CourtListener 10378089•People v. Williams CA2/6
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Filed 4/14/25 P. v. Williams CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B332652
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, F000240517002)
(San Luis Obispo County)
v.
TRAVIS RON WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
This is the second appeal from a postjudgment order
denying Travis Ron Williams’s petition for resentencing (Pen.
Code, § 1172.6)1 after he was convicted of murder, burglary, and
arson. He contends the record does not establish that the trial
court applied the correct legal standard in determining whether
he, as a 15-year-old youth at the time of his crimes, formed the
necessary mental state to be convicted of felony murder. We
affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1997, appellant pleaded no contest to first degree
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189), second degree burglary (§ 459),
and arson (§ 451, subd. (d)) and admitted a principal-armed-with-
a-firearm enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The change of
plea was entered after the preliminary hearing based on the
understanding that appellant and his cohort, Tommy Traughber,
committed a home-invasion burglary in which appellant and
Traughber kicked in the victim’s (a 75-year-old-widow living
alone) back door. The victim was shot in the back of the head at
close range. Appellant was sentenced to 26 years to life in state
prison. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: “The
court does not find that you actually pulled the trigger; that you
actually were the one who did the shooting.” There is a dispute
about who was the actual shooter. Appellant was 15 years old
when the offense was committed and tried as an adult.2
Petition for Resentencing
In 2019, appellant filed a petition seeking to vacate his
murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95).
The trial court denied the petition without an evidentiary
hearing. We reversed the denial and remanded the matter with
directions for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and
to hold an evidentiary hearing. (Williams, supra, B301556.)
On remand, the trial court conducted a three-day, joint
evidentiary hearing, addressing appellant’s and codefendant
Traughber’s individual resentencing petitions. The People
presented numerous witnesses and exhibits. Appellant presented
2 These facts are taken from our prior appellant opinion.
(People v. Williams (Nov. 17, 2020, B301556) [nonpub. opn.]
(Williams).)
2
testimony from Dr. Paul Elizondo, a child adolescent and forensic
psychiatrist who evaluated appellant. Dr. Elizondo testified
about the brain development of 15-year-olds generally, and
specially, about the effects of appellant’s youth and trauma-
related disorder on his conduct and mental state at the time of
the murder.
After the hearing, the parties submitted additional briefing
addressing the evidence presented. Appellant’s briefing included
a copy of Dr. Elizondo’s 16-page written report summarizing his
findings.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
In September 2023, the trial court issued its oral ruling. As
a preliminary matter, the trial court stated that it had “reviewed”
the parties’ briefing. It acknowledged how “difficult” the case was
to decide 30 years “after the fact,” which was also “complicated by
[petitioners’] youth.” The trial court nevertheless found appellant
and Traughber were major participants who acted with reckless
indifference to human life and denied their petitions. The trial
court explained, “These two planned the crime. They executed
the crime together. They are major participants. Neither one
[was] the lookout or the . . . getaway driver.”
Regarding its finding that appellant acted with reckless
indifference, the trial court explained, “there’s no question in the
Court’s mind based upon the evidence that’s been presented that
it was [appellant] who went to his mother’s safe, secured the
weapon [a .22 caliber pistol], knew that it was loaded and took
that weapon with him in this burglary that they planned
together.”
The trial court further opined, the burglary “was from a
residence. It was at night when [appellant and Traughber] got to
3
the residence. The lights were on. The car was in the driveway.
Even a 15-year-old should have recognized that that meant
someone was home and being armed with a loaded firearm or
perhaps it had been given to Mr. Traughber by then, if at all.
Even a 15-year-old, in the Court’s eyes, should have recognized
that he was acting recklessly and there was the likelihood of
death.”
The trial court explained that appellant’s “own statements
have him going into the house with Mr. Traughber. . . . It’s clear
to the Court that [appellant] knew that Ms. Agueda had been
killed or at least shot. Even if [appellant] wasn’t in the same
room, he admitted hearing the shot, and . . . the way . . . this
crime unfolded, it’s clear that [appellant and Traughber] were
together the entire time, meaning together doing these things,
not necessarily in the same room at all times, but they were
together, communicating with one another.”
According to the trial court, it had “no doubt that based on
these things, even if [appellant] was not the actual shooter, he
knew that a shooting had occurred. Then he goes along with
getting into [the victim’s] car. He has his brother hide the fruits
of the crime and the weapon, the firearm. He goes along with Mr.
Traughber in picking up these young wom[en], cruising about
town, essentially acting like teenagers.”
The trial court noted, “the cases have told me that I need to
look at those factors, and these are not factors the way they
unfolded that point to someone who was not acting with reckless
indifference to human life or who, when the crime unfolded in the
manner that it did, decided to separate themselves from the
crime.” The trial court added that “while it’s not clear what
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[appellant’s] role was in the burning of the car, it’s clear that he
was there. His own admissions establish as much.”
