CourtListener 10372268•People v. Watt CA2/8
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Filed 4/3/25 P. v. Watt CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B336414
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA509348)
v.
ANDREW JOHN WATT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Kim L. Nguyen, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Charles Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
Defendant and appellant Andrew John Watt’s sole contention
on appeal is that the trial court erred in ordering restitution to
reimburse the victim for lost wages. Defendant says the victim
received full pay through her employee benefits for the time she lost
from work and therefore had not shown any actual lost wages.
We affirm the restitution order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In August 2023, defendant pled guilty to one count of driving
under the influence (DUI) causing injury within 10 years of a
separate DUI offense (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)). Pursuant to
the plea agreement, the court suspended imposition of sentence and
placed defendant on three years formal probation according to
various terms and conditions. The court also ordered defendant to
serve 90 days in county jail with credit for two days served.
On January 10, 2024, the court held a restitution hearing.
Rubi Barragan, the victim who was struck by defendant while he
was driving under the influence, testified to the damages she
suffered as a result of the accident, including damage to her car,
medical injuries and lost wages. Ms. Barragan testified she missed
approximately two weeks from her job at Spectrum in El Segundo
where she had been an office worker at the time of the accident.
She was paid for the lost time, but she had to use 11 days of
vacation time, three days of sick leave, and one personal day. The
value of her lost wages for that time period equaled $4,078.85. At
the time of the hearing, she was working for a new employer.
The court rejected defendant’s argument that because of her
employee benefits, the victim had not suffered any actual lost
wages. The court found the amount of victim restitution
established by the People on behalf of Ms. Barragan was reasonable
and appropriate, and ordered defendant to pay total restitution in
the amount of $5,838.86.
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This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We review the court’s restitution order under the deferential
abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th
644, 663; People v. Santori (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 122, 126.) We
presume the order is correct, indulge all intendments and
presumptions to support it on matters as to which the record is
silent, “ ‘ “ ‘and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” ’ ” (Santori, at
p. 126.) “When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount
of restitution ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will
be found by the reviewing court.” (People v. Dalvito (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 557, 562.)
Article I, section 28 of the California Constitution states in
relevant part: “(A) It is the unequivocal intention of the People of
the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result
of criminal activity shall have the right to seek and secure
restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the
losses they suffer. [¶] (B) Restitution shall be ordered from the
convicted wrongdoer in every case, regardless of the sentence or
disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(13).)
Penal Code section 1202.4 implements the constitutional
mandate of article I, section 28. (People v. Mearns (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 493, 498; see also Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1)
[“It is the intent of the Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs
an economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall
receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of that
crime.”].) The statute expressly provides for the recovery of lost
wages. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(D).) “A victim’s restitution right is to
be broadly and liberally construed.” (Mearns, at p. 500; accord,
People v. Baudoin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1191.)
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“[A] prima facie case for restitution is made by the People
based in part on a victim’s testimony on, or other claim or
statement of, the amount of his or her economic loss. [Citations.]
‘Once the victim has [i.e., the People have] made a prima facie
showing of his or her loss, the burden shifts to the defendant to
demonstrate that the amount of the loss is other than that claimed
by the victim.’ ” (People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26,
italics added.)
Here, the victim testified at the hearing and supported her
testimony with documentation. The evidence presented was more
than adequate to establish a prima facie case for restitution in the
amount requested.
On cross-examination, the victim acknowledged she was paid
during the days she was off because of her employee benefits, and
confirmed she no longer worked for the same employer. Defendant
did not ask any other questions.
Defendant contends the evidence presented at the restitution
hearing was insufficient to support the order of restitution with
respect to lost wages because even though Ms. Barragan may have
depleted vacation and sick time, she no longer worked for the same
employer so she would not suffer any detriment from having used
up those benefits.
Defendant’s contention is pure speculation. Defendant did
not ask Ms. Barragan any questions in this regard at the restitution
hearing. It was defendant’s burden to establish that Ms. Barragan
did not suffer the losses she attested to, including whether she was
deprived of an end-of-employment payout for unused leave because
those days had already been exhausted.
In In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 666, the court
affirmed a restitution order, under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602, that included lost wages where the employee had also
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used leave time. The court explained, “The evidence was sufficient
to show that the victim continued to be paid by his employer only by
depleting his sick leave. This depletion represented a loss to him—
the credits consumed would not be available to cover future
illnesses or for whatever other beneficial purpose the employer
might allow. . . . The sick leave used by the victim was a valuable
right which he lost as a direct result of [the defendant’s] conduct.
Given that the exact value of that loss was dependent to some
extent on unknown variables, including unknowable future
contingencies, the trial court did not act irrationally in simply
allowing the value of the time it represented.” (K.F., at p. 666.)
Defendant has not affirmatively established an abuse of
discretion by the court in allowing the victim’s claim for lost wages
as part of her request for restitution.
DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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