CourtListener 10372201•People v. Murillo CA4/1
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Filed 4/3/25 P. v. Murillo CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082600
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN424606)
JORGE MURILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert J. Kearney, Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph Doyle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Years before the trial in this case, appellant Jorge Murillo sexually
assaulted three children. After the three children became adults, they
disclosed their molests to law enforcement. While all three accusers testified
against Murillo at trial, while still minors, two recanted their accusations
against him. Consequently, the prosecution called as an expert witness a
licensed clinical social worker who described Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). The social worker described generally
delayed disclosures, incremental disclosures, and recanting by sexual abuse
victims. The defense called its own expert, a psychologist, to testify as to
memory and suggestibility; however, the trial court did not permit him to
testify as to the specific facts of this case.
On appeal, Murillo argues the trial court made four errors which taken
individually or collectively, require reversal. Specifically, Murillo claims that
the trial court erred: (1) by abusing its discretion in allowing the social
worker’s CSAAS testimony because that testimony cannot be limited to a
proper purpose, therefore, her testimony violated Murillo’s due process rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;1 (2) by instructing the jury
with CALCRIM No. 1193, which explains CSAAS testimony, the court
reduced the People’s burden of proof, also violating Murillo’s due process
rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) by not allowing the
defense expert to apply his testimony to case-specific facts, the court violated
Murillo’s due process rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments;2
and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors violated his due process rights
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
1 Murillo also argues that if counsel failed to preserve this issue for
appeal, then she rendered ineffective assistance. Since we find defense
counsel preserved this question for review, we do not address Murillo’s
ineffective assistance of counsel argument as it relates here.
2 See fn. 1, ante.
2
We conclude: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the CSAAS expert testimony; (2) although the current version of
CALCRIM No. 1193 does not correctly explain the law regarding CSAAS
testimony, the error here was harmless; and (3) the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by disallowing the defense expert to apply case-specific facts to
his testimony. Finally, because we find but one error and it was harmless,
we reject Murillo’s due process arguments. Therefore, we affirm Murillo’s
conviction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2022, the People charged Murillo with eight counts of oral copulation
with a child 10 years old or younger (Pen. Code,3 § 288.7, subd. (b)) related to
victim E.L., two counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 years by
use of force or violence (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)) related to victim D.C., and 11
counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a))
related to victim J.L. On eight section 288, subdivision (a), counts, the
People added special allegations under section 801.1, subdivision (a)(1),4
while on the remaining three counts, the People alleged section 1203.066,
3 All further undesignated references are to the Penal Code.
4 Section 801.1, subdivision (a)(1), states, “Notwithstanding any other
limitation of time described in this chapter, prosecution for a felony offense
described in Section . . . 288 . . . that is alleged to have been committed when
the victim was under 18 years of age, may be commenced any time prior to
the victim’s 40th birthday.”
3
subdivision (a)(8), violations.5 Murillo pled not guilty to all charges and
denied the allegations.
A. Pretrial Motions
During motions in limine argument, the prosecution moved to admit
expert testimony to dispel general misconceptions regarding the child
molestation victims’ failure to disclose their abuse immediately. The
prosecutor did not give the CSAAS expert documents related to the case and
would not elicit from the witness any case-specific facts. In its motion, the
prosecution identified the misconceptions it sought to dispel, including that:
(1) the victim would quickly report the incident in full detail; (2) if a victim
“did not appear outwardly frightened, upset, or traumatized by the
Defendant’s conduct, the[n] the molest did not occur”; and (3) those who
molest children are primarily adults unknown to the children. The defense
objected to the motion and sought to exclude CSAAS evidence under People v.
Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, and Evidence Code section 352. The court granted
the motion to permit the expert testimony in the prosecution’s case-in-chief,
explaining: “Historically, the Courts of Appeal have found this to be relevant
to dispel misconceptions or if the victim’s credibility has been attacked.
