CourtListener 10363577•People v. Faison CA4/1
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Filed 3/25/25 P. v. Faison CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082817
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD298529)
MARCUS RAY FAISON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marion F. Gaston, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy Sánchez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Laura Baggett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Marcus Ray Faison of driving under the influence,
possessing cocaine base, possessing paraphernalia, and driving the wrong
way on the highway. For these offenses, Faison was sentenced to four years
in state prison. He argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to
stay punishment for one of his possession convictions according to Penal
Code1 section 654. He also contends the court failed to completely advise
him of his rights before he admitted a prior strike allegation, and then
abused its discretion in declining to dismiss the strike in the interest of
justice. For reasons we explain, we reject these claims and affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
One afternoon in March 2023, a police officer on patrol near downtown
San Diego noticed Faison parked underneath a freeway overpass, fully
reclined in the driver’s seat. As the officer passed Faison in his patrol car,
he sat up quickly, made eye contact with the officer, and widened his eyes.
He then put his car into drive and sped away, tires squealing.
Finding this behavior unusual, the officer turned around and followed
Faison, who was driving above the speed limit. Faison made two right turns,
then a left turn around a blind curve. As he rounded the curve, he veered
into oncoming traffic and collided head-on with another vehicle.
When Faison abruptly exited his vehicle, the officer ordered him to
stop, handcuffed him, and began questioning him about his erratic driving.
He observed that Faison seemed agitated. His body was rigid, his speech
was rapid, and he yelled “ahh” a couple of times. The officer eventually
searched Faison’s person and vehicle, finding a “small white rock-like
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
substance”—what the officer suspected was “crack cocaine”—in his back
pocket and on the driver’s side floorboard. The officer also found “a clear
glass cylindrical pipe that had white residue that was burned at one end” in
the driver’s side door. Faison was taken to the hospital, where his blood was
drawn and later determined to contain a high level of cocaine. Subsequent
lab testing also confirmed that the “rock-like substance” was cocaine base.
The driver of the other vehicle survived the collision. He was taken to
the hospital as well, where he learned his sternum was fractured.
The prosecution charged Faison with one felony—driving under the
influence (DUI) of drugs causing bodily injury to another (Veh. Code, § 23153,
subd. (f); count 1)—and three misdemeanors—possession of cocaine base
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 2), possession of paraphernalia
used for narcotics (id., § 11364; count 3), and driving the wrong way on a
divided highway (Veh. Code, § 21651, subd. (b); count 4). As to the DUI
charge, the information pleaded that Faison personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). It was further alleged that he suffered a 1988
conviction for residential burglary that constituted a prior strike (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i); 1170.12) and a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The
prosecution asserted several aggravating sentencing factors as well (Cal.
Rules of Court,2 rule 4.421(b)(2)–(5)).
A jury convicted Faison on all four counts, but found not true the great
bodily injury allegation. In a bifurcated proceeding, Faison admitted the
prior strike and three aggravating sentencing factors—that he previously
served time in prison (rule 4.421(b)(3)), that he was on Post Release
Community Supervision (PRCS) when he committed the current offenses
(rule 4.421(b)(4)), and that his prior performance on PRCS was unsatisfactory
2 Further rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
3
(rule 4.421(b)(5)). The trial court dismissed the prior serious felony by
operation of law.3 It also dismissed the remaining aggravating sentencing
factor on the prosecutor’s motion.
The court sentenced Faison to four years in state prison for the DUI
(count 1). This was the midterm of two years doubled due to the prior strike.
With respect to the misdemeanor counts, the court imposed concurrent terms
of one year in county jail for possessing cocaine base (count 2), six months in
jail for possessing paraphernalia (count 3), and six months for driving the
wrong way on the highway (count 4).
DISCUSSION
A. Section 654
Faison claims the trial court should have stayed his sentence for
possessing cocaine base (count 2) or possessing paraphernalia (count 3) under
section 654. He argues these offenses were committed pursuant to a single
objective (to smoke cocaine) and thus double punishment is unlawful. As the
record contains substantial evidence of multiple objectives, we see no error.
