CourtListener 10362624•People v. Kleinschmidt CA3
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Filed 3/24/25 P. v. Kleinschmidt CA3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098141
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21FE009928)
v.
CHARLES TRENT KLEINSCHMIDT,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Charles Trent Kleinschmidt of two counts of attempted
carjacking, one count of attempted vehicle taking, one count of resisting a police officer,
two counts of witness dissuasion, and two counts of violating a court order. After finding
that defendant had two serious felony convictions qualifying as strikes, the trial court
sentenced him to 4 consecutive sentences of 25 years to life plus a consecutive term of
42 years consisting of 40 years of enhancements. The court also denied any presentence
conduct credits and imposed a court operations assessment equal to 13 times the per-
count amount.
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Defendant contends there is prejudicial error in the following: (1) the jury
instructions; (2) the fact he was handcuffed while the instructions were read; (3) the
closing arguments; (4) the imposition of 40 years in sentencing enhancements; (5) the
presentence conduct credit denial; and (6) the amount of the court operations assessment.
He also challenges his trial counsel’s performance, claiming (1) counsel violated his
Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance and to maintain innocence and (2) the trial
court failed to conduct a hearing to replace counsel before sentencing.
We find merit in the following arguments that relate to the 40 years of
enhancements, the presentence conduct credit denial, and the amount of the court
operations assessment. We remand for a hearing on the enhancements and the conduct
credits, modify the judgment to reduce the assessment, and otherwise affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I
The Incidents
On June 10, 2021, victim I. was waiting outside a boxing gym in her parked car
with her daughter when defendant jumped on the hood and started pounding on the
windshield. To victim I., it seemed like defendant was fighting someone, but she did not
see anyone around. Defendant then entered the car through the passenger side and told
victim I. that “someone was following him and that he needed to get out of there.” He
was agitated, saying “many things that did not make sense,” and “clearly saying that
someone wanted to kill him.” Victim I.’s daughter was panicking, so victim I.
“screamed” at her to get out and ask for help. Victim I. tried to push defendant out of the
car, but he wouldn’t move. Victim I. then quickly got out of the car, and defendant
locked himself inside.
A coach from the gym arrived and told defendant he needed to get out. Defendant
refused to leave, insisting someone was after him and wanting the coach to drive him
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somewhere. The coach refused, took the keys out of the ignition, and told defendant to
go ahead and stay put so the cops could handle it. After 5 to 10 minutes, defendant got
out and started walking toward the gym. The coach grabbed and tossed him to keep him
from entering. Defendant stated he would get in even if he needed to break through
windows. After the coach verbally resisted defendant’s threat, defendant started crossing
the street, almost getting hit by multiple cars. The coach described defendant as behaving
irrationally and appearing to be under the influence of drugs.
Victim S. was driving on the road in front of the boxing gym with her pit bull in
the front seat when defendant jumped in front of her car, slid across to the passenger side,
and grabbed the cracked-open passenger window. After the window dropped down,
defendant tried to throw the dog out and unlock the car door. Victim S. continued to
drive the car for three to four blocks. Defendant told her to “get the fuck out of the car”
about five times. He appeared to be disoriented, and victim S. speculated that he could
be under the influence of something. Victim S. applied the brakes to get him to let go,
but he hung on. She kept going, and he finally let go. Victim S. then watched him climb
on top of another occupied car.
Defendant then went to a nearby parking lot, got into an unoccupied car, and
started ripping things out. The owner approached defendant and dragged him out of the
car. Defendant then jumped through the window of a parked truck, valued at over $950,
and tried to take it too, reaching toward the steering column. A crowd of people pulled
him away and started beating him up.
Officers arrived and detained defendant in handcuffs. Defendant was “very
uncooperative” during the booking process, refusing to sit or move as instructed. At one
point, an officer put his hand on defendant’s chest to get him to sit down, and defendant
“pushed into [the officer].” The officer then put defendant in “max restraints,” and
defendant resisted. Based on his experience, the officer “believed [defendant] was under
the influence of something.” Also, defendant had told the officer that “he had smoked a
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lot of meth.” Another officer described defendant as “under the influence of
methamphetamine.” But neither officer was a drug recognition expert, defendant was not
subject to field sobriety tests, and no blood was taken from him to test for
methamphetamine.
On September 1, 2021, defendant was served with a criminal protective order
prohibiting him from contacting victim I. and victim S (victims). Just over one week
later, victims received a text message from defendant through the fiancée of defendant’s
cellmate. The message asked victims to (1) understand that defendant was “harmless
scared and needing help” and “was not trying to hurt people or steal” and (2) “help fix the
situation by explaining the truth and being fully honest.” The text included the name and
phone number of defendant’s former defense attorney.
Defendant was charged with eight counts: two counts of attempted carjacking
(§§ 215; 664); one count of attempted unlawful taking of a vehicle (§ 664; Veh. Code,
§ 10851); one count of resisting a police officer (§ 148, subd. (a)); two counts of felony
attempting to dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2)); and two counts of misdemeanor
violations of court orders (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). The prosecution also alleged defendant
had two convictions that qualified as strikes and serious felonies.
