CourtListener 10372964•In re H.A. CA2/5
Texto completo
Filed 4/4/25 In re H.A. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re H.A. et al., Persons Coming B335055
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, Nos. 23LJJP00363A-C)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
K.A. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Debra L. Gonzales, Temporary Judge. Dismissed.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Father, K.A.
Janelle B. Price and Ellen Bacon Wiley, under
appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant Mother, R.A.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Dan Szrom for Minors, C.A. and S.A.
Charles Inada for Non-Minor Dependent H.A.
K.A. (father) and R.A. (mother), are the adoptive parents of
non-minor dependent Hannah A. (born in 2006), and minors C.A.
(born in 2008), and S.A. (born in 2020). Mother and father filed
separate notices of appeal challenging the juvenile court’s
January 10, 2024 jurisdiction and disposition orders, after the
juvenile court sustained petition allegations under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j),
based on physical and emotional abuse and general neglect, and
ordered all three children removed from parental custody.1
Both parents’ sole contention on appeal is that the
January 10, 2024 orders incorrectly made an implicit finding of
compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224 et seq.). No interested
party filed a respondent’s brief. Instead, counsel for all parties,
including the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department), parents, H.A., and minors,
filed a joint application and stipulation agreeing that the
Department failed to satisfy its inquiry obligations under ICWA
and related California law and seeking a conditional reversal of
the jurisdiction and disposition orders, remand to the juvenile
court for compliance with ICWA, and issuance of an immediate
remittitur.
We are not required to accept the parties’ agreement to
conditionally reverse and remand the matter for ICWA
compliance. (See California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau
v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664, [court in a civil case
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
2
may reject a stipulation that is contrary to public policy or
incorporates an erroneous rule of law; court cannot surrender its
duty and act as a puppet of the parties]; People v. Segura (2008)
44 Cal.4th 921, 931 [court can decline to approve a plea bargain
in a criminal case]; In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635,
637 [rejecting the parties’ joint stipulation for remand because it
did not seek affirmance or reversal of the juvenile court's order
and only sought a remand with directions to order ICWA
compliance]; In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 142, (dis. opn.
Baker, J.).) Under the Code of Civil Procedure, section 128,
subdivision (a)(8), an appellate court may only reverse a
judgment based on a party stipulation if it has found that no
public or nonparty interest will be adversely affected by the
reversal and the stipulating parties’ reasons “outweigh the
erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a
judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal
will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8)(B).)2 In deciding whether to accept the
2 The relevant statutory text states: “Every court shall
have the power to . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conform to law and
justice. An appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly
entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the parties
unless the court finds both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no
reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the
public will be adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The
reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the
erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a
judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal
will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).)
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parties’ stipulation and request to conditionally reverse, we
consider the parties’ proffered reasons in light of the
requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision
(a)(8). (In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 381 [parties’
reasons included judicial error and termination of rights without
notice]; see also In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803, 820
[parties’ proffered reasons for stipulated reversal do not overcome
the presumption against stipulated reversals].)
The stipulation submitted by the parties here states that
its purpose “is to place the parties in the same position they
would be in if the appeal were prosecuted to successful
completion and resulted in an order conditionally reversing the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and
orders for the sole purpose of remanding the matter to proceed in
compliance with the ICWA.” The stipulation relies on In re Dezi
C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112 (Dezi C.) to argue that conditional
reversal and remand is appropriate and should be granted, but
Dezi C. involved an appeal from a termination of parental rights
(id. at p. 1127), whereas parents here appeal from jurisdiction
and disposition orders. A number of appellate courts, including
this one, have declined to conditionally reverse juvenile court
orders that are appealed prior to termination of parental rights.
(See, e.g., In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140, 1154 [affirming
juvenile court orders in their entirety on the rationale that the
issue of ICWA compliance remains before the juvenile court and
any deficiencies may be corrected]; In re Baby Girl M., supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639 & fn. 2 [dismissing appeal where all
that the court of appeal could order in resolving the appeal was
for DCFS and the juvenile court to fulfill their inquiry and notice
obligations, which they were already doing]; In re Dominick D.
4
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 563–564, 567–568 [affirming juvenile
court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and vacating the
court’s finding that ICWA does not apply]; J.J. v. Superior Court
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 461 [finding ICWA issues premature
or unripe and declining to consider them on writ petition from
dispositional hearing].)
We briefly review the facts and law relevant to our decision
to reject the parties’ stipulation. The children were previously
declared dependents in a prior dependency case that started in
2013 and ended in 2020 with mother and father adopting the
children. The children’s biological mother is deceased. Father is
the children’s paternal uncle, their biological father’s brother.
