CourtListener 10378968•People v. Arellano CA2/6
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Filed 4/15/25 P. v. Arellano CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B331875
(Super. Ct. No. VA153217)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
OMAR PEDRO ARELLANO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Omar Pedro Arellano appeals the judgment after a jury
convicted him of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd.
(a), 189, subd. (a); count 1), attempted willful, deliberate, and
premediated murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); count 2), and three
counts of firearm possession by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
counts 4-6).2 The jury found true firearm use allegations as to
counts 1 and 2. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).) The trial court
1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 The amended information did not include a count 3.
sentenced Arellano to 25 years to life for count 1 plus 25 years to
life for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm
causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), life
with the possibility of parole after seven years for count 2 plus 20
years for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), a consecutive upper term of three years for
count 5, and consecutive eight-month terms each for counts 4 and
6.
Arellano contends there was insufficient evidence to
support the murder and attempted murder counts, his counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to prejudicial
gang evidence, one of his convictions for firearm possession must
be reversed, the court abused its discretion in sentencing him,
and clerical errors in the sentencing minutes and abstract of
judgment. We reverse count 5 for unlawful possession of a
firearm, but affirm in other respects.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The shooting
Desirea Delgado grew up in the city of Maywood and was
an associate of the Maywood Locos gang. She was dating
Arellano, a Maywood Locos gang member, in August 2019.
On August 23, 2019, Delgado picked up Arellano in her
white minivan and drove to a motel to spend the night. At the
motel, Arellano took a firearm from out of his waistband and put
it in a drawer. The next morning, Arellano asked Delgado to
drive him to his friend’s house in Maywood. She drove him to the
friend’s house, and he sat in the front passenger seat. He was
wearing a blue Dodgers jacket and hat. On the drive back to the
motel, Arellano said he forgot something at the friend’s house.
Delgado began driving back to the friend’s house when she saw
two males walking down Gifford Avenue. Soon after Delgado
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made a left turn on 56th Street, Arellano told her to pull over.
Arellano got out of the car and walked back towards Gifford
Avenue. A couple minutes later, Delgado heard multiple
gunshots. “Right away,” Arellano returned to the car. He
smelled like gun powder. He said that he “banged on two fools”
and “shot at them,” but told her not to worry because “they got
away.” “Banged on” meant asking what gang they were from.
The area of 56th Street and Gifford Avenue was located within
Maywood Locos gang territory.
Delgado and Arellano drove back to the motel and then to
Arellano’s house. Arellano removed a firearm from his waistband
and placed it on a bed. He told his roommate, Jason Ortiz, about
the shooting. Delgado looked on Facebook and learned that
someone was just killed in Maywood. Arellano said he “fucked
up” but told her “not to worry.” Sometime after the shooting,
Ortiz contacted Delgado and asked if she knew anyone who
wanted to buy his firearm. Ortiz’s firearm was the one Arellano
used in the shooting. Ortiz took several photographs of the
firearm. Delgado sold it. Based on the photographs, the firearm
appeared to be a .40-caliber Glock pistol.
Abel Canel’s home was on 56th Street in Maywood.
Between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. on the morning of the shooting,
he was backing his car into his driveway when he saw a white
van turn onto 56th Street from Gifford Avenue. Canel saw a
young “Latina” woman driving the van and a man wearing a
Dodgers windbreaker and hat in the front passenger seat. He
saw the white van stop after turning onto 56th Street and the
man “immediately” getting out of the van and walking toward
Gifford Avenue. Canel then heard over six gunshots and saw the
man get back into the van before it took off. He noticed that the
man’s hands were in the front waistband area underneath his
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windbreaker. A surveillance video depicted a man getting out of
a white van on 56th street at 7:21 a.m., and the man returning to
the van about a minute later. Canel verified that a surveillance
video taken from 56th Street was consistent with what he saw
the morning of the shooting.
Graciela Maldonado lived on Gifford Avenue. On the
morning of August 24, she was woken up by sounds of gunshots.
When she looked out her window, she saw a man lying face up in
the street. Another man moved him onto the sidewalk before
running away.
Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies responded to the scene and
found Raul Sahagun lying on the ground unresponsive. Sahagun
was shot in the back and the arm. The gunshot wound to the
back was fatal. Sahagun’s former girlfriend testified that he
lived on Gifford Avenue and was a member of The Lott gang.
The investigation
There were twelve .40-caliber shell casings about 150 feet
from Sahagun’s body. A firearm analysis showed that all of the
casings were fired from a single Glock pistol.
