People v. Bryant CA2/1

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Filed 3/27/25 P. v. Bryant CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337515

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A357588)
v.

JOHN CALVIN BRYANT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
Defendant and appellant John Calvin Bryant challenges
the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 A jury convicted Bryant of first
degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with a felony-murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) for his role in killing Andre
Hongo during an attempted robbery in 1980. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Bryant actually killed Hongo and thus remained
guilty of murder under current law, rendering him ineligible for
resentencing. Because the transcript of Bryant’s trial could not
be located, the trial court relied on the transcript of the
preliminary hearing for its factual findings. Bryant contends this
was error. We disagree and affirm, as we explain below.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
AND TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Bryant filed his petition for resentencing on July 29, 2019.
The trial court denied the petition, finding that Bryant had not
made a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief. We
reversed on the ground that “[n]othing in the record
demonstrates conclusively that Bryant was convicted of first
degree murder under a theory that is still valid today.” (People v.
Bryant (Oct. 26, 2021, B308662) [nonpub. opn.].) We remanded

1 At the time Bryant filed his petition, the applicable
statute was found at Penal Code section 1170.95. Assembly Bill
No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) has since renumbered section
1170.95 as section 1172.6. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we refer to the current citation at section 1172.6
throughout. Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

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the case with instructions that the trial court issue an order to
show cause (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)) and hold an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether to vacate Bryant’s murder conviction (id.,
subd. (d)).
Upon remand, the People filed an opposition to
resentencing arguing that Bryant was ineligible because he
actually killed Hongo. Because neither the parties nor the trial
court could locate a copy of the more-than-40-year-old transcripts
of Bryant’s trial, the People relied on the transcript of Bryant’s
preliminary hearing to prove the facts of Bryant’s offense.2
Bryant submitted no additional evidence, and neither party
called any witnesses.
The transcript of the preliminary hearing shows that the
People called only one witness, Yolanda R., who was working at
the restaurant targeted for robbery at the time of the shooting.
Bryant’s defense counsel cross-examined her. Yolanda testified
that, at around 10:00 a.m. on March 2, 1980, as she and several
other workers were preparing to open the restaurant, an
unknown man dressed in the restaurant’s uniform entered
through the back door. The man addressed the employees,
saying, “Everybody keep smiling and come on in.” The man
asked Hongo, who was Yolanda’s boss, to come into the

2 The People also submitted a copy of the opinion in
Bryant’s direct appeal (People v. Bryant (Sep. 30, 1982,
No. 39696) [nonpub. opn.]) but at an evidentiary hearing, the
court may consider prior appellate opinions only for “the
procedural history of the case” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)), not for the
underlying facts. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
292.)

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restaurant’s office and open the safe. Hongo responded that he
did not know the combination.
A minute or two later, Bryant (who Yolanda identified in
court while testifying) entered the store holding a gun. He told
the employees “to look down and keep wiping.” Later, the first
man and Hongo asked Yolanda, who was working as crew chief,
to open the safe. Yolanda walked back toward the office but said
she did not have the combination. The first man said, “Let’s
shoot him.” Yolanda, who was standing just in front of the door
to the office, saw Bryant shoot Hongo in the head. Both men fled
out the back door of the restaurant. At the end of the
preliminary hearing, the People and Bryant stipulated that
Hongo died from the gunshot wound to his head.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court
ruled as follows: “The court is now sitting as an independent fact
finder, and I have reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript.
The court is not judging the credibility of a particular witness
from the preliminary hearing because, of course, I was not there.
But, as an independent fact finder, I find that the people have
met their burden of proof by establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant or petitioner was the actual killer in
this case.” On that basis, the court denied the petition.
DISCUSSION
A. Background on Resentencing under Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6 allows certain defendants convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter to
petition the trial court for their convictions to be vacated and to
be resentenced. To be eligible for relief under the statute, it must
be the case that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to [s]ection

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188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3).) These changes to the law, enacted as part of Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), amended
section 188 to provide that, “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of
[s]ection 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a
crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The effect of this amendment was to
abolish the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis
of liability for murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
847-848.) Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, a defendant
could be convicted of murder under this doctrine simply by acting
as an accomplice in an offense that foreseeably resulted in the
commission of a murder, even if the defendant did not share the
mens rea of the killer. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
449; People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 164-165.)
In addition to abolishing the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, Senate Bill 1437 also amended section
189 to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine,
requiring greater personal culpability for a felony-murder
defendant to be liable for murder. (See People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 707-708.) To convict a defendant of felony murder
under the new law, the prosecution must prove that the
defendant either was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); acted
with the intent to kill in aiding, abetting, commanding,
encouraging, or soliciting the actual killer (id., subd. (e)(2)); or
“was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life” (id., subd. (e)(3)).
To obtain relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner must first
make a prima facie case for eligibility. (See id., subd. (c).) “[T]he

