People v. Wright CA3

CourtListener 10381252Calctapp18 de abr. de 2025

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Filed 4/18/25 P. v. Wright CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101340

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. NCR68335,
NCR51795)
v.

GARY LEE WRIGHT,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Gary Lee Wright filed petitions to withdraw his guilty pleas for two
prior convictions and to have the charges against him dismissed, pursuant to Penal Code
section 1203.4.1 Wright appeals, arguing that the trial court: (1) either abused its
discretion or was not aware of the full scope of its discretion under section 1203.4, and
(2) could have instead granted relief under section 4852.01. The People respond that:

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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(1) Wright is ineligible for relief under section 1203.4; (2) in any event, Wright has failed
to show an abuse of discretion under section 1203.4; and (3) Wright has forfeited any
claim of error under section 4852.01. We agree with the People and will affirm the
court’s order.
BACKGROUND
In 2000, Wright pled guilty in Tehama County Superior Court case
No. NCR51795 (the assault case) to violating section 245, former subdivision (a)(1),
committing an assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm or by any means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, former subd. (a)(1), as amended by
Stats. 1993, ch. 369, § 1.) The trial court sentenced Wright to the lower term of two
years in prison, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed him on probation for
three years. Wright’s probation agreement required, among other things, that he obey all
laws and “abstain absolutely from the use and possession of alcohol.” In 2001, Wright
was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Based on this conviction, the
trial court found Wright violated the terms of his probation in the assault case, terminated
probation, and executed the two-year prison sentence.
In 2006, Wright pled guilty in Tehama County Superior Court case
No. NCR68335 (the firearm possession case) to violating former section 12021,
subdivision (a)(1), possessing a firearm having been convicted of a felony. (Former
§ 12021, subd. (a)(1), as amended by Stats. 2004, ch. 593, § 6, p. 4665.) The trial court
sentenced Wright to the middle term of four years in prison.
In 2024, Wright filed pro. per. petitions asking the trial court to dismiss the
convictions in both cases. The petitions alleged that Wright qualified for dismissal
because he “fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period thereof” and was
“discharged from probation prior to the termination of the period thereof.” Neither
petition claimed or asserted that relief should be granted in the interests of justice. The
trial court considered the information Wright submitted with his petitions, including

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evidence that Wright had been rehabilitated since the second felony conviction in 2006.
The court also considered information provided by the probation officer, which showed
Wright had been convicted of eight other misdemeanor offenses in addition to the two
felonies, and had probation revoked three times. For the two felonies at issue in the
petitions, the court noted that Wright had probation revoked for one conviction and had
not been granted probation for the other conviction. Weighing all of these circumstances,
the court denied relief. Wright filed a timely notice appealing from the denials in May
2024. His opening brief was filed in December 2024, and the matter became fully
briefed on January 14, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Wright appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion or did not have
“complete awareness of the boundaries of the court’s discretion to grant relief under
either section 1203.4 or 4852.01.” Wright asks us to “remand in order for the trial court
to exercise its discretion under the two statutes and to articulate proper reasons for not
granting relief.” The People respond that: (1) Wright is ineligible for relief under section
1203.4; (2) in any event, Wright has failed to show an abuse of discretion under section
1203.4; and (3) Wright has forfeited any claim of error under section 4852.01. The
People have the better arguments.
I
Legal Background
In relevant part, subdivision (a)(1) of section 1203.4 provides as follows: “When
a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period of probation, or
has been discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in any other
case in which a court, in its discretion and the interest of justice, determines that a
defendant should be granted the relief available under this section, the defendant shall, at
any time after the termination of the period of probation, if they are not then serving a
sentence for an offense, on probation for an offense, or charged with the commission of

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an offense, be permitted by the court to withdraw their plea of guilty or plea of nolo
contendere and enter a plea of not guilty; or, if they have been convicted after a plea of
not guilty, the court shall set aside the verdict of guilty; and, in either case, the court shall
thereupon dismiss the accusations or information against the defendant and except as
noted below, the defendant shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities
resulting from the offense of which they have been convicted . . . .”
As an initial matter, we need not consider whether the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in denying Wright’s petition in the firearm possession case.
Relief under section 1203.4 “is offered only to those defendants who are admitted to
probation.” (People v. Guillen (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 975, 998; accord People v.
Mendez (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1773, 1780 [§ 1203.4 “applies only to that category of
persons who have been admitted to probation and not committed to prison . . . or other
state institutions”]; People v. Borja (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 378, 381-382 [rejecting
argument that the 1971 amendment to § 1203.4 allowed the court to grant relief where no
probation was granted in felony cases].) This means that Wright is ineligible for relief
under section 1203.4 for his conviction in the firearm possession case because the court
did not grant probation in that case.
For cases in which the trial court granted probation, “[t]here are three
circumstances in which a defendant may apply for relief under . . . section 1203.4: if,
‘(a) he has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period; (b) he has been
discharged before the termination of the period of probation; or (c) in any case in which a
court, in its discretion and the interests of justice, determines he should be granted
relief.’ ” (People v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1459.) Under the second
scenario, “the defendant must show more than mere early termination of probation; he or
she must show the early termination is attributable either to completion of the conditions
of probation during the probationary term, or early fulfillment of the conditions of
probation resulting in discharge prior to termination of the period of probation.” (People