These are all incidents where the disclosures were some time after the
5 Section 1203.066, subdivision (a), states that, “probation shall not be
granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for,
nor shall a finding bringing the defendant within the provisions of this
section be stricken pursuant to Section 1385 for, any of the following persons:
[¶] . . . [¶] (8) A person who, in violating Section 288 . . . , has substantial
sexual conduct with a victim who is under 14 years of age.” “ ‘Substantial
sexual conduct’ ” is “penetration of the vagina or rectum of either the victim
or the offender by the penis of the other or by any foreign object, oral
copulation, or masturbation of either the victim or the offender.” (§ 1203.066,
subd. (b).)
4
alleged conduct, anywhere from 4 to 10 years after. I do think the People are
entitled to call an expert to testify as things which would disabuse the jury’s
misconceptions.”
The court then explained it intended to inform the jurors about the
limited use of CSAAS testimony, both when the expert testified and as part of
the posttrial jury instructions. Defense counsel agreed, “in light of the court’s
ruling” that admitted CSAAS evidence, CALCRIM No. 1193 should be given
at those times. Defense counsel did not object to the language of the
instruction.
Defense counsel then raised the admissibility of its expert testimony “to
discuss the reporting and discuss different issues related to the witness
testimony . . . includ[ing] the context of the allegations, passage of time,
repeated questioning and cross-contamination.” The defense expert had
reviewed discovery in the case, and the defense sought to have him “provide
information [about] what types of things are cross-contamination.” The court
ruled that the defense expert’s testimony would be limited to generic
testimony, which could in essence include analogous hypotheticals but not
the details of the specific case.
B. Trial
The trial began on April 18, 2023. Trial testimony relevant to the
appellate issues was as follows.
1. Testimony of J.L.
Murillo moved in with J.L. and E.L.’s mother, Laura, when J.L. was
around six years old, E.L. was one or two years old, and their older sister was
nine or 10 years old. Murillo and Laura got married a few years later in
2005.
5
J.L. testified that, on multiple occasions over the course of several
years beginning when she was seven or eight years old, Murillo exposed his
penis to her, rubbed his penis against her hand and legs, straddled her
buttocks with his penis against her while giving her a “massage” under her
shirt, and otherwise touched her inappropriately while lying in bed with her.
The “massages” while he straddled her, for example, occurred approximately
two times a month until J.L. was around 11 or 12 years old. Later, when J.L.
was 13 years old, she awoke to Murillo touching her vaginal area. This
happened a second time when J.L. was 17 years old. After that, she refused
to sleep at her mother’s house.
J.L. reported Murillo’s assaults on multiple occasions over the years.
The first time, in 2005 at the age of eight or nine, she reported the incidents
to her older sister. Her sister confronted Laura, who then became angry at
J.L. for accusing Murillo of molest. !(5 RT 455)! Another time, about five
years later when J.L. was 14 or 15 years old, she told her then-boyfriend.
J.L.’s boyfriend then confronted Laura about the assaults. In response,
Laura became angry, locked J.L. in a bedroom, told her she was lying and
causing problems with the family, and threatened to take her to a mental
health facility. Because of her mother’s reactions and the threat of being
placed in a facility, J.L. wanted it to “all be over” so she recanted her
accusations, claiming she fabricated them. In 2016, J.L. went to law
enforcement and disclosed to them how Murillo assaulted her.
To undermine J.L.’s credibility, defense counsel used her cross-
examination to establish that J.L. did not tell her therapist in either
elementary school or middle school that she was sexually abused. Further,
J.L. lied to her family about when she would visit a boy she was dating. The
defense also elicited testimony that D.C.’s mother called J.L. in February
6
2021, and the two spoke about Murillo’s abuse of J.L. J.L. also testified that
she spoke to D.C. one time.
2. Testimony of E.L.
E.L. testified that, between the ages of four or five and seven, Murillo
forced E.L. to perform oral sex on Murillo around two times per month. In
2012, when E.L. was 10 years old, he reported the abuse to Laura and his two
older sisters. Because Laura reacted in a frantic, “shocked, aggressive, and
irrational” manner and made him confront Murillo, E.L. was scared and
stated his accusations were a lie. By lying he hoped “it would go away.” In
2016, E.L. was angry he had to deal with Murillo every day, and he reported
the abuse to his aunt and his therapist. He then filed a police report.