The police obtained surveillance videos from residences on
56th Street and on Gifford Avenue. One video depicted two men
walking together on the sidewalk on Gifford Avenue and a white
minivan driving down the street about a minute later. The video
showed the male passenger wearing a blue jacket and a
backwards baseball hat. At trial, Delgado identified her white
van and Arellano in a surveillance video.
About a month after the shooting, Delgado was arrested for
driving with a suspended license. While in custody, the police
asked questions about the murder. The police investigated her
phone and obtained search warrants for Delgado’s and Arellano’s
cell phones. Cell phone records showed that Delgado’s and
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Arellano’s phones were next to the motel around 6:45 a.m. on the
day of the shooting. Around 7 a.m., their phones were near
Arellano’s friend’s house. Around 7:21 a.m., Delgado’s phone was
on Gifford Avenue in Maywood. Around 7:30 a.m., the phones
were near the motel again.
Arrests
In April 2020, the police arrested Delgado and Arellano at a
motel for Sahagun’s murder. The police found a loaded Glock
pistol and brass knuckles belonging to Arellano. They also found
a journal with “gang-type” writing on it and a blue Dodgers hat.
The parties stipulated the Glock was not the same firearm that
discharged the bullet casings at the crime scene.
Following the arrest, the police interviewed Arellano. He
admitted being a Maywood gang member but denied knowing
anything about the shooting.
In June 2021, Delgado told the police about the shooting.
Her timeline of events was consistent with the cell phone
mapping records the police had obtained. Delgado was originally
charged with murder and attempted murder. In September
2021, she was offered a plea deal in exchange for her testimony.
In exchange for her testimony, she agreed to plead guilty to
voluntary manslaughter and to be placed on probation.
Gang expert testimony
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Francisco Quinones
testified as a gang expert for the prosecution. Quinones testified
that gang members are expected to “put in work” which meant
committing crimes. He explained that violent crimes promote the
gang’s fear and intimidation in the community, and if the
community fears the gang, the community is less likely to
cooperate with law enforcement. Quinones also explained the
importance of gang territory and described ways in which gangs
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defend their territory, including “gangbang[ing].” He described
“gangbanging” as walking up to a person in gang territory and
asking them “where you from”—meaning what gang they
belonged to. If there was a perceived threat, the gang member
could take physical action such as beating or shooting them.
Gang members are expected to bang and protect their territory.
Quinones testified that Maywood is a small city, and the
Maywood Locos gang operates in the western part of the city.
The area of the shooting was located within Maywood Locos
territory. The Maywood Locos gang was a rival of The Lott gang.
Quinones identified several Maywood Locos gang tattoos from
photographs of Arellano. One of the tattoos was a “SS” which
Quinones explained was a “South Side” tattoo. He explained that
“South Side is an affiliation to the Mexican Mafia, which . . . is a
Hispanic gang which controls the prisons.” He explained that
“gangs in Southern California pretty much have to fall under the
Mexican Mafia. So a lot of Hispanic gangs in Southern California
will have South Side . . . to pretty much display their allegiance
to the Mexican Mafia.” Quinones also testified regarding items
that belonged to Arellano with the writing “VMWLSX3” or
“VMWLSXIII” on it. He testified the abbreviation meant “Varrio
Maywood Locos 13” with “13” representing the gang’s affiliation
with the Mexican Mafia.
Martin Flores testified as a defense gang expert witness.
He opined that Arellano’s “SS” tattoo was a geographical tattoo to
represent that Maywood was in the south side of Los Angeles
County. He explained that it was “not identifying that they are a
part of the Mexican Mafia in terms of South Sider.” Flores also
opined that “VMWLSXIII” stood for “Varrio Maywood Locos 13,”
and explained that the “13” meant to signify that it was a
Southern California gang. Flores opined that “13” does not mean
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the individual is affiliated with the Mexican Mafia. He also
opined that the shooting took place in the 18th Street gang
territory, and not Maywood Locos territory.
DISCUSSION
Substantial evidence that Arellano was the shooter
Arellano contends the murder and attempted murder
convictions (counts 1 and 2) must be reversed because there was
insufficient evidence that he was the shooter. He contends that
much of the evidence against him came from the testimony of
Delgado, who was an accomplice, and her testimony was not
sufficiently corroborated. We are not persuaded.
“ ‘ “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we
‘examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] We
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]
[¶] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the
prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence . . . .
[Citation.] ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s
findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.’ [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or
reevaluate a witness’s credibility.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1117-1118.)