II
Jury Instructions
The court instructed the jury with a single instruction on attempt that addressed
both attempted carjacking and attempted vehicle theft. It explained that attempted
carjacking or attempted vehicle theft required the following elements: (1) defendant
“took a direct but independent step towards committing carjacking and/or vehicle theft”
and (2) defendant “intended to commit carjacking and/or vehicle theft.” The
corresponding written instruction included the identical elements and specified
parenthetically which elements applied to which counts. The court read the elements of
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the target offenses and directed the jury to read the attempt and corresponding target
offense instructions together.
As to carjacking, the court set forth the elements and explained that a person
“takes something when he or she gains possession of it and moves it some distance.” It
proceeded to provide the following instructions regarding “possession”: (1) “two or more
people may possess something at the same time,” (2) a person “does not have to actually
hold or touch something to possess it,” and (3) it is “enough for the person to have
control over it or the right to control it either personally or through another person.” And
the court defined “fear” for purposes of carjacking as “the fear of injury to the person,
himself, or injury to the person’s family or property or immediate injury to someone else
present during the incident or to that person’s personal property.”
At defense counsel’s request, the court gave a simple assault instruction as a lesser
included offense of carjacking. It explained that among other elements, assault required
proof that “defendant did an act [that] by its nature would directly and probably result in
the application of force to a person.” It defined the term “application of force” to mean
“to touch in a harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be enough if it is
done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with another person including through his
or her clothing is enough. The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any
kind.”
The court then presented instructions on the attempted unlawful vehicle taking
charged followed by instructions on the witness dissuasion charges, the resisting a peace
officer charge, and the court order violation charges.
III
Closing Arguments
The parties agreed that the case came down to defendant’s intent. Anticipating
defendant would argue he “was not intending to steal vehicles, ” the prosecutor urged the
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jury to look at the surrounding circumstances, glean defendant’s intent to leave the area
and his need for a car, and conclude that he intended to commandeer or take a car.
The prosecutor specifically addressed the attempt counts, explaining (1) the
elements for attempted carjacking as “the defendant took a direct but ineffective step
towards committing a carjacking, and the defendant intended to commit a carjacking.”
and (2) the elements for attempted vehicle theft as “the defendant took a direct but
ineffective step towards committing a vehicle theft, and the defendant intended to commit
a vehicle theft.”
Turning to the elements of carjacking, the prosecutor focused on whether
defendant had the intent to take a vehicle from the immediate presence of a person. She
argued that “taking” an item includes controlling or having the right to control the item
either personally or through another person. She gave the example of sitting in your car
when a person jumps in and “says drive, drive, drive, and you panic, so you start
driving.” In that example, she argued that a “person is now controlling the car through
you. They’re now in possession of your car through you.” She argued this is what
defendant was trying to do with victim I., urging the jury to reject the view that he was
merely looking for help. The prosecutor then addressed victim S. and argued it was very
clear defendant was also trying to take her car using force and fear, pointing to
defendant’s effort to get into the car, unlock the door, and pull the dog out, and his order
to victim S. to “get the ‘F’ out.”
Turning to the attempted unlawful vehicle taking charge, the prosecutor argued the
issue was whether defendant intended to temporarily or permanently take the truck
without the owner’s consent. Based on defendant’s movements toward the steering
column of the truck and his overall goal for the day of taking a car, the prosecutor argued
the evidence showed defendant had the requisite intent.
As to all the attempt charges, the prosecutor forecasted that defendant would argue
he was “simply . . . under the influence of something.” She continued that the evidence
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supporting that argument amounted to no more than speculation, and whether defendant
was under the influence ultimately did not matter because the issue was whether he had
the intention to commit the crimes using the required specific intent.
Defense counsel admitted he would not argue certain offenses, such as resisting a
police officer and disobeying a court order. But as to the “more serious offenses which
require [the] intent to do evil,” counsel argued defendant’s behavior belied that intent.
Specifically, he asked the jury to find defendant not guilty of carjacking, not guilty of
dissuading a witness, and not guilty of trying to steal a car.
As to the vehicle counts, defense counsel countered the prosecution’s view that the
only interpretation of the evidence was that defendant “was trying to steal [a] car,”
pointing to defendant’s apparent paranoia, his effort to find safety in different places, and
witness descriptions of him as irrational, delusional, or under the influence.
As to carjacking, defense counsel agreed that defendant entered a car and that such
entry would scare a reasonable person “because there [was] a present ability to use
force.” But he urged the jury to consider the lesser included offense of assault because
that offense did not require specific intent, so drug use was irrelevant. While noting he
did not recommend that the jury find defendant guilty of assault, he stated, “it’s
reasonable” and described the fear victims had as an assault. It was not reasonable
though, counsel argued, for the jury to infer that the only conclusion from the evidence
was that defendant intended to steal a car, again pointing to the other interpretation that
defendant was delusional, paranoid, on drugs, and trying to find safety. And he rejected
the prosecution’s view that defendant attempted to commandeer victims’ cars, arguing
that defendant didn’t try to grab the keys and didn’t tell victims to go somewhere.