“ ‘In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for,
more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct.’ ”
(People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 116.) Section 654 prohibits multiple
punishment for the same criminal act or omission. (Sloan, at p. 116.)
“Whether a defendant may be subjected to multiple punishment under
section 654 requires a two-step inquiry, because the statutory reference to an
3 Since the jury found the great bodily injury allegation not true, the
DUI is not a serious felony, which precludes application of the enhancement.
(See § 667, subd. (a)(1) [“A person convicted of a serious felony who previously
has been convicted of a serious felony . . . , shall receive, in addition to the
sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year
enhancement”].)
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‘act or omission’ may include not only a discrete physical act but also a course
of conduct encompassing several acts pursued with a single objective. We
first consider if the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’
If so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act. Only if
we conclude that the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of
conduct—do we then consider whether that course of conduct reflects a single
‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents and objectives.” (People v. Corpening
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311, citations omitted.) When a trial court expressly or
implicitly finds that the offenses involved more than one objective, that
factual determination must be sustained on appeal if it is supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730.)
Multiple punishment for possession of drugs and possession of
paraphernalia may be proper, depending on the facts of the case. For
instance, in People v. Pinon (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 956, the defendant pleaded
guilty to possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia.
(Id. at p. 961.) In support of the guilty plea, he admitted that he “ ‘willfully
and unlawfully possessed: (1) a usable quantity of methamphetamine, a
controlled substance and (2) a pipe used for smoking a controlled substance.’ ”
(Ibid.) Although the record was very sparse, the appellate court held the
defendant’s statement constituted substantial evidence to support the trial
court’s finding of multiple objectives. (Id. at p. 968.) As the appellate court
reasoned, the defendant “did not say he possessed the pipe for the sole
purpose of smoking the methamphetamine; rather, he possessed the pipe for
the more general purpose of smoking a controlled substance.” (Ibid.)
At trial in this case, Faison admitted he had been using cocaine for the
past eight years. Around the time of the crash, he had cut back to using
twice a day. He testified that he smoked cocaine two or three hours before
5
the crash, and a blood test confirmed he had cocaine in his system (in an
amount suggesting he had smoked closer in time to the crash). The pipe
that the officer found in Faison’s car had burnt white residue on one end,
indicating it had been used before. This evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that Faison possessed the pipe for the purpose of smoking
cocaine generally, not for the sole and specific purpose of smoking the pieces
of cocaine base found in his pocket and on the driver’s side floorboard. Thus,
section 654 is not violated.
B. Yurko Error
Faison further contends the court failed to give him all the necessary
advisements before accepting his admission to the prior strike. While the
court’s advisements were imperfect, any errors were harmless or waived.
Faison waived his right to a jury trial on the prior strike allegation
before jury selection began. Defense counsel advised the trial court that she
had talked to Faison about “his priors and the aggravating factors as listed in
the Amended Information.” In the event the jury returned guilty verdicts,
Faison “indicate[d] he would be willing to admit to his prior conviction, both
as a strike prior and serious felony prior,” as well as three of the aggravating
sentencing factors alleged. The court then addressed Faison:
“Mr. Faison, . . . you have the right to have the same jury
that is going to decide whether or not you’re guilty on the
other charges, you could have that same group of folks
decide whether or not you’re convicted of that prior. And of
whether or not the aggravating factors are true. [¶] What
your lawyer is telling me is you’re waiving that right and
agreeing not to have jury trial on those issues; is that
right?”
Faison confirmed that was correct.
6
After the jury returned guilty verdicts, defense counsel stated that she
had again conferred with Faison and he was “willing to admit to his strike
prior” as well as certain aggravating factors. The trial court and Faison then
engaged in the following colloquy, set forth in critical part:
“[The court:] So there is an allegation that you’ve suffered
what’s referred to as a ‘strike prior’ in 1988. It was August
26 in case CR96259, a residential burglary. [¶] When
there’s an allegation that you have a strike prior, you don’t
have to admit it. You have the right to a trial. [¶] So do
you understand that?
