CourtListener 10371476•People v. Rowel CA5
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Filed 4/2/25 P. v. Rowel CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F085904
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF160003B)
v.
SAMUEL DARNELL ROWEL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Chad A. Louie,
Judge.
Paul R. Kraus, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Kari R.
Mueller, Amanda D. Cary, and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Fain, J.†
†
Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
INTRODUCTION
In 2016, appellant Samuel Darnell Rowel was convicted via a plea agreement of
four felonies:
(1) First degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a);1 count 1);
(2) Two counts of infliction of corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 2 &
6); and
(3) Assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 10). For the two
counts of infliction of corporal injury, appellant admitted he personally used a deadly
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
Appellant received an aggregate prison term of 29 years eight months. This
included an upper term in count 1. Because he had previously been convicted of serious
felonies, he received two enhancements of five years each under section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). He also received a one-year prior prison term enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In 2023, appellant was resentenced under section 1172.75. The lower court struck
the now-invalid one-year enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Appellant
asked the court to resentence him fully and to further reduce his sentence. The court
declined to do so, ruling it did not have such authority without the prosecutor’s consent
due to the original plea agreement. In the alternative, the court ruled it would not further
reduce appellant’s sentence even if it had the authority. Appellant received an aggregate
sentence of 28 years eight months.
Appellant contends the superior court erred in concluding it lacked authority to
resentence him without the prosecutor’s consent. Appellant also asserts that the court
abused its discretion in ruling it would not further reduce the sentence.
1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2.
Effective January 1, 2025, section 1171 controls postconviction proceedings to
modify a sentence or conviction, including a proceeding under section 1172.75. (§ 1171,
subd. (a); see also Assem. Bill No. 2483 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.), stats. 2024, ch. 964,
§ 2.)
We agree with appellant that resentencing is required. Under section 1171, a
sentencing court is now required to “consider any pertinent circumstances that have
arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.” (§ 1171, subd. (c)(2).) A sentencing court
now “has jurisdiction to modify every aspect” of a sentence, even if “it was imposed after
a guilty plea.” (Ibid.) Finally, “[a]ny changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a
prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Id. at subd. (c)(3).)
We remand this matter for resentencing in conformity with this new law.
BACKGROUND
In February 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
identified appellant as serving a prison sentence that contained a now-invalid
enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b). In October 2022, appellant filed a pro.
per. motion for resentencing, asking the court to strike the one-year enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In December 2022, appellant’s appointed counsel filed a motion for resentencing
under section 1172.75 and Romero.2 The motion requested a full resentencing. The
defense asked for the one-year prior prison term enhancement to be struck. In addition, it
sought the midterm in count 1, dismissal of one prior serious felony enhancement (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), and the imposition of concurrent sentences for an aggregate prison term of
13 years. Appellant’s motion asked the sentencing court to consider his “improved
behavior” and “low risk” threat assessment. Attached to the motion were prison
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
3.
disciplinary records and various certificates showing appellant’s completion of various
programs.
Resentencing occurred on March 9, 2023. The sentencing court believed that,
because appellant was originally sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement, it could only
strike the one-year prior prison enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and it
could not further reduce the sentence. Appellant’s appointed counsel disagreed, arguing
that the court had the authority to resentence appellant fully and without the prosecutor’s
consent. The defense asked the court to strike a prior strike offense, and the two five-
year enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), which were referred to as the
“nickel priors.”
The prosecutor objected to reducing appellant’s sentence beyond striking the one-
year prison prior enhancement. The prosecutor submitted a certified record of appellant’s
prior convictions.
The court understood that the midterm was the presumptive sentence. The court
concluded that, based on the certified record of conviction, it could again impose an
upper term sentence.
Defense counsel noted that appellant was found in prison to be a “very low risk,”
and he was “now considered non violent.” The defense asked the court to consider “all
the classes he has taken, the work he’s done, and how he’s changed his life.”
The court reviewed appellant’s “certified rap sheet.” The court detailed
appellant’s extensive criminal history.
In 1994, appellant had a misdemeanor conviction for possession of a weapon.
In 1996, appellant had a felony conviction for possession of a controlled
substance.
In 1997, appellant had a felony conviction for shooting at an occupied dwelling;
he received a seven-year prison commitment.
4.
In 2002, appellant had a felony conviction for robbery; he received 32 months in
prison.
In 2004, appellant had a felony conviction for possession of a firearm with a gang
enhancement; he received an eight-year prison commitment.
In 2010, appellant had a felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance
while in prison; he received a consecutive two years in prison.
In 2013, appellant had a violation while on post release community supervision.
In 2014, appellant had a misdemeanor conviction for loitering and a misdemeanor
conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
In 2015, appellant committed the present offenses. He was convicted in 2016 via
a plea agreement to the following: (1) first degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); count 1);
(2) two counts of infliction of corporal injury (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 2 & 6); and
(3) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 10).
