CourtListener 10372365•Rockmaker v. West Coast Lending CA4/3
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Filed 4/3/25 Rockmaker v. West Coast Lending CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
NORMAN ROCKMAKER et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G063837
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-
01050162)
WEST COAST LENDING, INC.,
et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lon F. Hurwitz, Judge. Dismissed.
EDGE, Daniel A. Rozenblatt, Seth W. Wiener and Natasha
Dandavati for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Garcia Rainey Blank & Bowerbank, Jeffrey M. Blank, John E.
Bowerbank and Sean B. Post for Defendants and Respondents.
Norman Rockmaker, Alice Noble, Mike Rozenblatt, and Eric
Swindeman appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion to
dismiss their complaint in intervention which asserted both direct and
derivative causes of action arising out of a failed limited liability company.
Appellants filed their motion as part of a proposed settlement with
defendants.
The trial court denied appellants’ motion without prejudice.
Appellants assert the denial ruling is erroneous and appealable. Specifically,
they contend the ruling is appealable under the collateral order doctrine and,
alternatively, as an injunction order. We conclude appellants have failed to
demonstrate the appealability of the denial ruling, and we dismiss.
FACTS
I.
APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
We recite appellants’ allegations as the factual background for
this matter. In 2016, a limited liability company named MO Murrayfield,
LLC (the LLC) was formed to acquire and manage various real properties in
Missouri, including university dormitories. According to appellants: “To
induce [investors, including appellants,] to invest in [the LLC], the
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defendants in [this litigation ] made several misrepresentations and
omissions about . . . finances, tenant leases, and the student housing market
in Columbia, Missouri. . . . As a result of these misrepresentations and
omissions, the [m]embers were induced to invest in [the LLC] and agree[d] to
an inflated purchase price” of $14.7 million for real property.
Thirty members collectively contributed capital totaling a little
over $4 million to the LLC. The members included appellants and two
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companies, respondent West Coast Lending, Inc., and Salvation Investment,
LLC (Salvation).
Salvation filed its initial complaint in this matter in 2019,
alleging multiple direct causes of action as well as derivative causes of action
asserted on behalf of the LLC. In 2022, Salvation attempted to settle this
matter, but appellants objected and the trial court (Judge Peter J. Wilson)
denied Salvation’s motion for settlement approval. As characterized by
appellants: the court “rejected [Salvation’s proposed s]ettlement due to [the
court’s] concern about the fairness of the settlement to the absent members”
of the LLC.
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Appellants specify the following defendants: Alexander Philips,
Michael Meyer, TwinRock Holdings, LLC, TwinRock Partners, LLC, Mo
Azzurri, LLC, TRP Management Murrayfield, LLC, TRP Management
Azzurri, LLC, TRP Management VIII, LLC, and TwinRock Management, Inc.
Philips was the chief executive officer of TwinRock Partners, and a manager
of TwinRock Partners, TwinRock Holdings, TRP Management Murrayfield,
and TwinRock Management. Meyer was the chairman of TwinRock Partners,
and a manager of TwinRock Partners, TwinRock Holdings, TRP Management
Murrayfield, and TwinRock Management. The defendants’ precise
relationships to the LLC and other parties are immaterial to our disposition.
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The two other respondents in this matter are Trenton Rhodes
and California Anchor Consulting, Inc.
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Around the same timeframe as their objections to Salvation’s
proposed settlement, appellants sought and were granted leave to file a
complaint in intervention. Their operative second amended complaint in
intervention alleged 18 derivative causes of action and two direct causes of
action.
II.
THE DENIAL OF APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO SETTLEMENT
In 2023, it was appellants who sought the trial court’s approval of
a settlement, by filing a motion to dismiss their second amended complaint in
intervention pursuant to a settlement agreement reached with most of the
defendants listed above. The agreement stated that appellants had
collectively invested $550,000 into the LLC and would receive the same
amount as a settlement payment if the trial court granted their motion.
Appellants argued, inter alia, that their proposed settlement
should be approved because their derivative causes of action would be
dismissed without prejudice, meaning other LLC members could continue to
pursue such claims after appellants’ exit from litigation. Some of the parties,
including West Coast, opposed the settlement. The grounds for objection are
immaterial to our disposition.
The trial court denied, without prejudice, appellants’ motion to
dismiss (the denial ruling). The court specified its concerns about three
aspects of appellants’ request for settlement approval: (1) appellants’ “failure
to provide any analysis of their derivative claims”; (2) “alleged conflicts of
interests [between the LLC] and TwinRock’s counsel and whether counsel
was under the control of TwinRock, Meyer, and Philips”; and (3) appellants’
“status with regard[] to” the LLC, because of allegations that appellants’
memberships in the LLC had been involuntarily withdrawn. Appellants
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promptly filed a notice of appeal as well as a petition for writ of mandate
asserting the same challenge to the denial ruling. The writ petition was
denied in May 2024.
DISCUSSION
Appellants contend the trial court erred as a matter of law or, in
the alternative, abused its discretion by concluding that the terms of
appellants’ proposed settlement were not fair to others. Appellants emphasize
that because they sought to dismiss their derivative causes of action without
prejudice, it was erroneous for the court to deny their wish to exit litigation.
