CourtListener 10374507•People v. Vu CA3
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Filed 4/8/25 P. v. Vu CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100818
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 01F04848)
v.
HUNG VIET VU,
Defendant and Appellant.
Following a jury trial in 2004, defendant Hung Viet Vu was convicted of first
degree murder with special circumstances and was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole. In 2023, the trial court summarily denied Vu’s motion for a
postjudgment evidence preservation proceeding under Penal Code section 1203.01,1
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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(Cook) (Franklin/Cook proceeding). Vu now challenges the denial of that motion,
arguing he was denied due process by the summary denial of his motion after it was set
for a hearing. We agree the trial court erred when it relied upon the California Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, revd. (2024) 15 Cal.5th
834 (Hardin I), to find it had “no authority” to conduct such a hearing. Accordingly, we
shall reverse the order denying the motion for a postjudgment evidence preservation
proceeding and remand the matter for a new hearing on Vu’s eligibility for a
Franklin/Cook proceeding and/or the ability to file a postjudgment sentencing statement
pursuant to section 1203.01.
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Given the nature of the issue on appeal, we need not set forth the facts of the
underlying offenses; they are fully recounted in our prior opinion affirming Vu’s
convictions. (See People v. Vu (Dec. 13, 2005, C046707 [nonpub. opn.].) It is sufficient
to say that Vu was convicted of several offenses for his involvement in the 2001 fatal
shooting of Hoa Thanh Nguyen. In particular, the jury found Vu guilty of the first degree
murder of Hoa Thanh Nguyen (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found true allegations of a gang
enhancement under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), a personal use of a firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, and as a special circumstance under section 190.2,
subdivision (a)(21) that the murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle. The jury also found Vu guilty of assault on
Ha Van Nguyen with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and found true allegations of a gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5).
The court sentenced Vu to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for his
murder conviction and to a consecutive 25-year-to-life sentence for the section 12022.53
personal use of a firearm enhancement. As to his assault conviction, Vu was sentenced to
a total determinate sentence of 17 years, consisting of three years for the assault
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conviction, four years for the section 12022.5 use of a firearm enhancement, and 10 years
for the gang enhancement. (People v. Vu, supra, C046707.)
In 2023, Vu filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. In 2024,
after a prima facie hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding “that the jury
instructions, charging document, and verdict forms are conclusive—petitioner is
ineligible for relief because he was the actual killer.” This ruling is not challenged in the
instant appeal.
On the same day he filed his petition under section 1172.6, Vu also filed a “Motion
to Conduct Franklin hearing (Pen. Code § 1203.01; In re Cook).” In the motion, Vu
requested the “court to conduct a post-judgment hearing under Penal Code sections
1203.01, 3051 and 4801 which allow the defendant ‘to make an accurate record of the
juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense . . . .’
(People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Ca1.4th 261, 284 see In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439.)”
He further stated that he was younger than 26 years old when he committed the murder
and, thus, he was eligible for a Franklin/Cook proceeding pursuant to section 3051,
subdivision (b)(2) and section 4081, subdivision (c).
The matter was initially assigned to the presiding judge, who appointed counsel
for Vu and scheduled a status hearing on the section 1203.01 motion. The order of
assignment noted that the “record of conviction confirms defendant was under 25 years
of age at the time of the controlling offense and that he has not previously had an
opportunity to make a record of his youthful characteristics at the time of the offense.”
Thereafter, the matter was reassigned to a different judge, and a settlement conference
scheduled for August 23, 2024.
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in People v.
Hardin (2024)15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin II) in which the court determined that section
3051’s exclusion of youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP from early parole
consideration did not violate equal protection guarantees. On March 13, 2024, the judge
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issued a written order vacating the order granting the Franklin hearing, citing Hardin II,
and denying the motion. The order stated, “The Court previously allowed the defendant
to proceed to a hearing under Penal Code section 1203.01 (Franklin hearing). This
decision was based upon the ruling in People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273
(Hardin), which allowed youthful offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP) to preserve evidence for later use in youthful offender parole hearings.”
The court continued, “[f]ollowing the ruling in [the Supreme Court’s decision in] Hardin,
this Court no longer has the authority to hold a Franklin hearing for a youthful offender
sentenced to LWOP. [¶] The previous order granting a Franklin hearing is VACATED.
The request for a hearing is HEREBY DENIED. Any future court dates set are
VACATED.”
