CourtListener 10364776•People v. Castaneda CA4/1
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Filed 3/26/25 P. v. Castaneda CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085179
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. Nos. FWV19004062
& FWV19004063)
JOSUE DANIEL CASTANEDA et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Ingrid Adamson Uhler, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Josue Daniel Castaneda.
David P. Lampkin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Rony A. Castaneda Ramirez.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Josue Daniel Castaneda and Rony A. Castaneda Ramirez appeal the
judgments sentencing them to prison after a jury found them guilty of second
degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon. They contend the trial
court prejudicially erred by instructing the jury on a factually unsupported
theory of aiding and abetting and by refusing to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. Josue and
Rony1 also contend the court did not award them all the presentence custody
credits they were due. Josue contends his abstract of judgment contains a
clerical error. We modify the judgments to award the correct number of
presentence custody credits, order correction of the clerical error in Josue’s
abstract of judgment, and affirm the judgments as modified.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Josue and Rony are brothers who lived together in a residential section
of Chino. Their house was on Chino Avenue near the head of a horse trail
that runs along the rear of a property owned by Sandy.
On December 14, 2019, Sandy hosted a wedding reception in her
backyard for her sister, Esther, and brother-in-law, Joe. The guests
numbered between 250 and 300. Josue and Rony went to the party even
though they were not invited and spent several hours there drinking,
dancing, and conversing with guests. Police arrived at 11:45 p.m. to end the
reception because of the noise. Josue and Rony lingered at the bar with Joe
and Sandy’s uncle, Jose, until Sandy told them to leave, and then departed
through a gate that led to the horse trail.
1 We follow the parties’ practice of referring to appellants, victims, and
witnesses by their first names instead of last names for clarity because there
are common surnames among the group.
2
At approximately 2:20 a.m. on December 15, 2019, Sandy, Jose, and Joe
walked to the back of the yard to lock the gate. Sandy’s brother Juan
followed them. As Sandy glanced at the horse trail, she saw Rony and Josue
approaching. They said they returned to retrieve their cell phones. Joe
asked Rony and Josue who had invited them to the wedding reception, and
they answered, “George.” Joe asked, “What George?” Either Josue or Rony
then said to Joe, “Jump, bitch.”
Joe, Sandy, Juan, and Jose all jumped over the fence onto the horse
trail. A melee ensued during which Rony and Josue struck Joe with their
fists and struck Juan’s face and upper body with bats. Juan struggled with
Josue on the ground, wrested the bat from him, and tossed it to the side. As
Juan was getting up, Rony struck him in the head with a bat. Jose tried to
assist Juan and was struck in the shins with a bat. Rony and Josue then ran
down the horse trail toward their house.
Joe, Sandy, Juan, and Jose ran after Rony and Josue. Juan had to stop
and sit down at the curb when he reached the head of the horse trail on
Chino Avenue because he was dizzy. Joe continued to pursue Rony and
Josue, and Jose followed Joe. Sandy got into a truck she had parked on
Chino Avenue at the head of the horse trail and drove toward Joe.
Rony and Josue arrived at the house on the northeast corner of Chino
Avenue and 17th Street (the corner house) and entered the side yard through
a wooden gate that was painted white. Joe followed them through the gate.2
About a minute later, Jose went through the gate, called out for Joe, received
no answer, and left.
2 Jose saw Joe pass through an open gate into the side yard. Sandy saw
Joe kick the gate open and then enter the side yard.
3
Soon thereafter, Joe’s brother Isaac ran down Chino Avenue toward
17th Street and saw Josue holding a bat as he stood on the lawn of the house
next to the house on the corner. Isaac asked Josue where Joe was, but Josue
gave no answer. Isaac then saw Rony climb over the fence of the corner
house onto the top of a car in the driveway of the adjacent house and jump off
the car. Isaac asked Rony where Joe was, but Rony did not respond. Rony
joined Josue and the two departed. Isaac proceeded to the house on the
corner and entered the side yard through the open gate. He called out for Joe
but received no response.
