People v. Juarez CA6

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Filed 4/14/25 P. v. Juarez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051410
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR04422)

v.

JOSE MATTHEW JUAREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Jose Matthew Juarez was convicted by plea of one count of carrying a
loaded unregistered firearm on his person and in a vehicle (Pen. Code,1 § 25850, subds.
(a), (c)(6)). Juarez contends that his conviction should be reversed on two grounds:
(1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm; and
(2) section 25850 is unconstitutional under New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. Inc. v.
Bruen (2022) 597 U.S. 1 (Bruen). In addition, Juarez argues that the trial court violated
his equal protection rights by denying section 4019 credits for custodial time served on
private electronic monitoring.
For the reasons stated below, we disagree and affirm the judgment.

1
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts and Charges2
Christopher Jones was a sergeant with the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office.
While on duty the evening of October 2, 2022, about 10:18 p.m., he was asked to respond
to a citizen complaint about a possible suicide attempt near a vehicle on the Mar Monte
overpass on Highway 1.
As Sergeant Jones approached the overpass, he saw a red sedan parked on the
shoulder, with two men standing outside towards the back of the car. The vehicle was
parked facing westbound on the overpass’s shoulder, which was a small shoulder lane
without space for parking for nonemergency purposes. The overpass was a “highly
unusual” place to park, and it raised in Jones’s mind concerns about suicide and the risk
of getting hit by another vehicle. Although Jones did not think a crime was occurring, he
believed the men had parked illegally on the overpass, particularly because the vehicle
“was parked over the fog line.”
As Sergeant Jones approached the men, it did not appear to him that they were
trying to jump off the overpass, but he was not sure why they were there. Jones intended
to identify the men and determine why they were illegally parked on the overpass. It did
not seem to Jones that the men had a reason for being there. Their location concerned
him because it was “not a typical place where people loiter,” and it was too small for a
vehicle or pedestrians and it created a hazard.
Sergeant Jones found his initial interaction with the two men “strange,” noting
that, when he first arrived on the scene, both men “immediately started walking back
towards the vehicle as if they were going [to] get into it . . . without having any sort of
dialogue or interaction.” Jones asked Juarez to join him and the other man on the other

2
Because Juarez entered a plea of no contest and the parties waived the
preparation of a probation report, this factual background is based on the preliminary
hearing, which served as the basis for Juarez’s plea.
2
side of the vehicle. Juarez complied but seemed to be avoiding making eye contact with
him.
As Juarez came around the vehicle, Sergeant Jones “immediately noticed there
was a long . . . object at the right front pocket of his jacket,” which was a “windbreaker”
style that allowed “anything heavy in the pocket . . . [to] stand out, which it did.” The
object was “clearly delineated” and visible in the video from Jones’s body-worn camera.
Testifying based on the video, Jones noticed the object in Juarez’s pocket around 27
seconds from the beginning of the encounter. Based on his training and experience, Jones
had seen objects that looked like the one in Juarez’s pocket that “turn[ed] out to be
weapons.” He did not know, with “a mathematical certainty” that it was a gun in Juarez’s
pocket at the time; he only suspected it was a weapon. Jones observed that Juarez had an
object similar to a water bottle that he was moving back and forth in front of his pocket,
but Jones did not ask Juarez to keep his hands out of his pockets.
Sergeant Jones asked the men for their identification, called in their information,
and told the men that he was going to conduct a warrant check. If it turned out the men
had no warrants and had no weapon, Jones’s plan was to “send them on the[ir] way.”
Once Jones noticed the object in Juarez’s pocket, he felt he first needed to clear the
weapon because he “d[id]n’t want to get shot.”
Although Sergeant Jones did not “immediately solely focus on” the object in
Juarez’s pocket because he “was trying to determine who they were and what they were
doing,” he “intently focus[ed] [his] flashlight on th[e] item” in Juarez’s pocket until he
felt comfortable asking what the item was. Although Jones wanted to conduct a pat down
search for weapons and had called for backup assistance, he did not yet have a second
officer to help him.
Approximately three and one-half minutes into the incident, Sergeant Jones pat
searched Juarez’s pocket, found a loaded gun (which “returned non registered”), and
handcuffed Juarez.
3
B. Procedural Background
On October 14, 2022, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed a complaint
charging Juarez with one count of carrying a loaded firearm that was not registered to
him on his person and in a vehicle in violation of section 25850, subdivision (c)(6), and
one count of carrying a concealed firearm that was not registered to him on his person in
violation of section 25400, subdivision (a)(2). Juarez demurred to the complaint, arguing
that California’s firearm licensing scheme and, by extension, laws criminalizing firearm
possession without a license (including section 25850), are facially unconstitutional
under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen. The trial court overruled
Juarez’s demurrer, and Juarez entered a plea of not guilty to both counts.
On November 30, 2022, Juarez filed a motion to suppress the firearm. (§ 1538.5.)
On February 15, 2023,3 the trial court conducted a combined preliminary hearing and a
hearing on the motion to suppress. The sole witness at the hearing was Sergeant Jones.
The court viewed the first four minutes and seven seconds of the footage from Jones’s
body-worn camera, around the time when Jones discovered the firearm in Juarez’s
pocket. The court requested that the parties submit supplemental briefing on the
following issues: “when the detention started, whether it was unduly prolonged,” and
“the standard for searching someone who an officer suspects is armed.” The court held
Juarez to answer, finding sufficient evidence to support the charges, subject to the motion
to suppress and the admissibility of the evidence. Defense counsel and the district
attorney briefed the issues identified by the court.
On February 27, the district attorney filed an information charging Juarez with one
count of carrying a loaded unregistered firearm on his person and in a vehicle (§ 25850,
subds. (a), (c)(6)) and one count of carrying a concealed firearm on his person (§ 25400,
subd. (a)(2)).