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Vu contends that his right to procedural due process was violated
because his request for a Franklin-like evidentiary preservation proceeding pursuant to
section 1203.01 was denied without a hearing or an opportunity to address Hardin II,
supra, 15 Cal.5th 834. Alternatively, he contends that the trial court erred by “summarily
denying” his request for such a hearing, erroneously concluding it had no authority to
hold such a proceeding. Vu contends this case should be remanded to the trial court for
“the opportunity to establish . . . that he is eligible for a section 1203.01 proceeding post-
Hardin.”
I
Legal Framework
After Vu was sentenced to LWOP, the Legislature added sections 3051 and 4801.
Under section 3051, juvenile offenders and most youthful offenders are entitled to a
youthful offender parole hearing; however, youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP are
not. (Hardin II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 845-846; see also § 3051, subd. (h).) Pursuant to
section 4801, during such a youth offender parole hearing, the board “shall give great
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weight to the diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features
of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance
with relevant case law.” (§ 4801, subd. (c).)
After the enactment of sections 3051 and 4801, the California Supreme Court
decided Franklin, which created a process for offenders who qualified for a youth
offender parole hearing under section 3051 but who did not have an adequate opportunity
to present such evidence at sentencing to preserve youth-related mitigation evidence for
later consideration by the board. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.) A
Franklin proceeding gives “ ‘an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of
the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that
the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later, may properly discharge its obligation to “give
great weight to” youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the
offender is “fit to rejoin society’ ” ” despite having committed a serious crime while he or
she was a child in the eyes of the law. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
Franklin involved a defendant who sought to challenge his life sentence on direct
appeal. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 268.) Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439 extended the
availability of a Franklin proceeding to a youthful offender who qualified for early parole
consideration under section 3051 but whose conviction and sentence were final when
sections 3051 and 4801 were enacted. Specifically, it held that “an offender entitled to a
[youth offender parole] hearing . . . may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even
though the offender’s sentence is otherwise final.” (Cook, at p. 451.)
In doing so, the court acknowledged an obstacle: “ ‘ “In most cases, after the
judgment has become final, there is nothing pending to which a motion may attach.” ’ ”
(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 451.) It found the necessary statutory authority in section
1203.01, subdivision (a). (Cook, at pp. 452-453.) The court reasoned that the “purpose
of section 1203.01 parallels that of a Franklin proceeding” because while a Franklin
proceeding assists in gathering information to be considered during a youthful offender
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parole hearing, section 1203.01, subdivision (a) also allows the prosecutor, defense
counsel, and the trial judge to file statements of their views regarding the defendant and
the crime and the clerk must mail the statements to prison officials. (Cook, at p. 453,
citing § 1203.01, subd. (a).) Thus, the procedures under section 1203.01 and Franklin
both allow the court to gather evidence that may be relevant to effectuate sections 3051
and 4801. (Cook, at p. 453.) Transmission of that record to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), in turn, permits CDCR to discharge its duty to
later determine, using the youth-related factors under section 4801, subdivision (c),
whether the offender is “ ‘ “fit to rejoin society” ’ ” as outlined in Franklin. (Cook, at
p. 455.)
The Cook court additionally relied on Code of Civil Procedure section 187 (Cook,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 454-455), which provides, “When jurisdiction is . . . conferred on
a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given;
and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically
pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may
be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” The court
concluded, “Penal Code section 1203.01, augmented by the court’s inherent authority to
craft necessary procedures under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, authorizes it to
preserve evidence as promptly as possible for future use by the Board,” “consistent with
Franklin.” (Cook, at pp. 455, 458.)
Defendants who were statutorily excluded from youth offender parole hearings
began challenging the constitutionality of section 3051. At the time Vu filed his petition
for a Franklin/Cook proceeding, the appellate courts were split as to whether section
3051’s exclusion of LWOP youthful offenders from early parole consideration violated
equal protection. (Compare In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 436 [rejecting
argument that the exclusion of young adults sentenced to LWOP violated equal
protection]; People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204-205 [same]; People v.
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Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347 [same]; People v. Jackson (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196-197 [same]; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779
[same] with Hardin I, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 288-289 [finding the exclusion of
youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP violates equal protection], revd. Hardin II, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 839.)
