CourtListener 10378969•Odenwald v. Frederickson CA2/6
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Filed 4/15/25 Odenwald v. Frederickson CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
ANTHONY ODENWALD, 2d Civ. No. B335026
(Super. Ct. No. 23CVP-0228)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
ROGER B. FREDERICKSON et
al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
The trial court denied defendant’s petition to compel
arbitration on the ground that a party to the arbitration is also a
party to a pending court action arising out of the same
transaction and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings. (Code
Civ. Proc.,1 § 1281.2, subd. (c).) We affirm.
1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless stated otherwise.
FACTS
Anthony Odenwald claims he was injured when he tripped
and fell over a defect in the public sidewalk in front of the First
Presbyterian Church of Templeton (Church). Odenwald retained
Roger Frederickson and Frederickson Hamilton, LLP (collectively
Frederickson) to represent him in an action to recover damages
for his injuries. The retainer agreement contained a provision
requiring arbitration of any dispute between Frederickson and
Odenwald.
Frederickson filed an action against the Church.2 The
Church’s answer to the complaint alleged defenses of comparative
negligence, acts of others, and several liability for non-economic
damages. (Civ. Code, § 1431.2.)
Frederickson also submitted a government tort claim to the
County of San Luis Obispo (County). The County denied the
claim, but Frederickson never filed an action against the County.
The statute of limitations for an action against the County
expired.
Odenwald obtained a new attorney to continue the action
against the Church and to file a malpractice action against
Frederickson for failure to sue the County.
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Frederickson responded to the malpractice action with a
motion to compel arbitration. The motion was based on the
arbitration provision in the retainer agreement between
Frederickson and Odenwald.
Odenwald opposed the motion on the ground that both the
Church and malpractice actions are pending and have common
2 Odenwald’s motion for judicial notice filed on October 1,
2024, is granted.
2
issues of law and fact that raise the possibility of conflicting
rulings.
The trial court agreed with Odenwald. The court cited
possible conflicting rulings on comparative liability, the allocation
of non-economic damages, and whether the defect in the sidewalk
was trivial. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration.
DISCUSSION
Possibility of Conflicting Rulings
Section 1281.2 provides in part: “On petition of a party to
an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written
agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the
agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall
order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the
controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the
controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] . . . [¶] (c) A
party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending
court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out
of the same transaction or series of related transactions and
there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of
law or fact.”
Section 1281.2, subdivision (c) grants the trial court
discretion to deny a petition to compel arbitration where: 1) a
party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending
court action with a third party; 2) the pending third party action
arises out of the same transactions as the claims subject to
arbitration; and 3) there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact. (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real
Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 964.)
The first condition of section 1281.2, subdivision (c) is
satisfied. Odenwald is a party to the arbitration agreement and
3
also to a court action against the Church. Frederickson argues
that there is no pending litigation in which Frederickson and the
Church are both parties. The argument misses the point. It is
because Frederickson and the Church are not both parties to the
same litigation that there is the possibility of conflicting rulings
on common issues of law and fact.
The second condition is also satisfied. The transaction
involves the same set of operative facts. (Avila v. Southern
California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 845.)
The action against the church arises out of the same slip and fall
claim as the malpractice action.
Finally, the third condition is satisfied. Almost all of the
issues in the action against the Church are also issues in the
malpractice action against Frederickson. The situation is
saturated with the possibility of conflicting rulings.
Frederickson argues there is a possibility that Odenwald
may recover all of the compensation to which he is entitled in his
action against the Church. But there is also the possibility he
may not. Section 1281.2, subdivision (c) is concerned with the
“possibility of conflicting rulings,” not with the possibility that
the plaintiff may recover fully from one of the parties.
Exercise of Discretion
Having found that section 1281.2, subdivision (c) applies,
the trial court has a variety of options: “The court may (1) refuse
to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention
or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2)
order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3)
order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to
arbitration and stay the pending court action or special
proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or
4
(4) stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or
special proceeding.” (DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1358.)
Frederickson argues that instead of denying it the right to
arbitrate, the trial court should have stayed the arbitration on
the malpractice claim pending the litigation against the Church.
But Frederickson does not dispute that it failed to request
that the trial court choose that option. Failure to raise the issue
in the trial court waives the issue on appeal. (In re. M.H. (2016)
1 Cal.App.5th 699, 713-714.)
In any event, Frederickson does not dispute that rulings of
law or fact in the action against the Church would not be binding
in the arbitration. Thus staying the arbitration would not resolve
the problem of inconsistent rulings.
Clearly the best way to avoid inconsistent rulings is to
consolidate the cases. Frederickson points out that Odenwald
has not moved for consolidation. But Frederickson admits the
case against the Church is still pending. Either Odenwald or
Frederickson may yet move for consolidation, or the trial court
may do so on its own motion.
Finally, Frederickson places much emphasis on the
statement found in many cases that there is a strong public
policy favoring arbitration. Assuming that is so,3 the Legislature
in enacting section 1281.2, subdivision (c), has balanced public
3 But see Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411,
418. Frequent use of the phrase, “policy favoring arbitration,” is
merely an acknowledgement of the Federal Arbitration Act’s
(FAA) commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. The policy is to make
arbitrator agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not
more so. Most California cases follow FAA cases.
5
policy favoring arbitration against a public policy in favor of
denying arbitration where there is a possibility of conflicting
rulings. Section 1281.2, subdivision (c) expressly provides for
only one remedy: denial of the petition to compel arbitration. We
cannot fault the trial court for applying the statutory remedy.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
6
Michael C. Kelley, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Kaufman Dolowich, Barry Z. Brodsky, Rosely George and
Steve R. Belilove for Defendants and Appellants.
Barnick Hodges and Whitney Northington Barnick;
Roberts & Spiegel and Steven P. Roberts for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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