3
Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2023.
4
On April 7, the trial court conducted a further hearing on the motion to suppress.
Juarez’s trial counsel argued Sergeant Jones’s account of the evening lacked credibility
and urged the court to reject Jones’s assertion that he had reason to detain and pat down
Juarez. Juarez’s trial counsel argued that, because Jones did not require Juarez and the
driver to sit down and show their hands and Juarez was “allowed to put his hands in and
around his pockets,” the court should not find credible Jones’s claim that he saw the “gun
under [] Juarez’[s] clothing and simply didn’t take any action until” later. The district
attorney responded that there was a Vehicle Code violation as a result of the two men
parking illegally on the overpass, and that Jones testified “repeatedly” that he
“immediately noticed the weapon” but chose not to “immediately deal with” it because
“he wanted to be more casual about it.”
After hearing argument, the trial court found there was a detention when Sergeant
Jones arrived on the scene; Jones had “reasonable cause to detain”; he lawfully detained
Juarez based on the illegally parked vehicle on the overpass; and Jones “present[ed]
specific and articulable facts to justify the pat search,” which he effectuated within “a few
minutes.” The court denied the motion to suppress the gun. Juarez entered a plea of not
guilty to both counts of the information.
On June 5, Juarez filed a motion to dismiss both charged counts under section 995
on the ground that the evidence supporting the charges was illegally obtained. The
district attorney opposed Juarez’s motion. Both parties relied on arguments made in the
earlier motion.
On August 7, the trial court heard the motion to dismiss. The court reviewed
Sergeant Jones’s bodycam video and testimony and found that the video evidence and
Jones’s testimony both indicated that Jones “saw what looked like a weapon within
. . . 27 seconds.” The court observed that Jones “kept his flashlight pretty much right on
the spot of [Juarez’s] jacket . . . where that weapon appears to be,” and noted that Jones
had also testified to doing so for the purpose of “[e]nsur[ing] officer safety while he
5
didn’t have backup.” The court stated that the foregoing led it to find credible Jones’s
testimony regarding the timing of his suspicion that Juarez was concealing a weapon.
The court denied Juarez’s motion to dismiss.4
On September 15, Juarez pleaded no contest to count one (carrying a loaded
unregistered firearm on his person and in a vehicle (§ 25850, subds. (a), (c)(6)). The
district attorney stated that Juarez would not be eligible for the Custody Alternatives
Program (CAPS) because his conviction involved possession of a gun. The trial court
suspended imposition of Juarez’s sentence and ordered him to serve 120 days in jail,
awarded him one day of custody credit, and authorized Juarez to complete the balance
“on electronic monitoring like LCA [Leaders in Community Alternatives] or Options.”
Over defense counsel’s objection, the court did not authorize any section 4019 credits for
the time Juarez would serve on electronic monitoring. The court dismissed the remaining
count.
Juarez timely filed a notice of appeal, stating the appeal was based on:
(1) postplea matters that did not affect the validity of the plea under California Rules of
Court, rule 8.304(b); (2) the denial of a motion to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5); and
(3) the denial of section 4019 credits on private monitoring. Juarez did not request a
certificate of probable cause.5

