CourtListener 10364667•People v. Pech CA2/8
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Filed 3/26/25 P. v. Pech CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B335990
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA091369)
v.
ALEXANDER MANUEL PECH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Alexander Manuel Pech pled no contest to attempted
murder, and he admitted firearm and prior prison term
allegations. The trial court sentenced Pech to 28 years in prison,
including 20 years for the firearm enhancement and 1 year for
the prior prison term enhancement.
The court later resentenced Pech to 27 years in prison
under Penal Code1 section 1172.75, striking the one-year prior
prison term enhancement and reimposing the 20-year firearm
enhancement. At the resentencing hearing, the court stated that
it could only strike or reimpose, but not reduce, the firearm
enhancement. On appeal, Pech argues, and the People concede,
that the matter must be remanded because the court was
unaware of its discretion under People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado) to strike Pech’s firearm enhancement and
impose a lesser one. We agree with parties, vacate Pech’s
sentence, and remand the matter for a new resentencing hearing.
BACKGROUND
In May 2015, the People charged Pech with one count of
attempted premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187) and four counts of
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). As to the attempted
murder charge, the People alleged several firearm enhancements
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–(d)) and a great bodily injury
enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The People also alleged that
Pech committed the crimes for the benefit of a gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)) and that he served a prior prison term (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)).
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
In December 2016, Pech pled no contest to attempted
murder. Pech admitted that he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (c),
and that he served a prior prison term under section 667.5,
subdivision (b). The court struck the “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated” language from the attempted murder charge, and
it dismissed the four counts of assault with a firearm and all
remaining enhancement allegations. The court sentenced Pech to
28 years in prison, including the mid-term of 7 years for
attempted murder, plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), and one year for the prior
prison term enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In 2023, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation referred Pech’s case for resentencing under
section 1172.75. The court set a resentencing hearing and
appointed counsel to represent Pech.
Pech filed a resentencing brief. He explained his
rehabilitation efforts while in custody, including renouncing his
gang ties, expressing serious remorse for his criminal conduct,
and participating in several “prison-offered and self-help
‘programming’ and rehabilitative services, including NA, AA,
CGA, and SAP.” Pech was excelling at his job as a “Clerk
Custodian” and as a student in prison-offered courses.
Pech asked the court to strike his prior prison term
enhancement, strike or reduce his firearm enhancement, and
impose the low term of five years for his attempted murder
conviction. Pech argued that because he was successfully
rehabilitating, the court should dismiss his firearm enhancement
under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). Citing Tirado, Pech
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argued the court could, in the alternative, strike his firearm
enhancement and impose a lesser one.
The court held a resentencing hearing in November 2023.
The court praised Pech for his progress rehabilitating, stating
that it had not “seen something recently where someone has
taken such great opportunity to better themselves while they find
themselves in custody.” The court then dismissed the one-year
prior prison term enhancement and resentenced Pech to 27 years
in prison, consisting of the mid-term of 7 years for attempted
murder, plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (c).
The court explained why it did not dismiss the
section 12022.53, subdivision (c) firearm enhancement or impose
a lesser firearm enhancement: “The court recognizes its
authority to consider [Pech’s] post-sentencing conduct, his
attempts at rehabilitation, his sincerity and his remorse for his
actions. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [I]f the court exercised its discretion to
strike the 20-year enhancement, I do believe that it would be an
abuse of my discretion. This is a case where Mr. Pech . . .
appears to have been involved in some gang-related activity
where he shot at these people who were standing in a driveway
and shot the victim in the face. [¶] To impose a sentence of simply
seven years for this type of conduct would be an abuse of my
discretion. It would be unjust, and it would be outside of, in
essence, my authority to do so. It would be, as I stated, an abuse
of my discretion. [¶] I do find appropriate under the current
status of the law to strike the one-year enhancement. If there
was something less that the court could do, I might consider it.
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But in this case, it’s either a 20-year enhancement or nothing.
And to do so, as I stated, would be an abuse of my discretion.”
Pech appeals.
DISCUSSION
Section 12022.53 creates a tiered system of sentencing
enhancements for when a defendant uses a firearm while
committing certain felonies. (People v. McDavid (2024)
15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020 (McDavid).) “Section 12022.53(b)
mandates the imposition of a 10-year enhancement for personal
use of a firearm in the commission of one of those felonies; section
12022.53(c) mandates the imposition of a 20-year enhancement
for personal and intentional discharge of a firearm; and section
12022.53(d) provides for a 25-year-to-life enhancement for
personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great
bodily injury or death to a person other than an accomplice.”
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 694–695.)
In 2018, the Legislature amended section 12022.53,
subdivision (h), to give trial courts discretion to strike or dismiss,
in the interest of justice, “an enhancement otherwise required to
be imposed by this section.” (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2.) After
section 12022.53, subdivision (h) was amended, appellate courts
were split as to whether a trial court could strike a firearm
enhancement and impose a lesser firearm enhancement under
the statute. (See Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 696.)
The Supreme Court resolved this split in Tirado, where it
concluded that “the statutory framework permits a court to strike
the section 12022.53(d) enhancement found true by the jury and
to impose a lesser uncharged statutory enhancement instead.”
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 692.) Thus, “[w]hen an
accusatory pleading alleges and the jury finds true the facts
5
supporting a section 12022.53(d) enhancement, and the court
determines that the section 12022.53(d) enhancement should be
struck or dismissed under section 12022.53(h), the court may,
under section 12022.53(j), impose an enhancement under section
12022.53(b) or (c).” (Id., at p. 700.)
More recently, in McDavid, the Supreme Court held that
when dismissing a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (h), a trial court is not limited to reimposing a lesser
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53. (McDavid, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 1030.) Instead, the court has discretion to
impose “a lesser included, uncharged enhancement under a law
other than section 12022.53,” such as section 12022.5 or
section 12022, so long as that lesser enhancement is “supported
by facts that have been alleged and found true.” (Ibid.)
The parties agree, and so do we, that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion when it
found it could not strike Pech’s 20-year firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), and impose a lesser
firearm enhancement. As we just explained, a trial court has
discretion to strike a firearm enhancement imposed under
section 12022.53 and impose a lesser one under that statute or
another statute, such as section 12022.5 or section 12022, so long
as the lesser enhancement is supported by facts that have been
alleged and found true. (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 692,
700; McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1030.) That the court
misunderstood the scope of its discretion to strike Pech’s 20-year
firearm enhancement and impose a lesser one is itself an abuse of
discretion. (McDavid, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1023 [a court
abuses its discretion when it acts without understanding the full
scope of its discretion].)
6
The “appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing
unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would
have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that
it had such discretion.’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391.) At the November 2023 resentencing hearing, the
court praised Pech’s efforts at rehabilitation while in custody and
stated that if there was “something less” that it could do other
than simply striking Pech’s 20-year firearm enhancement, it
“might consider it.” The record, therefore, does not clearly
indicate that the court would have reached the same decision—
i.e., simply reimposing the 20-year firearm enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (c)—had it been aware of its
discretion to impose a lesser firearm enhancement.
We must vacate Pech’s sentence and remand the matter for
a new resentencing to allow the court to exercise its discretion to
determine whether to strike Pech’s 20-year firearm enhancement
under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), and impose a lesser
firearm enhancement. At the new resentencing hearing, the
court shall “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council
and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) We express no opinion on how the court should
exercise its discretion at that hearing.
7
DISPOSITION
Pech’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a
new resentencing hearing to be conducted in a manner consistent
with the views expressed in this opinion.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
WILEY, J.
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