People v. Payne CA2/4

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Filed 4/15/25 P. v. Payne CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B325436 consolidated with B333501

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA004575)
v.

MYRON ATTRICE PAYNE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, David W. Stuart, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
instructions.
Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In these consolidated appeals, appellant Myron Payne
contends the court erred by summarily denying his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 and his motion for
a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261
(Franklin). Respondent Attorney General argues that the section
1172.6 petition is procedurally barred as successive, but concedes
the matter should be remanded for proper consideration of the
Franklin motion. We reverse both orders and remand for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I. Conviction
On November 19, 1992, the People filed an information
charging appellant and codefendant Samuel Braccey with the
June 1992 murder of William Gillard (§ 187, subd. (a)). The
information also charged Braccey with the attempted murder of
Michael Gillard (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). It alleged that appellant
personally used a firearm during the murder, and Braccey
personally used a firearm during the attempted murder.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
On August 12, 1993, appellant pled guilty to first degree
murder and admitted the firearm allegation. The trial court
sentenced him to 25 years to life for the murder plus a
consecutive term of three years for the enhancement. Appellant
was 18 years old at the time of the crimes and 19 years old at the
time of his plea and sentence.

1 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further undesignated statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

2
The only information in the appellate record regarding the
factual circumstances of the crimes is contained in a post-
sentence probation report dated August 25, 1993. The probation
report states that, “according to District Attorney information,”
appellant and Braccey, both armed with handguns, broke into
victim William Gillard’s residence to steal cash. Appellant fatally
shot William after an altercation, while Braccey nonfatally shot
William’s son, Michael. Appellant denied committing the crime
and stated that he pled because he had the gun and “my crimey
rolled over on me.”
II. Resentencing Petitions
A. First Petition
In January 2019, immediately after Senate Bill No. 1437
took effect, appellant filed a petition for resentencing (first
petition). The first petition is not in the appellate record.
On January 16, 2019, the trial court, Judge Daviann
Mitchell, summarily denied the first petition. The order states in
relevant part:
“The court has received and reviewed a petition for recall
and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. The
petition is summarily denied because the petitioner is not
entitled to relief as a matter of law, for the following reason:
“[XX] The petitioner was convicted of murder but the court
file reflects that the petitioner was the actual killer and was not
convicted under a theory of felony-murder of any degree, or a
theory of natural and probable consequences. There are no jury
instructions for aiding and abetting, felony murder, or natural
and probable consequences.
“In fact, on August 12, 1993, the petitioner plead [sic] to
count 1, first degree murder in violation of Penal Code section

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187, and admitted that he personally used a firearm during the
commission of the crime pursuant to Penal Code section
12022.5(a). (Minute order dated August 12, 1993).”
Appellant did not appeal the order denying the first
petition.
B. Second Petition
1. Petition
On December 8, 2020, appellant filed a second petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 (second petition). Appellant
alleged he was charged with felony murder and accepted a plea
offer “based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.” He further
alleged that he was “refiling the instant petition” because the
trial court erroneously denied the first petition “on the grounds
that, I was not convicted on the theory of felony murder, and
because I accepted a plea.” Appellant asserted that “the trial
court cannot re-write the law as was enacted by the California
Legislature, which such plain language and intent the legislature
made plea’s deal’s [sic] applicable to Penal Code sec 1170.95,
supra, as the prior petition I attempted to file.” He requested
that the trial court vacate its order denying the first petition,
appoint counsel, and hold an evidentiary hearing.
Appellant attached several documents to the second
petition, including the abstract of judgment, the court’s January
16, 2019 order denying the first petition, and the text of Senate
Bill No. 1437. He also attached a personal declaration in which
he raised various complaints about his arrest, pre-trial detention,
interrogation, alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
alleged bait-and-switch on what he claims was a 12-year plea
offer, and excessive sentence. Appellant also asserted that he
was factually innocent and “there was no meaningful, nor factual

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basis for a guilty plea.” He stated that “the alleged crime
occurred exactly 3 months & 3 days after my 18th birthday.”
Appellant did not attach the probation report or a preliminary
hearing transcript, nor did he provide any other information
about the facts of the crime.
2. Request for Ruling and Appeal
For reasons unclear from the appellate record, it appears
no timely action was taken on the second petition. On September
22, 2021, approximately nine months after he filed the second
petition, appellant filed a “Motion and Request for Response to
Petition for Resentencing Pursuant to Penal Code
§ 1170.95/Senate Bill 1437.” Appellant asserted that he filed a
facially sufficient petition, requested counsel, and “made a proper
‘prima facie’ showing of entitlement to relief.” He further
asserted that the “failure and/or refusal to respond to petitioner’s
properly filed petition in a timely manner . . . has the possibility
of prejudice to defendants [sic] entitled relief and the requested
appointment of counsel.” He requested a response “forthwith.”
The court did not act upon the Request for Response. On
September 12, 2022, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the
denial of the second petition, even though the petition remained
pending.
3. Ruling
On October 11, 2022, the trial court, Judge David Stuart,
held a hearing on appellant’s Franklin motion, discussed post.
During that hearing, appellant asked the court for a copy of “the
most recent denial of 1170.95.” The court informed him, “[t]here
is only one denial. So if there is another 1170.95 pending, I’m
going to deny that since it’s already been ruled upon.” The
minute order documenting the hearing states: “Defendant’s