Police officers responded to a 911 call and found Juan lying on the
ground with a head injury. Other family members asked officers to look for
Joe and directed them to the corner house. When officers arrived at the
corner house, they entered the side yard through the open gate. They found
Joe lying dead on the concrete walkway behind the house where Rony had
climbed over the fence. There were white paint markings on the vest Joe was
wearing. A wooden plank that was painted white and that had been
detached from the gate to the side yard lay near his feet.
At autopsy, the pathologist identified several injuries on Joe’s body.
Two distinct lacerations above and to the side of his left eye overlay skull
fractures, which overlay hemorrhages in and on the brain. Those two injuries
were caused by two distinct impacts with a hard object, either one of which
would have rendered Joe unconscious and led to death within minutes.
There were two abrasions on the left side of Joe’s face, contusions on both
sides of his nose, a laceration of his lower lip, and bleeding in his upper lip.
Injuries to Joe’s torso included an abrasion on the right side of his chest and
contusions on the right side of his abdomen, hip, and upper back. The
abrasion on the right side of the chest corresponded to the white paint
4
markings on Joe’s vest. The contusions on the upper back, abdomen, and hip
were consistent with being hit by a bat. Joe also had multiple contusions on
his upper and lower limbs that indicated he had been hit at least eight times.
The pathologist concluded the cause of Joe’s death was blunt force trauma to
the head and the manner of death was homicide.
On the afternoon of December 15, 2019, police officers executed a
search warrant at Rony and Josue’s house. Officers found the clothing Rony
and Josue had worn at the wedding reception freshly washed and piled up on
a chair; two cell phones, one belonging to Rony and the other to Josue; but no
bat. Josue and Rony were taken into custody. Rony had no visible injuries.
Josue had a small cut over his left eye, abrasions and contusions on his left
shoulder and right arm, and redness on his mid- to lower back, and he
complained of pain in his right hand.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Josue and Rony with the murder of Joe (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a); undesignated section references are to this code) and assault
on Juan with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). They pled not guilty. The
case proceeded to a jury trial at which the parties presented witnesses and
other evidence that established the facts summarized in part I, ante.
The prosecutor’s theory on the murder charges was that Josue and
Rony killed Joe with implied malice. The prosecutor argued Josue and Rony
were “working together as a team” and “ambushed” Joe in the back of the
corner house. She argued one of them, the direct perpetrator, used the bat to
strike the fatal blows to Joe’s head, and the other, the aider and abettor,
knew the direct perpetrator was going to use the bat in that way and assisted
the direct perpetrator by using the wooden plank from the gate to the side
5
yard to strike Joe. The prosecutor told the jury she did not have to prove
which brother was the direct perpetrator and which the aider and abettor.
Both were guilty of second degree murder, she argued, based on the types
and number of injuries they inflicted on Joe and the types of weapons they
used to inflict those injuries, which showed they intentionally committed acts
they knew were life-threatening and did so with conscious disregard for Joe’s
life.
Josue and Rony argued self-defense. Their theory was that they ran to
the corner house to hide from Joe and the others who were chasing them,
that Joe broke the wooden plank off the gate and used it as a weapon to chase
after Rony and Josue, and that they defended themselves against Joe’s
advances.
The trial court gave the jury several instructions related to the murder
charges. It instructed the jury on implied malice murder. (CALCRIM
No. 520.) The court gave an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, as a
lesser included offense of murder, based on theories of heat of passion and
imperfect self-defense. (CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571.) It instructed on principles
of aiding and abetting as they apply to implied malice murder or voluntary
manslaughter. (CALCRIM No. 401; see fn. 3, post.) The court gave
instructions on self-defense or defense of another as negating liability for
murder or manslaughter. (CALCRIM No. 505.) It refused Josue and Rony’s
requests to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser
included offense of murder. (CALCRIM No. 580.)
After deliberating for approximately 10 hours, the jury found both
Josue and Rony guilty of second degree murder and assault with a deadly
weapon. The trial court sentenced them each to prison for three years for the
assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) plus a consecutive term of 15 years to life for the
6
murder (§ 190, subd. (a)). The court awarded Josue and Rony each 1,185
days of presentence custody credits.
III.