3. Testimony of D.C.
For several months in 2010 or 2011 when D.C. was five years old, she
and her mother lived in a mobile home on the same property as Laura and
Murillo. During that time, Murillo got in bed with D.C., exposed his penis to
her, and forced her to touch it with her hand. On another occasion, Murillo
was in bed on top of D.C., who was laying on her back with her legs apart,
and she felt a very sharp pain in her vagina. In 2021, D.C. told her mother
about the assaults.
On cross-examination, the defense attorney questioned D.C. regarding
differences between her trial testimony and preliminary hearing testimony.
Defense counsel established that D.C. did not disclose the sexual abuse to a
counselor D.C. saw weekly from 2017 to 2020.
4. The People’s CSAAS Expert
The People presented a licensed clinical social worker, Christina
Shultz, who testified as an expert on conducting forensic interviews with
child sexual abuse victims and myths and misconceptions surrounding child
7
sexual abuse. For this case, she did not conduct any interviews or review any
related reports.
Prior to Shultz’s testimony, the court instructed the jury using a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 1193:
You will hear testimony from Ms. Shultz regarding child
sexual abuse disclosure. Child sexual abuse disclosure
testimony relates to a pattern of behavior that may be
present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the
disclosures are offered only to explain certain behavior of
an alleged victim of child sexual abuse.
Ms. Shultz’s testimony about child sexual abuse disclosures
is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the
crimes charged against him or any conduct or crimes of
which he was not charged. You may consider this evidence
only in deciding whether or not the complaining witnesses
or alleged victims in this case’s conduct was consistent with
the conduct of someone who has been molested and in
evaluating the believability of the alleged victims.6
Specifically, Shultz testified as to patterns of delayed disclosure,
gradual or incremental disclosure, and recanting. First, as to delayed
disclosure, she testified that “the vast majority of [child sexual abuse victims]
do not make an immediate outcry,” and the delay may be months or years.
She explained that the closer the relationship of the victim to the offender,
the more likely there will be a longer delay in disclosure. Additionally, she
testified that younger children are more likely to delay disclosure, since they
may not initially understand that the abuse was wrong. She further
described that “[m]ore often than not there is a bond and some sort of
6 The court modified CALCRIM No. 1193 by changing the phrase “child
sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” to “child sexual abuse disclosure.”
Following prior cases and the parties’ briefs, we use the term CSAAS.
8
attachment” between the victim and the offender, so the child may want to
avoid getting the offender in trouble or causing consequences to their
relationship. Another reason a victim may delay disclosure is fear that he or
she will get in trouble or that others will not believe him or her.
Regarding gradual or incremental disclosure, Shultz explained that
disclosure is considered a process that can occur over time. A person begins
by sharing a small amount of information to gauge the listener’s reaction.
Then, if the child feels believed or supported, he or she may provide further
information, including additional incidents or more details. Further, the
amount of information may vary depending on how comfortable the child
feels with the listener, such as a law enforcement officer, a child protective
services worker, or a therapist.
Finally, as to recanting, Shultz explained that after reporting a
sexual abuse incident, a child may say it did not happen. One major factor
in whether a recantation occurs is whether the child feels supported by a non-
offending parent. If the child feels supported and believed, he or she will
likely remain resolute; if the child does not feel believed, and a non-offending
parent shows support for the offender, there is a higher chance he or she will
recant.
As part of the discussion on recantation, Shultz made brief, general
references to studies involving confirmed cases of abuse. Shultz stated,
“[M]any of those kids, I believe up to half, denied all together.” There was no
objection to the mention of these studies.
The defense objected, however, to other aspects of Shultz’s testimony.
The objections included Shultz’s use of the language “more often than not,”
referring to the preexisting relationship between the victim and offender and
the reference to the likelihood of the child to recant. The trial court overruled
9
the objections but reminded the jury, “[T]his is limited to general class
characteristics not to prove that abuse did happen or didn’t happen, just for
you to evaluate the facts as given to you in evaluating credibility of the
complaining witnesses.”
Shultz agreed that no two people are the same and various factors
influence disclosure.
After the close of the prosecution’s case, the court dismissed two
section 288.7, subdivision (b), counts and one section 288, subdivision (a)
count.