Turning to the vehicle taking charge, defense counsel argued the jury’s choice was
to decide whether defendant was trying to hide or trying to steal the truck. Suggesting
that the stealing view was unreasonable, he pointed to the fact that defendant had no keys
and never tried to drive, but just sat there until he got pulled out.
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Finally, as to the witness dissuasion charges, defense counsel argued that
dissuading occurs “when you try to stop someone from testifying” or when you threaten
them if they testify. Here though, according to counsel, defendant apologized and asked
victims to tell the truth, which “is the opposite of dissuading.”
In rebuttal, the prosecutor pointed to the lack of concrete evidence that defendant
was delusional or paranoid. She admitted she “never once said [defendant] was not under
the influence of something,” and argued her point was that “we don’t know what he was
under the influence of, if anything.” She argued that a person “can be under the influence
of something and still have the ability to have intentions.” As to witness dissuasion, she
asked the jury to read between the lines of the text messages sent to victims and look at
the surrounding evidence, arguing that the messages were sent to people who were
already terrified of defendant and that defendant was trying to show them he could get to
them even from jail.
IV
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of all counts. In a separate bench trial, the court
found the allegations true that defendant had been convicted of sexual penetration with a
foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)) in 2006 and forcible oral copulation.
Because those prior convictions qualified as strikes under the “Three Strikes” law,
the probation department recommended 25 years to life for each carjacking and witness
dissuasion conviction, the middle term of 1 year doubled for the vehicle taking
conviction, no time for the resisting conviction, and stayed time for the court order
violations. (§ 667, subds. (e)(2)(A)(ii) & (e)(1).) And because the prior convictions were
also violent felonies, the department recommended an additional 50 years consisting of
10 years for each carjacking, witness dissuasion, and vehicle taking conviction. (§ 667,
subd. (a).) It also listed five aggravating circumstances, three mitigating circumstances,
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and defendant’s seven other prior felony convictions and nine prior misdemeanor
convictions between 1996 and 2020.
At the sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged its discretion to strike the prior
offenses and expressed its election not to do so in the interest of public safety. In the
court’s view, defendant had “a long record of violent behavior and it [was] in the interest
of public safety that he be incarcerated to protect the public. No amount of supervision
[was] likely to deter his violent behavior in the future.”
The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 42 years plus a consecutive
indeterminate term of 100 years to life consisting of the following: (1) 25 years to life for
each of the attempted carjacking and attempted dissuasion counts, (2) 10 years for each
of those counts due to the prior serious felony convictions, (3) 2 years for the attempted
vehicle taking, and (4) 2 years (stayed under section 654) in county jail for the court
order violations. At the time of the sentencing hearing, defendant was 44 years old.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Jury Instructions
Defendant asserts five challenges to the jury instructions. He challenges: (A) the
consolidated specific intent instruction for attempt; (B) the simple assault instruction;
(C) the carjacking instruction; (D) the witness dissuasion instruction; and (E) the absence
of certain instructions specific to his defense. As we will explain, we find no merit to
these challenges.
A. Consolidated Specific Intent Instruction for Attempt
Defendant contends the trial court erred by consolidating the specific intent
instructions for attempted carjacking and attempted vehicle theft in a manner that was
reasonably likely to mislead the jury. In his view, a lay juror could reasonably conclude
9
that the specific intent element for carjacking could be proven by the specific intent to
commit vehicle theft coupled with a completed assault. We disagree.
The written instruction on attempt, which controls over the oral instruction,
properly correlated the elements to each count, specifying that defendant was charged in
“Counts 1 and 2 with attempted carjacking” and in “Count 3 with attempted vehicle
theft” and that guilt of those crimes required proof that defendant “took a direct but
ineffective step toward committing carjacking (Counts 1 and 2) and/or vehicle theft
(Count 3)” and “intended to commit carjacking (Counts 1 and 2) and/or vehicle theft
(Count 3).” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803 [written instructions control].)
The identification of the counts as to each element eliminated the potential for the jury to
improperly combine the elements. (See People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th
1101, 1113.) Furthermore, the prosecutor echoed the same correlation (People v. Young
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202 [must consider closing argument]), and defendant provides
no evidence of jury confusion. On this record, we presume the jurors were able to make
the required correlations. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662.)
B. Simple Assault Instruction
Defendant contends the trial court erred by granting defense counsel’s request to
provide an instruction on simple assault as a lesser included offense of attempted
carjacking. This contention fails under the invited error doctrine.
“[W]hen a lesser included offense instruction is requested by the defense, the
invited error doctrine precludes objection to that instruction on appeal.” (People v.
Barnard (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 400, 409.) In cases involving an action affirmatively
taken by defense counsel, courts have found “a clearly implied tactical purpose to be
sufficient to invoke the invited error rule.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004)
34 Cal.4th 1, 49.) Here, “the inescapable inference from the fact of defendant’s request
for an instruction on [simple assault] is that . . . counsel’s tactical purpose was to place
before the jury the option to convict on a less serious charge.” (Barnard, at p. 410.)
10
Because any error in giving the instruction was invited, defendant’s contention is
forfeited.