“[Faison:] Yes.
“[The court:] All right. And so do you admit or deny that
you have that strike prior?
“[Faison:] I admit.
“[The court:] All right. It’s also alleged that there’s certain
aggravating factors that existed in this case. . . . [¶] And
just like with the strike prior, when an allegation like that
is made, you don’t have to admit it. You do have the right
to a full trial on that issue with the right to a lawyer, the
right to present evidence, the right to question the evidence
against you, the right to remain silent. And so if you
admit, then you won’t have a trial.”
Faison then admitted three aggravating sentencing factors, described
above. The court found his admissions were knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. At sentencing, the court declined to dismiss the prior strike in the
interest of justice and doubled his sentence pursuant to the Three Strikes
law. Faison did not raise any issue as to the validity of his prior strike
admission on the record at the sentencing hearing.
In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 (Yurko), the Supreme Court held
that “before a court accepts an accused’s admission that he has suffered prior
felony convictions,” the reasoning of Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238
7
and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 require that the accused be given “express
and specific admonitions as to the constitutional rights waived by an
admission” in the same manner as in the case of an accused’s guilty plea.
(Yurko, at p. 863.) In particular, “the trial court must advise the defendant
and obtain waivers of (1) the right to a trial to determine the fact of the prior
conviction, (2) the right to remain silent, and (3) the right to confront adverse
witnesses.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 356 (Mosby), citing
Yurko, at p. 863.) “Proper advisement and waivers of these rights in the
record establish a defendant’s voluntary and intelligent admission of the
prior conviction.” (Mosby, at p. 356.) The lack of express advisement and
waiver of all three rights, however, does not require automatic reversal. (Id.
at p. 360.) Rather, the error is harmless and the factual determination on a
prior conviction allegation must be upheld if, upon examining the whole
record, we conclude the “admission of the prior conviction was intelligent and
voluntary in light of the totality of circumstances.” (Id. at p. 361.)
As “a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure,” Yurko further
requires the trial court to advise the accused of the direct penal consequences
of admitting a prior conviction allegation—including “the precise increase in
the term or terms which might be imposed”—before accepting the accused’s
admission. (Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 864.) Because advisement as to the
consequences of an admission is not constitutionally mandated, however, the
error can be waived absent a timely objection before or at sentencing. (People
v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023 (Walker).) For the same reason, the
court’s failure to give such an advisement is reversible only if the accused can
demonstrate it is reasonably probable they would not have entered the
admission had they been told about the consequence at issue. (Ibid.)
8
Implicitly acknowledging that he properly waived his right to a jury
trial on the prior strike allegation, Faison specifically argues the court failed
to advise him of his rights to remain silent and confront adverse witnesses.
To be sure, the court did not advise him of those rights before he admitted the
strike prior. Immediately afterward, however, while taking his admission to
the aggravating factors, it clarified: “And just like with the strike prior, when
an allegation like that is made, you don’t have to admit it. You do have the
right to a full trial on that issue with the right to a lawyer, the right to
present evidence, the right to question the evidence against you, the right to
remain silent. And so if you admit, then you won’t have a trial.” (Italics
added.) This prompted no objection from Faison or any expression of
confusion.
Beyond this colloquy, several other circumstances convince us that
Faison knowingly and voluntarily admitted the prior strike. At the end of the
preliminary hearing, when Faison was being arraigned on the Information,
his counsel confirmed that he was “advised of his constitutional rights and
maximum penalties” and wished to deny all charges and allegations. Counsel
represented that she discussed the prior strike allegation with Faison on at
least two additional occasions before he admitted its truth.
Moreover, at the time he admitted the strike, he had already completed
the jury trial, where his counsel cross-examined the witnesses against him.
In waiving his right to a jury trial on the strike allegation, we can infer he
understood he was waiving his concomitant right to confront witnesses. (See
Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 364 [Since defendant “had just undergone a
jury trial” where “he had, through counsel, confronted witnesses . . . , he
would have understood that at a trial he had the right of confrontation”].)