Regarding appellant’s youth at the time of the crimes, the
trial court acknowledged appellant was younger than Traughber,
who was 17 years old. Given this age difference, the trial court
reasoned, “I think it is a closer call in terms of whether the
youthfulness offset or negated the recklessness with which
[appellant] proceeded. Nevertheless, for the reasons I have
already stated, taking a loaded gun to a residence at night with
every reason to believe someone is present, even a 15-year-old
should understand that that is reckless and likely to lead to the
loss of human life. So I am not going to find that it is a factor
that negates the findings the Court needs to make . . . here today.
But as I have already said, it’s an incredibly important factor in
terms of parole, and I’m pleased to see that the parole board has
already made a decision to release [appellant] because of his
youth.”
Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which significantly limited
the scope of the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and
eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime. (See, generally People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959;
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a special procedural
mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek
retroactive relief under the law as amended. (People v. Strong
5
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708.) A defendant commences that
procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that,
among other things, the defendant could not presently be
convicted of murder under the current law. (Id. at p. 708.)
When, as here, the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief pursuant to section 1172.6,
the trial court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder
conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (Id., subd. (d)(1).) At that hearing, the burden of proof
shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
the law as amended. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the
prosecutor may offer new or additional evidence to meet their
respective burdens. (Ibid.)
Discussion
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court’s order denying his section 1172.6
petition for resentencing. His sole contention is that the record
does not establish that the trial court applied the correct legal
standard in determining whether he, as a then 15-year-old youth,
formed the necessary mental state to be convicted of felony
murder.
The law recognizes that the “hallmark features” of youth
include “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks
and consequences.” (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 477.)
Several appellate decisions have recently considered the
relevance of a defendant’s youth as a factor in the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (See, e.g., People v. Jones
6
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1091-1093 [remanding for trial court
to have a “meaningful opportunity” to consider defendant’s youth
as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining
reckless indifference]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434,
454-455 [defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in determining
whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life]; People
v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 [defendant’s youth made
it unclear whether he was aware of dangers posed by nature of
crime, weapons, and other participants’ criminal histories]; see
also People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 416-418 [youth
is relevant factor in determining whether defendant acted with
implied malice].)
Appellant contends the record does not establish that the
trial court applied the controlling law. For example, he contends
the trial court made repeated statements about “what it thought
a 15-year-old should be capable of thinking,” rather than what he
was actually thinking the night of the murder. Appellant also
contends the trial court only “briefly” acknowledged the
evidentiary testimony of Dr. Elizondo and made no mention of
the “trauma factors” Dr. Elizondo found relevant. Appellant
concludes there was, “at a minimum, some ambiguity in the
court’s reasoning.” These contentions are meritless.
“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is
that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and
it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.”
(People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573; People v.
Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549.) We also adhere to the
well-established principle that we review the legal correctness of
a ruling, not the trial court’s rationale. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4
Cal.4th 929, 976.)
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Here, the trial court was not required to provide a rationale
for its decision. (See People v. Tessman (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1293, 1302.) However, when the trial court offers an explanation,
its remarks generally “cannot be used to show that [it]
misapplied the law or erred in its reasoning.” (Ibid.) A limited
exception exists only where the judge’s comments, taken as a
whole, unambiguously “disclose an incorrect rather than a correct
concept of the relevant law, embodied not merely in ‘secondary
remarks’ but in [the judge’s] basic ruling . . . .” (People v. Ortiz
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 249, 253; see also In re Jerry R. (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1440.)
Our review of the trial court’s statements, taken as a
whole, establish that it understood and properly applied the law.
This is a not case where the trial court did not have a
“meaningful opportunity” to consider appellant’s youth as a
relevant factor in determining whether he acted with reckless
indifference at the time of his crime. To the contrary, defense
counsel made appellant’s “neuropsychological impairments” and
“trauma-related disorder” the main issue of his case and provided
extensive briefing to that effect.
That the trial court did not refer to or discuss certain
evidence when it rendered its ruling does not mean it
misunderstood or incorrectly applied the law. Even so, the trial
court was not bound by Dr. Elizondo’s testimony and opinion.
(See In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212-213.) As the trial
court unambiguously stated, “there is no question in the Court’s
eyes that [appellant] was a major participant acting with reckless
indifference to human life.”
We also reject appellant’s contention that the trial court’s
statements regarding his youth as an important factor in terms of
8
a parole decision misstated the relevance of his adolescence. The
trial court’s comments that youth is “an incredibly important
factor in terms of parole” did not undermine the trial court’s
previous findings. Considering the trial court’s statements as a
whole, it is apparent that it did not believe appellant’s youth
negated his reckless indifference to human life.
Disposition
The judgment (order denying petition for resentencing) is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
9
Jesse J. Marino, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
_____________________________
Law Offices of John Derrick and John Derrick, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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