DISCUSSION
Rony and Josue seek reversal of their murder convictions on two
grounds. They complain the trial court prejudicially erred by: (1) instructing
the jury on a “factually invalid” theory of liability for murder based on aiding
and abetting; and (2) refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. Rony and Josue also
complain the trial court did not give them all the presentence custody credits
to which they are entitled and ask us to modify the judgment to award the
correct number of credits. Finally, Josue asks us to correct the year of the
commission of the murder in his abstract of judgment. We take up these
issues in turn.
A. Instruction on Aiding and Abetting
Rony and Josue argue the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on
aiding and abetting as a theory of liability for implied malice murder because,
they say, there was no evidence that either of them knew the other intended
to commit a life-endangering act, committed an act to assist the other, and
acted with conscious disregard for human life. They further argue the
instructional error was prejudicial and deprived them of liberty without due
process of law because there is a reasonable probability the jury found them
guilty based on a factually invalid theory. These arguments lack merit.
1. Standard of review
Whether we consider this claim as one of instructional error in
submitting the issue of aiding and abetting to the jury or as one of
insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdicts on the
7
murder charges, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the
claim. (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 550; see People v. Thompson
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 120 (Thompson) [rejecting claim insufficient evidence
supported aiding and abetting instruction when sufficient evidence supported
conviction as aider and abettor].) We review the record in the light most
favorable to the verdicts to determine whether the record contains
substantial evidence (i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value) from which a reasonable jury could find each element of the charged
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307,
318–319; Nelson, at p. 550.) We presume in support of the verdicts the
existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence.
(Nelson, at p. 550; People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “We
discard evidence that does not support the judgment as having been rejected
by the trier of fact for lack of sufficient verity.” (People v. Moore (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 937, 940 (Moore).) Substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it, and such
evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a verdict. (People v.
Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 105–106; People v. Moore (1957) 48 Cal.2d 541,
547 (Moore); People v. Myles (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 711, 739 (Myles).)
2. Liability for aiding and abetting implied malice murder
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “Malice is implied when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(2).) Our Supreme
Court has held implied malice has physical and mental components. The
physical component is satisfied if the defendant performs an act that is
dangerous to human life, and the mental component is satisfied if the
8
defendant knows the act endangers the life of another and performs it with
conscious disregard for life. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1181.)
Liability for murder may be imposed not only on the person who
actually kills the victim with implied malice (i.e., the direct perpetrator) but
also on a person who, with implied malice, helps or induces the direct
perpetrator to do so (i.e., an aider and abettor). (§ 31; People v. McCoy (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1111, 1116–1117, 1122; People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972,
979, 983 (Langi); People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
485, 499 (Valenzuela).) Liability for “direct aiding and abetting is based on
the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own
mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus reus
required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For
the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute
aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an
implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or
conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that
act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider
and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act,
intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the
act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human
life.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712–713, fn. omitted
(Powell); accord, People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–991; Langi, at
p. 983; Valenzuela, at p. 501.)3
3 For the murder charges, the trial court modified the standard
instruction on aiding and abetting (CALCRIM No. 401) to make it comply
with the requirement in the cited cases that the aider and abettor act with
implied malice.
9
Where, as in this case, two defendants are charged with murder, “[i]t is
settled that as long as each juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
[each] defendant is guilty of murder as that offense is defined by statute, . . .
the jury need not decide unanimously whether [each] defendant was guilty as
the aider and abettor or as the direct perpetrator. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Not only is
there no unanimity requirement as to the theory of guilt, the individual
jurors themselves need not choose among the theories, so long as each is
convinced of guilt. Sometimes, as probably occurred here, the jury simply
cannot decide beyond a reasonable doubt exactly who did what. There may
be a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the direct perpetrator, and a
similar doubt that he was the aider and abettor, but no such doubt that he
was one or the other.” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918–919;
accord, People v. Smith (2014) 60 Cal.4th 603, 618 (Smith).)
3. Sufficiency of the evidence
The dispositive question is whether the evidence introduced at trial
sufficed to support imposition of liability on Josue and Rony for aiding and
abetting murder under the principles set out above. They contend the
answer is “no,” because “there is a dearth of evidence” on “what the events in
the backyard [of the corner house] were.” They argue there is no evidence
either of them knew the other would hit Joe on the head with the bat, said or
did anything to encourage or to assist the other to hit Joe on the head with
the bat, or acted with conscious disregard for Joe’s life in so encouraging or
assisting the other. Since “[i]t is error to give an instruction which, while
correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case”
(People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129), Rony and Josue contend the
trial court erred by instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. We disagree.
