed by the Agency’s counsel.
B. Juvenile Court’s Ruling
The juvenile court issued a two-year restraining order, finding notice proper and
the evidence sufficient. Mother was ordered to have no contact with father or the minor
and to stay 100 yards away from them.
C. Mother’s Contentions
Mother argues father was required, and failed, to personally serve her with the
restraining order application and order to show cause. She also contends that the notice

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provided to her counsel was insufficient.2 She specifically argues the notice requirement
set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (d)(2), must be incorporated
and met; this statute requires service of notice of the restraining order hearing on the
party to be restrained at least five days after the TRO or two days before the hearing.3
(Code Civ. Proc. § 527, subd. (d)(2).) We disagree that reversal is required.

2 Mother notes, in passing, that her counsel received the notice and request for the
restraining order electronically, rather than by U.S. mail. She also notes the discrepancy
between the number of pages counsel reported to have received and the fewer number of
pages the juvenile court had on file. To the extent mother contends the manner by which
counsel received the notice and request, or the substance of the documentation counsel
received, requires reversal, such contentions are forfeited because counsel failed to object
on these bases in the juvenile court and because mother failed to separately argue or
develop the issues in her opening appellate brief. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 375-376; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(B), 8.360(a) [each point in a
brief must be stated under a separate heading]; see People v. Lombardo (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 553, 565, fn. 6 [declining to address an argument “because it was not stated
under a separate heading or subheading”]; People v. McElroy (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th
874, 884, fn. 3 [same].)
3 Code of Civil Procedure section 527, subdivision (d), provides that, in the case that a
TRO is granted without notice: (1) the matter shall be made returnable on an order to
show cause generally within 15 days from the date the TRO was issued; (2) that the
applicant party “shall, within five days from the date the [TRO] is issued or two days
prior to the hearing, whichever is earlier, serve on the opposing party a copy of the
complaint if not previously served, the order to show cause stating the date, time, and
place of the hearing, any affidavits to be used in the application, and a copy of the points
and authorities in support of the application”; (3) that “[w]hen the matter first comes up
for hearing, if the party who obtained the [TRO] is not ready to proceed, or if the party
has failed to effect service as required by paragraph (2), the court shall dissolve the
[TRO]”; and (4) “The opposing party is entitled to one continuance for a reasonable
period of not less than 15 days or any shorter period requested by the opposing party, to
enable the opposing party to meet the application for a preliminary injunction. If the
opposing party obtains a continuance under this paragraph, the [TRO] shall remain in
effect until the date of the continued hearing.”

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D. Personal Service
Even assuming mother was required to be personally served with the notice of the
request for a restraining order and was not personally served, she has not established
prejudice. “No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, . . . for any
error as to any matter of pleading, . . . unless, after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
The record here supports the juvenile court’s finding that mother had both notice
of the request for a restraining order and an opportunity to be heard. Mother points to no
statutory provision requiring her to be personally served with notice of the hearing,
beyond the notice provided to her appointed counsel of record. She points only to the
checked box on the TRO indicating the applicability of the (incomplete) sentence that
reads: “[X] The person in [2] must be personally served with a copy of this order and
Request for Juvenile Restraining Order (form JV-245), if form JV-245 was filed by
(date):____________” with the date left blank.
To the extent the notice was incomplete because mother was not personally served
in accordance with the juvenile court’s form TRO, any error was harmless because
mother had actual notice of the restraining order request and the hearing date. While
mother’s counsel did object to proceeding on the request for restraining order because the
request had not been personally served on mother, he did not represent that mother did
not know of the hearing or that her attendance was required. To the contrary, in response
to the juvenile court’s direct inquiry as to whether mother’s counsel told mother the
restraining order would be heard at the February 26, 2024, hearing, counsel replied: “I
indicated to her that father’s attorney is asking for a restraining order and the Court may
hear that, your Honor. I told her that she had to be here. And then I advised her of the
Calaveras County request for a restraining order and I gave her the date that . . . [father’s
counsel] [¶] . . . [¶] indicated in court. Like I said, I told mother I do not represent her in