At the 2023 resentencing, the court reiterated its belief that it did not have
discretion to reduce appellant’s sentence further over the People’s objection. However,
the court stated that, even if it did have such authority, it would not do so based on
appellant’s criminal history and based on the facts and circumstances of his offenses. In
making its ruling, the court did not expressly consider appellant’s disciplinary record or
his record of rehabilitation while incarcerated.
The court found appellant’s “lengthy criminal history” and his “repeated criminal
convictions” as a factor in aggravation. The court concluded that the upper term was
warranted. The court also found that, based on appellant’s criminal history and the nature
of this current offense, appellant did not fall outside the spirit of the “Three Strikes” law.
The court denied the request to strike the prior strike conviction. The court denied the
request to strike the two nickel priors, finding that striking those enhancements would
endanger public safety as defined under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). The court
updated appellant’s sentence to reflect a striking of the one-year prison prior.
5.
DISCUSSION
I. An Overview of Section 1172.75.
“Before January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to
impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the
defendant had served a prior prison term and had not remained free of custody for at least
five years. [Citation.] Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg.
Sess.) (Senate Bill 136) amended section 667.5 by limiting the enhancement to only prior
prison terms served for sexually violent offenses. [Citation.] Enhancements based on
prior prison terms served for other offenses became legally invalid. [Citation.]” (People
v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.)
“In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 … which, among other
things, made the changes implemented by Senate Bill 136 retroactive. [Citation.]”
(People v. Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 966.) In an uncodified section of Senate
Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), the Legislature declared, “[T]o
ensure equal justice and address systemic racial bias in sentencing, it is the intent of the
Legislature to retroactively apply … Senate Bill 136 of the 2019–20 Regular Session to
all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed
sentence enhancements. It is the intent of the Legislature that any changes to a sentence
as a result of the act that added this section shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court
to rescind a plea agreement.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1, italics added.)
Senate Bill 483 also added section 1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.)
Section 1172.75 provides that except for certain sexually violent offenses, “ ‘[a]ny
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5 … is legally invalid.’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)” A person
currently serving a sentence that includes a now-legally invalid sentence enhancement
under section 1172.75 need not do anything to correct that sentence. Instead, the statute
requires the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and each
6.
county’s correctional administrator to identify those persons to the sentencing court that
imposed the legally invalid enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) If the sentencing court
determines the person’s current judgment includes “such a legally invalid enhancement,
‘the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.’ (Id., subd. (c).)”
(People v. Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 966.)
Section 1172.75 provides five specific instructions for resentencing. First, the
resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result
of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety,” but
in any event it “shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
Second, the trial court “shall apply” the Judicial Council’s sentencing rules “and
apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so
as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
Third, the court “may consider postconviction factors,” including “evidence that
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
Fourth, with certain exceptions, the court “may not impose a sentence exceeding
the middle term.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(4).)
Finally, the court “shall appoint counsel” for the resentencing. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(5).)
II. An Overview of Section 1171.
Effective January 1, 2025, section 1171 controls postconviction proceedings to
modify a sentence or conviction, including a resentencing proceeding under section
1172.75. (§ 1171, subd. (a); see also Assem. Bill No. 2483, stats. 2024, ch. 964, § 2.)
7.
The parties agree that section 1171 applies retroactively here. We agree. Section
1171 applies retroactively to appellant because it is an ameliorative change to the
criminal law which became effective prior to the judgment in this case becoming final.
(See People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 630–632; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740,
745.)
Section 1171 has made significant changes to the law of resentencing. Relevant to
our discussion here, the sentencing court is now required to “consider any pertinent
circumstances that have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.” (§ 1171,
subd. (c)(2).) A sentencing court now “has jurisdiction to modify every aspect” of a
sentence, even if “it was imposed after a guilty plea.” (Ibid.) Finally, “[a]ny changes to a
sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Id. at
subd. (c)(3).)
Section 1171 has resolved a split of authority. Prior to the enactment of
section 1171, there was a dispute among the appellate courts regarding the scope of
section 1172.75. At least one published opinion held that, if a defendant was convicted
via a plea agreement, a resentencing court is not permitted to fully resentence the
defendant and go beyond merely striking a now-invalid enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b). (People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 565.)
Other courts have taken a different approach and held that a resentencing court may
reduce a sentence further without the consent of the prosecution even when the defendant
was originally sentenced via a plea agreement. (People v. Hernandez (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 981, 986; People v. Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 964.)
In his original briefing, appellant relied on People v. Montgomery (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 768. In Montgomery, the appellate court held that the prosecution was
not entitled to amend or withdraw its plea agreement if the sentencing court shows an
inclination to reduce an agreed-upon sentence beyond dismissing a prior prison term
enhancement. (Montgomery, supra, at p. 774.) However, on December 18, 2024, the
8.