10
No testimony or other evidence was introduced at trial as to exactly
who did what to Joe in the back of the corner house where he was found dead.
“It is true that the evidence is largely circumstantial, but such evidence ‘is as
sufficient to convict as direct evidence.’ ” (Moore, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 547.)
To find Rony and Josue guilty, “[t]he jury certainly had to find that someone
committed murder. But the ‘jury simply did not have to find’ exactly who
that person was.” (Smith, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 619.) As long as the
evidence sufficed for the jury to find that either Rony or Josue was the direct
perpetrator (i.e., the one who struck the fatal blow with implied malice) and
that the other one was the aider and abettor (i.e., the one who with implied
malice helped his brother strike the fatal blow), the jury could find them both
guilty of second degree murder without having to decide who was the direct
perpetrator and who was the aider and abettor. (Id. at p. 618; Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 979.)
The evidence sufficed to establish either Josue or Rony was the direct
perpetrator. Witnesses saw Joe enter the side yard of the corner house after
Josue and Rony had entered the yard. Soon thereafter, Josue was seen
holding a bat on the lawn of an adjacent house, and Rony was seen climbing
over the fence behind the corner house to join his brother. Joe was found
lying dead on the concrete walkway near where Rony had climbed over the
fence. At autopsy, Joe was found to have bruises on his torso that were
consistent with being hit by a bat, and fatal head injuries that resulted from
being hit by a hard object. From that evidence, the jury reasonably could
conclude that either Rony or Josue killed Joe by striking his head with a bat.
The evidence also sufficed to establish the direct perpetrator, whether
it was Josue or Rony, struck the fatal blow with implied malice. “[L]ike all
other elements of a crime, implied malice may be proven by circumstantial
11
evidence.” (People v. Superior Court (Costa) (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 690,
697.) “Among the circumstances courts have found relevant in determining
whether malice may be inferred are the victim’s vulnerability, the number of
assailants, the ferocity and duration of the attack, and the unusualness or
unexpectedness of the victim’s death.” (Valenzuela, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 502.) Josue and Rony beat Joe with fists on the horse trail and at least one
of them beat him with a bat at the corner house. The autopsy revealed Joe
was hit repeatedly with the bat, thrice to the torso and twice to the head.
The blows to the head were so forceful that they fractured his skull in
multiple places. Joe also had many other injuries all over his body. From
this evidence, the jury reasonably could infer “the manner of the assault and
the circumstances under which it was made rendered the natural
consequences of [the direct perpetrator’s] conduct dangerous to life.” (People
v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508 [defendant struck already beaten
victim with such force that he lost consciousness, fell, and fractured his skull]
(Cravens).) The jury also “was entitled to infer [the direct perpetrator’s]
subjective awareness that his conduct endangered [Joe’s] life from the
circumstances of the attack alone, the natural consequences of which were
dangerous to human life.” (Id. at p. 511.) Moreover, the direct perpetrator
“came to the fight armed, indicating he knew it would be dangerous—so
dangerous he needed a weapon to either defend himself or inflict serious
injury or death.” (Valenzuela, at p. 503.) Lastly, the jury could reasonably
infer the direct perpetrator acted with conscious disregard for Joe’s life from
the evidence that after “having knocked [Joe] unconscious and with his head
split open on the ground, he took no steps to ascertain [Joe’s] condition or to
secure emergency assistance.” (Cravens, at p. 511.)
12
The evidence also sufficed to establish that either Josue or Rony aided
and abetted the killing with implied malice. “[T]o be liable for an implied
malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid
the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of the act.” (Powell,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) “Aiding and abetting may be shown by
circumstantial evidence. It is well settled that the presence at the scene of
the crime and failure to prevent it, companionship and conduct before and
after the offense, including flight, are relevant to determining whether a
defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the crime.” (People v.
Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599 (Glukhoy).) “Motive is another
circumstance to be considered in determining aiding and abetting liability.”
(Ibid.) These circumstances were all present in this case.