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v. Johnson (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 252, 263.) When a defendant’s probation has been
revoked and the defendant has been sentenced to prison, he is not eligible for relief under
the second scenario. (Id. at p. 262.)
II
Discretion Under Section 1203.4
In the assault case, Wright is ineligible for relief under either the first or the
second set of circumstances under section 1203.4 because he did not fulfill or satisfy the
conditions of his probation and he was not discharged from probation before his
probationary term expired. Thus, he cannot seek relief under either of those scenarios.
This arguably leaves only the third scenario, which “requires the court to determine
whether, in its discretion and the interests of justice, the relief should be granted.”
(People v. McLernon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 569, 574.) The court may grant relief
under this provision, even “where a probationer has not satisfied the terms of probation if
it is in ‘the interests of justice’ ” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4 Cal.5th 277, 286), and may
consider “any relevant information, including the defendant’s postprobation conduct,” in
determining whether to grant relief (McLernon, at pp. 576-577). The Legislature added
this discretionary relief option to the statute “to give trial courts the power to set aside a
conviction after the termination of probation whenever the circumstances warranted it.
(§ 1203.4, subd. (a) [relief may be granted ‘in any other case in which a court, in its
discretion and the interests of justice, determines that a defendant should be granted the
relief available’ (italics added)]; Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Bill Dig. of Sen. Bill No.
248 (1971 Reg. Sess.) June 22, 1971, furnished by Legislative Research Incorporated
[proposed amendment expands statute ‘so that it applies to defendants who did not
successfully complete their probation. In effect, it provides that any defendant can have a
conviction set aside after the termination of probation whenever a court, in its discretion
and the interests of justice, determines that such relief should be granted.’].)” (Id. at p.
576, fn. omitted.) If the court “patently fail[s] to consider the matter as one of

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discretion,” we may remand for the court to exercise its discretion. (People v. Holman,
supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463.) Otherwise, we review the court’s decision for abuse
of discretion.
The People contend Wright is ineligible for discretionary relief in the assault case
because the trial court revoked his probation and executed his suspended prison sentence.
To the contrary, Wright contends “[i]t is unclear from this record whether the [trial] court
in ruling on the motions originally filed under section 1203.4 realized that[,] even though
[Wright’s] probation was initially revoked and he was sent to state prison, he was
nonetheless eligible for relief if the court agreed that in an exercise of its discretion and in
the interest of justice relief was appropriate.” We disagree with Wright because when a
“trial court revokes probation and commits the defendant to state prison, the defendant’s
status changes from ‘probationer’ to ‘prisoner’ and the defendant is ineligible for section
1203.4 relief” (People v. Parker (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 498, 502), even in the interest of
justice.
Furthermore, even if Wright was eligible for relief, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying his petition. Our review of the hearing transcript indicates the
court was not merely finding Wright ineligible as a matter of right. Rather, the court also
considered the information Wright presented with his petition and information from the
probation officer about Wright’s criminal history and weighed the circumstances
presented. This indicates the court was aware that even if it had the discretion to grant
the petition in the interest of justice, it was exercising its discretion not to do so and did
not abuse that discretion.
Here, the trial court considered all the information provided and determined
Wright’s criminal history made him unsuitable for relief. Section 1203.4 “rewards those
who comply with their terms of probation or are relieved from compliance.” (People v.
Johnson, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 261-262.) Wright failed to complete probation in
at least three cases, while committing eight misdemeanor offenses in addition to the two

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at issue here. The trial court reasonably viewed Wright’s behavior as directly
contravening the desired outcome under section 1203.4 and, accordingly, we cannot say
that the court’s decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could
agree with it.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
III
Section 4852.01
Wright also contends the trial court had discretion under section 4852.01 to grant a
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. This argument fails because Wright never asked
the trial court to grant relief under section 4852.01. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37
Cal.4th 428, 435 [“A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it
was not asked to conduct”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Wright’s petitions is affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
DUARTE, J.

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