California Supreme Court depublished the Montgomery opinion, rendering it not citable.
(People v. Montgomery (2024) [2024 Cal.LEXIS 7084].)
In light of section 1171, we need not resolve the prior split of authority or address
further the parties’ respective briefing on that issue. A resentencing court now “has
jurisdiction to modify every aspect” of a sentence, even if “it was imposed after a guilty
plea.” (§ 1171, subd. (c)(2).) “Any changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a
prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” (Id., at subd. (c)(3).)
III. The Holding in Stamps.
When appellant was resentenced in 2023, the lower court felt it lacked authority to
further reduce appellant’s sentence in light of the prior plea agreement. The court cited
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps) to support its understanding of the law.
In Stamps, our high court examined the ramifications if a defendant was originally
sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement, and he was resentenced under Senate Bill
No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). Senate Bill No. 1393 allows a trial court to dismiss a
serious felony enhancement in the furtherance of justice. (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 693.) The Stamps court held that, if the defendant is resentenced contrary to the
original plea agreement, the prosecutor is entitled to withdraw assent to the plea
agreement. (Id. at pp. 707–708.) In addition, the court may withdraw its approval of the
plea agreement. (Id. at p. 708.)
In light of section 1171, the holding in Stamps is not applicable here.
IV. Appellant Must be Resentenced in Conformity with Section 1171.
Respondent contends that section 1171 has no impact in this matter. According to
respondent, a remand is unnecessary because the sentencing court ruled that imposition
of the upper term was justified, appellant did not fall outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes law, and striking the prior serious felony enhancements would endanger public
safety. Respondent argues that appellant has forfeited any claim that the lower court
failed to expressly consider postconviction factors. In the alternative, respondent asserts
9.
that appellant has not overcome a presumption that the court did in fact consider the
postconviction factors, but nevertheless decided that issue unfavorably for appellant
because a reduction in his sentence was against the interests of justice. Respondent
maintains that the judgment should be affirmed. We disagree.
Contrary to respondent’s assertion, appellant has not forfeited this issue. Because
section 1171 was not yet enacted when resentencing occurred in 2023, appellant may
now seek its retroactive benefits because we assume the Legislature intended this statute
“to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the statute’s operative
date.” (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323.)
We reject respondent’s position that it would be an idle act to remand this matter
for resentencing. Defendants are entitled to a sentencing court exercising “ ‘informed
discretion.’ ” A court cannot exercise informed discretion if it is unaware of its
discretionary authority. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 774.)
Here, the court did not exercise fully informed discretion when it resentenced
appellant in 2023. Under the current law, appellant’s plea agreement is no longer a factor
to consider, and the sentencing court “has jurisdiction to modify every aspect” of
appellant’s sentence. (§ 1171, subd. (c)(2).) The court, however, believed it had no
authority to reduce appellant’s sentence beyond striking the now-invalid prior prison term
enhancement.
Moreover, section 1171 now requires a sentencing court to “consider any pertinent
circumstances that have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.” (§ 1171,
subd. (c)(2), italics added.) At the 2023 resentencing, the defense asked the court to
consider appellant’s conduct and behavior while in prison as grounds to further reduce
his sentence. The court never expressly considered appellant’s recent conduct and
behavior. Instead, the court focused exclusively on appellant’s criminal conduct before
this judgment was imposed. Consequently, the new requirements of section 1171 were
not met when appellant was resentenced in 2023.
10.
We do not suggest that appellant’s prior criminal history is no longer a legitimate
factor to consider at sentencing. To the contrary, California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b), permits a sentencing court to consider a defendant’s criminal history as a
possible factor in aggravation. What is apparent from this record, however, is that the
lower court focused exclusively on appellant’s prior criminal conduct without
considering any pertinent circumstances that have occurred since his prior sentence was
imposed. (§ 1171, subd. (c)(2).)
Finally, when a court has not exercised informed discretion, remand is required
unless the record clearly indicates the court would have reached the same decision even if
it had been aware of its discretion. (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431.)
However, our high court has cautioned that, when the law governing a defendant’s
sentence has substantively changed after sentencing, “it is almost always speculative for a
reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the
scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.” (Ibid.)
In light of the new statutory requirements, this matter must be remanded for
resentencing so that the court can exercise informed discretion. We decline to speculate
how the court might exercise its discretion in light of the clear mandate in section 1171.
As such, we remand this matter for resentencing. A full resentencing is required. (See
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [a full resentencing is required so the court
can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances].) We take no
position regarding how the lower court should exercise its sentencing discretion.
DISPOSITION
Appellant’s sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for a full resentencing
in conformity with section 1171. Appellant’s judgment is otherwise affirmed.
11.
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