As for companionship, Josue and Rony are brothers who lived together
and were together before, during, and after the killing. As for conduct before
the killing, the brothers returned to Sandy’s house armed with bats under
the pretext of retrieving their cell phones, instigated a fight during which
they both beat Joe with their fists and Juan and Jose with their bats, and
then fled together to the corner house with Joe in hot pursuit. As for
presence at the crime scene and failure to prevent the crime, Rony and Josue
ran to the corner house together, and after Joe followed them there, one of
the brothers killed him by striking his head with a bat. From the paint
markings on Joe’s vest, the underlying contusion on his chest, and the
location of the wooden plank from the gate near Joe’s feet, it appears the
other brother struck Joe with the plank. As for conduct after the killing,
Rony climbed over the fence into the neighboring yard, where Josue stood
holding the bat. As the two fled the scene together, they refused to respond
to Isaac’s inquiries about Joe’s whereabouts. Finally, as to motive, “familial
13
concern” presented a motive for one brother to assist the other in the life-
endangering attack on Joe. (People v. Rogers (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 502, 514;
accord, Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 599–600.)
From this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that Josue and Rony:
(1) returned to Sandy’s house to instigate violence; (2) ran together to the
corner house, where they coordinated a life-endangering attack on Joe during
which one brother used the bat to knock Joe unconscious and fracture his
skull while the other assisted by using the wooden plank to hit Joe in the
chest; and (3) with conscious disregard for human life, left Joe on the ground
for dead. Such inferences support guilt of aiding and abetting an implied
malice murder. (See Myles, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 739 [substantial
evidence includes circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from it];
Valenzuela, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 502–503 [instigation of and
participation in armed group attack on victim who was killed supported
liability for aiding and abetting implied malice murder].)
Rony and Josue offer several reasons why, in their view, the jury could
not draw those inferences. None of the reasons requires reversal of the
murder convictions.
Rony and Josue contend the aider and abettor had no way to know the
direct perpetrator would strike Joe on the head with the bat. (See Powell,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713 [aider and abettor must know direct
perpetrator intended to commit life-endangering act].) They argue they ran
to the corner house to hide from Joe and the others whom they fought on the
horse trail, not to ambush Joe. They also argue the direct perpetrator used
the bat to inflict nonfatal blows to Joe’s torso before striking the fatal blows
to his head. We are not persuaded. Minutes before the fatal attack on Joe,
Rony and Josue both used bats to strike Juan’s head and upper body. (See
14
Glukhoy, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 599 [conduct before crime is relevant to
determining aiding and abetting liability].) Rony and Josue were
outnumbered on the horse trail, but they outnumbered Joe at the corner
house. (See Valenzuela, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 502 [number of
assailants is relevant to determining mental state for aiding and abetting
implied malice murder].) Although not all blows Joe suffered were fatal, the
number of blows and other injuries to his body manifested the serious danger
the attack posed to his life. (See Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511 [jury
may infer defendant’s subjective awareness that attack endangered victim’s
life from circumstances of attack].) From these circumstances, the jury
reasonably could infer the aider and abettor knew the director perpetrator
would strike Joe’s head with the bat.
Rony and Josue next contend there was no evidence either of them said
or did anything to assist the other in hitting Joe’s head with the bat. They
argue the prosecutor’s theory that the aider and abettor struck Joe with the
plank from the gate is inconsistent with Sandy’s testimony that Joe kicked in
the gate before he entered the side yard at the corner house, and the only
reasonable inference from her testimony is that Joe broke the plank off the
gate and used it as a weapon. We disagree. Although Sandy testified Joe
kicked in the gate to the side yard at the corner house, Jose testified the gate
was open. Neither testified Joe had a plank. White paint markings on Joe’s
vest and a contusion on his chest were consistent with having been struck by
the plank, but there was no evidence Josue or Rony had been struck by the
plank. The plank was found near the fence at the spot where Rony was seen
climbing over the fence after the fatal attack on Joe. On substantial evidence
review, we do not reevaluate witnesses’ credibility or resolve conflicts in their
testimony, because such matters are exclusively for the jury. (People v.
15
Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106.) “ ‘We presume in support of the judgment
the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the
evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s
findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ”
(People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.) From the evidence, the jury
reasonably could infer either Rony or Josue used the plank to strike Joe while
the other beat him with the bat.