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prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,] subdivision (c) is
limited,” and the trial court must “ ‘ “take[ ] [the] petitioner’s
factual allegations as true” ’ ” and “should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
971, 972.) The court may deny a defendant’s petition if the record
refutes the defendant’s allegation that he is eligible for
resentencing (id. at p. 971), but this does not occur “unless the
record conclusively establishes every element of the offense.”
(People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
If the petition survives the prima facie stage, the court
must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the People bear the
burden “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner
is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as
amended by” Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the
People cannot carry this burden, the court must vacate the
murder conviction and then resentence the defendant on any
remaining charges. (Id., subd. (d)(1).)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Relying on the
Transcript of the Preliminary Hearing
Bryant contends the trial court erred by denying his
petition solely on the basis of facts derived from the transcript of
the preliminary hearing. We disagree. Nothing in the text of
section 1172.6 nor the case law indicates that a court may not use
the transcript of a preliminary hearing the way the trial court did
in this case. Indeed, as we will explain, the statutory language is
expressly to the contrary.
Courts have expressed caution about the use of testimony
from a preliminary hearing at the prima facie stage. At this
stage, factfinding is forbidden, and a court may deny a petition

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only “[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief.” (People v. Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 450.) A court may rely on unchallenged,
relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to
reject a petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Patton
(Mar. 3, 2025, S279670) ____ Cal.5th ____ [2025 WL 666005 at
p. *6].) However, when the preliminary hearing transcript
contains evidence consistent with a conviction on a now-invalid
theory, such as the existence of multiple perpetrators, a court
cannot properly deny a petition at the prima facie stage. (People
v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 340.)
Bryant concedes that different principles govern the
evidentiary hearing, and that testimony from a preliminary
hearing is admissible at this stage. Section 1172.6 provides that
“[t]he admission of evidence in the [evidentiary] hearing shall be
governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may
consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or
trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.”
(Id., subd. (d)(3).) Yolanda’s testimony and the stipulation
regarding the cause of death came from such a prior hearing.
Nevertheless, Bryant argues that “under the unique
circumstances here the prosecution could not—through the
preliminary hearing transcript alone—satisfy its burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] remains guilty of murder.”
He notes that only one witness testified at the preliminary
hearing, whereas the opinion in Bryant’s direct appeal suggests
that multiple witnesses testified at trial. According to that
earlier opinion, one of those witnesses was another restaurant
employee, Victor H., who testified that “he heard [Bryant] say

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‘shoot him,’ and then he heard a shot.” (People v. Bryant, supra,
No. 39696.) In addition, Bryant notes that the circumstances and
purpose of a preliminary hearing (to establish probable cause) are
different from those in a trial (to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt).
But “[t]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
support a conviction” for murder. (People v. Canizalez (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th 832, 845.) Where it is available, the prosecution can
certainly present more robust evidence, including a trial
transcript, than the single witness it did here. But we see no
basis for forbidding reliance on the preliminary hearing
transcript where the trial transcript is missing. Courts have
approved of using the preliminary hearing transcript as the sole
or primary source of evidence at section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearings in other situations, such as cases where there was no
trial transcript because the defendant pleaded guilty. (E.g.,
People v. Davenport (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1157; see also
People v. Davis (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 500, 503, 512.) There is
no reason why the same logic does not apply in cases like this one
that proceeded to trial but where the trial transcript has been
lost.
As the court explained in Clements, the evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6 was designed to balance fairness to the
defendant against the expense of additional factfinding. The
Legislature “could have directed that qualifying offenders receive
a new trial by a new jury on the critical factual questions. But
that was impractical for many reasons; the expense would have
been enormous and the chances of obtaining live testimony from
witnesses who remembered the events from years or decades
earlier is small. The Legislature also could have simply refused

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to make the benefits of the new law available to people already
validly convicted under the old law. They chose the middle
course of requiring trial judges to decide the critical factual
questions based—at least in some cases—on a cold record.”
(People v. Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 297.)
The use of transcripts rather than live testimony inevitably
leads to a loss of nuance. As the trial court here noted, for
example, witness credibility can become difficult to judge because
the fact finder was not present for the testimony. But that is part
of the compromise the Legislature chose. Nothing prevented
Bryant from supplementing the record with his own testimony or
any other available evidence, but as was his right he chose not to
do so.
In determining whether a trial court correctly denied a
section 1172.6 petition following an evidentiary hearing, we
review its factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v.
Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 383.) Yolanda’s testimony
that Bryant was the actual killer was substantial evidence
supporting the court’s findings that Bryant was the actual killer
and therefore remained guilty of murder under current law.
More or different evidence was not required.

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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

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