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that matter and she has not been served with this restraining order that he filed here.”
(Italics added.) We reject mother’s strained reading of counsel’s explanation as
establishing her counsel had provided her only with notice of when the Calaveras County
restraining order would be heard. It is clear from the portion of the explanation that we
have italicized above that counsel was first referencing the San Joaquin County case.
In sum, the record establishes mother had actual notice that the juvenile court in
San Joaquin County would hear father’s request for a restraining order at the February 26,
2024, hearing for which she failed to appear. She was ordered to be present at the
hearing. She had discussed the merits of the request for a restraining order with her
attorney prior to the hearing, who presented her position and argued on her behalf at the
hearing. Thus, any error in failure to personally serve mother, beyond the service on her
appointed counsel, was harmless and reversal is not required. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
We further reject mother’s suggestion that the failure to personally serve her
constituted structural error requiring reversal per se. Mother’s reliance on Severson &
Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938 is misplaced. In Severson, the
court issued a TRO against the responding party based on allegations he was severely
harassing Severson & Werson attorneys. (Severson, at pp. 942-944.) Service was later
effectuated on the responding party, but only four days before the scheduled hearing on
the restraining order, rather than the statutorily required five days before the hearing. (Id.
at p. 943.) The request for a restraining order was granted. (Id. at p. 944.) The
responding party did not personally attend the hearing and was not represented by
counsel. (Id. at pp. 942-944.) After being subsequently served with the final order, he
appealed, claiming the failure to serve him five days prior to the hearing voided the
court’s actions. (Id. at p. 944.) The appellate court reversed, finding the responding
party’s due process rights had been violated by failing to provide him with notice and an
opportunity to be heard and the ramifications of such failure were too speculative to
apply a harmless-error analysis. (Id. at pp. 946-951.) It also expressly limited its holding

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to circumstances where the responding party did not appear at the hearing. (Id. at p. 949,
fn. 7.)
Here, by contrast, mother was ordered to attend the hearing, and did not do so.
She was, however, represented by counsel at the hearing, and counsel had notice of the
hearing, had discussed the request for a restraining order with mother prior to the hearing,
presented mother’s position at the hearing, and challenged the evidence at the hearing.
Severson is not on point here. (C.f. Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard, supra, 37
Cal.App.5th at p. 949, fn. 7 [expressly limiting holding to circumstances where
responding party did not appear at the hearing].)
E. Timing of Service
We likewise reject mother’s contention that reversal is required because her
counsel had not been timely served with the restraining order request.
Section 213.5 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.630 govern the issuance of
restraining orders in juvenile proceedings. (See also In re L.W. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 44,
49.) While TRO’s may be issued without notice and a hearing, restraining orders may be
issued only “upon notice and a hearing.” (§ 213.5, subds. (c)(1) & (d)(1).) The specific
amount of time necessary to satisfy the “notice” requirement for a restraining order is not
delineated in section 213.5, but more than courtroom notice is required. (In re Jonathan
V. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 236, 245.) Some advance notice is required to allow counsel
the opportunity to prepare for the hearing. (See Babalola v. Superior Court (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 948, 965.)
Mother acknowledges that neither section 213.5 nor California Rules of Court,
rule 5.630, include any specific requirements for service of notice of the restraining order
hearing. Instead, relying on the language in section 213.5, subdivision (a), mother argues
requirements set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 527 must be incorporated.
Section 213.5, subdivision (a) provides that while a dependency case is pending,
the court may issue the “ex parte order . . . upon application in the manner provided by

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Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure or, if related to domestic violence, in the
manner provided by Section 6300 of the Family Code.” (§ 213.5, subd. (a), italics added;
c.f. In re E.F. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 320, 325, 327 [addressing the application of TRO notice
requirements in juvenile delinquency case not involving domestic violence].) Because
the restraining order at issue here is related to domestic violence, it appears that, by its
own terms, the procedural requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 527 do not
apply. But even assuming for the sake of argument that they do, the claim of error is
forfeited for failure to object in the juvenile court.
Applying the timing requirements in Code of Civil Procedure section 527,
subdivision (d)(2), father would have been required to serve counsel five days after
issuance of the TRO or two days before the hearing, whichever is earlier. Mother’s
counsel reported he received the documents three or four days before the February 26,
2024, hearing, while five days after the court issued the February 14, 2024, TRO would
have been approximately seven days before the hearing. Thus, mother’s counsel did not
receive the documents five days after the TRO (the earlier of the two requirements). But
mother’s counsel did not object to the timing of the service he received, nor did he
request a continuance, to which he would have been entitled. (See § 213.5, subd. (c)(2);
Code. Civ. Proc., § 527, subd. (d)(4).) Counsel did not object to time or manner of the
service, he did not represent that he was unprepared to go forward with the hearing, and
he did not request a continuance to meet the request. Instead, he noted that he had gone
through the Calaveras County request, “if they mimic the same restraining order,” and
proceeded to present mother’s position arguing against the issuance of the restraining
order. Thus, any objection to the service upon counsel of the request for restraining order
was forfeited. (In re Christopher S. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1344; People v. Smith
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852; In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411-412; see also
People v. Nguyen (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 260, 271 [claim of lack of notice can be
forfeited by failure to object even when party claims due process violation].)

