People v. Johnson CA2/5

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Filed 4/17/25 P. v. Johnson CA2/5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B314999

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA450691)
v.

LLOYD JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Sentence Vacated;
Remanded with directions.
Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Stephanie C. Santoro,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2017, the jury found Lloyd Johnson guilty of second
degree robbery for forcibly taking a wallet. (Pen. Code, § 211.)1
In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true the
allegations that Johnson suffered five prior serious and/or violent
felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and suffered one prior
conviction of a serious felony within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). The trial court dismissed four of Johnson’s
prior strikes pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Johnson was sentenced to a total of 15
years in state prison, comprised of a term of five years, doubled to
10 years under the Three Strikes law, plus a consecutive term of
five years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Following Johnson’s first appeal in this court, we remanded
the matter to the trial court to determine whether to exercise its
discretion to grant pretrial diversion pursuant to section 1001.362
or, if not, to determine whether to exercise its discretion to strike
the five-year enhancement.3 The court found pretrial diversion

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Section 1001.36 became effective on June 27, 2018.
(People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 995.) The statute
creates a pretrial diversion program for certain defendants with
mental health disorders and “applies retroactively to all cases in
which the judgment is not yet final.” (Ibid.)
3 We take judicial notice of our prior opinion in People v.
Johnson (Oct. 23, 2019, B291454) [nonpub. opn.].

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inappropriate, declined to strike the enhancement, and re-
imposed the original 15-year sentence.
In his second appeal, Johnson contended that the recent
amendments to section 1170 pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) and Assembly Bill No.
124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 124), which became
effective after his 2020 resentencing hearing, required remand
for resentencing. The People conceded that Senate Bill 567 and
Assembly Bill 124 retroactively applied to Johnson’s case, but
argued remand was futile, as the record clearly demonstrated the
trial court would re-impose the original sentence. A majority of
this court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. One justice, who
concurred in part and dissented in part, would have instead
remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
On June 14, 2023, the California Supreme Court granted
review in this case and deferred briefing pending the court’s
consideration and disposition of related issues in People v. Lynch,
S274942, and People v. Salazar, S275788. On January 15, 2025,
the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court to
vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 (Salazar) and People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch).
Pursuant to the high court’s order, we vacated our prior
opinion. The parties submitted supplemental briefs addressing
the effects of Salazar and Lynch on the instant appeal. Having
reconsidered the cause in light of these authorities, we remand
the matter for the trial court to exercise its discretion under
amended section 1170, subdivision (b).

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Sentencing

At sentencing, the trial court first considered whether to
strike, pursuant to Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, one or more of
Johnson’s prior strikes. Johnson’s prior strikes included four
robbery convictions and one murder conviction arising from the
same case in 1970. The trial court dismissed four of the strikes,
and proceeded to sentence Johnson as a second striker.
With respect to the sentence, the trial court stated that it
was “torn between” imposing the middle term and the high term
doubled, sentences of 11 and 15 years, respectively. The court
decided to impose the high term because the prior strike was not
Johnson’s first offense; he had several prior offenses that resulted
in juvenile court commitments.
Defense counsel argued that Johnson had been in prison
since 1970, which was close to his entire life. Johnson was
66 years old at the time of the hearing and would be 81 years old
when released. The court responded that it had taken Johnson’s
advanced age and his extended time in prison into account when
it struck the prior strikes and imposed a determinate term rather
than a life sentence.4

4 The court observed that Johnson was on parole at the
time of the offense and subject to lifetime commitment on the
basis of his parole violation. Although this did not factor into the
court’s decision, the court observed that as a practical matter the
sentence the court imposed would not impact the duration of
Johnson’s incarceration.

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The trial court observed, “[T]his is the most difficult
sentencing case I’ve ever had.” The court was sympathetic to the
fact that Johnson had served a very long sentence for his prior
convictions, and recognized that the punishment should be
proportionate to the nature of the present offense, which “was
nothing more, nothing less than a purse snatch.” The court also
considered that Johnson was only 19 years old when he was
incarcerated in the prior case. Weighed against these mitigating
factors were the fact that the prior robberies Johnson committed
involved multiple victims—one of whom was murdered—and
Johnson’s significant criminal history. Additionally, Johnson was
on parole for the prior strikes for only a short period of time
before he committed the present robbery. The victim in the
instant robbery, like those in the earlier offenses, was relatively
defenseless. The court expressed concerns for public safety.
The trial court balanced these factors when it chose to
impose a determinate sentence rather than a life sentence. The
court then found the high term was the appropriate determinate
sentence in light of the aggravating factors. Johnson was
sentenced to 15 years in prison, consisting of the high term of five
years, doubled to 10 years under the three strikes law, plus an
additional five years for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancement.
Johnson timely appealed. We conditionally reversed the
judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court with
directions to consider whether to exercise its discretion to grant
pretrial diversion pursuant to section 1001.36 or, if not, to
consider whether to exercise its new discretion to strike the five-
year section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement pursuant to
Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393).