5. Defense Expert
The defense called a psychologist, Dr. Bradley McAuliff as an expert
to testify on children’s suggestibility and forensic interviewing.7 He
explained, “Suggestibility is a broad term [used] to look at different
factors that essentially influence the accuracy of memory.” He explained
that various factors impact memory, including: the context of the
allegation, family and peer relationships, age, questioning by an authority
figure, cross-contamination, and stereotype induction.
The trial court permitted the defense to question Dr. McAuliff
regarding general concepts, including factors that affect memory, but not as
to the accuracy of the allegations in this case. The credibility of the
witnesses, the court explained, is the purview of the jury.
According to Dr. McAuliff, research shows that children and teens tend
to be more suggestible than adults, meaning information exchanged from
their peers and family members “have an impact on one’s memory more so
than getting that information from another source.” Older children are less
7 Dr. McAuliff also had not conducted a forensic interview with any party
in this case.
10
susceptible to suggestibility, with adolescents over 14 years old being the
least suggestible, and preschoolers being the most. Children are also
“sensitive to cues from an adult or from an interviewer.” They may make
allegations to please a parent or to receive attention and support from a
parent. A concerned parent may ask questions in a certain way, or
repeatedly ask questions to ensure a child is safe, and the questioning may
impact the child’s memory of the event. The child may then embellish or
exaggerate.
Next, Dr. McAuliff testified that research shows that memory becomes
weaker as time passes. The passage of several months or years is a long
period of time over which “memory trace can get incredibly weak.” Memory
trace is information we obtain through our senses that becomes part of our
memory for an event. As time passes, other events and material are “sources
of potential contamination for a weak memory trace.” However, Dr. McAuliff
agreed that “core” or “central” details, such as the touching involved in an
incident of abuse, are more resistant to suggestibility than “peripheral
details,” such as dates.
Additionally, Dr. McAuliff testified as to “cross-contamination,”
meaning information about an event derived from a source other than the
child involved. Cross-contamination can occur, for example, when two
witnesses share information, when a child overhears a conversation between
others about the event, or when the same interviewer communicates with
multiple witnesses.
Dr. McAuliff then discussed CSAAS evidence, stating that it is not
generally accepted in the scientific field because it did not include the
comparison group of children falsely alleging abuse. Further, the scientific
11
community agrees that other plausible explanations exist for delay,
intermittent disclosure, and recantation.
When instructing the jury after closing arguments, the trial court again
repeated the modified CALCRIM No. 1193 instruction.8
The jury found Murillo guilty on all remaining counts. The court
sentenced Murillo to a term of 40 years consecutive to a term of 90 years to
life in prison.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Admitted CSAAS Testimony
Murillo argues the trial court erred by admitting CSAAS testimony
because that testimony cannot be limited to a proper purpose, necessarily
suggesting certain behaviors are “consistent with — or predictive of” child
abuse having occurred. He states that Shultz’s testimony as given
8 Our analysis of this case uses the CALCRIM No. 1193 as adapted by
the trial court and provided to the jury:
You have heard testimony from experts regarding sexual
abuse disclosure patterns.
Child sexual abuse disclosure testimony relates to a
pattern of behavior that may be present in child
sexual abuse cases.
Testimony as to disclosure patterns is offered only to
explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual
abuse.
Testimony about child sexual abuse disclosure pattern[s] is
not evidence that the defendant committed any of the
crimes charged against him or any conduct or crimes with
which he was not charged.
You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or
not D[.]C., E[.]L., and J[.]L[.]’s, conduct was consistent with
the conduct of someone who has been molested, and in
evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.
12
exacerbated that problem and was improper because it “put loose percentages
to the circumstances under which certain [children’s] behaviors occur.”
We review the trial court’s admission of expert testimony, including the
admission of CSAAS expert testimony, for abuse of discretion.9 (People v.
McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299 (McAlpin); People v. Lapenias (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 162, 170 (Lapenias).) “ ‘[A] trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.’ ” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 430.)
