People v. Wallace CA2/7

CourtListener 10374561Calctapp8 de abr. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Wallace CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B334126

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA094372)
v.

ALPHONSO WALLACE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Affirmed.
Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

In 2008 a jury convicted Alphonso Wallace on one count of
first degree murder and five counts of attempted murder. In
2022 Wallace filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 The superior court ruled
Wallace failed to state a prima facie case for relief and denied the
petition without issuing an order to show cause. Wallace argues
he made a prima facie showing he was eligible for resentencing
on three of his attempted murder convictions because he was
convicted of committing those crimes under a “kill zone” theory of
liability that, he says, allowed the jury to impute malice to him.
We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. A Jury Convicts Wallace of First Degree Murder and
Attempted Murder, and We Affirm
We described much of the factual background of this case in
Wallace’s direct appeal. (See People v. Wallace (Jan. 17, 2012,
B216931) [nonpub. opn.] (Wallace I).) On November 21, 2007
Llewelyn Miller, Damone Johnson, La Tonya Strattion, James
Eddings, Marion Cantlope, and two other people were in the
garage and driveway of Cantlope’s home. The garage door was
open. As Miller walked down the driveway to cross the street, a
car with its windows halfway down drove up and stopped in front
of him. Someone in the car asked, “What’s up, cuz?” When Miller
leaned in to see who was in the car, two shooters began firing,

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
one from the driver’s window and another from the passenger’s
window. Miller ran back toward the garage. Five bullets hit his
torso and legs, and two bullets grazed his head. Johnson was
shot in the head and leg; he fell in the driveway. After the
shooting there was blood and a bullet hole in the bumper of
Strattion’s car, which was parked in the driveway. Johnson died
from the gunshot wound to his head, and Miller was seriously
injured. No one else was hit. The next day police recovered the
shooters’ car near the home of Wallace’s grandparents. Wallace
confessed he participated in the shooting. (Ibid.)
A jury convicted Wallace on one count of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) (count 6) and four counts of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) (counts 7 through 10) for the
November 21, 2007 shootings. On the attempted murder
convictions the jury found true allegations Wallace attempted to
commit the murders willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The jury also found true gang and firearm
allegations.2 The trial court sentenced Wallace to an aggregate
prison term of 90 years to life, plus four life terms with a
minimum parole eligibility of 15 years. We affirmed the
judgment. (Wallace I, supra, B216931.)

2 The jury also convicted Wallace on one count of attempted
murder (count 4) and one count of shooting at an inhabited
dwelling (§ 246) (count 5), and found true gang and firearm
allegations, for a shooting on November 5, 2007. The jury found
Wallace not guilty on counts 1, 2, and 3 for a shooting on
November 30, 2007.

3
B. The Superior Court Denies Wallace’s Petition for
Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
In March 2022 Wallace filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, checking boxes on a form petition stating
he was eligible for relief and asking the court to appoint counsel
to represent him. The superior court appointed counsel, and the
parties submitted briefs. The People argued that Wallace was
prosecuted as a direct perpetrator who acted with actual malice
and that the jury was not instructed on felony murder or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. The People
submitted the jury instructions given at Wallace’s trial and our
unpublished opinion in Wallace’s direct appeal. Wallace argued
that the jury was instructed on the kill zone theory, which was
“almost completely done away with in” People v. Canizales (2019)
7 Cal.5th 591, and that he had made a prima facie showing he
was eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
At the hearing the superior court stated it had reviewed the
record of conviction, including the jury instructions. The court
asked the prosecutor to respond to Wallace’s argument about the
kill zone theory, and the prosecutor argued a petition under
section 1172.6 was not a “well-founded vehicle to address kill
zone” because under that theory “the perpetrator or the aider or
abettor must intend to kill someone.”
The superior court denied Wallace’s petition without
issuing an order to show cause. The court stated that the jury
was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and that it was “readily ascertainable from
the record without weighing any evidence or exercising any
discretion that Mr. Wallace is ineligible.”