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B. Resentencing

Prior to resentencing Johnson, the trial court informed the
parties that it intended to reinstate the original sentence and
that it did not believe the case was appropriate for mental health
diversion.
At the hearing, defense counsel represented that Johnson
was evaluated and had no apparent cognitive issues. Defense
counsel asked the court to consider the fact that Johnson was
now 69 years old and to sentence him to a lesser term to permit
Johnson to have time outside of prison before his death.
The court stated that Johnson’s prior convictions were for
four robberies and a murder, and Johnson had been on parole at
the time he committed the instant robbery. “And I struggled, if
you will recall, mightily with whether I was going to give him
that third strike 30-year-to-life sentence . . . , and I ended up
giving him the determinate sentence based on exactly the factors
you’re talking about. I think that is the right decision.”
With respect to mental health diversion, the court stated it
had reviewed the reports previously prepared by three mental
health experts and found nothing to indicate that Johnson’s
depression was a “significant factor” in the commission of the
robbery as required to qualify for diversion pursuant to section
1001.36. The court noted that Dr. Ann L. Walker’s report, upon
which this court relied in remanding the matter after the prior
appeal, did not link Johnson’s depression to the crime in any way.
The court was satisfied that Johnson’s depression did not
“substantially contribute” to the robbery. No new evidence had
been presented to the contrary. The court alternatively ruled

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that, even if Johnson were eligible for diversion, the court would
find him unsuitable because Johnson would pose an
unreasonable danger to the community. In addition to the factors
the trial court considered when re-imposing the upper term, the
court found that the victims of the prior strike crimes were
vulnerable senior citizens, and the present case also involved a
vulnerable senior citizen.
The court again referenced its struggle regarding the
appropriate sentence, but stated definitively that “the question in
my mind at that time was never whether Mr. Johnson should be
released, but whether he should receive a sentence of 30 years to
life or whether I strike some of the strikes and sentence him to a
determinate term.” The court declined to exercise its discretion
to strike the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-year sentence for
the reasons that it had already articulated. The court
summarized, “I did choose what I thought to be the most lenient
sentence that the crime and his criminal history allowed, that is,
the maximum determinate sentence, and . . . believe that is the
correct sentence.” The court re-imposed a sentence of 10 years, to
be served concurrently with any other sentence that Johnson was
currently serving, plus the five-year term pursuant to section
667, subdivision (a)(1).

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles

On October 8, 2021, the governor approved a trio of bills
effective January 1, 2022, that proposed similar amendments to
section 1170—Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124,

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which are at issue in this appeal, and Assembly Bill No. 1540
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1540), which is not
implicated here. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
37, 44, fn. 11.) As the last bill approved by the Governor, Senate
Bill 567 prevails over Assembly Bill 124 and Assembly Bill 1540.
(Gov. Code, § 9605, subd. (b); see, e.g., In re Thierry S. (1977) 19
Cal.3d 727, 738–739; Jones, at p. 44, fn. 11.) The parties, as has
become common practice, refer to the amendments to section
1170, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(7), which do not conflict with
Senate Bill 567, as having been effected by Assembly Bill 124.
For ease of reference, we will do the same.
When Johnson was resentenced, former section 1170,
subdivision (b) gave the court broad discretion to decide whether
to impose a term of imprisonment for an offense with a triad of
possible punishments. Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124
changed the nature of the court’s discretion.
As relevant here, Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170,
former subdivision (b)(1) to make the middle term the
presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment. The court may
impose a higher sentence “only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(2).) There is one exception to this requirement: “the court
may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining
sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)