4
Juarez does not challenge on appeal the order denying his motion to dismiss.
5
On January 2, 2025, Juarez applied in this court for relief from default for leave
to file an amended notice of appeal which includes a statement and request for certificate
of probable cause. The Attorney General did not oppose Juarez’s application. On
February 4, 2025, this court filed an order granting Juarez’s application, giving him 15
days to file the amended notice of appeal, and directing the trial court to rule on Juarez’s
request for certificate of probable cause. On February 19, 2025, this court received a
copy of Juarez’s application to the trial court to file an amended notice of appeal and
request for certificate of probable cause. On February 25, 2025, the trial court filed
Juarez’s amended notice of appeal and granted his request for certificate of probable
cause.
6
II. DISCUSSION
Juarez argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the
firearm was discovered in the course of an unlawful detention. He also asserts that his
conviction violates the Second Amendment because California’s firearm licensing
scheme at the time of his arrest was both unconstitutional on its face due to its inclusion
of the “ ‘good cause’ ” and firearms training requirements, and as applied to him. In
addition, Juarez contends that the trial court violated his equal protection rights by
denying him section 4019 credits. He maintains that “Options,” the privately operated
home detention program in which he participated, meets the minimum statutory
requirements for home detention pursuant to section 1203.016, and, thus, he should be
awarded credits on an equal basis with participants in the county “CAPS program.” The
Attorney General disagrees on all points and requests that this court affirm the judgment.
A. The Trial Court did not Err in Denying the Motion to Suppress
1. Legal Principles
“A defendant may move to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 on grounds
that a search without a warrant was unreasonable. A warrantless search is presumptively
unreasonable, and the prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification
for the search.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120 (Simon).)
“ ‘In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from
governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional
standards.’ ” (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.) The Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution “ ‘prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures’ ”
(ibid.) and our state Constitution has a similar provision. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)
Traffic stops are considered “ ‘investigatory detentions.’ ” (People v. Greenwood
(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 742, 746.) “ ‘ “A detention is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that,
considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective
7
manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
“[T]he circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and
articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken
place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is
involved in that activity. Not only must he subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it
must be objectively reasonable for him to do so: the facts must be such as would cause
any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training
and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement
by the person in question.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893 (Tony C.); see also
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 21 (Terry).)
The Fourth Amendment standard “ ‘ “depends on the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act.” [Citation.] Courts “cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty
. . . where none exists.” [Citation.] Rather, they must permit officers to make
“commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” ’ ” (People v. Flores
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041 (Flores).) However, “officers are not entitled to rely on
mere hunches” (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299) but instead must point
to “articulable facts” (ibid.) and “particularized suspicion” (id. at p. 301) that the
defendant “may have been acting illegally.” (Id. at p. 299.)
Although there may be a harmless explanation for the observed conduct, an officer
may still investigate for the purpose of “resolv[ing] that very ambiguity and establish[ing]
whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal to ‘enable the police to quickly determine
whether they should allow the suspect to go about his business or hold him to answer
charges.’ ” (Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 894; see also People v. Leyba (1981) 29
Cal.3d 591, 599.)
“[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
8
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, . . . and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his
own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.” (Terry, supra,
392 U.S. at pp. 30–31.) “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that [their] safety or that of others was in danger.” (Id. at p. 27.)
“Whether an officer’s conduct was reasonable is evaluated on a case-by-case basis in
light of the totality of the circumstances.” (In re Raymond C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303,
307.)
When “reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the
trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial
evidence.” (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 120.) “In doing so we do not consider each fact
in isolation. Instead, ‘we must consider “the totality of the circumstances—the whole
picture.” ’ ” (Flores, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1043.) “If there is conflicting testimony, we
must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, its evaluations of
credibility, and the version of events most favorable to the People, to the extent the
record supports them.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.)
We “independently appl[y] the law to the trial court’s factual findings,
determining de novo whether the findings support the trial court’s ruling.” (Gardner v.
Appellate Division of Superior Court (2019) 6 Cal.5th 998, 1006.)
2. Analysis
Juarez argues that Sergeant Jones lacked justification to detain him because
(1) Jones responded to the overpass to investigate a report of a potential suicide attempt,
9
which “was almost immediately resolved”; (2) Jones’s testimony that he was there to
investigate a parking violation was not credible because he did not request a driver’s
license and registration,6 issue a parking citation, or request that the men move the
vehicle; and (3) Jones detained the men merely because he thought their behavior
“ ‘odd.’ ”
It is true that Sergeant Jones determined when he approached the scene that Juarez
and the other man did not appear to be attempting to jump off the overpass. However,
Jones testified to his belief that the men had illegally parked on the overpass, since they
were “parked over the fog line.” He observed that the overpass was a “highly unusual”
place to park and loiter, which created a hazardous situation. In addition, Jones discerned
the men’s “strange” behavior and that Juarez appeared to be “trying to avoid making
[eye] contact with” him.
Taken together, these facts provide reasonable, articulable suspicion that Juarez
and the other man had violated the Vehicle Code, that criminal activity might be “about
to occur,” and that Juarez was involved. (Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893.)
Moreover, under the Fourth Amendment, Sergeant Jones reasonably stopped Juarez and
the other man for their suspected violation of the Vehicle Code. (People v. Bennett
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 917; Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 810 [“As a general
matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable
cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”]; see also Veh. Code, § 22500,
subd. (k) [prohibition against stopping, parking, or leaving standing any vehicle “[u]pon a
bridge”].) We determine that the trial court did not err in finding that Sergeant Jones had
“reasonable cause to detain” Juarez on the basis of the illegally parked vehicle.