Because the prosecution here presented evidence of an
accomplice’s testimony, a “conviction can not be had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such
7
other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the
commission of the offense; . . . the corroboration is not sufficient if
it merely shows the commission of the offense or the
circumstances thereof.” (§ 1111.) Section 1111 requires
“ ‘evidence tending to connect defendant with the crimes “without
aid or assistance from the testimony of” ’ the accomplice.
[Citations.]” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 452.)
Corroborating evidence “ ‘ “need not independently establish the
identity of the victim’s assailant” [citation], nor corroborate every
fact to which the accomplice testifies [citation], and “ ‘may be
circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when
standing alone.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “But the evidence must
nonetheless connect the defendant to the crime itself, rather than
simply connect the accomplice to the crime.” (Ibid.) “The
corroborating evidence does not need to independently prove
guilt. The evidence simply must support the accomplice
testimony and permit a reasonable inference that the
accomplice’s testimony is true.” (People v. Hall (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 1077, 1092.)
Here, Delgado’s testimony was corroborated by sufficient
evidence to satisfy section 1111’s requirements. The cell phone
records were consistent with Delgado’s story and placed her and
Arellano together on the day of the shooting. The records showed
that both cell phones were around the location of the motel on the
morning of the shooting and around Arellano’s friend’s house
later that morning. Delgado’s phone records showed it was close
to the crime scene on Gifford Avenue in Maywood at the time the
shooting occurred, and around 7:30 a.m. both phones were at the
motel again. Furthermore, the surveillance video evidence and
Canel’s testimony corroborated Delgado’s testimony that she was
driving a white minivan with Arellano in her front passenger
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seat, that Arellano was wearing a blue Dodgers jacket and hat,
that her van passed two men walking down Gifford Avenue, and
that Arellano got out of the car on 56th Street and came back
about a minute later. And photographs of the firearm Delgado
sold after the shooting were consistent with the type of firearm
used at the crime scene, according to the ballistic evidence. In
sum, multiple details of Delgado’s testimony were corroborated
by independent evidence.
We conclude that such evidence and Delgado’s testimony
constituted substantial evidence to support that Arrellano was
the shooter. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 703
[testimony of a single witness can be sufficient proof of any fact].)
Delgado testified that she stopped her van on 56th Street,
Arellano got out and walked towards Gifford Avenue, she heard
multiple gunshots, and Arellano immediately returned to the van
smelling like gunpowder. She also testified that Arellano said he
“banged on two fools” and shot at them. When Delgado learned
that someone was just killed in Maywood, Arellano said he
“fucked up” but told her “not to worry.” The surveillance videos,
cell phone records, and Canel’s testimony support Delgado’s
testimony. The photographs of the firearm sold after the
shooting was also consistent with the ballistic evidence at the
crime scene. Furthermore, there was evidence of motive.
Arellano was a Maywood Locos gang member and Sahagun was a
rival gang member from The Lott, and the murder happened in
Maywood gang territory. Substantial evidence supports the
finding that Arellano was the shooter.
Substantial evidence of attempted murder
Arellano contends the evidence was insufficient to support
attempted murder of John Doe (count 2). We conclude otherwise.
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To prove attempted murder, “the prosecution must
establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct
but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602.)
“Direct evidence of intent to kill is rare, and ordinarily the intent
to kill must be inferred from the statements and actions of the
defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” (Ibid.)
Arellano fired his firearm at least 12 times and was
successful in killing one of the men. Evidence of a shooter firing
multiple times towards a group of victims can support an
inference the shooter harbored a specific intent to kill all of them.
(See People v. Foster (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 430, 445 [firing a
firearm multiple times at a group was substantial evidence
supporting a jury finding of the specific intent to kill, and the
direct but ineffective step towards killing victims who survived
the shooting]; People v. Garcia (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 542, 554
[“Shooting at a group from a distance at which a mortal wound
could be inflicted supports an inference of an intent to kill”].)
Surveillance video evidence also established that Doe and
Sahagun were walking together on Gifford Avenue around the
time of the shooting. Maldonado testified that immediately after
the shooting, Doe moved Sahagun onto the sidewalk. Delgado
testified that Arellano said he “banged on two fools” and “shot at
them,” which supports his intent to kill both Sahagun and Doe.
(Italics added.) Substantial evidence supports the conviction for
the attempted murder of John Doe.
Gang evidence
Arellano contends the trial court admitted prejudicial gang
evidence referencing the Mexican Mafia. He acknowledges
defense counsel did not object, but contends counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object. We disagree.
10
The prosecution did not pursue any gang enhancements.
