People v. Taylor CA3

CourtListener 10373676Calctapp7 de abr. de 2025

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Filed 4/7/25 P. v. Taylor CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099150

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21FE011009)

v.

VINCENT TAYLOR et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

A jury found defendants Vincent Taylor and Raymond Valentino Butler guilty of
murder. After the close of evidence, a witness recanted his testimony but could not
appear in court for several days. The trial court denied defendants’ motion to continue
and later their motion for a new trial. On appeal, defendants challenge these rulings. We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendants were found guilty of murder for the shooting death of Terrance
Flournoy. Flournoy was involved in a custody dispute with the mother of his child,

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resulting in her uncle, defendant Butler, killing Flournoy with his friend, defendant
Taylor, soon after communicating with her via text messages and phone calls. The
shooting was caught on surveillance footage, although defendants were not clearly
depicted in it. Evidence of defendants’ association with each other on the day of the
shooting came from multiple sources, including cell phone location data; defendant
Taylor’s fingerprints on the exterior of the passenger door of the getaway car, which was
registered to defendant Butler’s wife; and home surveillance footage showing defendants
together outside defendant Butler’s home. Defendant Taylor was found to be the actual
shooter, meaning defendant Butler was the driver of the getaway car depicted on the
surveillance footage.
One witness saw the shooter when the witness arrived for an appointment at
Flournoy’s barbershop. The shooter, wearing a mask and hat, approached the witness
and told him to get back in his car. After the witness returned to his car, he saw the
shooter fire his gun. The witness testified the shooter was taller than six feet two inches
and appeared to be over 40 years old given the wrinkles around his eyes and tenor of his
voice. Before his death, Flournoy also identified the shooter as a tall, dark man wearing a
mask.
Nathan L. testified at trial that he was at a convenience store across the parking lot
from the barbershop at the time of the shooting. He testified he could not see the
barbershop or the shooter from his vantage point in a recessed area outside the store.
After hearing shots, Nathan went to the barbershop and found Flournoy on the ground.
Nathan drove Flournoy to the hospital in Flournoy’s car. Nathan did not want to testify
and was in court because he was subpoenaed to be there. Nathan was unhoused and had
been hired by Flournoy in the past to work in his shop.
Over a week after the close of evidence but before closing arguments, Nathan
provided a declaration to defendant Butler’s wife essentially stating that, at the time of
the shooting, he saw a man named Marua, a person he knew to be dangerous, park near

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the scene of the shooting in a car matching the car depicted in the surveillance footage.
The trial court permitted defendants a one-day continuance (from Tuesday to
Wednesday) to investigate the declaration and secure the appearance of Nathan. The next
day, Nathan did not appear because he was in Las Vegas celebrating his birthday.
Defendant Butler’s attorney communicated with Nathan, who assured her he would come
back to Sacramento either the following Saturday or Sunday. He also said the reason he
did not tell the truth before was because he feared retaliation given his vulnerability as a
transient. Nathan also provided a statement to a defense investigator reiterating his
declaration and adding that he saw Marua shoot Flournoy before returning to his car and
fleeing the scene. Given the time already provided to defendants to secure Nathan’s
presence, the lack of assurance Nathan would eventually appear in court, and the
anticipated delay in securing Nathan’s presence, the court denied defendants’ request for
a continuance to the following week.
Following the jury’s guilty verdicts, defendants filed a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence provided by Nathan. At the hearing on the motion,
Nathan testified he saw Marua, who he sometimes called Marva, and another person pull
into the parking lot before Nathan walked into the convenience store. Before entering the
convenience store, Nathan and Marua nodded at each other. According to Nathan, when
he left the convenience store, he stood in a recessed area outside the store and heard
gunshots. He did not see the shooting. When he walked out of the recessed area, Nathan
saw Marua’s car driving away with Marua in the passenger’s seat. Nathan had known
defendant Butler’s wife since childhood and approached her with his recantation after
trial.
The officer who interviewed Nathan after Nathan took Flournoy to the hospital
also testified at the hearing on defendants’ new trial motion. According to the officer,
Nathan told him that he did not see the shooting or who shot Flournoy. Another officer
reviewed the surveillance footage taken from the convenience store and the footage did