9
The record also reflects that Faison is experienced with prior strike
allegations. Indeed, the probation report shows that since his 1988
residential burglary conviction, the prosecution alleged he suffered one or
two prior strikes in five separate cases (not including this one). He admitted
the strike allegations in at least two of those previous cases. (See Mosby,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 365 [a defendant’s prior experience with the criminal
justice system is relevant to the question of whether they knowingly waived
constitutional rights].) Under the totality of these circumstances, we can
comfortably conclude that Faison admitted the prior strike in this case with
knowledge of his rights to remain silent and cross-examine witnesses.
To the extent Faison argues the trial court also failed to advise him of
the consequences of admitting the strike—namely, that he would be subject
to double punishment—any error was waived because he failed to raise the
issue before or during sentencing, where the strike was explicitly discussed
by the court and counsel. (See Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1023.) In any
event, given that counsel informed Faison of his maximum exposure at the
preliminary hearing, coupled with his experience with prior strikes, he likely
understood that admitting the strike could subject him to increased
punishment. We therefore doubt he would have refused to admit the strike
had the court expressly reminded him of the consequences.
C. Romero Motion
Faison lastly argues the trial court erred in declining to strike his prior
strike in the interest of justice according to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. We discern no abuse of the court’s discretion.
Before sentencing, defense counsel filed a Romero motion inviting the
trial court to exercise its discretion to dismiss Faison’s prior strike. Counsel
set forth several reasons why dismissing the strike would further the interest
10
of justice, including Faison’s age (61 years); the remoteness of the prior strike
conviction (1988); the generally nonviolent nature of his criminal record; his
sincere remorse over hurting the other driver in this case; and the fact that
most of his offenses, including the current offenses, stem from his struggle
with addiction, which lessens his culpability.
At the sentencing hearing, Faison personally addressed the court and
reiterated his apologies to the victim. He admitted he had struggled with
drugs for several years and needed treatment. He had strong family support
and wanted to continue working in the community.
In opposition, the prosecutor emphasized Faison’s recidivism. She
pointed out that he suffered well over a dozen convictions since 1980. He
was sentenced to prison at least 10 separate times. When he was granted
probation or released from prison on parole or PRCS, he often violated the
terms of supervision. Indeed, when he committed the offenses in this case,
he was on PRCS.
The trial court appreciated that the age of the strike weighed heavily
in favor of dismissal. On the other hand, it recognized that Faison had been
“sentenced to prison ten times since then” and essentially engaged in “an
uninterrupted course of criminal behavior while out in the community.” The
court also highlighted the seriousness of the current offenses. On balance,
it found striking the strike would not be in the interest of justice.
We review the denial of a Romero motion for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).) Abuse is found
where the decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) This occurs, for example, where the trial
court was not aware of its discretion to strike a prior conviction or considered
improper factors. (Id. at p. 378.) In determining whether to strike a prior
11
strike allegation “in furtherance of justice” (§ 1385, subd. (a)), a court must
“ ‘consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present
felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the
particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may
be deemed outside the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part,
and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
We cannot say this is an “extraordinary case” where the evidence
“manifestly support[s] the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable
minds could differ.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) In denying the
Romero motion, the trial court considered appropriate factors, including
Faison’s criminal history and the nature of the current offenses. It did not
see how Faison fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law given his
failure to remain law abiding despite multiple prison terms and opportunities
at community supervision. (Cf. People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
354, 366 [ten felony convictions resulting in four separate prison terms and
multiple parole violations over 17 year period brought defendant “squarely
within the Three Strikes ambit”].) While his past offenses are generally
nonviolent—mostly theft and drug related offenses—the current DUI offense
was not relatively benign. He got behind the wheel while under the influence
of a serious narcotic, crashed, and hurt someone. The outcome could have
easily been much worse. On this record, we see no abuse of discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
CASTILLO, J.
13
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