Rony and Josue finally argue the “great variety of circumstance [that]
might have preceded Joe’s death” and the “dearth of evidence concerning
them” make it “difficult to say there is evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that [either of them] must have acted
with a conscious disregard for human life.” We again disagree. The autopsy
showed Joe suffered a brutal beating during which he sustained many
injuries all over his body, including multiple skull fractures caused by two
blows to the head, one of which rendered him unconscious and the other of
which killed him. The circumstantial evidence showed either Josue or Rony,
with the assistance of the other, struck those blows with a bat. After the
blows caused Joe to collapse on the ground, Rony and Josue fled the scene,
refused to tell Isaac where Joe was, and made no effort to summon assistance
for Joe. Assisting in an armed attack that severely injures the victim and
abandoning him as he lay unconscious on the ground manifests a conscious
disregard for human life. (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511; People v.
Palomar (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 969, 977–978.)
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude substantial evidence supported
imposition of liability on Rony and Josue for aiding and abetting implied
malice murder. The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on that
16
theory of liability. (Thompson, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 120.) “Without error,
of course, there can be no prejudice.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612,
677, fn. 12.) This claim of error therefore fails.
B. Refusal to Instruct on Involuntary Manslaughter
Rony and Josue complain the court erroneously refused their requests
to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense
of murder. They assert, “There was more than substantial evidence from
which a rational properly instructed jury could have found that [they] killed
accidentally, but without a conscious disregard for human life.” Josue and
Rony rely on evidence that they were intoxicated,4 that they were “greatly
outnumbered,” that Juan was struck with bats but not killed, and that Joe
“was struck with a bat” but “no evidence that [he] was struck repeatedly.”
From this evidence, they argue that “[a] reasonable fully instructed jury
could have concluded the intent behind the single blow to [Joe] was to
incapacitate so the brothers could flee, as opposed to concluding with
certainty that [they] understood or appreciated the risk to human life at the
time the single blow was inflicted.” Rony and Josue further argue the
instructional error requires reversal of their murder convictions because it is
likely that without the error the jury would have found them guilty of
involuntary manslaughter rather than murder. We reject these arguments.
1. Duty to instruct on lesser included offense and standard of review
“Generally, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser offense included
within the offense of murder.” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083,
4 Josue and Rony cite nothing in the record to support their assertion
they were intoxicated, and we have found nothing. In any event, voluntary
intoxication cannot negate malice, the mental state required for the jury to
find them guilty of murder. (§ 29.4; People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 975;
People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 997.)
17
1145; accord, Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 706.) “ ‘A trial court must
instruct on all lesser included offenses supported by substantial evidence.’
[Citation.] Although instruction on a lesser included offense ‘is not required
when the evidence supporting such an instruction is weak’ [citation] or based
on speculation [citation], it is required when the lesser included offense is
supported by ‘ “evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive” ’
[citation].” (People v. Steskal (2021) 11 Cal.5th 332, 345.) “[W]e construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the [accused]” (People v. Smith (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 298, 308), and “ ‘ “[d]oubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence
to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of the accused” ’ ” (Steskal,
at p. 345). “We review independently whether the trial court erred in
rejecting an instruction on a lesser included offense.” (Ibid.)
2. Substantiality of the evidence of involuntary manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful, unintentional killing of a
human being without malice. (§ 192, subd. (b); People v. Hendricks (1988)
44 Cal.3d 635, 643.) The required mental state is criminal negligence, i.e.,
the commission of an act that a reasonable person would realize involved a
high degree of risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being but
that defendant did not realize involved such a risk. (People v. Butler (2010)
187 Cal.App.4th 998, 1007–1009; People v. Evers (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 588,
596 (Evers).) “[T]he essential distinction between second degree murder
based on implied malice and involuntary manslaughter is the subjective
versus objective criteria to evaluate the defendant’s state of mind—i.e.[,] if
the defendant commits an act which endangers human life without realizing
the risk involved, he is guilty of manslaughter, whereas if he realized the risk
and acted in total disregard of the danger, he is guilty of murder based on
implied malice.” (People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 378.)