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not depict Nathan nodding at an individual in the parking lot before the shooting. The
same officer went to the convenience store and determined Nathan would not have been
able to see the barbershop during the shooting or the car fleeing the parking lot after the
shooting from his vantage point in the recessed area of the convenience store.
The trial court denied defendants’ new trial motion and explicitly found Nathan to
be not credible. The trial court sentenced defendant Butler to an aggregate term of 75
years to life plus one year and defendant Taylor to an aggregate term of 125 years to life.
Defendants appeal.
DISCUSSION1
I
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion By Denying Defendants’ Motion To Continue
Defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their
motion to continue for the purpose of securing the presence of Nathan, the recanting
witness. We disagree.
“ ‘The granting or denial of a motion for continuance in the midst of a trial
traditionally rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge who must consider not
only the benefit [that] the moving party anticipates but also the likelihood that such
benefit will result, the burden on other witnesses, jurors and the court and, above all,
whether substantial justice will be accomplished or defeated by a granting of the
motion.’ ” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 972.) Additionally, “When a
continuance is sought to secure the attendance of a witness, the defendant must establish
‘he[, she, or they] had exercised due diligence to secure the witness’s attendance, that the

1 Defendants join each other’s argument, and the People do not oppose the joinder.
Defendant Butler brings an additional issue he concedes is moot after the trial court
issued an amended abstract of judgment.

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witness’s expected testimony was material and not cumulative, that the testimony could
be obtained within a reasonable time, and that the facts to which the witness would testify
could not otherwise be proven.’ ” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037.)
“The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing
an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully
attacked. [Citation.] [¶] Under this state law standard, discretion is abused only when
the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.” (People v.
Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. Nathan did not contact the
defense with his recantation until several days after the close of evidence and then went
to Las Vegas such that he could not appear in court to verify his statement or be subjected
to cross-examination. While defense counsel communicated with Nathan, Nathan was
noncommittal about the date of his return to Sacramento. Given Nathan’s prompt
departure from town after recanting his testimony and unwillingness to promptly return,
it is unclear whether Nathan would eventually appear in court even if he were given
additional time to do so. Further, the jury had already been absent from court for over a
week before Nathan recanted his testimony and the defense could not secure Nathan’s
presence until the next week. Given the anticipated delay and Nathan’s uncertainty, it did
not exceed the bounds of reason for the court to find the requested delay to secure
Nathan’s presence may not result in his appearance and would result in an undue delay.
Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny defendants’
motion to continue. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, it further did not
deny defendants’ due process. (See People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 450 [a
defendant must show an abuse of discretion and prejudice to demonstrate a due process
violation based on denial of a continuance].)

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II
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
By Denying Defendants’ Motion For A New Trial
Defendants contend the trial court abused its discretion when it denied their
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in the form of Nathan’s
testimony. We disagree.
“ ‘ “To grant a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the evidence
must make a different result probable on retrial.’ ” ” (People v. O’Malley (2016)
62 Cal.4th 944, 1016.) “ ‘ “[T]he trial court may consider the credibility as well as
materiality of the evidence in its determination [of] whether introduction of the evidence
in a new trial would render a different result reasonably probable.” ’ ” (In re Masters
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1054, 1082, quoting People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 329.)
A new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence is disfavored, and denial
of such a motion will be affirmed unless the defendant has clearly shown “a manifest and
unmistakable abuse of discretion.” (People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125,
1151.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion if it acts “in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner” ’ ” or “ ‘when its ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason.” ’ ”
(People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 399.) “In addition, ‘[w]e accept the trial
court’s credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported
by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 308; accord,
People v. O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1016.)
The trial court did not exceed the bounds of reason by finding Nathan’s testimony
would not render a different result probable upon retrial. Importantly, the trial court
found Nathan was not a credible witness, and that finding is supported by substantial
evidence. For example, Nathan’s testimony at the hearing for the new trial motion
conflicted with the convenience store’s surveillance footage that recorded Nathan and the
car carrying the shooter arrive and leave the convenience store’s parking lot. Nathan’s

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statements to defense counsel were also inconsistent with his eventual testimony at the
new trial hearing—Nathan used inconsistent names for the person he saw and told
counsel he saw the shooting but then testified he only heard it. Further, Nathan had a
preexisting acquaintance with defendant Butler’s wife, potentially demonstrating an
element of bias.
Given the trial court’s credibility finding, we cannot conclude it is reasonably
probable a jury would reject the surveillance footage evidence depicting defendant
Butler’s wife’s car as the getaway car, defendant Butler’s motive to help his niece with
her custody dispute, and his communications with his niece close in time to the shooting
in favor of Nathan’s testimony. We further cannot conclude it is reasonably probable a
jury would consider Nathan’s testimony as undermining the fingerprint, cell phone
location, and home surveillance evidence of defendants’ association on the day of the
shooting and the reasonable inference therefrom that they were together at the shooting.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendants’ new trial
motion based on newly discovered evidence.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
RENNER, J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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