4
Wallace timely appealed. He challenges the superior
court’s ruling he was ineligible for resentencing on his attempted
murder convictions on counts 8, 9, and 10; he does not challenge
the court’s ruling on his other convictions.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder by eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and significantly narrowing the
felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for murder.
(People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558; People v. Arellano
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 467-468; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 448-449; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708
[felony murder]; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843
[natural and probable consequences].) Section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
a person’s participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to
convict a defendant of murder, except under the revised felony-
murder rule. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); Arellano, at
pp. 467-468; Curiel, at p. 499.) Effective 2022, the Legislature
amended section 1172.6 to apply to persons convicted of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3; People v. Rodriguez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences

5
doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and resentence the defendant on any remaining counts
if he or she could not now be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of the legislative changes to the definitions of
murder. (See People v. Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 468-
469; People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450.) If a
section 1172.6 petition contains all the required information, the
court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if
requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 962-963; People v. Foley (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
653, 659.) The People must file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see
People v. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 556.)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (People v. Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 463-464.) The court may consider the record of conviction,
which will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving

6
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at
p. 972; see People v. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563; People v.
Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301.) “‘If the petition and
record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is
ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.
[Citation.] If, instead, the defendant has made a prima facie
showing of entitlement to relief, “the court shall issue an order to
show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)’” (People v. Arellano, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 469.) We independently review an order denying
a petition under section 1172.6 without issuing an order to show
cause. (People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170,
disapproved on another ground in Patton, at p. 569 & fn. 12;
People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Wallace’s
Petition Under Section 1172.6
A defendant convicted of attempted murder is eligible for
relief under section 1172.6 only if he or she is convicted “under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); see People v. Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 457 [section 1172.6 “applies ‘only to attempted murders based
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine’”]; People v.
Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865 [same]; People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [same].) The jury in Wallace’s
trial did not convict him of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine: The trial court did not
instruct the jury on that theory. (See Coley, at p. 548 [defendant
was not entitled to relief where the jury was instructed on direct
aiding and abetting, but not on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine]; People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th

7
198, 203 [defendant “could not demonstrate that he was convicted
of either murder or attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine because the jury was not
instructed on that theory of liability”].) Therefore, the jury
instructions conclusively established Wallace was ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (See People v.
Nguyen (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 668, 677 [“In making the prima
facie determination, the court may rely on the record of
conviction, including the jury instructions and verdict forms.”];
People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055 [the superior
court may “rely on the jury instructions, which are part of the
record of conviction, in assessing the prima facie showings under
section [1172.6]”]; see also People v. Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 564 [“Conclusory allegations, such as checkbox ones . . ., are
particularly subject to refutation by the record of conviction.”].)
Wallace concedes the trial court did not instruct the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Instead, relying
on excerpts of legislative history, he argues the Legislature
intended section 1172.6 to apply not only to ‘“attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,”’ as the
statute says, but also to attempted murder under ‘“any other
theory under which malice is imputed to the person based solely
on their participation in a crime.”’ The plain language of
section 1172.6 contradicts Wallace’s proposed interpretation.
As originally enacted, the predecessor to section 1172.6
applied to any “person convicted of felony murder or murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory . . . .” (Former
§ 1170.95, added by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) The Legislature
amended the statute to apply to any “person convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences

8
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or manslaughter . . . .” (Former § 1170.95, as amended
by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, italics added.) Thus, section 1172.6
as amended applies to defendants convicted of murder under a
theory where malice is imputed based solely on the defendant’s
participation in a crime. But for attempted murder,
section 1172.6 applies only to defendants convicted under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Because the
language of section 1172.6 is plain and unambiguous, we need
not consider the legislative history to determine the statute’s
meaning. (See People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1123
[“‘If no ambiguity appears in the statutory language, we presume
that the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of
the statute controls.’”]; People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240,
244 [“If the plain language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we need not embark on
judicial construction.”]; People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
237, 243 [where “the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, we follow its plain meaning and do not consider
the legislative history”].)3

3 Wallace also argues section 1172.6 “applies whenever the
prosecution could have proceeded on a natural and probable
consequences theory,” even if that theory was not “the basis of
the defendant’s conviction.” That argument is directly
contradicted by the first sentence of section 1172.6, which states
a “person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with
the court . . . to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder,