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Motion and Request for Response to Petition for Resentencing
Pursuant to Penal Code 1170.95/Senate Bill 1437 filed on 9/22/21
is denied for the reasons previously denied on 1/16/19 (refer to
minute order dated 1/16/19).” During a May 10, 2023 hearing on
appellant’s Franklin motion, see post, the trial court orally
clarified that it previously had denied the second petition.
4. Appeals
On May 4, 2023, the court of appeal dismissed appellant’s
September 12, 2022 notice of appeal without prejudice as
premature. Remittitur issued on July 10, 2023.
On August 28, 2023, appellant filed a notice of appeal
purporting to appeal from the remittitur and denial of the second
petition. After conducting “further review of the trial court’s
minute orders,” the court of appeal concluded that the trial court
denied the second petition on October 11, 2022, while appellant’s
original notice of appeal was pending. Because an appealable
order was entered while the appeal was pending, the court
recalled the remittitur and permitted appellant’s appeal from the
denial of the second petition to proceed.
III. Franklin Filings
A. Habeas Petition and Ruling
On January 23, 2020, appellant filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.2 In addition to seeking withdrawal of his guilty
plea and arguing that the parole suitability criteria are irrational
and arbitrary, appellant contended that he should have received
a youth offender parole hearing and Franklin hearing.

2 Appellant initially filed the petition in Kings County on
December 2, 2019. It was transferred to Los Angeles County and
refiled on January 23, 2020.

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In a written order filed February 28, 2020, the trial court,
Judge William Ryan, denied the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. As relevant here, the trial court concluded appellant was
not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing, because he
received a parole suitability hearing on January 14, 2015, prior to
his twenty-fifth year of incarceration. To the extent appellant
sought a Franklin hearing to present evidence regarding his
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense, the
court concluded that a petition for writ of habeas corpus was not
the appropriate vehicle for such a request. It therefore denied
the request “without prejudice to him filing a proper motion
under Penal Code section 1203.1 [sic].”3
B. Section 1203.01 Franklin Motion and Ruling
On April 27, 2020, appellant filed a motion for a Franklin
hearing pursuant to section 1203.01. Appellant attached
evidence that he had engaged in and completed rehabilitative
programming during his incarceration. In July 2020, the trial
court appointed counsel to represent appellant in connection with
the Franklin motion.
Proceedings on the section 1203.01 motion were continued
numerous times. During a June 28, 2023 hearing, the trial court,
Judge David Stuart, denied the Franklin motion on the grounds
that it had already been decided and denied by Judge Ryan on
February 28, 2020.
Appellant timely appealed the ruling. This court
consolidated the appeal with appellant’s previous appeal from the
order denying his second petition for resentencing.

3 The relevant statutory provision is section 1203.01, not
section 1203.1.

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DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.6 Petition
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by summarily
denying his second 1172.6 petition. He argues that the second
petition was not successive because new authorities clarified that
a guilty plea to murder does not bar relief and that youth is a
significant factor in determining whether someone convicted
under a felony murder theory acted with the requisite mens rea.
Appellant also argues that the record of conviction does not
conclusively foreclose his eligibility for relief. Respondent
contends appellant’s second petition was procedurally barred,
because the trial court denied appellant’s first petition on the
merits and appellant did not challenge that ruling on appeal. We
review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to
show cause. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545;
People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
Under section 1172.6, “A person convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced
the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts” if “[t]he petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a) and (a)(3).) The statute requires the petition to include
a declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief,

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certain case information, and whether the petitioner requests
appointment of counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).) A petition that
meets these criteria “is facially sufficient and entitles the
petitioner to counsel.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17Cal.5th 549,
559 (Patton).)
Appellant’s second petition facially met the “minimal
compliance requirement[s]” of section 1172.6, subdivision (b).
(Patton, supra, at p. 562.) The court accordingly was required to
appoint counsel for appellant, allow briefing by the parties, and
hold a hearing to assess whether appellant established a prima
facie claim for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c); People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Denying appellant’s petition
without meeting these requirements was error.
This error is subject to harmless error analysis under
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 957–958 [failure to appoint counsel under § 1172.6,
subd. (b)(3) is “state law error only, tested for prejudice under
[Watson]”], 974.) Thus, reversal is required only if appellant can
show a reasonable probability that, absent the error, his petition
would not have been summarily denied. (See id. at pp. 972-974;
People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 676.) Conversely, the
error is harmless if the record of conviction refutes appellant’s
prima facie showing and establishes as a matter of law that he is
not entitled to relief. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971-
974; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47-48.)
Respondent contends that the petition was barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel and properly denied as successive.
We disagree. “Neither the express language of section [1172.6]
nor the stated purpose of the legislation supports limiting access
to relief under section [1172.6] as advocated by respondent