Also, contrary to defendant’s position, we disagree that counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance by making this request. To establish a claim of
ineffective assistance, a defendant must prove that his lawyer’s performance was
deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003 (Cunningham).) Defendant fails to make that
showing. Counsel made a tactical decision to try to avoid a third strike conviction for
defendant by putting forth simple assault as a lesser included offense to attempted
carjacking. Given the weight of incriminating evidence in the record, we cannot say this
decision was incompetent. (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1166.)
C. Carjacking Instruction
Defendant contends the trial court should have defined the term “force” for
purposes of carjacking for two reasons: (1) the instructions specified the meaning of
“application of force” for purposes of simple assault, making it likely the jury would
apply that meaning to carjacking; and (2) defense counsel conceded during closing
argument that victims had reason to be fearful for purposes of simple assault, leading to
the inference that the force component of carjacking was satisfied. (People v. Wright
(1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 203, 211.) Counsel never requested a clarifying instruction to this
effect at trial, so this contention is forfeited. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1149,
1202.)
Defense counsel’s failure to make that request does not amount to ineffective
assistance. As stated above, counsel made the reasonable tactical decision to present
simple assault as an alternative to attempted carjacking. His closing argument that
victims were afraid defendant was “physically going to do something to them” when he
entered or tried to enter their cars was consistent with that strategy. Counsel’s rational
tactical purpose defeats defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (People v.
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Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711.) We also discern no prejudice from the lack of
clarification, or request for clarification, of the term “force” for purposes of carjacking.
(Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1003 [ineffective assistance claim requires showing
of deficient performance and prejudice].) Carjacking can be accomplished through fear
or force (In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 373; see e.g., People v. Magallanes
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 529, 534), and counsel conceded, in accordance with his
reasonable strategy, that defendant’s action placed victims in fear. There is no reasonable
probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion had it received an
instruction specifying the concept of force for purposes of carjacking.
D. Witness Dissuasion Instruction
Defendant contends the trial court was required to instruct the jury on
misdemeanor violations of witness dissuasion as lesser included offenses of the charged
felony violations. We disagree that such an instruction was required.
In support of this contention, defendant relies on the following sentence from
People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682: “[o]ur case law has consistently treated the
misdemeanor as a lesser offense than the felony wobbler.” (Id. at p. 689.) Defendant
improperly takes this sentence out of context. In Statum, our Supreme Court considered
whether a trial court’s reduction of a wobbler to a misdemeanor at sentencing constituted
an appealable order. (Id. at p. 685.) The Court did not suggest that the jury should decide
whether a wobbler offense, like the offense at issue here (People v. McElroy (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 874, 880), should be a misdemeanor or a felony. In fact, such an offense
“is deemed a felony unless charged as a misdemeanor by the People or reduced to a
misdemeanor by the sentencing court under . . . section 17, subdivision (b).” (Statum, at
p. 685; see People v. Morse (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 620, 647 [rejecting lesser included
argument as to wobbler offense].) The potential misdemeanor classification of a wobbler
is not a separate lesser included offense of the felony classification.
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Nor do we find merit in defendant’s argument in reply that a sentencing court’s
discretion to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor constitutes factfinding that must be
reserved for a jury. In support, defendant relies on People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th
730, at page 742, for the principle that “any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater
potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge.” This principle is inapposite.
The prosecution charged and prosecuted the witness dissuasion offense as a felony,
thereby exposing defendant to the felony sentence. The court’s discretion under section
17 to decrease that offense to a misdemeanor did not give the court the ability to impose a
greater sentence and did not trigger any required jury findings.
E. Instructions Specific to Defendant’s Defense
Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to
instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and mistake of fact. We conclude any error
was harmless.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the intent required for the charged
offenses, and nothing in those instructions precluded the jury from considering voluntary
intoxication or mistake of fact. (See People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 571-572.)
Indeed, the jury was asked to decide those very issues. During closing argument, defense
counsel urged the jury to find reasonable doubt of defendant’s intent based on the
evidence that defendant was under the influence and operating under the mistaken belief
that he was in danger. The prosecutor anticipated that issue and argued defendant had the
requisite intent even if he was delusional or under the influence. The verdicts show that
the jury rejected defendant’s version of the events. Given these circumstances, there is
no reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome
had the jury received a voluntary intoxication or mistake of fact instruction. (Id. at
p. 572.)
Defendant contends the trial court also prejudicially erred by failing to give
instructions on duress or necessity. We find no merit to this contention.
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Instruction on a defense is required only where there is substantial evidence to
support each element of the defense. (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146,
1165 [necessity]; People v. Steele (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 703, 707 [duress].) Here, there
was no evidence to support at least two elements of the necessity defense, specifically
that (1) defendant had an objectively reasonable belief that his actions were necessary to
prevent a significant and imminent evil and (2) there was no reasonable legal alternative
to defendant’s actions. (People v. Kearns (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135.) As to the
duress defense, there was no evidence that defendant acted under a threat or menace
accompanied by a direct or implied demand to commit the crime charged. (People v.
Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 567 [no facts showing an express or implied
demand].) For these reasons, the trial court’s failure to give necessity or duress
instructions was not error, and defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by
failing to request those instructions. (Id. at p. 572.)