9
Wallace’s argument fails for a second reason: The kill zone
theory is not a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Instead,
the kill zone theory is a “theory for establishing the specific
intent to kill required for conviction of attempted murder.”
(People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 607; see People v. Hin
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 457 [kill zone theory may “establish the
specific intent to kill”].) Under the kill zone theory, “‘the nature
and scope of the attack directed at a primary victim may raise an
inference that the defendant “‘intended to ensure harm to the
primary victim by harming everyone in that victim’s vicinity.’”’”
(Hin, at p. 457; see Canizales, at p. 602.) The theory does not
impute malice. To convict a defendant under the kill zone theory,
the jury must find the “defendant intended to kill everyone in the
kill zone as a means of killing the primary target.” (Canizales, at
p. 607, fn. 5.)
For the attempted murders of Strattion, Eddings, and
Cantlope (counts 8, 9, and 10), the trial court instructed the jury
on attempted murder and the kill zone theory with CALCRIM
No. 600: “The defendant is charged . . . with attempted murder.
To prove that the defendant is guilty of attempted murder, the
People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant took at least one
direct but ineffective step toward killing another person;
[¶] AND [¶] 2. The defendant intended to kill that person.” The
court further instructed the jury: “A person may intend to kill a
specific victim or victims and at the same time intend to kill
anyone in a particular zone of harm or ‘kill zone.’ In order to
convict the defendant of the attempted murder of La Tonya

or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced . . . .”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a), italics added.)

10
Strattion, James Eddings, Marion Cantlope in counts 8, 9, and
10, the People must prove that the defendant not only intended to
kill Llewelyn Miller [the primary target] but also intended to kill
anyone within the kill zone or intended to kill Llewelyn Miller by
harming everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of the victims in
counts 8, 9, and 10.” (Italics added.)4
Wallace argues the kill zone instruction “permitted the jury
to find him guilty of attempted murder even if his intent was only
to harm, and not to kill, thereby imputing malice to him.”
Wallace made the same argument in his direct appeal, and we
rejected it, concluding “no reasonable juror ‘could have failed to
understand from the instructions as a whole’ that ‘harm’ meant
‘harm of death’ and that an attempted murder conviction requires
a defendant’s intent to kill his victims.” (Wallace I, supra.)
Wallace argues that, at the time of his trial in 2008, CALCRIM
No. 600 referred to ‘“harm,”’ but “the legal landscape has
changed” since then. He cites People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th
131, where the Supreme Court stated “it would be better for
[CALCRIM No. 600] to use the word ‘kill’ consistently rather
than the word ‘harm’” (id. at p. 138, fn. 3) and points out
CALCRIM No. 600 “has since been amended” to replace “harm”
with “kill.” Wallace argues he “could not currently be convicted
of attempted murder under the instructions given here.”
To be eligible for relief under section 1172.6, however,
Wallace must show he can no longer be convicted of attempted

4 In his direct appeal Wallace argued the trial court erred in
omitting the phrase “if you have a reasonable doubt” from the kill
zone instruction. We concluded any error was harmless.
(Wallace I, supra, B216931.)

11
murder “because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added), not
because of changes to the law governing, or the pattern jury
instructions describing, the kill zone theory. Wallace cannot
make that showing because the 2019 legislative changes did not
make any changes to the kill zone theory or the intent
requirement for attempted murder. (See People v. Berry-
Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 935 [“the instructional
errors [the defendant] asserts have nothing to do with these 2019
legislative changes”]; People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862,
867 [rejecting argument that the “misleading former version of
CALCRIM No. 400 created, in effect, an ‘other theory’ of imputed
malice within the meaning of section 1172.6”]; People v. DeHuff
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438 [section 1172.6 “does not permit a
petitioner to establish eligibility on the basis of alleged trial
error”].)
Finally, Wallace argues section 1172.6 violates his right to
equal protection by providing relief to “people convicted of
attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences
theory,” but not to people convicted of “other forms of imputed
malice attempted murder . . . such as the ‘kill zone’ theory.”
Wallace’s equal protection argument fails because, as discussed,
the kill zone theory is not a form of “imputed malice attempted
murder.”

12
DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

13

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.