Following a line of appellate court cases, including this court’s opinion
in People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385 (Bowker), our Supreme
Court held CSAAS evidence was “admissible to rehabilitate [a] witness’s
credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the
incident — e.g., a delay in reporting — is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is
needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child
sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s
seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’ ” (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at
p. 1300–1301.) California courts continued to recognize “the well-established
relevance, necessity, reliability, and importance of this evidence.” (People v.
Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468 (Munch).)
But CSAAS testimony comes with restrictions. “CSAAS evidence is
relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of an alleged
child victim of sexual abuse.” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 171.) To
keep CSAAS testimony tied to evaluating a witness’s credibility, the
9 As an initial matter, we conclude Defense counsel’s objections in court
both in her trial briefs, and orally, were sufficient to preserve these
arguments for review.
13
prosecution must “identify the myth or misconception the evidence is
designed to rebut”; the testimony “must be targeted to [the] specific ‘myth’ or
‘misconception’ suggested by the evidence”; and “the jury must be instructed
simply and directly that the expert’s testimony is not intended and should
not be used to determine whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.”
(Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 385 at pp. 393–394.) To identify a myth or
misconception, the prosecution need not expressly do so on the record but
may rely on “the victim’s credibility [being] placed in issue due to the
paradoxical behavior, including a delay in reporting a molestation.” (People
v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744–1745.) In this case, the
prosecution’s in limine motions explicitly identified common misconceptions
of abuse the CSAAS testimony would target, including delayed reporting,
gradual reporting, and recanted abuse allegations.
Indeed, each prosecution witness testified about her or his own
experiences with Murillo and their ensuing self-impeaching behaviors,
including delayed or incremental reporting and recantations. Shultz’s
testimony properly “targeted” the “ ‘misconception[s]’ suggested by the
evidence.” (Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 394.) Each sexual assault
witness “delay[ed] a significant period of time before reporting an incident or
pattern of abuse,” permitting expert testimony “that such delayed reporting
is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser
who occupies a position of trust.” (Ibid.) Testimony from J.L. and E.L. about
recanting also made relevant Shultz’s testimony that past research revealed
“such behavior is not an uncommon response for an abused child.” (Ibid.)
The trial court reasonably determined that an expert’s general experience
about this specific conduct was relevant and admissible “for the purposes of
assessing [the witnesses’] credibility.” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
14
p. 172.) Finally, prior to Shultz’s testimony, the trial court instructed the
jury that her testimony could not be used to determine whether sexual abuse
occurred, but only to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses accusing
Murillo.
Part of Murillo’s objection to admitting Shultz’s testimony is that her
terms and phrases such as “more likely” and “more often than not” were
“loose percentages” that did more than simply discuss common myths about
responses to sexual assault. Rather, these descriptions rendered Shultz’s
testimony improperly predictive of abuse. As support, Murillo cites to People
v. Julian (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 878, 885. In that case, the expert testified:
“The range of false allegations that are known to law enforcement or [Child
Protective Services] . . . is about as low as one percent of cases to a high of
maybe 6, 7, 8 percent of cases that appear to be false allegations.” (Id. at
p. 883, italics omitted.) The court concluded that this “92 to 99 percent
probability evidence invited jurors to presume Julian was guilty based on
statistical probabilities, and not decide the evidence properly introduced in
the case.” (Id. at p. 886.)
Another court explained the concern created by the testimony in
Julian: “The problem in . . . Julian was not that the CSAAS expert used
statistics in his testimony but that he used statistics conveying that
complainants almost always tell the truth — and therefore that the
defendant was most likely guilty.” (People v. Sedano (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
474, 481, italics omitted.) In this case, Shultz did not testify that child
sexual abuse victims nearly always, or even “likely” or “often,” report the
truth. Rather, here Shultz’s use of words such as “likely” and “often”
permissibly conveyed the relative commonality of those reactions among
15
known victims — not the direct likelihood or probability that a witness’s
testimony was true or probably true.