II
Defendant’s Handcuffing During Jury Instructions
A. Additional Background
After over two days of trial, both parties rested. The following Monday morning,
the court discussed jury instructions and closing arguments with the parties outside the
jury’s presence. The court then welcomed the jury and proceeded to read the instructions.
After the jury was excused for a 10-minute break, defense counsel stated he “saw a juror
staring” at defendant, so he “looked over and realized” defendant was still handcuffed
“all through this.” The bailiff admitted the handcuffs were an oversight and removed
them. Defendant contends this incident violated his right to be free from physical
restraints in the jury’s presence and necessitates reversal of five of his eight convictions.
We disagree.
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B. Analysis
Under California law, “a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of
any kind in the courtroom while in the jury’s presence, unless there is a showing of a
manifest need.” (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–291; see also Deck v.
Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 624 [federal law].) That said, unjustified restraints are
harmless (1) where there is no evidence they were seen by the jury (People v. Tuilaepa
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583-584) or (2) when there is nothing in the record suggesting that
the restraints impacted the defendant’s participation, demeanor, or mental faculties.
(People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1271; People v. Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266,
291.) And “[b]rief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have not been deemed
prejudicial.” (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 988.)
Here, defendant relies on defense counsel’s remark that he noticed a juror staring
at defendant. But this remark does not establish that the handcuffs were generally visible
to either the staring juror or other members of the jury. “[W]e will not assume this
occurred in the absence of affirmative evidence.” (People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186,
206; see also People v. Chubbuck (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 [“ ‘any uncertainty in the
record must be resolved against the defendant’ ”].) Unlike People v. Miller (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 1109, on which defendant relies, the court did not instruct the jury to
disregard the handcuffs, so we have no reason to infer that they were visible. (Id. at
p. 1115.) And even if one or more jurors did view the handcuffs, that view was brief in
the context of the entire trial. It occurred after the conclusion of evidence and had no
bearing on defendant’s choice not to testify, and there is no evidence the handcuffs
impaired defendant’s mental faculties or demeanor. We conclude any error regarding the
handcuffs was harmless.
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III
Closing Arguments
Defendant contends defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance during closing
arguments in two ways: (1) by failing to object to, and eventually adopting, the
prosecutor’s “inaccurate framing” of the intent elements for attempted carjacking and
attempted vehicle taking, and (2) by conceding that defendant committed simple assault.
We address each contention in turn.
A. Intent to Commit Carjacking and Vehicle Taking
Defendant takes issue with the prosecutor’s focus on whether defendant had the
“intent to steal.” He contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance by adopting that
“mis-framing” of the required intent. We do not discern reversible error.
Defendant contends that the “intent to steal” is not the same as the “intent to
permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of possession,” but he does not explain
how that difference had any prejudicial effect on this case. (People v. Fernandez (2013)
216 Cal.App.4th 540, 564 [defendant must show he suffered prejudice].) “Intent to steal”
is the intent to permanently take property from the owner (People v. Riel (2000)
22 Cal.4th 1153, 1205), while the intent to take property in a carjacking or a vehicle
taking can be permanent or temporary. (§§ 215, 10851.) To the extent the parties’
remarks in closing arguments suggested defendant needed to have the intent to
permanently take a car such that the intent to temporarily take a car was insufficient,
those remarks imposed a higher standard on the prosecution, not a lesser one as defendant
suggests. (People v. Garcia (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 211, 228-229 [error harmless where it
favors the defendant].) Moreover, the court’s instructions made the required intent clear,
and we presume the jury followed those instructions over any contrary closing arguments
by the parties. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 717 (Osband).)
Defendant also contends the prosecutor’s closing argument on carjacking left the
jury with four inaccurate understandings of the carjacking and vehicle taking elements.
16
First, defendant appears to contend that the prosecutor proffered a “burden-
reducing argument” by suggesting that the intent to possess a car at the same time as the
owner is the same as the intent to deprive the owner of possession. Defendant
misrepresents the prosecutor’s argument. Courts have made clear that a victim can be
deprived of possession of a car for purposes of carjacking not only when the perpetrator
physically forces the victim out of the car, but also when the victim remains in the car
and the defendant exercises dominion and control over the car by force or fear. (People
v. Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973, 985; see, e.g., People v. Duran (2001)
88 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377.) Consistent with those courts and the jury instruction on
carjacking, the prosecutor stated that “[a] person takes something when or she gains
possession,” that “[t]wo or more people may possess something at the same time,” and
that a person can possess something by having control over it either personally or through
another person. (CALCRIM No. 1650.) We see no error in this argument.
Second, defendant contends the prosecutor’s arguments regarding co-possession
suggested that the concept applied to vehicle taking. This contention is not supported by
the record. The prosecutor’s arguments were specifically made in the context of the
attempted carjacking charges. The prosecutor separately addressed the attempted vehicle
taking charge and made no suggestion that co-possession was possible. And again, the
instructions were accurate, and we presume the jury followed them. (Osband, supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 717.)