In contrast to litigation based solely on direct causes of action
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(Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subds. (b)(1) & (2)), voluntary dismissal of a
derivative cause of action is not available as a matter of right (Ensher v.
Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 407). Instead,
“plaintiffs [of derivative causes of action] have no power to settle or
compromise the [represented entity]’s action absent court approval.”
(Gaillard v. Natomas Co. (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 410, 419, disapproved of on
other grounds by Grosset v. Wenaas (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1100, 1119, fn. 16; see
PacLink Communications Internat., Inc. v. Superior Court (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 958, 963 [principles of derivative actions for corporations
apply to limited liability companies].)
I.
APPEALABILITY
In addition to demonstrating trial court error, an appellant must
also establish appealability. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001)
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Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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25 Cal.4th 688, 696.) The baseline principle of appealability is the one final
judgment rule, which “prohibits review of intermediate rulings by appeal
until final resolution of the case.” (Id. at p. 697.)
Appellants assert two exceptions to the one final judgment rule
as alternative grounds for appealability: (1) the collateral order doctrine and
(2) the statutory exception for orders on injunctions. For both grounds,
appellants attempt to characterize the denial ruling as an order “forc[ing
them] to pursue [derivative] claims on behalf of [the LLC].”
At the outset, we are not persuaded that the denial ruling
compels the performance of any particular act, most critically because the
denial ruling was without prejudice. (See Aleman v. Airtouch Cellular (2012)
209 Cal.App.4th 556, 586 [denial of class certification “without prejudice” not
appealable under death knell doctrine because plaintiffs were “free to move
for class certification again”].) We reject appellants’ assertions that their
ability to “file a renewed request for dismissal is irrelevant” and that “the
results of the [denial ruling] cannot subsequently be undone or reversed.”
A. Collateral Order Doctrine
The collateral order doctrine “allows an appeal to be taken
‘[w]hen a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue [of
the case], dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral
matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act.’
[Citation.]” (Longobardo v. Avco Corp. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 429, 432,
quoting In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368.) The denial
ruling’s lack of an order directing any particular action bears directly on
appellants’ attempt to rely on the doctrine.
Setting aside the question of whether the denial ruling can even
be categorized as covering a collateral matter, appellants’ claim to the
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collateral order doctrine fails because the ruling does not direct a party to
perform a particular act. The doctrine does not provide a basis for
appealability.
B. Orders Regarding Injunctions
We are also not persuaded by appellants’ invitation to treat the
denial ruling as an injunction order made appealable by section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(6) [“an order granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing
to grant or dissolve an injunction” is appealable]. The Code of Civil Procedure
defines an “injunction” as a prohibitory injunction—i.e., “a writ or order
requiring a person to refrain from a particular act” (§ 525)—but case law
broadens the definition to include mandatory injunctions, which are orders
that compel a party to perform a particular act (Daly v. San Bernardino
County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1040, fn. 5).
Appellants argue the denial ruling should be construed as an
appealable order granting a mandatory injunction. The argument is
unpersuasive on two levels. First, as noted, the ruling did not force any
particular act to be performed by appellants.
Second, even assuming arguendo that the denial ruling can be
construed as compelling action, appellants do not provide any meaningful
discussion of case law they cite to for appealable injunction orders. For
example, appellants provide no discussion for their citation to URS Corp. v.
Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 872, which focused
solely on a disqualification of counsel issue and the scope of automatic stays
pending an appeal from an appealable order. (Id. at pp. 876-877.) Facially,
the case provides no support for appellants’ view on appealability.
Appellants also do not discuss their citation to Art Movers, Inc. v.
Ni West, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640 (Art Movers). The appellate court there
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held that an order—which granted summary adjudication against a cause of
action seeking a permanent mandatory injunction to clean up chemical
contamination (id. at p. 644)—was not appealable under the predecessor of
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6), even though the order fit the facial language
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of the subdivision. The holding was based on a distinction between requests
for provisional (or “pendente lite”) injunctions versus requests for permanent
injunctions. (Art Movers, at pp. 645, fn. 4, 646.) The appellate court agreed
with case law that “limited the applicability of . . . section 904.1, subdivision
(f) and its predecessor to pendente lite injunctions and . . . refused to find
interlocutory orders denying permanent injunctions to be appealable, except
from a final judgment.” (Id. at p. 647.)
Art Movers was cited with approval on a tangential ground in
County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 110,
reinforcing that the provisional versus permanent nature of an injunctive
order is what primarily governs appealability under section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(6). So even assuming arguendo that the denial ruling could be
interpreted as a mandatory injunction, appellants would fail to carry their
burden because they provide no analysis about how the ruling granted a
provisional rather than permanent injunction.
Appellants have failed to demonstrate the applicability of an
exception to the one final judgment rule. Accordingly, we dismiss this matter
as based on a nonappealable order. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 696.)
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At the time of Art Movers, former section 904.1, subdivision (f)
contained the same language, verbatim, as currently codified: “an order
granting or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to grant or dissolve an
injunction” is appealable. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(6).)
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DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed. Respondents are entitled to recover
their costs on appeal.
O’LEARY, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
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