6
Contrary to Juarez’s argument, the record indicates that Sergeant Jones did ask
for the men’s identification and the driver provided his driver’s license, but Juarez only
identified himself verbally.
10
Juarez also argues that Sergeant Jones unduly prolonged the detention beyond
what was reasonable because, “once [Jones] was satisfied that no suicide was planned,
his original reason for the investigation had been fulfilled.” As discussed ante, we are
not persuaded by Juarez’s argument in light of the Vehicle Code violation and unusual
circumstances of the incident. Moreover, once Juarez came around the vehicle, Jones
“immediately noticed there was a long . . . object” in Juarez’s jacket pocket, which, based
on his experience, Jones surmised could be a weapon. Jones “intently focus[ed] [his]
flashlight on th[e] item” until he felt he could safely conduct a pat down search, and he
requested backup assistance.
The trial court found credible Sergeant Jones’s testimony about how quickly he
spotted the potential weapon, which was supported by evidence from the body-worn
camera footage showing Jones training his flashlight beam on the area in Juarez’s jacket
pocket “where [the] weapon appear[ed] to be” approximately 27 seconds into the
encounter. Jones conducted a pat search of Juarez’s pocket approximately three and one-
half minutes into the encounter and discovered the unregistered, loaded firearm. The
court found that Jones offered “specific and articulable facts to justify the pat search” and
conducted the search within “a few minutes.”
Although “[a]n investigatory stop exceeds constitutional bounds when extended
beyond what is reasonably necessary under the circumstances that made its initiation
permissible[,] . . . [c]ircumstances which develop during a detention may provide
reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention.” (People v. Russell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
96, 101–102.) Sergeant Jones initially detained Juarez and the driver to investigate a
possible Vehicle Code violation, but when Jones detected a potential weapon in Juarez’s
jacket pocket soon after encountering the men, he reasonably prolonged their detention
for the purpose of investigating the nature of the suspected weapon while engaging in
actions meant to maintain his and others’ safety. Thus, despite Juarez’s assertion that
Jones’s timeframe within which to conduct an investigation ended once he discerned that
11
the two men were not attempting suicide, intervening observations provided reasonable
justification for the continuation of the detention for the three to four minutes it took for
Jones to investigate the possible Vehicle Code violation, identify the potential weapon,
call in a warrant check on the two men, request assistance, and conduct a pat search of
Juarez’s jacket pocket. (Id. at p. 102.) Jones “had to make a quick decision as to how to
protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do so” (Terry,
supra, 392 U.S. at p. 28), including confining the pat search to Juarez’s jacket pocket.
(Id. at p. 30 [noting search was reasonable where the officer “confined his search strictly
to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the men were armed and to disarm
them once he discovered the weapon”].)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that substantial
evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Sergeant Jones had
reasonable suspicion and had specific, articulable facts to justify (1) detaining Juarez to
investigate his purpose for parking illegally on the overpass; and (2) once he noticed the
possible weapon, detaining Juarez until he could safely conduct a pat search of his jacket
pocket. The trial court did not err in denying Juarez’s motion to suppress.
B. Juarez’s Conviction did not Violate the Second Amendment
1. Legal Principles
The Second Amendment states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” (U.S. Const., 2d Amend.) States are subject to the Second Amendment
pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (McDonald v. City of
Chicago (2010) 561 U.S. 742, 791.)
In District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570 (Heller), the United States
Supreme Court held that the rights granted by the Second Amendment include “the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” (Id. at
p. 635.) In its decision in Bruen, the United States Supreme Court extended its holding in
12
Heller to recognize “an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the
home.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 10.)
Bruen decided a Second Amendment challenge to New York’s firearm licensing
scheme brought by two New York residents who had separately applied for unrestricted
licenses to carry handguns in public. They alleged they were denied such licenses on the
grounds “that they had failed to show ‘proper cause,’ i.e., had failed to demonstrate a
unique need for self-defense.” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 16.)
After engaging in a textual and historical analysis of New York’s regulation of
firearms, the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional New York’s
requirement that gun license applicants establish “proper cause” to obtain an unrestricted
license to carry handguns in public. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. p. 71.) The court concluded
that the “proper-cause” requirement “prevents law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-
defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms” (ibid.) by requiring them
to “demonstrat[e] to government officers some special need” to bear arms. (Id. at p. 70.)
The United States Supreme Court articulated a “text and history” test for analyzing
constitutional challenges based on rights granted by the Second Amendment. (Bruen,
supra, 597 U.S. at p. 17.) “[W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its
regulation, . . . the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with
this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only if a firearm regulation is
consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the
individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Writing for the court and separately, justices in the Bruen majority reiterated that
the Second Amendment does not protect a right to “ ‘keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’ ” (Bruen, supra, 597
U.S. at p. 21 (maj. opn. of Thomas, J.); id. at pp. 80–81 (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.),
13
citing Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 626.) They cautioned that an individual’s Second
Amendment right remains “subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions,”
(Bruen, at p. 70) including the “imposi[tion of] licensing requirements for carrying a
handgun for self-defense” (id. at p. 79 (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.)), such as
“fingerprinting, a background check, a mental health records check, and training in
firearms handling and in laws regarding the use of force, among other possible
requirements.” (Id. at p. 80 (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.); see also Heller, at p. 627, fn.
26 [setting forth a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures”].)
a. Section 25850
Section 25850, subdivision (a) (section 25850(a)) provides that “[a] person is
guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when the person carries a loaded firearm on the person
or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in an incorporated city,
city and county, or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area of an
unincorporated area of a county or city and county.” Section 25850, subdivision (c)(6)
sets forth the punishment for a violation of section 25850(a) by a person who has not
registered the firearm.
“Although framed as a default prohibition, section 25850 is in effect the
enforcement mechanism of a regulatory regime that grants licenses to those who may
lawfully carry firearms and withholds licenses from those who may not.” (In re T.F.-G.
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 893, 915 (T.F.-G.).) On its own, section 25850 “appears broadly
prohibitory, [but] it exists within a framework of numerous express exemptions.” (T.F.-
G., at p. 908.) Among these exemptions is section 26010, which provides that section
25850 does not apply to individuals who have concealed carry permits issued pursuant to
section 26150 et seq. (T.F.-G., at p. 908.)