We likewise find Murillo’s citation to People v. Clotfelter (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 30, unpersuasive. In that case, the prosecution called an
expert to testify about CSAAS. (Id. at p. 62.) But the alleged victims had
never reported any sexual abuse, the victims consistently denied any such
abuse by the defendant, there was no evidence of abuse, delayed reporting,
incremental disclosures, or recanting of sexual assault, and the victims’
parents — mandated sexual abuse reporters — also never saw anything of
which to be suspicious or concerned. (Id. at p. 64.) During Clotfelter’s closing
argument, the defense stated that the evidence showed “the victims never
thought they were victims and they didn’t act like victims and they didn’t
present like victims and no one noticed signs that they were victims.” (Id. at
p. 63.) During rebuttal the prosecutor elevated CSAAS testimony into actual
evidence to use against the defendant. The prosecutor said CSAAS evidence
supported the state’s allegations that abuse occurred because “victims don’t
always show signs of abuse.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) That was an
impermissible use of CSAAS evidence because it posits that not showing
signs of sexual assault is its own evidence showing that sexual assaults
occurred. (Id. at p. 64 [“this is precisely the argument that the prosecutor
was making to the jury: that it could use the CSAAS testimony to infer that
Steven, B.H. and E.H. were victims of the crimes charged”].) That argument
converted the CSAAS testimony from information used to rehabilitate
damaged credibility into independent evidence in support of conviction.
That did not occur here. In the instant matter, the jury heard evidence
from Murillo’s accusers of delayed and gradual reporting as well as recanting.
Using this, defense counsel attacked the credibility of J.L., E.L., and D.C. on
16
cross-examination, putting their reliability in question. Neither Ms. Shultz
nor the prosecutor suggested that delayed or gradual reporting, or recanting,
amounted to facts supporting that abuse occurred. Unlike in Clotfelter, the
use and nature of the CSAAS evidence was appropriate here.
Nor did admitting the CSAAS testimony violate Evidence Code
section 352 by being unduly prejudicial to, or likely “to evoke an emotional
bias against,” Murillo such that no reasonable court would have admitted the
evidence. (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174.) As in Lapenias, “the
prejudicial impact of the relatively benign CSAAS testimony was likely to
have paled in comparison to the charged conduct” of multiple, repeated sex
crimes against minors. (Ibid.) The court made a reasonable determination in
its discretion after briefing and argument that the danger of undue prejudice
did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence under
Evidence Code section 352.
Finally, to prevail on his argument that he was denied due process of
law by the admission of CSAAS testimony, appellant must show that the
admission of the evidence was erroneous, and that the error was so
prejudicial that it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Partida
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436, 439.) “ ‘Only if there are no permissible
inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due
process. Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as necessarily
prevents a fair trial.” [Citations.] Only under such circumstances can it be
inferred that the jury must have used the evidence for an improper purpose.’
[Citation.] ‘The dispositive issue is . . . whether the trial court committed an
error which rendered the trial “so ‘arbitrary and fundamentally unfair’ that it
violated federal due process.” ’ ” (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th
214, 229–230.) Because we find no error in admitting Shultz’s testimony,
17
there is no deprivation of Murillo’s due process rights under either the Sixth
or Fourteenth Amendments.
B. While CALCRIM No. 1193 Is Incomplete, It Did Not Lower the Burden of
Proof, and Any Error Was Harmless10
Murillo argues that CALCRIM No. 1193 inaccurately describes to juries
how CSAAS testimony may be used.11 We find the instruction’s current
wording is unclear, but conclude any error was harmless given the other
instructions read to the jury and the strength of the evidence.
Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is an issue we
review de novo. In determining whether the trial court properly instructed
the jury, we consider “ ‘the entire charge of the court’ ” rather than focusing
on any single instruction. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 192.)
CSAAS testimony assists the jury in placing a child’s self-impeaching
behavior in a broader context. (Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 504.)
Its purpose is to educate triers of fact that children may exhibit a range of
reactions to being molested, some of which a jury may find counterintuitive.