But in Hardin II, the California Supreme Court held that section 3051, subdivision
(h), which excludes youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP, does not violate equal
protection guarantees. (Hardin II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 866.) Recognizing that rational
basis review is deferential, the court held that a rational basis exists for excluding Hardin,
a young adult offender sentenced to LWOP based on special circumstance murder, from
youth offender parole consideration. (Id. at p. 839.) The court stated: “Without
foreclosing the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute, we conclude that
Hardin has not demonstrated that Penal Code section 3051’s exclusion of young adult
offenders sentenced to life without parole is constitutionally invalid under a rational basis
standard, either on its face or as applied to Hardin and other individuals who are serving
life without parole sentences for special circumstance murder. Under California law,
special circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense, punishable only by death or
life without possibility of parole. When it was considering whether to expand the youth
offender parole system to include not only juvenile offenders but also certain young
adults, the Legislature could rationally balance the seriousness of the offender’s crimes
against the capacity of all young adults for growth, and determine that young adults who
have committed certain very serious crimes should remain ineligible for release from
prison. Hardin has not demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining to
grant the possibility of parole to young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance
murder, even as it has granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other
offenses.” (Ibid.)
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II
Analysis
Cook confirmed that the manner and extent of a Franklin/Cook proceeding is left
to the discretion of the trial court. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.) In deciding
whether the trial court has abused its discretion, “we note that when a trial court’s
decision rests on an error of law, that decision is an abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 746.)
Here, Vu was sentenced to LWOP for a crime that he committed when he was over
18 but under 26 years of age. He has, therefore, always been statutorily ineligible for a
youth offender parole hearing. (§ 3051, subds. (b), (h).) Although a few appellate court
cases briefly stood for the proposition that the exclusion of certain youthful offenders
(like Vu) under section 3051, subdivision (h) violated equal protection, the law was not
settled on this point until the California Supreme Court decided Hardin II. Post-Hardin
II, the exclusion under section 3051, subdivision (h) continues to render defendants like
Vu categorically ineligible for a youth offender parole hearing. This does not mean, as
the trial court found, that the court had no authority to hold a Franklin/Cook proceeding.
(See Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 447 [“the court has inherent authority under Code of
Civil Procedure section 187 to authorize additional evidence preservation consistent with
our holding in Franklin”].) Vu contends that he should be allowed an opportunity to
establish his eligibility for a Franklin/Cook proceeding, post-Hardin II. We agree. Once
the trial court granted the motion for a Franklin/Cook proceeding and placed the motion
on calendar, the decision to dismiss the motion without providing notice or an
opportunity to respond was arbitrary and elevated efficiency over fairness. (See
Hernandez v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1169, 1171 [order removing matter
from calendar instead of considering reasonable alternatives and without any notice
constituted “ ‘a gross injustice to petitioner, and a severe abuse of the powers of the
respondent court in setting and sending out cases for trial’ ”].) Indeed, to the extent Vu is
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entitled to procedural due process prior to dismissal of the motion, such process requires
“ ‘ “notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action affecting their property interest and an opportunity to present their objections.” ’ ”
(People v. Minor (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1, 20.) Rather than providing Vu an
opportunity to respond to Hardin II, the court, without providing the parties with notice
or an opportunity to be heard, issued a written order dismissing the motion. This was an
abuse of discretion.
As mentioned, Hardin II foreclosed one challenge to section 3051’s exclusion of
LWOP defendants for eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing. Other possible
challenges remain viable. (See, e.g., People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 487
[although Hardin II foreclosed one of multiple challenges to the defendant’s exclusion
from early parole consideration under § 3051, another survived and entitled him to a
Franklin hearing]; People v. Sands, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201-202 [“Any offender
that brings a Cook motion must establish his entitlement to a youth offender parole
hearing in his moving papers (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459), which is how Sands
raised the equal protection issue”].) Before us, Vu provides potential claims regarding
eligibility, which he contends he should have been given an opportunity to raise prior to
the denial of the motion. We need not address the merits of these claims, however, as Vu
will have an opportunity to establish his eligibility for a Franklin/Cook proceeding before
the trial court.
We further note that Vu’s motion to conduct a Franklin hearing also referenced
section 1203.01. Section 1203.01 provides that, postjudgment, “the trial court may
generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 447; see
§ 1203.01.) This information may include statements from defense counsel, the trial
judge, and/or the prosecutor pertaining either to the person convicted/sentenced or the
crime committed. (§ 1203.01, subd. (a); People v. Ferenz (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1032,
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1045-1046.) On remand the trial court should also consider whether or not to permit Vu
to file information consistent with section 1203.01.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying Vu’s request for a Franklin/Cook proceeding is
reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
DUARTE, J.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
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