14
b. Firearm Licensing
Sections 26150 and 26155 set forth California’s requirements for obtaining a
license to carry a concealed firearm.7 At the time of Juarez’s offense, former section
26150 required an applicant for a concealed carry license to meet four requirements:
They must (1) be “of good moral character”; (2) provide “[g]ood cause [] for issuance of
the license”; (3) be a resident of the county in which they are seeking the license; and
(4) complete a firearms training course “as described in [s]ection 26165.” (Former
§ 26150, subd. (a), added by Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6, p. 4105 and amended by Stats.
2023, ch. 249, § 10, p. 4473, eff. Jan. 1, 2024 (former section 26150(a)).) After the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bruen, the Legislature amended
former section 26150(a) and, among other changes, removed the “[g]ood cause”
requirement.8 (Stats. 2023, ch. 249, § 10, p. 4473.)
At the time of Juarez’s offense, section 26165, former subdivision (a) required
new license applicants to complete a training course that met all of the following criteria:
(1) a course of a duration between eight and 16 hours; (2) instruction on firearm safety
and handling, “shooting technique, and laws regarding the permissible use of a firearm”;
and (3) “live-fire shooting exercises on a firing range” and “demonstration by the

7
Section 26150 covers the issuance of concealed carry licenses by a county
sheriff. (§ 26150, subd. (a).) Section 26155 covers the issuance of concealed carry
licenses by the chief of police. (§ 26155, subd. (a).) Juarez focuses his claim of facial
invalidity on former section 26150, and we limit our discussion to that provision.
8
Effective January 1, 2024, pursuant to Senate Bill No. 2, the Legislature replaced
the “good cause” requirement with a requirement that the applicant be and prove that they
are at least 21 years of age; replaced the “good moral character” requirement with a
requirement that the applicant meet the standards set forth in section 26202, which
governs the designation of persons disqualified from obtaining a concealed-carry license;
replaced the “may issue” language with “shall issue”; added guidance on the evidence
needed to establish residency in the county; and added the requirement that the applicant
be the registered owner of the firearm for which they are seeking the concealed-carry
license. (Stats. 2023, ch. 249, § 10, p. 4473.)
15
applicant of safe handling of, and shooting proficiency with, each firearm that the
applicant is applying to be licensed to carry.”9
“ ‘The interpretation of a statute and the determination of its constitutionality are
questions of law. In such cases, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review.’ ”
(People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 469, 474 (Alexander).)
“ ‘ “A defendant challenging the constitutionality of a statute carries a heavy
burden: ‘The courts will presume a statute is constitutional unless its unconstitutionality
clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears; all presumptions and intendments favor its
validity.’ ” ’ [Citations.] Typically, a litigant may challenge the constitutionality of a
statute in two ways: on its face or as applied.” (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144,
156 (D.L.).)
“A facial challenge seeks to void the statute as a whole by showing that ‘ “no set
of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid,” i.e., that the law is
unconstitutional in all’ ” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 157; see also Tobe v. City of
Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [“ ‘ “[P]etitioners must demonstrate that the act’s
provisions inevitably pose a present total and fatal conflict with applicable constitutional
prohibitions[]” ’ ”]) or at least the “ ‘ “great majority of cases” ’ ” (T.F.-G., supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at p. 909, italics omitted). When reviewing a facial challenge to a statute,
we “consider[] only the text of the measure itself, not its application to the particular
circumstances of an individual.” (Tobe, at p. 1084.) In contrast, a defendant making an
“as applied” challenge to a statute “seek[s] ‘relief from a specific application of a facially
valid statute or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly
9
Following Bruen, the Legislature amended section 26165, subdivision (a) to
lengthen the required duration of training, indicate the listed criteria were the minimum
required, and add subjects to the required course, including a component on mental
health. (Stats. 2023, ch. 249, § 13, pp. 4474–4475.) Juarez cites the post-Bruen version
of section 26165 (which was not in effect at the time Juarez committed his offense) when
he argues that the numerosity of the training requirements violates the Second
Amendment. We discuss his argument post (pt. II.C.2.a.).
16
impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the manner or circumstances in
which the statute or ordinance has been applied.’ ” (D.L., at p. 157.)
“ ‘Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try
to limit the solution to the problem,’ severing any ‘problematic portions while leaving the
remainder intact’ ” because an unconstitutional provision in a statute “ ‘does not
necessarily defeat or affect the validity of its remaining provisions.’ ” (Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd. (2010) 561 U.S. 477, 508.) If only a
portion of the statute is unconstitutional, and that portion is severable, courts will uphold
the statute as constitutional. (People v. Mosqueda (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 414
(Mosqueda).)
When assessing whether an unconstitutional statutory provision is severable, if the
statute does not contain a severability clause, we must determine whether the provision is
“ ‘grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.[10]’ ” (California
Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 271 (Matosantos).) Whether
or not a provision is grammatically severable “depends on whether the invalid parts ‘can
be removed as a whole without affecting the wording’ or coherence of what remains.”
(Ibid.) Whether or not a provision is functionally severable depends on whether, after
removal of the invalid provision, the remainder of the statute is “ ‘ “ ‘complete in
itself’ ” ’ and ‘capable of independent application.’ ” (Abbott Laboratories v. Franchise
Tax Bd. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1358.) Whether or not a provision is volitionally
severable “depends on whether the remainder [of the statute] ‘ “would have been adopted
by the legislative body had the latter foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute.” ’ ”
(Matosantos, at p. 271.)

