CourtListener 10375332•People v. Vargas CA4/1
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Filed 4/9/25 P. v. Vargas CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083404
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD296287)
MARGARITO ANGELES VARGAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert O. Amador, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert L. Hernandez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric Swenson and Monique Myers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury convicted Margarito Angeles Vargas of a second degree Watson1
murder of a 19-month-old child, driving with a suspended license, multiple
drunk driving crimes, and hit and run driving. Vargas appeals from the
judgment, asserting instructional error relating to the implied malice
element of a Watson murder. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In a prior incident in 2016, Vargas was arrested for driving under the
influence with a 0.21 blood alcohol content and later pled guilty to driving
under the influence. Before entering his plea, Vargas signed and initialed a
written change of plea form, which he reviewed with his attorney and the
assistance of an interpreter. His 2016 change of plea form included language
informing him that driving under the influence of alcohol was “extremely
dangerous to human life” and that further offenses resulting in death could
lead to a murder charge. The court suspended his driving privileges and
ordered Vargas to complete a nine-month alcohol program, during which he
was repeatedly warned about the risks of driving under the influence and
again informed that he could be charged with murder if he killed someone
while driving under the influence. Vargas also attended a Mothers Against
Drunk Driving presentation, in which a California Highway Patrol officer
shared a case involving a child killed by a drunk driver.
Approximately six years later, on September 24, 2022, Vargas drove an
SUV on a suspended license to a friend’s party. He arrived at 5:30 p.m.,
consumed alcohol while at the party, and left at 6:30 p.m.
Meanwhile, a few blocks from the party, 19-month-old A.R. and her
older sisters had been playing outside their home. Their grandmother left
1 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson).
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the house and crossed the street to her car on her way to pick up food. The
girls, wishing to accompany her, followed. The older sisters had already
crossed the street when A.R. entered the street alone despite her
grandmother’s warnings to stop.
At 6:42 p.m., Vargas’s SUV struck A.R. as she crossed the street. As a
result of her injuries, A.R. died in the hospital hours later. Shortly before the
collision, a surveillance video captured Vargas running a stop sign and nearly
striking a parked vehicle as he negotiated the turn onto A.R.’s street. At that
point, A.R. had already entered the roadway.
Vargas’s vehicle showed no signs of slowing before hitting A.R. A.R.’s
grandmother testified the SUV was traveling at a high rate of speed, possibly
50 miles per hour, but an accident reconstruction expert opined the vehicle
had been traveling 18 miles per hour, under the 25-mile per hour residential
speed limit.
Vargas did not stop after the impact and drove off. Antonio Jasso
Rodriguez, a neighbor who had been outside working on his car, heard the
impact and saw A.R. on the ground. Rodriguez got in a car and followed the
SUV. Rodriguez confronted Vargas while he was buying corn from a street
vendor. Vargas denied hitting a girl, calling Rodriguez “crazy,” and quickly
drove off. Vargas ran two more stop signs before Rodriguez lost sight of him.
Shortly thereafter, Peter Provencio observed Vargas’s erratic driving
and watched him swerve into a bicycle lane toward a bus stop. As he passed
Vargas to “put distance” between them and avoid an accident, Provencio
noticed that Vargas had red, glazed eyes and flushed skin and believed
Vargas was intoxicated. Not long afterwards, Vargas rear-ended Provencio’s
car while it was stopped at a light. Vargas then repeatedly backed up and
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then drove into Provencio’s car, hitting Provencio’s car a total of three times
before fleeing the scene.
At approximately 7:20 p.m., Vargas arrived home where officers were
waiting. Vargas exhibited multiple signs of intoxication and performed
poorly on various field sobriety tests.
A vehicle search revealed an almost empty 24-ounce beer can in the
center console, two empty beer cans on the backseat floorboard, and two
unopened 24-ounce beer cans on the front passenger floorboard. At 9:32 p.m.,
two breath samples revealed breath alcohol concentrations of 0.233 and 0.246
percent. Officers arrested Vargas, and a subsequent blood test reflected a
0.206 blood alcohol content.
Vargas was charged and later tried on six counts: second degree
murder (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a); count 1); gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a); count 2)3; driving under the influence
(DUI) causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 3); causing injury
while driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or greater
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b); count 4)4; hit and run causing death (Veh.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
specified.
3 Count 2 also alleged Vargas caused great bodily injury to the victim
(§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and fled the scene (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)).
4 In both DUI counts, it was further alleged that appellant had been
convicted of another DUI offense within the previous 10 years (Veh. Code,
§ 23560).
4
Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 5); and driving with a suspended license.
(Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a); count 6).5
During closing arguments, defense counsel stipulated Vargas was
guilty of counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and only asked the jury to return a not guilty
verdict on count 1, the second degree murder charge.
The court instructed the jury on the elements of murder as stated in
the version of CALCRIM No. 520 then in effect, which stated in relevant part:
“The defendant acted with implied malice if:
“1. He intentionally committed the act;
“2. The natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life;
“3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was
dangerous to human life;
“AND
“4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life.”
On November 15, 2023, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all six
counts, including the second degree murder charge, and found true all
allegations and aggravating factors submitted to it. Following a bench trial
5 Additionally, Vargas was tried on four aggravating factors: 1) the
victim was particularly vulnerable (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)); 2)
appellant’s prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness
(Id., rule 4.421(b)(2)); 3) appellant’s previous performance on probation had
been unsatisfactory (Id., rule 4.421(b)(5)); and 4) appellant had a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.15 percent at the time of the crimes (Id.,
rule 4.408(a)).