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II
Visitation
Mother next contends we must reverse the exit order denying her visitation and
contact with the minor. She argues that monitored visitation with the minor is not
necessarily incompatible with the restraining order and, therefore, the juvenile court
abused its discretion in ordering no visitation. As we explain, we find no abuse of
discretion here.
A. Section 362.4 Exit Orders
When the juvenile court terminates dependency jurisdiction, it has the authority to
issue orders addressing custody and visitation. (§ 362.4; In re T.H. (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1122-1123.) Those orders focus on the minor’s best interests. (In
re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 206; In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251,
268.) “If there is a pending marital or paternity proceeding relating to the child, the
custody order will be transferred to the existing family court file. (See [§ 362.4,]
subd. (b).) Otherwise, the order may be used to open a new file in the superior court of
the county in which the parent who has been given custody resides. (See id., subd. (c).)
The order shall continue ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent order of the
superior court.’ (Id., subd. (b).)” (In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835, 863.) “An
order entered pursuant to section 362.4 is commonly referred to as an ‘exit order.’ ” (In
re Nicholas H., supra, at p. 269.)
We review custody and visitation exit orders for abuse of discretion. (Bridget A. v.
Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) Such determinations are not disturbed
in a dependency proceeding in the absence of an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
exercise of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Maya L.
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 81, 102.) A court can also abuse its discretion by committing
legal error. (See In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 161.)

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B. Analysis
Mother argues that, despite her continued drug use, her supervised visits with the
minor were generally not problematic. She adds that because monitored visitation is not
necessarily incompatible with a restraining order, the juvenile court abused its discretion
in issuing the no visitation order.
We agree that visitation is not necessarily precluded by a restraining order, but
conclude that the circumstances here were such that denying visitation was well within
the juvenile court’s discretion. During the dependency proceedings, mother’s visitation
with the minor had been professionally facilitated and supervised by the Agency. The
arrangements and minor’s transportation for the visits did not involve father’s
participation or contact with mother. Each visit, itself, was professionally supervised,
including the visit supervisor’s care of the special needs minor while waiting for mother,
who often arrived late to the visit. Now, upon termination of dependency jurisdiction, the
Agency’s facilitation and supervision of visitation would cease. There would not be a
plan in place to facilitate mother’s visits in a manner that would not involve her contact
with father or to provide safe, third-party supervision of such visits. Nor was any
alternative facilitation, supervision and safety plan proposed. Accordingly, the no
visitation order was not an abuse of discretion in this case.
To the extent appellate counsel now posits there may have been a safe way to
allow for continued visitation, proposals not before the trial court cannot be advanced for
the first time on appeal. (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676,
686.) If mother can show that she has arranged visitation that is safely facilitated and
supervised by an appropriate third party, she is not precluded from seeking a modification
of the visitation order in the family court based on change of circumstances. (§ 302,
subd. (d); see also Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1163-1164; In re
Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 714.)

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III
ICWA Compliance
Finally, mother contends conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s exit orders is
required because the juvenile court and Agency failed to fully comply with the inquiry
requirements of the ICWA. She contends various relatives could have, but were not,
contacted to inquire about possible Indian ancestry. She further argues that the minor’s
subsequent return to father’s custody after having been detained and removed from
parental custody, did not obviate the juvenile court’s and the Agency’s obligation to
comply with the ICWA. The Agency responds that any ICWA inquiry error should be
considered harmless in light of the juvenile court’s dismissal of dependency jurisdiction.
We conclude that the order terminating jurisdiction renders mother’s challenge to
the ICWA finding moot because the Agency can no longer seek permanent foster care or
the termination of parental rights in this proceeding. (See In re Alexis H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 11, 14 [“By its own terms, [ICWA] requires notice only when child welfare
authorities seek permanent foster care or termination of parental rights; it does not require
notice anytime a child of possible or actual Native American descent is involved in a
dependency proceeding”]; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); 25 C.F.R. § 23.11(a) (2018).)
ICWA notice is required when a hearing may culminate “in an order for foster care
placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement, or adoptive placement.”
(§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Here, the proceedings have terminated. The juvenile court no longer
has jurisdiction over the minor, who is in the custody of father. Even assuming the
Agency was required to interview additional relatives about the minor’s possible Indian
ancestry while these dependency proceedings were pending, there is no effective relief
that can be granted and the matter is moot. (See In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th
1313, 1316.)

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DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

/s/
Duarte, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
Mesiwala, J.

/s/
Feinberg, J.

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