10
California case law appears to use the terms “severable” and “separable”
interchangeably in this context.
17
2. Analysis
a. Former Section 26150
Juarez contends that former section 26150 is unconstitutional on its face because
the Bruen decision rendered the statute’s “ ‘good cause’ ” requirement unconstitutional.
Moreover, Juarez asserts that because, when he was arrested, “[n]o California court had
yet altered” the interpretation of the statute by declaring the “ ‘good cause’ ” requirement
severable, the statute was still unconstitutional at that time. He additionally contends
that, even with the “ ‘good cause’ ” requirement severed, California’s licensing scheme
remains unconstitutional because the training requirement “imposes so many conditions
on the issuance of the license that it cannot be squared with Bruen.”
The Attorney General concedes that the “ ‘good cause’ ” requirement of former
section 26150 is unconstitutional following Bruen. As the statute contains no severability
clause, we must consider whether the invalid provision is “ ‘grammatically, functionally,
and volitionally separable’ ” from the remainder of the statute. (Matosantos, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 271.)
As it read at the time of Juarez’s arrest, the “[g]ood cause” requirement in former
section 26150(a) was both grammatically separate from the other license requirements set
forth in subdivision (a) and set forth in its own subdivision, subdivision (a)(2).
Removing the “[g]ood cause” requirement does not impair the wording or coherence of
the remainder of the requirements in subdivision (a), and therefore this element is
grammatically separable for purpose of the severance analysis.
With respect to functional severability, none of the other requirements are reliant
upon or cross-reference the “good cause” requirement. Moreover, when the Legislature
replaced former section 12050 with former section 26150, it “included the same general
requirements for obtaining a license to carry a concealed weapon . . . without substantive
change” but separated the requirements into “distinct paragraphs.” (D.L., supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 164; see also Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6, p. 4105.) Not only are the other
18
licensing requirements independent and complete irrespective of the “ ‘good cause’ ”
requirement (D.L., at p. 163), “the Legislature viewed [them] as separate, and as
functioning independently of one another.” (Id. at p. 164.) Thus, the “good cause”
requirement is functionally separable as well.
The crux of the third severability prong—volitional separability—“is whether a
legislative body, knowing that only part of its enactment would be valid, would have
preferred that part to nothing, or would instead have declined to enact the valid without
the invalid.” (Matosantos, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 273.) California courts have
recognized the Legislature’s interest in regulating firearms, particularly in controlling
concealed firearms (Nichols v. County of Santa Clara (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1236,
1246), limiting firearms licenses to “law-abiding” citizens in line with Heller and Bruen
(see, e.g., Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 479), and “ ‘ensuring Californians who
carry firearms . . . know how to safely handle a gun’ ” (Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 414). We conclude that the Legislature would have preferred to excise the “good
cause” requirement rather than eliminate the licensing scheme as a whole.
For these reasons, we decide the unconstitutional “good cause” requirement is
severable from former section 26150. The remainder of former section 26150—
including the training requirement Juarez challenges—is constitutionally sound post-
Bruen. The only provision in New York’s licensing framework the United States
Supreme Court invalidated was the “proper cause” requirement. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S.
at p. 71.) Specifically, the court explained that “ ‘nothing’ in its analysis should be
interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of licensing regimes that require applicants
to” meet objective criteria, such as “ ‘undergo[ing] a background check or pass[ing] a
firearm safety course’ to obtain a license.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 165, citing
Bruen, at p. 38, fn. 9.)
At least two of former section 26150(a)’s other three licensing requirements at the
time of Juarez’s offense constitute objective requirements: Residence within the county
19
where the applicant seeks the license, and completion of a firearm training course.11 The
court in Mosqueda concluded that those requirements, together with the “ ‘good moral
character’ ” requirement, “advance California’s long-held goals of ‘ensuring Californians
who carry firearms are responsible and law-abiding, live in or have substantial contact
with the licensing jurisdiction (since local law enforcement is tasked with licensee
compliance) and know how to safely handle a gun.’ ” (Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at p. 414.)
We conclude California’s “ ‘good cause’ ” requirement is severable and, once
severed, its licensing scheme under former section 26150 remains constitutionally valid.
(T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 916, citing D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 163–
165.)
Nevertheless, Juarez argues that, even if the “good cause” requirement is
severable, such separation cannot be applied retroactively to overcome the
unconstitutionality of his arrest for an offense that occurred before the California courts
determined the requirement was severable. He relies on Smith v. Cahoon (1931) 283
U.S. 553 and In re Porterfield (1946) 28 Cal.2d 91 to support his argument. In D.L., the
defendant made a similar argument, alleging “that severability does not cure the harm
suffered from his pre-Bruen conviction.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
However, the court concluded that such an argument “could only make sense in the
context of an ‘as applied’ challenge.” (Ibid.) Both Smith and Porterfield are