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In Lynch, our Supreme Court considered when a remand
for resentencing is required for defendants sentenced to an upper
term of imprisonment under a prior version of section 1170,
subdivision (b). (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743, 761.)
“Our Supreme Court held, ‘[A] sentence imposed under former
section 1170[, subdivision] (b), must be reversed and remanded
unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true
all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to
conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were
otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.’
(Lynch, [supra, 16 Cal.5th] at p. 743.) [¶] Further, because
Senate Bill 567 ‘altered the scope of the trial court’s discretion’
regarding sentences imposed pursuant to former section 1170,
subdivision (b), the record must ‘clearly indicate that the court
would have found an upper term justified had it been aware of its
more limited discretion.’ ([Ibid.].)” (People v. Cabada, 2025 WL
892552, at *4.)
Assembly Bill 124 amended section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6)(A) to make the lower term the presumptive term where the
defendant “has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence,” and the experience “was a contributing factor
in the commission of the offense.” The presumption in favor of
imposition of the lower term may be overcome if “the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
“Salazar held that these changes create a presumption that
affects the scope of the trial court’s discretionary sentencing

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authority. (Salazar, at pp. 419, 426–427, 429–430.) Accordingly,
when there is evidence in the record meeting the statute’s
threshold requirement for triggering the lower term presumption,
a defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing unless the
record ‘ “ ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it
had such discretion.’ ” ’ (Id. at p. 425, quoting Gutierrez, supra,
58 Cal.4th at p. 1391.)” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 771–
772.)

B. Analysis

Johnson contends that his case should be remanded for
resentencing because Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124 were
not in effect when he was last resentenced, so the trial court
could not have considered the new legislation when the court
imposed the upper term of imprisonment. The People correctly
concede that Senate Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124, which
became effective while Johnson’s case was pending on appeal,
apply here (see Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 749), but argue
that remand is not necessary because the court clearly indicated
that it would re-impose the upper term under the amendments
made to section 1170, subdivision (b) if it was aware of the
changes in the scope of its discretion.
In Lynch and Salazar, our Supreme Court emphasized that
“ ‘when the applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence
has substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always
speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court
would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary
powers at the time of sentencing.’ (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at

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p. 425.)” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.) In both cases, the
Supreme Court admonished: “ ‘[m]ere reliance on the length of
the original sentence and attendant decisions, such as imposing
consecutive sentences, imposing middle or upper term sentences,
or declining to strike enhancements, is not sufficient to provide a
clear indication of what a sentencing court might do on remand if
it had been fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers.’
(Salazar, at p. 431.)” (Id., at p. 777.) As an example of a court’s
statements that would clearly indicate the court would re-impose
the sentence even if aware of the scope of its discretion, the
Supreme Court cited People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432,
where the court found the defendant “ ‘ “deserving [of] the
ultimate sentence of death,”’ observed that the defendant was
‘ “the worst of the worst,” ’ that he ‘ “show[ed] absolutely no
remorse” ’and that ‘ “[i]t’s as if he has no soul” ’ ” (Lynch, at p.
777.) The court also indicated that a court’s statement that it
was aware of upcoming legislation and would impose the same
sentence if the standards of that legislation applied would be
sufficient to clearly indicate that the court would re-impose the
sentence and obviate the need for resentencing. (Ibid.)
Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to
limit the trial court’s discretion. Previously, the court exercised
full discretion to impose any of three sentences in a triad. Now
there is a presumption that the middle term applies. In this case,
at resentencing the trial court carefully considered its sentencing
choices and re-imposed the prior sentence despite its newfound
discretion to strike the five-year section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
enhancement. The current circumstances are different,
however—rather than expanding the trial court’s discretion as
Senate Bill 1393 did, Senate Bill 567 constrains the trial court’s

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discretion. Here, the trial court did not make the type of
damning statements that the court made in People v. Flores,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 432. Rather, it observed that the current
offense “was nothing more, nothing less than a purse snatch.”
The trial court also did not presage the new legislation and
comment as to how it would sentence Johnson given the change
in the scope of its discretion. Thus, there is no clear indication,
as delineated by our Supreme Court in Lynch, of what the trial
court would do under the current law. We cannot speculate as to
whether the trial court would decide to re-impose the high term.
This conclusion alone requires a remand for a full
resentencing. Upon remand, and insofar as the issues are raised
by the parties, the trial court is to consider the effect of Senate
Bill 567 and Assembly Bill 124 in the first instance. The People
will have the opportunity to prove aggravating circumstances in
conformance with the amendments to section 1170, subdivision
(b), and Johnson will have the opportunity to present any
additional evidence pertinent to Assembly Bill 124 or other
legislation then effective.

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DISPOSITION

We vacate Johnson’s sentence and remand the case for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We
otherwise affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.
We concur:

BAKER Acting, P. J.

KIM (D.), J.

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