Third, defendant contends the prosecutor’s arguments regarding dominion and
control were improper because those arguments apply to the actus reus of completed
carjacking, not the mens rea of that crime. We disagree. Attempted carjacking requires
the specific intent to deprive the person of possession of the car, and that intent includes
the intent to exercise dominion and control over the car. (People v. Marquez (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1068; People v. Gray, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.) This
specific intent is not limited to the completed act.
17
And fourth, defendant contends the prosecutor’s focus on whether defendant had
the intent to commandeer or take a car for purposes of attempted carjacking improperly
suggested that he did not need to intend to do so by way of force or fear. The court
accurately instructed the jury on the carjacking elements, including the requirement that
defendant’s attempt to take a vehicle must have been performed at the time or during the
time he used force or fear. Nothing in the prosecutor’s argument suggested force or fear
were not required, and we presume the jury followed the court’s instructions. (Osband,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 717.)
B. Assault Concessions
Defendant contends defense counsel’s concessions during closing argument
regarding simple assault constituted ineffective assistance. We already rejected his
related claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by requesting an assault
instruction. We similarly reject the claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective by
suggesting assault as a reasonable conclusion for the jury to reach. Given the largely
undisputed evidence as to defendant’s conduct with respect to victims and the serious
consequences facing defendant for a third strike conviction, defendant cannot show that
counsel’s decision was outside the range of reasonableness. (See, e.g., People v.
Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 498 [“Recognizing the importance of maintaining
credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was
ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt”].)
IV
Marsden, McCoy, and Sentencing Error
A. Additional Background
A few months before trial, defendant requested a hearing under People v. Marsden
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 orally and in writing, asserting that the case was falsified and
defense counsel was not communicating with him or doing anything to defend him. After
a hearing, the court denied the motion.
18
At the sentencing hearing held six months later, the trial court began by noting that
defendant had “written numerous letters and jail messages to the [c]ourt” (court letters),
which the court declined to read due the prohibition on ex parte communication. In the
court letters, which were dated between November 2022 and February 2023, defendant
denied guilt, claimed he was the one being assaulted on June 10 while having an
emergency, and claimed everyone involved in the case was lying, falsifying facts, and
concealing evidence. He also claimed he did not receive a fair trial and described counsel
as “pure slime.” In one of those letters, dated December 15, 2022, he asserted that
counsel “did not do anything [he] told him to do.”
The prosecutor argued that a number of the court letters showed that defendant
“refuse[d] to take accountability for his actions.” Interrupting the prosecutor, defendant
asserted this was a “falsified case,” referred to the “50-page Marsden motion” he filed on
defense counsel “to get rid of him before trial,” and accused counsel of being involved in
“concealing the evidence.” The prosecutor then referred to a court letter in which
defendant stated he “want[ed] to slap [counsel] right in his face.” Defendant interjected
again, stating, “He’s concealing all the evidence that I’m innocent.” Counsel
acknowledged defendant’s frustration and undesirable behavior and argued the evidence
showed he was suffering from drug addiction. Defendant interjected, “No, it indicates
that these are liars.” Counsel resumed his argument, emphasizing the lack of physical
violence in the case and defendant’s willingness to take a determinate sentence before
trial.
The court then allowed defendant to speak, at which point defendant asserted the
following three claims: (1) on June 10, 2021, he was suffering from a medical
emergency involving his leg, (2) the witnesses lied at trial regarding what happened that
day, and (3) defense counsel was deficient by failing to bring up the medical emergency
and expose the lies. The court refused to “relitigate” the case and proceeded to sentence
defendant.
19
Based on this background, defendant asserts McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 584 U.S.
414 (McCoy), Marsden, and sentencing errors. We begin with the McCoy and Marsden
assertions.1
B. Asserted McCoy and Marsden Errors
Defendant contends he repeatedly tried to assert his innocence, citing his pre-trial
request for a Marsden hearing and the court letters, and defense counsel failed to follow
that objective, violating his right to maintain innocence under McCoy. He also contends
the trial court committed prejudicial error by sentencing him without holding another
Marsden hearing. We discern no error under McCoy or Marsden.
McCoy does not apply where the defendant denies guilt but never (1) makes clear
a desire to pursue innocence as his defense or (2) voices intransigent objection to
counsel’s defense strategy. (People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891.) This
standard is fatal to defendant’s contention. The record provides no indication that
defendant disagreed with counsel’s strategy before or during trial. And although
defendant claims he “repeatedly tried to assert his innocence,” he does not claim or cite
evidence he expressed a clear desire to pursue innocence as his defense. The closest
statement defendant made to this effect is that counsel “did not do anything [he] told him
to do.” But this statement does not clearly reflect a communication to his counsel to
pursue innocence as a defense. Furthermore, this statement was made after a verdict was
rendered, and there is no error under McCoy where a defendant complains about a
concession only after trial. (McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 415; People v. Palmer (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 268, 281-282.)
1 McCoy “considered ‘whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede
guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection’ and answered that
question in the affirmative.” (People v. Bloom (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1008, 1037.)
