CourtListener 10380613•People v. Arias CA2/5
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Filed 4/17/25 P. v. Arias CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B332935
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA017836)
BULMARO MAGANA ARIAS, ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND DENYING
Defendant and Appellant. REHEARING
NO CHANGE IN THE
JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 10, 2025, be
modified as follows:
1. On page seven, in footnote 6, add the following
paragraph before the paragraph beginning “Although
defendant discussed”:
Although defendant obliquely referred to the
invalidity of his second-degree murder conviction
based on an invalid felony-murder theory in his
opening brief, he failed to identify it as a separate
and distinct legal argument and failed to cite legal
authority in support of it. California Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires that each brief must
“[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point, and support each
point by argument and, if possible, by citation of
authority.” An argument unsupported by legal
authority is forfeited. (County of Sacramento v.
Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861; see People v.
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [“‘[E]very brief
should contain a legal argument with citation of
authorities on the points made. If none is furnished
on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration’”].)
2. On page seven, in the existing text in footnote 6, replace
“Although” with “And although” so that the sentence
reads:
And although defendant discussed this
argument again in the supplemental brief we
solicited on the applicability of Patton, that
discussion exceeded the scope of our request for
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supplemental briefing and accordingly provided the
People no opportunity to respond.
* * *
There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
——————————————————————————————
HOFFSTADT, P. J. MOOR, J. KIM, J.
3
Filed 4/10/25 P. v. Arias CA2/5 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B332935
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA017836)
v.
BULMARO MAGANA ARIAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed, and
remanded with directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Tarlyle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Bulmaro Magana Arias (defendant) appeals the trial court’s
order summarily denying his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code1 section 1172.6.2 Defendant claims that the trial
court erred in considering the facts from his preliminary hearing
transcript in denying the petition at the prima facie stage. Under
our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Patton (2025) 17
Cal.5th 549 (Patton), the trial court did not err in summarily
denying his petition, but we remand to give defendant the
opportunity to amend his petition with specific facts.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. The underlying crime3
On October 26, 1993, defendant entered a residence in
Long Beach carrying a .9 millimeter handgun. Defendant asked
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
We therefore refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95
as section 1172.6.
3 Our recitation of the facts is taken from defendant’s
preliminary hearing conducted on November 17, 1993.
2
the occupants of the residence who was in the back bedroom;
when the occupants informed him that the victim and his
girlfriend were in the bedroom, defendant approached the
bedroom, drew his gun, and chambered a round. The other
occupants hid in a bathroom.
Defendant entered the back bedroom and found the victim
standing against a wall and the victim’s girlfriend sleeping.
Defendant spoke to the victim and asked him to return
something of the defendant’s. Following a brief exchange,
defendant shot the victim twice, once in the stomach and once in
the chest, killing him. Defendant then fled.
Defendant spoke with police officers the next day, and
admitted to shooting Gomez.4
B. Plea, conviction and sentencing
Defendant pled guilty to second degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and admitted to the use of a firearm during a felony (§
12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to 20 years to
life in state prison.
II. Procedural Background
In 2022,5 defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6, which allows incarcerated persons to petition for
4 Because defendant’s admission was to the testifying officer
and because it is sufficient by itself to establish that defendant
was the actual killer, we need not address whether the testifying
officer’s relaying of what other witnesses said—pursuant to
section 872—may be appropriate. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
557, fn. 2 [reserving this issue].)
5 The record on appeal is incomplete. It does not contain
defendant’s petition or, by extension, the date it was filed. The
first mention of the petition comes in the People’s October 28,
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resentencing on the grounds that they were previously convicted
under a now-invalid theory of murder (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)). The
People opposed the petition and attached a copy of defendant’s
1993 preliminary hearing to their opposition.
On June 28, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the
petition, during which both sides submitted on the briefing
without further argument. Defendant was represented by
counsel. The court determined, based on the record before it, that
“defendant [wa]s the actual killer” and was therefore not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing or to relief under section 1172.6. The
court summarily denied the petition.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in summarily
denying him relief under section 1172.6.
