CourtListener 10381232•People v. Poe CA1/2
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Filed 4/18/25 P. v. Poe CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170263
v.
DAVID POE, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR-16036-1)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant David Poe appeals following resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.75. He contends the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard in declining to exercise its discretion to strike a five-year
enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction. Defendant also argues—
and the Attorney General agrees—that the abstract of judgment and minute
order should be corrected to accurately reflect his conviction for count 2 and
that the matter should be remanded for the trial court to calculate his
custody credits.
We will remand for the trial court to correct the record and recalculate
defendant’s custody credits. However, we otherwise affirm because
defendant has not shown the trial court misapplied the law in deciding not to
dismiss the enhancement.
1
BACKGROUND
Underlying Criminal Convictions and Sentence
On the evening of February 8, 1989, 14-year-old Jane Doe walked to a
park with an acquaintance she knew as “Wormy” along with two men she did
not know, defendant and his codefendant at trial, Dominic Faber.1 After
hanging out with the men for about 45 minutes, Doe tried to leave, and
Wormy and defendant told her to stay and grabbed her arm. Wormy took
Doe behind a park bathroom. Defendant was angry and “told [Doe] that
before we leave there that [she] was going to fuck every one of them.”
Defendant pushed Doe to the ground. Doe started yelling, and defendant hit
her on the chin and jaw on both sides of her face while straddling her.
Defendant and Faber repeatedly sexually assaulted Doe over the course of
hours. Doe estimated she was pinned to the ground behind the bathroom for
close to three hours.
A jury convicted defendant of 12 offenses: sexual penetration with a
minor (Pen. Code,2 § 289, subd. (h); count 1), oral copulation with a minor
(former § 288a, subd. (b)(1); count 2), three counts of forcible rape (former
§ 261, subd. (2); counts 3, 7, and 11), two counts of forcible oral copulation
(former § 288a, subd. (c); counts 4 and 8), two counts of forcible rape in
concert (§ 264.1; counts 5 and 9), two counts of forcible rape with a foreign
object (§ 289, subd. (a); counts 6 and 10), and false imprisonment by violence
(§ 236; count 12). The jury also found true enhancement allegations that
1 The facts of the offenses are based on Jane Doe’s trial testimony.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
defendant suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and
served a prior prison term (former § 667.5, subd. (b)).3
In 1990, the trial court sentenced defendant to 83 years, eight months
in prison, which included consecutive upper terms for most of the counts plus
five years for the prior serious felony conviction and one year for the prison
prior.
Current Proceedings – Motion for Resentencing
Effective January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b), was amended
to eliminate the one-year enhancement for prior prison terms except in cases
where the defendant served the prior prison term for a qualifying sexually
violent offense, and effective January 1, 2022, “the Legislature made the
change retroactive.” (People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, __
[330 Cal.Rptr.3d 576, 581].)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a
prior conviction for a [qualifying] sexually violent offense . . . is legally
invalid.”4 “The statute expressly provides for [full] resentencing; once a trial
court has determined that a defendant’s current judgment includes a now-
invalid prior prison term enhancement, ‘the court shall recall the sentence
3 The verdict is not part of the appellate record.
In the information,
which is in the record, it was alleged that defendant suffered prior serious
felony convictions of kidnapping and rape in 1977 and rape and burglary in
1980 and that he served a state prison term for a conviction in 1986 of
assault with a deadly weapon.
4 In the present case, although defendant has prior convictions for
violent sex offenses, the one-year enhancement for a prior prison term is
based on a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon, not a qualifying
sexually violent offense.