18
The question here is whether there was substantial evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude Josue and Rony did not realize they
were endangering Joe’s life by beating him as they did. They correctly point
out that “California courts have long recognized that not all beatings are life
threatening.” (People v. Vasquez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 786, 796.) In
Vasquez, the defendant used his hands and feet to hit the victim, and “almost
all of the victim’s injuries—taken alone—were nonlethal. [The victim] did
not suffer a fractured skull, tooth damage, intracranial bleeding, or brain
bruises, which might be expected from high-impact blows to the head.” (Id.
at pp. 791, 796.) In this case by contrast, Rony and Josue first beat Joe with
their fists on the horse trail, and then beat him with a bat and a wooden
plank at the corner house, where they fractured his skull and caused fatal
intracranial bleeding. They outnumbered Joe at the corner house and did not
face the same amount of resistance they faced when they attacked Joe and
Juan on the horse trail. At the corner house, Joe did not sustain a single
blow with the bat, as Josue and Rony assert; Joe sustained two blows to his
head and three to his torso. There were also lacerations, abrasions, and
contusions all over Joe’s body. After administering the brutal beating, Josue
and Rony left Joe on the ground to die. They “did not simply start a fist fight
in which an unlucky blow resulted in [Joe’s] death. [They] savagely beat
[Joe] to death. Because the evidence presented at trial did not raise a
material issue as to whether [Josue and Rony] acted without malice, the trial
court was not obliged . . . to instruct the jury on involuntary
manslaughter . . . .” (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 597 (Cook); see
Evers, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597–598 [no instruction on involuntary
manslaughter required when severity of victim’s injuries indicated whoever
inflicted them had to know they were life-threatening].)
19
Even had the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter, any error was harmless. “Error in failing to
instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is harmless when the jury
necessarily decides the factual questions posed by the omitted instructions
adversely to defendant under other properly given instructions.” (People v.
Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646.) The court instructed the jury on voluntary
manslaughter, which is a killing without malice. (§ 192, subd. (a); People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 252.) By finding Rony and Josue guilty of
second degree murder instead of voluntary manslaughter, the jury
necessarily found they acted with implied malice. “Because the jury resolved
the factual finding requisite to involuntary manslaughter against [them],
[they] cannot have been prejudiced by the lack of an instruction on
involuntary manslaughter . . . .” (Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 597; see
People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 884 [when jury was instructed on
lesser included offenses of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter
and found defendant guilty of first degree murder, “there [was] no reasonable
probability that, had the jury been instructed on involuntary manslaughter,
it would have chosen that option”]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083,
1145 [“the fact that the jury rejected [voluntary] manslaughter and found
defendant guilty of the first degree murder . . . precludes any possible error in
the refusal to instruct on involuntary manslaughter”].)
C. Presentence Custody Credits
Josue and Rony contend they are entitled to an additional 32 days of
presentence custody credits. The People agree, and so do we.
The trial court awarded Josue and Rony each the 1,185 days of credit
recommended in the probation officer’s reports. That recommendation was
based on a sentencing hearing date of March 13, 2023. The hearing did not
20
occur until April 14, 2023, however. Rony and Josue are entitled to credit for
all days of custody from the date of arrest through the date of sentencing.
(§ 2900.5, subd. (a); People v. Dearborne (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 250, 267.) We
modify the judgments to award them each an additional 32 days of custody
credits, for a total of 1,217 days each. (§ 1260 [appellate court may modify
judgment]; People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 428 [modifying
judgment to award additional presentence credits].
D. Clerical Error in Josue’s Abstract of Judgment
Josue contends his abstract of judgment lists 2018 instead of 2019 as
the year the murder was committed and asks us to order the trial court to
correct the error. The People concede the error and agree we should order the
requested correction. We may order correction of a clerical error in an
abstract of judgment and shall do so here. (People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185; People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 858–859.)
21
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are modified to award each appellant an additional 32
days of presentence custody credits, for a total of 1,217 days each. As so
modified, the judgments are affirmed. On remand, the trial court shall
prepare amended abstracts of judgment that reflect the modifications. The
court shall also correct appellant Josue Daniel Castaneda’s abstract of
judgment to list the year of the commission of the murder as 2019. After
making the modifications and correction, the court shall send certified copies
of the amended abstracts of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
22
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