In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” in our State to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the
“[m]alice” element of that crime “based solely on [a defendant’s]
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Our Legislature’s
purpose was to ensure that “[a] person’s culpability for murder
[is] premised upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens
rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).) As amended, liability
for murder is limited to persons (1) who are the actual killer; (2)
who aided and abetted the actual killer in the murder (that is,
2022, request for an extension to respond to the petition. We
accordingly presume that the petition was filed sometime in the
preceding 60 days and—because the People responded—that it
was facially sufficient. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c) [“Within 60 days after
service of a petition that meets the requirements [of the statute],
the prosecutor shall file and serve a response”].)
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who acted with the intent to kill); or (3) who were a major
participant in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing,
but only if they also acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)
Section 1172.6 is the procedural vehicle by which persons
convicted of murder in a now-final judgment can seek to vacate
convictions that do not satisfy the currently permissible theories
for homicide liability. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Summary denial of a
so-called section 1172.6 petition is appropriate only if the
defendant petitioning for relief fails (1) to file a facially valid
petition, or (2) to make a “prima facie case for relief” under the
statute. (Id., subds. (b) & (c); Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp.
558-559, 562.) A defendant files a facially valid petition as long
as he “recit[es]” “section 1172.6’s requirements.” (Id. at p. 562.)
A prima facie case for relief entails a “more demanding”
“inquiry.” (Id. at p. 566.) To evaluate whether a petition
establishes a prima face case, a court must take the petition’s
factual allegations as true and ask “‘“whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if [those] allegations were proved.”’”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) “‘However, if the
record, including the court’s own documents [from the record of
conviction], “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner”’” and summarily
denying the petition. (Ibid.) Where a petition makes only
“conclusory allegations” (including those made by “checkbox”),
the record of conviction controls and summary denial is
appropriate. (Patton, at pp. 564-565.) But where a petition
“points to specific facts” indicating that the defendant was
convicted on a now-invalid theory, there is a “material fact
5
dispute” necessitating an evidentiary hearing and precluding
summary denial. (Id. at p. 567.) Thus, where, as here, the record
of conviction establishes that defendant was the actual killer, a
defendant seeking to avoid summary denial must allege “specific
facts that identify someone else as the direct perpetrator” (rather
than merely allude to a “hypothetical alternate direct
perpetrator”). (Ibid.)
The trial court did not err in summarily denying
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition in this case. Here, the
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing indicates that
defendant was the actual killer. A court examining whether a
defendant who has entered a plea has made a prima facie case
may look to the preliminary hearing, even if the defendant did
not adopt the preliminary hearing transcript as a factual basis
for the plea. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569 & fn. 12.)
Because defendant has not produced the petition itself and thus
failed to show that its allegations pointed to “specific facts that
identify someone else as the direct perpetrator,” the record of
conviction makes clear that defendant was the actual killer and
that his petition may be summarily denied. (Id. at p. 567; People
v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233.)
Defendant resists this conclusion, arguing for the first time
in his reply brief that any defendant who pleads to second-degree
murder is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because (1) it is
unclear on what theory defendant was convicted, and (2) our
Legislature in 2018 eliminated felony-murder as a viable theory
for second degree murder. We decline to consider this argument
because it was not raised until the reply brief. (People v. Wilson
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 872, fn. 11 [“We need not, and typically do
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not, address arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief”].)6
However, because Patton was the first decision to draw the
distinction between conclusory and factual allegations and
because defendant has so requested, we will remand the matter
to the trial court to give defendant the opportunity to amend his
petition to allege “specific facts” “identify[ing] someone else as the
direct perpetrator.”
DISPOSITION
The order of June 28, 2023, denying defendant’s section
1172.6 petition is affirmed, but we remand this matter to
the superior court with directions to consider an amended
petition should defendant, within 30 days of the issuance of the
remittitur, seek to file one.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
6 Although defendant discussed this argument again in the
supplemental brief we solicited on the applicability of Patton,
that discussion exceeded the scope of our request for
supplemental briefing and accordingly provided the People no
opportunity to respond.
7
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
8
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