3
and resentence the defendant.’ ” (People v. Terwilligar, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. __ [330 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 581], quoting § 1172.75, subd. (c),
italics omitted.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), requires, among other
things, that the trial court “apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
On December 5, 2023, defendant filed a motion for recall of his sentence
and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. Defendant asserted he
experienced “childhood trauma as a result of his upbringing,” which included
“physical abuse at the hands of several uncles” and exposure “to alcohol from
a very young age as a result of rampant alcohol use by many members of his
family,” and he urged the court to impose lower terms for all counts. The
prosecution filed an objection, conceding that the one-year enhancement for
the prison prior was invalid, but opposing any other reduction in defendant’s
sentence. The prosecution recounted defendant’s sexually violent criminal
history, which included prior convictions of forcible rape, kidnapping, oral
copulation, sodomy, and false imprisonment,5 and noted defendant had been
released on parole “a mere 2 days before forcibly raping 14-year-old Jane
Doe” in the current offenses.6
5 Per his 1990 probation report, defendant was convicted by a jury in
1977, together with three codefendants including his brother and uncle, of
kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, forcible sodomy, forcible
rape in concert and false imprisonment of a 17-year-old girl, and, in 1974,
when defendant was 16 years old, a juvenile court sustained allegations of
gang rape by defendant and his younger brother.
6 The prosecution argued defendant “has such a propensity for violence
that he could not last more than 48 hours after being released from prison to
find an innocent child to target while out on parole.”
4
A hearing on defendant’s motion was held March 29, 2024. The trial
court stated it had reviewed the motion papers, the abstract of judgment, the
information, the probation report from 1990, defendant’s certified rap sheet
and his prison discipline history. Defense counsel noted that defendant was
separately serving a 25-year-to-life sentence “out of another county,” and the
prosecutor explained this was the result of defendant having been convicted
of possession of a weapon in prison in 2014, a third strike. After reporting
that “earlier this month [defendant] was found with another weapon in our
jail,” the prosecutor argued it was “very apparent over his lengthy criminal
career that he cannot regulate his behavior under any circumstances” and,
“No amount of age, maturity, supervision or consequences will stop him from
violating the law and presenting a danger to anyone around him.”
The trial court struck the one-year enhancement for the prison prior
that was no longer valid but otherwise imposed the same sentence defendant
received in 1990. Explaining its sentencing decision, the court cited the
circumstances that the current crimes were “horrific,” involving “sexually
abusing a 14-year-old that [defendant] snatched off the street and tortur[ing]
her and rap[ing] her . . . for three hours,” and that defendant was a repeat
sexual offender; he was over 30 years old at the time of the current offenses
and he was previously convicted of sexually violent offenses committed when
he was a juvenile and, later, when he was a young adult.
The court also relied on the circumstances that defendant “was on
parole at the time of these offenses and he was released a mere two days
before these violent and callous acts occurred” and he now “has even more
convictions than he had” at the time of his original sentencing.
In addition, there were “thousands of pages of disciplinary chronology
and rules violations in the CDC records,” and defendant’s prison discipline
5
records showed “lots of possessions of weapons, being under the influence of
manufactured alcohol, attempted murder on an inmate, refusing a direct
order, battery on a peace officer, battery on an inmate,” “[f]looding a cell,”
“[e]ngaging in [mu]ual combat,” and “[d]rug use.”
The court described defendant’s current and past sexual offenses as
“[j]ust savage, really depraved behavior” and stated, “No woman would be
safe around you, especially if they were young and vulnerable like the ones
you preyed on were.”
The trial court expressly declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss
the five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. The court
recognized it had such discretion but explained, “I decline to dismiss [the
enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a),] because it would not be in
the interest of justice due to the serious danger that is presented by
[defendant’s] conduct.” Defendant was therefore sentenced to 82 years, eight
months in prison.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court’s Decision Declining to Exercise its Discretion Under
Section 1385 to Dismiss the Five-Year Enhancement
Under section 1385, subdivision (c) (§ 1385(c)), the trial “court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.”
(§ 1385(c)(1).) In exercising its discretion under section 1385(c), “the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
prove . . . [specified] mitigating circumstances . . . are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means
6
there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385(c)(2).)
Here, it is not disputed that at least one mitigating circumstance is
present.7 However, “consideration of the mitigating factors in section
1385(c)(2) is not required if the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
would endanger public safety.” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 297.)
Defendant contends the trial court applied the wrong legal standard
when it considered whether to exercise its discretion under section 1385 to
dismiss the five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction.