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on additional aggravating factors, the court sentenced Vargas to four years
plus 15 years to life in state prison.
DISCUSSION
Vargas contends his second degree murder conviction must be reversed
because the court erroneously instructed the jury with an “incomplete”
definition of implied malice contained in the version of CALCRIM No. 520
then in effect. Relying on the California Supreme Court’s decision in People
v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes), which was decided several months
before trial, Vargas argues the court should have defined the term
“dangerous to human life” as used in CALCRIM No. 520 to mean “a high
degree of probability that it will result in death.” We reject this contention.
Initially, the Attorney General contends that Vargas has forfeited this
argument by failing to request any such clarifying instruction at trial. It is
settled that “[a] party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in
law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without
first requesting such clarification at trial.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002)
27 Cal.4th 469, 503 (Hillhouse).) At the same time, however, a failure to
object does not prevent a defendant from challenging an instruction on
appeal if the asserted error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.
(§ 1259; People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.)
We agree with the Attorney General that Vargas’s challenge to the
version of CALCRIM No. 520 given at trial appears to fall within the former
category. He does not assert that any of the language in the instruction as
given was legally incorrect. Specifically, he does not argue that the
“dangerous to human life” standard is legally incorrect. Rather, he contends
the instruction was “incomplete” because it did not further define the phrase
“dangerous to human life.” This is an argument that the instruction given at
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trial, though legally correct, was “too general or incomplete, and thus needed
clarification.” (Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 503 [italics added].)
Because no such request for clarification was made in the trial court, the
issue is forfeited. (See, e.g., People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877
[“Defendant’s failure to request clarifying language forfeits the issues on
appeal.”]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 153 [“[B]ecause the instruction
given was correct, it was incumbent on defendants to request clarifying
language.”].)
Even if Vargas had preserved his challenge, however, we would reject it
on the merits because it is foreclosed by binding Supreme Court precedents.
In People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 110–111 (Nieto Benitez), the
court rejected a similar argument that a finding of implied malice requires
that a defendant commit an act that objectively involves a high probability
that death will result. In that case, the defendant argued that CALJIC
No. 8.31 “misstates the law because the instruction omits a requirement that
defendant commit the act with a high probability that death will result.”6
(Id. at p. 111.) The Supreme Court disagreed and concluded that “the
present CALJIC No. 8.31 correctly distills the applicable case law.” (Ibid.) In
reaching this conclusion, the court noted it had previously concluded in
Watson “that the two linguistic formulations—‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life’ and ‘an act [committed] with a
high probability that it will result in death’ are equivalent and are intended
6 The version of CALJIC No. 8.31 given in Nieto Benitez stated in
relevant part: “ ‘Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of
a human being when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶]
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3.
The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and
conscious disregard for, human life.’ ” (Nieto Benitez, at p. 100.)
7
to embody the same standard.” (Nieto Benitez, at p. 111; see also People v.
Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219, 1221–1222 (Dellinger) [approving
CALJIC definition of implied malice without any “high probability” language
and noting that Watson “made it abundantly clear that the two definitions of
implied malice” in the case law “articulated one and the same standard”].)
To the extent Vargas is suggesting that these cases have been impliedly
overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Reyes, we disagree. There, the
court was reviewing the denial of a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The Supreme Court concluded there was insufficient evidence
to support a theory that the defendant was guilty of murder as a direct
perpetrator who harbored implied malice. The court based its decision
primarily on the lack of substantial evidence of proximate cause, but it also
took issue with the trial court’s conclusion that the defendant’s conduct was
“ ‘dangerous to human life.’ ” The Supreme Court explained: “To suffice for
implied malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to
life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[ ] a high degree of
probability that it will result in death. ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 989.) The court found that the defendant’s conduct in traveling to rival
gang territory with other gang members did “not by itself give rise to a high
degree of probability that death will result.” (Ibid.)
Reyes did not involve a jury instruction issue and the court did not
suggest that either Nieto Benitez or Dellinger was wrongly decided. The
Reyes court’s reference to the “high probability of death” standard in deciding
a sufficiency of evidence question under section 1172.6 does not amount to a
holding that trial courts must include such language in the jury instructions
defining implied malice. Reyes also did not call into question the Supreme
Court’s own prior holdings that the “high probability” and “natural
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consequences” standards of implied malice are one and the same, and that it
is proper to instruct the jury solely on the latter. (Nieto Benitez, supra,
4 Cal.4th at p. 111; Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1219, 1221–1222.) To
the contrary, the Reyes court quoted with approval language from another
Supreme Court decision reaffirming that “under the objective component of
implied malice, ‘dangerous to life’ means the same thing as a ‘high degree of
probability that’ the act in question ‘will result in death.’ ” (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 989 [cleaned up].) Because the Supreme Court in Reyes did
not decide this instructional issue and did not overrule or disapprove any of
its own prior case law, we remain bound by its decisions in Nieto Benitez and
Dellinger. We therefore find no error in the implied malice instruction given
at Vargas’s trial.7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
7 We recognize that since Vargas’s trial, CALCRIM No. 520 has been
modified in light of Reyes to state in relevant part: “The natural and probable
consequences of the (act/[or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life in
that the (act/[or] failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it
would result in death.” (Italics added.) In making this modification,
however, the CALCRIM committee did not suggest that it was legal error to
give the prior version, the substance of which was approved in Nieto Benitez
and Dellinger. “ ‘[J]ury instructions, whether published or not, are not
themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal propositions or
precedent.’ ” (People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1157, fn. 7.)
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BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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