11
Juarez does not challenge, and we do not address, the constitutionality of former
section 26150’s “good moral character” requirement for licensure. Although the
Legislature has replaced the “good moral character” requirement in section 26150 with a
requirement that the applicant not be a “disqualified person” under section 26202 (Stats.
2023, ch. 249, § 10, p. 4473), the New York statute at issue in the Bruen case likewise
included a “ ‘good moral character’ ” requirement, which the Supreme Court
acknowledged but did not deem unconstitutional. (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 11.)
Notably, the Supreme Court distinguishes between licensing schemes that require a
showing of “good cause” or “need” and those that include a “good moral character” or
“suitability” requirement, treating the latter favorably. (See id. at p. 13, fn. 1.)
20
distinguishable as they involved “as applied” challenges to the applicable statutes, not
facial challenges. (Smith, at p. 556; Porterfield, at p. 96.) Moreover, as the court in D.L.
reasoned, even if the defendant could and did assert an as applied challenge, his
conviction “had nothing to do with the ‘good cause’ licensing requirement.” (D.L., at
p. 165.) We agree.
In addition, Bruen does not support Juarez’s contention that the “many” training
requirements in former section 26150 render it unconstitutional. Bruen and Heller both
discuss our country’s history of regulating the carrying of firearms and expressly state
that their holdings do not limit a state’s ability to continue to regulate firearms. Such
regulations may include the imposition of firearms training courses. For example, in his
majority opinion, Justice Thomas stated that “nothing” in the Court’s analysis rendered
unconstitutional objective criteria such as the requirement to “pass a firearms safety
course, [which is] designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are,
in fact ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ ” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 38, fn. 9.) In
addition, in his concurring opinion, Justice Kavanaugh stated that the shall-issue states’
licensing statutes may continue to require the fulfillment of objective requirements such
as “fingerprinting, a background check, a mental health records check, and training in
firearms handling and in laws regarding the use of force, among other possible
requirements” (Id. at p. 80 (conc. opn. of Kavanaugh, J.)) and the may-issue state
licensing regimes may also enforce licensing requirements “so long as those [s]tates
employ objective licensing requirements like those used by the 43 shall-issue [s]tates.”
(Ibid.; see also Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 597, 619.) We reject Juarez’s facial
challenge to former section 26150.
b. Section 25850
“Given our conclusion that the ‘good cause’ requirement from sections 26150 and
26155 is severable, California’s firearm licensing framework—and the criminal penalties
under section 25850—remain valid.” (D.L., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “If a state
21
may enforce a licensing regime, then a state may impose penalties for noncompliance.”
(T.F.-G., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 915; see also Mosqueda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 414 [noting that a defendant’s “Second Amendment rights are not violated when the
state enforces [its licensing requirements] criminally”].) Section 25850 is one such
enforcement mechanism. (See T.F.-G., at p. 915.)
The penalties section 25850 imposes on those who do not have a concealed carry
license would apply not only to those “who are wrongfully denied licenses based on the
unconstitutional good cause requirement, but [also] on individuals who cannot or do not
obtain licenses due to constitutionally valid restrictions” set forth in section 26150,
including the residency and firearms training requirements. (T.F.-G., supra, 94
Cal.App.5th at p. 916.) A facial challenge to section 25850 “succeeds only where [the]
statute is unconstitutional in all or at least the generality or great majority of cases” (id. at
pp. 915–916), so “it is not enough to show that [the] statute may have an unconstitutional
application to a hypothetical person lawfully carrying” a loaded firearm on their person
and/or in their vehicle “after failing to secure a license [to do so] due to [the] ‘good
cause’ requirement.”12 (Id. at p. 915; see also Alexander, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 474
[noting that, when “analyzing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute,” the
reviewing court does not consider “ ‘its application to the particular circumstances of an
individual’ ”].) Section 25850 could still have been constitutionally applied to applicants