Defendant relies on People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215.) There,
the sentencing court stated its analysis under section 1385 was to determine
whether the defendant “ ‘currently at the time of sentencing represent[s] a
danger to society,’ ” and it declined to dismiss an enhancement because it
found, “presently he does represent a danger to society.” (Id. at p. 223, italics
added.) The Court of Appeal held the sentencing court applied an erroneous
legal standard “because it considered only whether Gonzalez currently posed
7 Defendant asserts that “[s]everal” mitigating circumstances apply in
his case including “[t]he application of an enhancement could result in a
sentence of over 20 years” (§ 1385(c)(2)(C)) and “[t]he enhancement is based
on a prior conviction that is over five years old” (§ 1385(c)(2)(H)). The
Attorney General does not dispute the premise that defendant proved a
mitigating circumstance applies. We question whether section 1385(c)(2)(C)
applies in this case given that defendant’s sentence is over 20 years
regardless of whether the five-year enhancement is imposed, but it does
appear that section 1385(c)(2)(H) applies as the prior serious felony
convictions alleged were more than five years old when he committed the
current crimes in 1989. (See People v. O’Bannon (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 974,
984 [“the mitigating circumstance in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H) is
measured from the date of the defendant’s prior conviction to when the
defendant commits the current offense”].)
7
a danger to the public when assessing if a dismissal of the firearm
enhancement would ‘endanger public safety.’ ” (Id. at p. 230, some italics
added.) The Gonzalez court explained that the sentencing court’s “singular
focus on whether the defendant currently poses a danger” did not comport
with section 1385(c)(2), which “focuses on the danger associated with the
dismissal of an enhancement.” (Id. at p. 228.)
But the trial court in this case did not singularly focus on whether
defendant was currently dangerous. Rather, the court properly considered
his criminal history, the circumstances of the current offenses, and his
conduct since incarceration to determine defendant “would [not] behave
differently” at any unspecified time, not just at the time of sentencing.
Unlike the sentencing court in Gonzalez, the court here never stated or
suggested its only task was to assess defendant’s current dangerousness.
Defendant’s appellate claim fails because he has not shown the trial
court applied an incorrect standard in exercising its discretion under section
1385. (See People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 82 [a sentencing “court
is ‘presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law’ ” and the
burden is on the appellant to demonstrate the court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion].)
B. Correcting the Abstract of Judgment and Minute Order
Next, defendant argues the minute order and abstract of judgment
must be corrected to properly reflect the conviction on count 2. The Attorney
General agrees. For count 2, the jury found defendant guilty of oral
copulation with a minor in violation of former section 288a, subdivision (b)(1),
but the minute order and abstract of judgment show count 2 as “288(b)(1).”
Accordingly, we instruct the trial court to correct the minute order and
abstract of judgment to accurately reflect defendant’s conviction for count 2
8
as a violation of section 288a, subdivision (b)(1). (See People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“Courts may correct clerical errors at any time”].)
C. Custody Credits
When a defendant is resentenced “during the term of imprisonment,
the trial court must calculate the actual time the defendant has already
served and credit that time against the ‘subsequent sentence.’ ” (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23 (Buckhalter); see § 2900.1 [when a
sentence is modified while being served, the time already served “shall be
credited upon any subsequent sentence [the defendant] may receive upon a
new commitment for the same criminal act or acts”].)
Here, the trial court gave defendant the same credit award he received
with his original sentence in 1990, but defendant should have been credited
with the time he spent in custody up to resentencing in 2024. (See
Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 37.)
Defendant contends the matter must be remanded for the trial court to
calculate his custody credits, and the Attorney General concedes the point.
We agree with the parties. Accordingly, we remand the matter and direct the
trial court to recalculate defendant’s post-sentence custody credits.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court (1) to correct
the minute order and abstract of judgment to reflect that count 2 is for
violation of Penal Code section 288a, subdivision (b)(1), and (2) to recalculate
defendant’s custody credits. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
9
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.
_________________________
Desautels, J.
A170263, People v. Poe
10
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