20
Defendant’s claim to a Marsden hearing before sentencing falls short as well. To
trigger such a hearing, there must be “at least some clear indication by defendant that he
wants a substitute attorney.” (People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281, fn. 8.) “We
will not find error on the part of the trial court for failure to conduct a Marsden hearing in
the absence of evidence that defendant made his desire for appointment of new counsel
known to the court.” (People v. Richardson (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 479, 484.) No such
evidence appears here. Defendant’s “diatribes” about the trial and his counsel’s tactical
decisions in the court letters and at the sentencing hearing did not constitute a Marsden
motion because those diatribes did not include a request for substitute counsel. (Compare
People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 103 [defendant’s statement that he’d “ ‘object to
everything’ ” his counsel did in the courtroom and that counsel was not representing him
did not constitute a Marsden motion] with People v. Armijo (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1171,
1179-1180 [letters clearly indicated the defendant sought the discharge of the public
defenders who were representing him and their replacement by another court-appointed
counsel].) Complaints regarding the adequacy of representation at trial do not constitute
a request for substitute counsel at sentencing or for any other purpose going forward.
(People v. Richardson, at p. 485.) Contrary to defendant’s view, his reference to his
earlier Marsden motion was not sufficient to trigger a Marsden hearing. If anything, that
reference indicates that defendant knows how to trigger the Marsden inquiry, having
done so earlier in the case. (People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 573-574.) We
discern no McCoy or Marsden error.
C. Asserted Sentencing Errors
Defendant challenges two components of his sentence: (1) the attempted witness
dissuasion sentence and (2) the multiple five-year enhancements imposed under section
667, subdivision (a). We address each challenge in turn.
21
i. Attempted Witness Dissuasion Sentence
Defendant contents defense counsel provided constitutionally deficient
performance by (1) failing to move for a reduction to the misdemeanor version of witness
dissuasion at sentencing under section 17 and (2) failing to seek a stay on the sentences
for those convictions under section 654. As we will explain, these contentions fail for
lack of prejudice.
Both sections 654 and 17 involve the exercise of court discretion. (People v.
Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 579.) Under section 654, an act punishable by more than
one provision of law can be punished by only one provision, and the court has the
discretion to impose and execute the sentence of either provision. (People v. Mani (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.) Section 17, subdivision (b) gives the court discretion to
reduce a “wobbler” from a felony to a misdemeanor. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) The relevant criteria in exercising that discretion include
“ ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and
attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and
demeanor at the trial.’ ” (Id. at p. 978.) Courts may also consider the sentencing
objectives set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 4.410. (Alvarez, at p. 978.) Those
objectives include protecting society, punishing the defendant, deterring crime,
encouraging the defendant to lead a law-abiding life, and preventing the defendant from
committing new crimes. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.410(a).)
Here, the record is clear that a motion under section 654 or section 17 would have
been futile. Noting defendant’s long criminal record, the court refused to strike his prior
convictions and imposed five-year enhancements on four counts for each of those
convictions. Given those decisions, it is unlikely the court would have seen fit to select
lower terms for the witness dissuasion convictions. Defendant’s focus on the “relatively
benign” nature of the text messages he had sent to victims is improper. The “current
offense cannot be considered in a vacuum.” (Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 979.) Also,
22
the evidence showed that defendant attempted to influence witness testimony while in
custody and in violation of a court order, going to great lengths to convey a message to
victims. Defendant also showed a lack of appreciation of his actions and dismissive
attitude toward the offenses. This evidence supports a finding that the longer term for the
witness dissuasion convictions would protect society. For these reasons, it is not
reasonably probable that the court would have chosen a lesser punishment for these
convictions.
ii. Five-Year Enhancements
Section 667, subdivision (a)(1) requires a trial court to impose a five-year
enhancement for each prior serious felony conviction. Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1)
requires the court to dismiss an enhancement “if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so.” In exercising section 1385 discretion, the court is required to consider and afford
great weight to certain enumerated mitigating circumstances, the presence of which
“weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of [an] enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
The mitigating circumstances include the situation in which “multiple enhancements are
alleged in a single case,” and “[i]n this instance, all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).) Relying
on this “shall be dismissed” language, defendant contends the trial court was required to
dismiss all but one of his section 667 serious felony enhancements. Defendant is
mistaken.
California courts have rejected arguments that the “shall be dismissed” language
in section 1385 mandates dismissal. (People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233,
239; People v. Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1289-1290; People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295-296; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 17-
18.) We agree with those courts. As the court in Anderson explained, “the statement that
a court ‘shall’ dismiss certain enhancements appears as a subpart to the general provision
23
that a ‘court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.’
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(1), italics added.) In other words, the dismissal of the enhancement is
conditioned on a court’s finding [that] dismissal is in the interest of justice.” (Anderson,
at p. 239.) The “shall dismiss” statement is also subject to the court’s finding regarding
public safety. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) If the court finds that dismissal would endanger
public safety, the trial court is not required to consider the circumstances in favor of
dismissal, including the circumstance that there is more than one enhancement.
(Mendoza, at p. 296.) In sum, defendant’s reliance on that circumstance alone as
mandating dismissal lacks merit.