12
Juarez argues for the first time on appeal that section 25850 is unconstitutional
as applied to him. “Because an as-applied challenge asserts a ‘constitutional defense
[that] may be correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding
to the trial court for further findings’ [citation], it is not appropriately raised for the first
time on appeal.” (Zachary H. v. Teri A. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1144; People v.
Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946 [“An as-applied constitutional challenge is
forfeited unless previously raised.”].) Therefore, we decline to consider Juarez’s as-
applied challenge to section 25850. (People v. Anderson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 577,
584, fn. 1.)
22
who failed to secure a license due to the residency and/or firearms training requirements,
and Juarez does not claim otherwise.
We therefore conclude Juarez’s conviction does not violate the Second
Amendment.
C. Juarez Has not Demonstrated a Violation of his Right to Equal Protection
1. Legal Principles
“ ‘[E]qual protection of the law is denied only where there is no “rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose.” ’ [Citation.] ‘In other words, the legislation survives constitutional scrutiny as
long as there is “ ‘any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational
basis for the classification.’ ” [Citation.] This standard of rationality does not depend
upon whether lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve.
Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated.’ ” (People v. Gerson
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1090.)
“Since 1976, Penal Code section 4019 has offered prisoners in local custody the
opportunity to earn ‘conduct credit’ against their sentences for good behavior. Conduct
credits encourage prisoners to conform to prison regulations, to refrain from criminal and
assaultive conduct, and to participate in work and other rehabilitative activities.” (People
v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 317, fn. omitted; People v. Orellana (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 319, 324, fn. 4.)
Section 4019 applies to prisoners who participate in a home detention program,
subject to certain conditions. (§§ 4019, subd. (a)(7), 1203.016, subd. (b).) Section
1203.016, subdivision (i)(1) authorizes the correctional administrator, with board of
supervisor approval, to “administer a home detention program pursuant to written
contracts with appropriate public or private agencies or entities.” Privately operated
home detention programs must agree to operate in compliance with all applicable state
laws and standards, demonstrate financial responsibility, and submit to an annual
23
compliance review by the correctional administrator. (Id., subd. (i)(3)(B)(i), (iii), (iv).)
To participate in a home detention program, an individual must comply with the
program’s rules and regulations, including “admit[ting] any probation officer or other
peace officer designated by the correctional administrator into the participant’s residence
at any time for purposes of verifying the participant’s compliance with the conditions of
the detention.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) If a peace officer supervising a participant in a home
detention program “has reasonable cause to believe that the participant is not complying
with the rules or conditions of the program . . . the peace officer may, . . . without a
warrant of arrest, retake the person into custody to complete the remainder of the original
sentence.” (Id., subd. (c).) “[U]nauthorized departures from the place of home
detention” and “[w]illful failure” of the participant to return to home detention at
prescribed times are punishable as escapes under section 4532. (Id., subd. (f).)
Because Juarez’s claim on appeal involves the interpretation of a statutory claim
and an alleged equal protection violation, we review it de novo. (California Grocers
Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208 [equal protection claims]; People
v. Brewer (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 457, 461 [statutory interpretation].)
2. Analysis
Juarez contends that the Options home detention program satisfies the minimum
statutory requirements set forth in section 1203.016, subdivision (b). According to
Juarez, as an Options program participant, he and participants in the Santa Cruz Sheriff
Office’s CAPS program are similarly situated and equally entitled to conduct credits
under section 4019.
While section 1203.016 allows correctional administrators to engage with private
agencies or entities to provide home detention services, the record does not demonstrate,
and Juarez does not argue, that a written contract exists between Options and the Santa
Cruz County administrator, as expressly required under section 1203.016, subdivision
(i)(1).
24
Juarez relies on comparisons between Options and CAPS’s respective enrollment
forms to demonstrate their alleged equivalency. He filed in this court a request for
judicial notice of copies of these enrollment forms. However, Juarez acknowledges, and
the Attorney General confirms, that neither document appeared in the record before the
trial court nor in the record before us on appeal. Because the enrollment forms were not
presented to the trial court, they are not appropriate for consideration on appeal. (People
v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 303, fn. 3 [declining to take judicial notice
where the record on appeal “does not indicate the trial court reviewed or took judicial
notice” of the proffered documents]; Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 1281, 1307 [“Documents not presented in the trial proceeding generally
cannot be included as part of the record on appeal and must be disregarded on appeal as
beyond the scope of review.”]; Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of
evidence not presented to the trial court. Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the
correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters
which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.’ ”].) Juarez has not
presented any exceptional circumstances here that would justify deviation from that
general principle (Vons, at p. 444, fn. 3), and we deny Juarez’s request for judicial notice.
Because Juarez fails to support his arguments with citations to admitted evidence
in the record, we conclude Juarez cannot prevail on his equal protection challenge to the
trial court’s decision to deny Juarez section 4019 credits for the time he served on the
Options electronic monitoring program.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

25
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Lie, J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H051410
People v. Juarez

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