During the Department’s investigation in November 2023,
mother and Hannah claimed possible Native American ancestry
through the biological mother, and Hannah stated that her
biological mother’s sisters, maternal aunts Lilian G. and Jessica
M., may have additional information. On December 6, 2023,
mother informed the Department that she had asked the
relatives of biological mother that she knows, and they denied
any Indian ancestry and did not want her to share their contact
information with the Department. The social worker also spoke
with the children’s adult brother, A.A., but did not ask him about
possible Indian ancestry. Instead, the social worker asked A.A.
for maternal aunt Lilian G.’s phone number. A.A. responded he
would have to ask Lilian G. for permission before releasing the
number. On the same day, the social worker unsuccessfully
attempted to contact maternal aunt Lilian G. by phone. There is
no evidence of any additional efforts to contact either maternal
aunt.
5
At the detention hearing, father filed an ICWA-20 form,
selecting the check box for the statement “I am or may be a
member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized
Indian tribe.” An explanation stated the children’s paternal
great-grandmother A.A. was born in the Choctaw tribe. Both
father’s attorney and the attorney for the Department reported to
the court that ICWA had been found inapplicable in the
children’s prior dependency case. Noting that the Department
had an ongoing duty of further inquiry and a duty to investigate
claims of Native American heritage, the court ordered the
Department to interview every known relative and other
participants about possible Indian ancestry. The court took note
of father’s ICWA-20 form and asked father if he had any
additional information about paternal great-grandmother’s
registration status with the Choctaw tribe. Father informed the
court that she was deceased, but she had a roll number, and that
the children’s biological father might have additional
information. The court directed father to provide the Department
with contact information so the Department could investigate.
Similarly, the court directed mother to provide to the Department
contact information for the children’s biological maternal aunts.
By December 2023, both mother and father denied that any
relatives had any information about possible Indian ancestry on
father’s side of the family. According to the jurisdiction and
disposition report filed on December 15, 2023, the Department
unsuccessfully attempted to speak by phone with the children’s
adult brother, A.A., and father’s biological children, who are the
children’s paternal cousins. Attached to the 2023 report was a
2013 report from the children’s prior dependency case, which
included information about additional paternal relatives: the
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names of four additional adult siblings, three additional paternal
cousins, who are father’s biological children, and the name and
phone number of a paternal second cousin.
The parties stipulate that this case involves reversable
error based on the Department’s noncompliance with the inquiry
requirements of ICWA and related California provisions.
Specifically, the Department did not comply with its initial
inquiry obligations when a social worker spoke with the
children’s adult brother, A.A., and did not ask him if he had any
information about potential Indian ancestry. In addition, father’s
ICWA-20 form and his responses to the court’s questions about
paternal great-grandmother gave the Department reason to
believe minors were Indian children, triggering a duty of further
inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (e).3
Under section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2)(A), when there is
reason for the Department to believe, but insufficient information
to know, a child is an Indian child, the Department is required to
inquire further including interviewing the parents and extended
family members to gather the information required in section
224.3, subdivision (a)(5). The information required in section
3 This duty of further inquiry is triggered if the Department
or court “has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved”
because the record contains “information suggesting” the child is
an Indian child, and, once triggered, obligates the Department to
conduct further interviews to gather information, to contact the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and state department of social services
for assistance, and/or to contact the relevant Indian tribe(s).
(Ibid.) “[R]eason to believe” is defined as “information suggesting
that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or
citizen, or may be eligible for membership or citizenship, in an
Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
7
224.3, subdivision (a)(5)(C) is: “All names known of the Indian
child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents,
or Indian custodians, including maiden, married, and former
names or aliases, as well as their current and former addresses,
birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment,
membership, or citizenship information of other direct lineal
ancestors of the child, and any other identifying information, if
known.” In addition, section 224.2, subdivisions (e)(2)(B) and
(e)(2)(C) specifies that further inquiry efforts include contacting
the relevant federal agencies and tribes.
The court and the Department’s duties of inquiry under
ICWA continue throughout the dependency proceeding,
particularly if subsequent information provides a reason to
believe a minor is an Indian child under ICWA. (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at pp. 1132, 1134; In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1,
14 [“juvenile court has an affirmative and continuing duty in all
dependency proceedings to inquire into a child’s Indian status”].)
No conditional reversal is necessary to permit the court and
the Department to carry out their affirmative and continuing
obligation to ensure ICWA compliance. (In re Baby Girl M.,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 638–639.) Consistent with our
reasoning in In re Baby Girl M., rather than approving the
parties’ stipulation and entering a conditional reversal that
would micromanage the juvenile court’s and the Department’s
obligations to fulfill their obligations under ICWA and related
California law, we dismiss the parents’ appeals as moot. (Ibid.)
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DISPOSITION
The appeals filed by K.A. and R.A. are dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
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