But over the defense’s objection, the trial court allowed the
prosecution to present gang evidence for the limited purpose of
proving motive, intent, and identity. Detective Quinones testified
generally about gangs and the Maywood Locos gang. He also
referenced the Mexican Mafia when testifying about Arellano’s
gang tattoos and a written inscription on items belonging to
Arellano. He said that Arellano’s “SS” tattoo represented the
“South Side,” an affiliation to the Mexican Mafia. He also opined
that the written inscription’s inclusion of the number 13
represented an affiliation with the Mexican Mafia because “M”
was the 13th letter in the alphabet. Flores, the defense gang
expert, disagreed that the “SS” tattoo and the number 13
represented associations with the Mexican Mafia.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show trial counsel’s performance was deficient
and resulting prejudice. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181,
198 (Mickel); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668.) To
prove deficient performance, the “defendant bears the burden of
showing that counsel’s performance ‘ “ ‘ “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional
norms.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] To demonstrate prejudice, defendant
bears the burden of showing a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. [Citations.]” (Mickel, at p. 198.)
In evaluating the deficiency prong, we presume “counsel’s
actions fall within the broad range of reasonableness, and afford
‘great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’ [Citation.]”
(Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198.) We will not reverse a
conviction unless there is affirmative evidence counsel had
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“ ‘ “ ‘no rational tactical purpose’ ” ’ ” for the act or omission.
(Ibid.)
Here, the record does not disclose why counsel did not
object to Detective Quinones’s references to the Mexican Mafia.
Therefore, we presume there was a rational tactical decision for
not objecting. For example, counsel could have made a tactical
decision not to object so that the defense gang expert could
contradict Detective Quinones’s testimony. This case presented
competing gang expert testimony, and such a tactic could have
put the prosecution witness’s reliability into question.
Regarding prejudice, the testimony and reference to the
Mexican Mafia was brief. Detective Quinones did not describe
the Mexican Mafia in detail and the prosecutor did not belabor
the point. The trial court also provided a limiting instruction
regarding the gang evidence. We presume the jury understood
and followed the instruction. (People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 107.) In our view, there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome would have been more favorable to
Arellano had his counsel objected. We conclude there was no
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Firearm possession convictions (counts 4 and 5)
Arellano contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that
one of his convictions for possession of a firearm by a felon (either
count 4 or 5) must be reversed because possession of the same
firearm was a continuous offense.3 (People v. Mason (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 355, 367 (Mason).) We agree.
“ ‘In the case of continuing offenses, only one violation
occurs even though the proscribed conduct may extend over [an]
indefinite period.’ [Citation.]” (Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
3 Count 6 alleged possession in April 2020.
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p. 365.) Thus, where possession of a firearm is continuous and
there is no evidence that possession ceased, the defendant only
commits a single offense and cannot be convicted of more than
one count of unlawful possession. (Id. at pp. 366-367.) If the
defendant is convicted of multiple counts, all but one count must
be reversed for lack of evidence. (Id. at p. 367.)
Here, it was alleged that count 4 occurred on August 23,
2019, the day before the shooting. Count 5 occurred on August
24, 2019, the day of the shooting. There was no evidence that
Arellano’s possession of the same firearm was interrupted
between those two days. Thus, count 5 must be reversed because
the crime was “complete” when Arellano first possessed the
firearm on August 23 (count 4) and “violated the duty imposed by
the statute not to do so.” (Mason, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p.
366; see also People v. Ratcliff (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1401, 1410
[“the crime is committed the instant the felon in any way has a
firearm within his control” (italics omitted)].)
Because we reverse the conviction for count 5 and the
sentence on that count was the primary determinate term, the
trial court must select which primary term to impose for either
count 4 or 6. (§ 1168, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.451(a).) When resentencing Arellano, the trial court “ ‘is
entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme. Not limited to
merely striking illegal portions, the trial court may reconsider all
sentencing choices. [Citations.] This rule is justified because an
aggregate prison term is not a series of separate independent
terms, but one term made up of interdependent components.’ ”
(People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1258; see also
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a
sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can
13
exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed
circumstances’ ”].) Since Arellano is entitled to resentencing on
remand, we do not consider the arguments regarding purported
sentencing errors. Any clerical errors and inaccuracies as to the
description of the sentence for count 2 regarding the abstract of
judgment and sentencing minutes should be corrected upon
resentencing.
DISPOSITION
Count 5 is reversed. The matter is remanded for a full
resentencing. We express no view as to how the trial court shall
exercise its sentencing discretion upon resentencing. After
resentencing, the court shall prepare an amended sentencing
minute order and abstract of judgment and forward a certified
copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
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Debra Cole-Hall, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Valerie G. Wass, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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