However, CSAAS testimony is not independent evidence that a molest did or
did not occur. As Bowker explained, “[i]t is one thing to say that child abuse
10 Previous cases approved the instruction in its earlier form. (See, e.g.,
People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 (Gonzales) [“A reasonable
juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193 to mean that the jury can use
Ward’s testimony to conclude that L.W.’s behavior does not mean she lied
when she said she was abused. The jury also would understand it cannot use
Ward’s testimony to conclude L.W. was, in fact, molested”]; Munch, supra,
52 Cal.App.5th at p. 474, quoting Gonzales, at p. 504.)
11 The instruction the trial court gave was modified by that court and is
different than the standard CALCRIM No. 1193. However, our holding in
this section is equally applicable to the instruction the court used and to the
pattern CALCRIM instruction.
18
victims often exhibit a certain characteristic or that a particular behavior is
not inconsistent with a child having been molested. It is quite another to
conclude that where a child meets certain criteria, we can predict with a
reasonable degree of certainty that he or she has been abused. The former
may be appropriate in some circumstances; the latter . . . clearly is not.”
(Bowker, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 393, italics added.)
The wording of CALCRIM No. 1193 changed in late 2022 in response to
criticism from two unpublished cases that the instruction was “potentially
misleading.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Advisory Com. on Criminal Jury
Instructions Rep., Jury Instructions: Criminal Jury Instructions
(2022 September) (2022) p. 4.) Consequently, the drafters removed a double
negative, changing “not inconsistent” to “consistent.” Closer examination of
the instruction reveals the change opens the instruction to misuse.
Prior to 2022, CALCRIM No. 1193 reflected Bowker’s message that
after being molested, young sexual assault victims sometimes exhibit
paradoxical behavior. The instruction reminded jurors that simply because
such self-impeachment occurred, that was “not inconsistent” with being
molested. As Bowker implies, the purpose of using the term “not
inconsistent” in the instruction is to communicate that reactions to actual
child sexual assault fall along a spectrum between conduct commonly
understood as consistent with molest (e.g., immediate reporting) all the way
to behaviors not generally understood as common — inconsistent — reactions
to being sexually assaulted (e.g., delayed or incremental reporting). (Bowker,
supra, 203.Cal.App. 3d at p. 393.)
By looking more closely, we see the double negative in this instance
served the important purpose of communicating there is a range of possible
reactions to child sexual assault. But stating an action is consistent with
19
molest erases the possibilities that the earlier CALCRIM No. 1193 allowed.
The new instruction is now easily interpreted by a jury to mean the child’s
failure to report the assault in fact supports a conclusion that a molest
occurred.12 This contravenes the basic premise that CSAAS is not predictive
of whether molest occurred in any given situation.
Of course, a child’s conduct in a case may legitimately be impeaching,
but that is a credibility determination for the jury to make. A correctly
instructed jury should emerge with an understanding that, given the context
in which a sexual assault on a child occurs, the young person could exhibit a
variety of behaviors, some of which will be counterintuitive. We conclude
that telling a jury a young person’s “conduct was consistent with the conduct
of someone who has been molested” inadequately communicates that
message.13
We find here the error is harmless. As stated above, CALCRIM
No. 1193 informed the jury that CSAAS evidence could not be used to
determine if Murillo committed any of the charged crimes. The trial judge
separately explained during Shultz’s testimony that the prosecution could not
use her evidence to prove that abuse happened, but only to assist the jury in
evaluating the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the trial court explained
12 As the trial court itself stated, “[o]bviously, the expert cannot testify
that [the victims’] behavior was consistent with having been abused versus
not having been abused.” Yet, that’s exactly what the current CALCRIM
No. 1193 says.
13 As an example, one way to eliminate the double negative while still
reflecting Bowker’s concerns with CSAAS testimony could be to instruct the
jury — it may consider CSAAS evidence solely for the purpose of determining
whether the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are
inconsistent with having been molested.
20
in another instruction the jurors could accept or reject the experts’ testimony.
(See CALCRIM No. 332.) And Dr. McAuliff testified that CSAAS evidence is
not generally accepted in the scientific community. Together these
instructions conveyed the limitations on CSAAS testimony. We also hold for
the same reasons that the burden of proof was not lessened.