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where, as here, the subsequent petition rested on new authority
which challenged the basis for the superior court’s summary
denial of the previous petition.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 942, 946-947.) “[J]udicial interpretations of section
[1172.6] may afford a petitioner grounds for claiming eligibility
for relief under the statute that were not previously available
under other judicial interpretations.” (Id. at p. 951.)
Here, the trial court denied appellant’s first petition less
than three weeks after the statute took effect, apparently
concluding that his plea established he was the actual killer. At
that time, there was no published case law interpreting or
clarifying the nascent statutory provision. By the time appellant
filed his second petition on December 8, 2020, however, appellate
courts had begun to clarify that “section 1170.95 is available to
defendants convicted of murder following a plea in lieu of trial.”
(People v. Rodriguez (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 227, 239, vacated by
People v. Rodriguez (Dec. 22, 2021, S266652); see also People v.
Paige (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 194, 202.) Although his second
petition, which he filed in propria persona, did not cite any
specific cases, appellant clearly stated that “plain language and
intent of the legislature made plea’s deal’s [sic] applicable to
Penal Code sec 1170.95,” and asserted that the court erred in
summarily denying his first petition. Appellant’s second petition
rested at least in part on new developments in the law and
accordingly should not have been denied as successive.4

4 As appellant points out in his brief, even more authority
supporting his second petition existed by the time the court made
its ruling in October 2022, including that relating to the
relevance of youth at the time of the offense.

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In light of the drastic changes to the legal landscape by the
time appellant’s second petition was filed and denied, we
conclude that the trial court’s failure to comply with the
requirements of section 1172.6, subdivisions (b) and (c) was not
harmless and requires remand. We will not, however, direct the
trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing, as appellant requests. Because the court
failed to appoint counsel for appellant and received no briefing or
argument from the parties, the record does not demonstrate the
court made an adequate inquiry concerning whether appellant’s
second petition establishes a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c). We decline to perform this
statutorily mandated task for the first time on appeal.
We reverse the order denying appellant’s section 1172.6
petition, with directions to the trial court to appoint counsel for
appellant and proceed as required pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (c). We express no view as to whether appellant has
established a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief.
II. Franklin Motion
Appellant contends—and respondent concedes—that the
trial court erred by summarily denying his Franklin motion as
successive. We agree and reverse to provide the trial court the
opportunity to consider the motion on the merits.
Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801 “provide a parole
hearing during the 25th year of incarceration for certain juveniles
sentenced as adults.” (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446
(Cook).) The Supreme Court held in Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 283, that these statutory provisions “also contemplate that
information regarding the juvenile offender’s characteristics and
circumstances at the time of the offense will be available at a

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youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s
consideration.” As Franklin was a direct appeal, the Supreme
Court remanded the matter to provide defendant Franklin with
“sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of
information that sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a
youth offender parole hearing,” and the prosecution a similar
opportunity to offer evidence “that demonstrates the juvenile
offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on
the influence of youth-related factors.” (Id. at p. 284.) The court
explained that the “goal of any such proceeding is to provide an
opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the
juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time
of the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly
discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youth-related
factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is
‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime
‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ (citation).” (Ibid.)
In Cook, the Supreme Court held that persons who are
entitled to a youth offender parole hearing but whose convictions
were final prior to Franklin may “seek the remedy of evidence
preservation” by filing a “motion in the trial court for that
purpose, under the authority of section 1203.01.” (Cook, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 447; id. at p. 458 [“the proper avenue is to file a
motion in superior court under the original caption and case
number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and today’s
decision”].) The court further clarified that the trial court has
significant discretion in ruling on such motions, and may consider
“whether a Franklin proceeding is likely to produce fruitful
evidence considering such factors as the passage of time and
whether the offender has already benefitted from the factfinding

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procedures set forth in section 3051, subdivision (f)(1) and (2)
with the assistance of appointed counsel (citations).” (Id. at p.
459.) We review the trial court’s ruling on a section 1203.01
Franklin motion for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Benzler
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749-750.)
Here, appellant initially sought a Franklin hearing through
the improper procedural vehicle of a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The trial court denied the request without prejudice to
appellant refiling his request under section 1203.01 in accordance
with Cook. When appellant subsequently filed a section 1203.01
motion, the trial court summarily denied it on the sole ground
that it had been previously denied. This was error; the merits of
the section 1203.01 motion had not yet been considered. (See,
e.g., People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 716 [collateral
estoppel applies in criminal proceedings, but only where the
previous decision was final and on the merits].)
We accordingly reverse the order denying appellant’s
section 1203.01 Franklin motion and remand to provide the trial
court the opportunity to address the motion on its merits. We
express no opinion as to those merits or how the court should
exercise its discretion in connection with the motion.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition filed
December 8, 2020 is reversed. The order denying appellant’s
section 1203.01 Franklin motion is also reversed. The matter is
remanded with directions that the trial court (1) appoint counsel
and perform the prima facie inquiry required by section 1172.6,
subdivision (c) and (2) address the merits of appellant’s section
1203.01 Franklin motion.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, ACTING P. J.

DAUM, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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