Alternatively, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in deciding
to impose the five-year enhancements here. Specifically, he contends the court was
unaware of its discretion to dismiss them under section 1385, subdivision (c). Assuming
the court was aware of its discretion, defendant contends (1) the court failed to apply a
requisite rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal and (2) its decision to add
enhancements totaling 40 years to his indeterminate sentence was absurd. We disagree
that the court was unaware of its discretion or required to apply a rebuttable presumption,
but we find merit in defendant’s concern regarding the 40 years of enhancements.
Section 1385, subdivision (c) became effective on January 1, 2022, and
defendant’s sentencing hearing occurred in 2023. Because defendant provides no
evidence that the trial court was unaware of this law, we assume such awareness. (People
v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724.) Also, the view that section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) erects a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal has been rejected
by the California Supreme Court. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033.) We
are bound by that decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d
450, 455.)
This leaves us with defendant’s remaining contention that the trial court’s
imposition of 8 five-year enhancements was absurd. In his view, the addition of 40 years
24
to his indeterminate 100-years-to-life sentence could not be necessary to protect the
public from serious danger or physical injury. We see merit in his perspective on this
record. The court’s sentence was based exclusively on defendant’s future threat to public
safety. In passing on that issue, a trial court should consider the date the defendant would
be released without the enhancement. (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215,
228-229; see also People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, 1063.) Here, that date
would be well after defendant’s natural lifespan, and it is unclear how defendant could
continue to be a danger to the public at that point. (See Williams, at p. 1063 [“If a
defendant’s term is still effectively life without parole after resentencing, then
resentencing cannot pose an unreasonable risk to public safety”].) For this reason, we
remand to the trial court for resentencing on this limited issue. Should the court find
dismissal of the enhancements would pose no danger to the public, it must then consider
the applicability of the mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 1385, subdivision
(c) and whether dismissal of the enhancements would be in furtherance of justice.
(People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.) We express no opinion on how the trial
court should exercise its discretion.
V
Presentence Conduct Credits
A. Additional Background
According to the probation report, while defendant was in custody, he received
numerous days of restriction in an 18-month period for insubordination, vandalism,
entering an unauthorized area, and cursing and making threats toward staff. The report
calculated his time in custody and indicated that section 2933.1, subdivision (c) applied
to limit his conduct credits to 15 percent.
During sentencing, the trial court noted that defendant was “entitled to 624 days
good-time/work-time if he [had] earned it through good behavior” under section 4019.
But, after noting defendant’s multiple instances of misconduct while incarcerated and his
25
recent threat to slap his attorney, the court credited “zero good-time/work-time.”
Defendant made no objection.
B. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court’s impromptu denial of conduct credits violated
his right to due process. Anticipating a forfeiture argument, he also contends his trial
counsel’s failure to object to the denial violated his right to effective assistance of
counsel. We exercise our discretion to consider defendant’s contention on the merits
(People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6.) and conclude remand is required.
Before conduct credits may be denied, “the defendant is entitled to prior notice
and an opportunity to (1) rebut the findings of his jail violations, and (2) present any
mitigating factors.” (People v. Duesler (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 273, 277.) The probation
report is an appropriate vehicle for providing notice to a defendant that his conduct
credits are at risk by suggesting or recommending withholding credits. (Ibid.) A report
that merely mentions that defendant had behavioral problems in jail is insufficient to give
notice that conduct credits may be denied. (Ibid.)
Here, the probation report indicated that defendant had behavioral problems in jail
but did not recommend denying conduct credits or give any warning that those credits
were in jeopardy, nor did defendant receive any other notice that his conduct credits were
at risk. The trial court erred by failing to give defendant an opportunity to prepare and
present a defense to the elimination of conduct credits. The People contend this error was
nonprejudicial, and an objection would have been futile, “in light of the documented
misconduct.” But the probation report lacks sufficient detail on the misconduct for us to
conclude that giving defendant an opportunity to present a rebuttal and any mitigating
factors would be an idle act. Defendant is entitled to a limited remand for this purpose.2
2 We express no opinion on whether the trial court should deny conduct credits, nor do
we decide whether section 2933.1, subdivision (c) applies to those credits. Section
2933.1, subdivision (c) limits the maximum conduct credit a person convicted of a
26
VI
Court Operations Assessment
Section 1465.8 authorizes a court operations assessment of $40 per conviction.
The jury convicted defendant of 8 counts, so the trial court should have imposed an
assessment of $320 (8 x $40) under section 1465.8 instead of $520.
violent felony may earn to 15 percent of the actual period of confinement. Violent
felonies are those listed in section 667.5, subdivision (c) and include carjacking.
(§ 667.5, subd. (c)(17); but see People v. Ibarra (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 413, 425 [section
667.5 does not apply to attempts to commit the crimes referred to as violent felonies].)
27
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reduce the court operations assessment from $520 to
$320. The case is remanded for the limited purpose of: (1) determining whether to
impose the enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a) and section 1385,
subdivision (c); and (2) determining defendant’s presentence custody credit. The trial
court is ordered to prepare an amended abstract of judgment that reflects the $320 court
operations assessment, any enhancements imposed, and any credit award and to forward
a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the CDCR. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
28
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