Finally, the evidence against Murillo recounted by three people is
overwhelming. In comparison to that evidence, the explanation on recanting
was of minimal importance. Despite the delayed prosecution and J.L.’s and
E.L.’s single incidents of recanting, they reported the sexual assaults on
multiple occasions and, after recanting, testified in front of the jury that
Murillo did commit the crimes at issue. They also explained to the jury the
reasons they previously recanted. And it is extremely unlikely that the jury
was skeptical of the witnesses’ testimony but found Murillo guilty because
Shultz testified that child abuse victims may delay reporting and recant their
disclosures.
The lack of Bowker’s language did not affect the verdicts, even if we
apply the Chapman v. California harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) We find the error
here was harmless.
C. The Court Properly Limited Defense Expert Testimony
Finally, Murillo contends the trial court erred by precluding the
defense expert from testifying as to the specific facts of the case. Murillo
complains, “Dr. McAuliff had scientific expertise that could have shown the
jury how the allegations against Mr. Murillo could have developed — indeed,
he could have shown the jury how the allegations could have been false” and
“identif[ied] the potential problems with each of the disclosures.” In addition,
Murillo specifically argues the court should have permitted Dr. McAuliff
21
to testify that “it was not as though [D.C.] being separate from [J.L.]
and [E.L.] for many years meant that she could not have been subject to
cross-contamination,” and that J.L. and E.L.’s father “was a possible source of
cross-contamination.”
“The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or
exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert
testimony meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse
of discretion.” (People v. McDowell, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 426.) We conclude
the trial court did not abuse this broad discretion in limiting Dr. McAuliff’s
testimony.
The trial court ruled based on the legitimate concern that Dr. McAuliff
would testify as to whether the complaining witnesses were telling the truth,
explaining: “Your expert cannot conclude X, Y, and Z and tell the jury who
they should and shouldn’t believe,” but defense counsel “can argue to the
jury, hey, this is what the expert said, that’s what happened in this case,
therefore, you should conclude X, Y, and Z.” Indeed, “[t]he general rule is
that an expert may not give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth,
for the determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond
common experience that the expert’s opinion would assist the trier of fact; in
other words, the jury generally is as well equipped as the expert to discern
whether a witness is being truthful.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004)
34 Cal.4th 1, 82.) Thus, permitting an expert to opine on “how the
allegations” of the specific witnesses in the case “could have been false” or as
to concerns about witnesses’ “disclosures” would have been an improper
opinion on the truthfulness of the witnesses’ testimony.
Further, the information provided by Dr. McAuliff was sufficient for the
jury to apply the general concepts to witness testimony. (People v. Page
22
(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 161, 188 [“an expert’s thorough description of the
general principles to be applied in a given case may make additional (and
more specific) expert testimony superfluous”].) Dr. McAuliff testified, for
example, that memory weakens over time. Nothing more from Dr. McAuliff
would assist the jury in addressing the time that passed prior to J.L., E.L.,
and D.C.’s reports of abuse. Dr. McAuliff also explained when cross-
contamination occurs, including when two witnesses share information or
when the same individual communicates with multiple witnesses. There was
evidence in the case that J.L. and E.L. knew about each other’s abuse, and
that J.L. talked to D.C. and her mother. The jury did not need Dr. McAuliff
to specifically explain that was a potential instance of cross-contamination.
Evaluating whether their communication affected their credibility was
properly in the province of the jury.
Finally, an expert may not provide an opinion “based ‘on assumptions
of fact without evidentiary support [citation], or on speculative or conjectural
factors.’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1008, overruled on
other grounds.) Murillo complains that the court prevented Dr. McAuliff
from testifying as to what “could have been,” “potential problems,” and a
“possible source of cross-contamination.” The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding such speculative testimony.
Murillo’s cited cases do not assist him. The case People v. Caparaz
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669, 683–684, raised by Murillo is irrelevant because it
involved a defense expert who testified that the defendant’s admission was
false because he was suggestible. In People v. Wilson (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th
559, 567, 572, and People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 448–449,
there was no suggestion that the defense suggestibility expert testified about
the facts specific to the case.
23
D. There Was No Error to Cumulate
We have concluded that there was no prejudicial error. “In the absence
of error, there is nothing to cumulate.” (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th
527, 562.) Further, Murillo’s claims that his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated also fail.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.
KELETY, J.
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