In re N.F. CA2/3

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Filed 3/20/25 In re N.F. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re N.F., a Person Coming Under B337789
the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES, No. 23CCJP00378B)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Najam F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Najam F. (father) appeals from juvenile court
final custody orders declining to order visitation for father and
minor N.F. We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
I. Facts
In 2019, DCFS received a referral indicating that father
choked mother and hit her in the head. Mother reported that she
fell while running away from father with N.F.’s half sibling, and
the child sustained a black eye and a cut that required stitches
and became a large scar. The referral was closed as inconclusive.
While mother was pregnant with N.F., father was convicted
of mayhem, and he went to prison before the child was born. He
was released on parole in August of 2022. N.F. was two years old
at the time. A restraining order prohibited father from
contacting mother until November 15, 2022. Father and mother
spent time together soon after father’s release, which father
admitted was a violation of his parole. Mother let father stay at
her home occasionally, but she kicked him out on or about
November 25.
On November 27, 2022, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a
referral indicating that father and mother got into a violent

1 We grant respondent’s motion to augment the record on
appeal to include the November 1, 2023 six-month status review
report, which was filed with the juvenile court. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

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argument in N.F.’s presence. Mother reported that on November
26, she was sleeping in her bedroom around midday when father
came into the room and started arguing with her. Father was
there to move a bed out of the home. Father took an iPad from
mother, and when mother tried to get it back, father punched her
twice, pushed her, and tried to punch her again. N.F. and her
half sibling were in the room. After the fight, mother had
redness and scratches on her arms. She obtained an emergency
protective order barring father from contacting her until
December 2.
In early December, mother told a DCFS social worker that
the November incident did not involve father, but was instead a
dispute between mother and two men from whom she bought a
mattress. She asserted that she had had no contact with father
since 2019. However, the next month, mother admitted to the
social worker that she had lied initially. She confirmed that
father came to her home in November to pick up a bed and
refused to leave. Mother locked herself in a room with N.F., but
father “burst through the door” and “a tussle ensued.”
A DCFS social worker also interviewed father in December.
He asserted he had never seen N.F. in person and had never had
any contact with her, and said he had no relationship with
mother.
On January 20, 2023, DCFS received another referral
involving N.F. Mother reported that father approached her as
she was carrying N.F. up the stairs to her home. Father
“demanded to take the child” and tried to “rip” her out of mother’s
arms. When mother resisted, father bit her forearm, leaving
swelling, redness, and a bite mark. They argued for about
30 minutes and father eventually left. After mother went inside,

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she heard a loud bang, and when she went back outside she
found that her car windshield had been smashed. Early the next
morning, mother’s car was set on fire. Father texted mother kiss
emojis shortly after the fire. Mother believed father broke the
windshield and set the fire. She got another emergency
protective order prohibiting father from contacting her through
January 27.
In late January, a DCFS social worker interviewed father
about the two incidents. Father said he went to mother’s home in
November to pick up a bed, at her request. According to father,
mother instigated the fight and punched him twice in the face.
As to the January incident, father claimed he came over to
mother’s home with her permission and took N.F. to get some
chips at a corner store. Father then asked mother if he could
take N.F. with him for the day, but mother said no. According to
father, mother then tried to “snatch” N.F. from him. Father
returned N.F. to mother and left. He denied that he bit mother,
broke her windshield, or set her car on fire.
Father also accused mother of infidelity and told the social
worker that he doubted N.F. was his child. He asked for a
paternity test because he did not want to participate in the
dependency proceedings if he was not related to N.F.
DCFS records indicated that father had a history of similar
violent behavior. In 2014, DCFS learned of a police report
indicating that father punched a woman in the head and dragged
her by the hair in the presence of a three-month-old child. Father
admitted to a DCFS social worker that he hit the woman but
denied doing so in front of a child. The victim said father had
assaulted her once previously. In 2017, DCFS received a referral
indicating that father grabbed his girlfriend “by the neck, lifted

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her off the ground,” and threatened to kill her. When the victim’s
son told father to stop, father backhanded the child in the face.
II. Procedure
On January 26, 2023, DCFS requested an order
authorizing removal of N.F. from mother and father. The
juvenile court granted the request the next day.
On January 31, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300 petition as to N.F.2 The petition alleged that mother
and father got in a domestic violence incident in 2019 which
caused injury to N.F.’s half sibling, that father “repeatedly
struck” and “pushed” mother on November 26, 2022, and that he
bit her while trying to pull N.F. away on January 20, 2023. It
further alleged that this violence endangered N.F. and her half
sibling and placed them at serious risk of harm.
When a DCFS social worker discussed the petition with
father, he denied that he was at mother’s home on November 26,
2022, or on January 20, 2023.
In February, at the detention hearing, the juvenile court
ordered N.F. removed from mother and father pending
disposition of the petition. The court found that father was N.F.’s
alleged father, noting that he was not married to mother and did
not sign N.F.’s birth certificate.
Father was not present at the February detention hearing.
The court noted that father was “in the vicinity earlier” but “may
have been detained.” Father later confirmed that he was
arrested when he came to court that day.

2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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The juvenile court ordered that father be removed from jail
and transported to court for a March 7 arraignment hearing.
Father refused to exit his cell and he missed the hearing.
On March 20, father filed a statement regarding parentage
which asked the juvenile court to find that he was N.F.’s
presumed father. The court appointed counsel for father the next
day. It also appointed an expert and ordered a paternity test to
determine father’s biological relationship to N.F.
The juvenile court held a jurisdiction and disposition
hearing on May 17. Father, who was still incarcerated, attended
the hearing. The court sustained the petition. It declared N.F. a
dependent of the court and removed her from mother’s and
father’s custody. The court found that father remained an
alleged parent because his paternity test was still pending, but it
exercised its discretion to provide him with reunification services.
The court ordered father to complete a 52-week domestic violence
course, developmentally appropriate parenting programs, and
individual counseling. It also ordered that father have monitored
visits with N.F., including phone and video visitation, subject to
restrictions at father’s penal facility.
Later in May, the superior court entered a criminal
protective order barring father from contacting N.F. or mother
until 2033.
In August, father told a DCFS social worker that he had
signed up for parenting classes. The social worker attempted to
confirm this with the prison, but by November 15, DCFS had
received no verification of father’s enrollment in any services.
In November, mother was actively participating in services
and had regularly visited with N.F.

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At the November 15, 2023 six-month review hearing, the
juvenile court found that mother had substantially complied with
her case plan and that returning N.F. to mother would not create
a substantial risk to the child’s safety. It therefore returned N.F.
to mother’s physical custody and ordered family maintenance
services for mother. The court found that father had not
substantially complied with his case plan and ordered
enhancement services for him.
In May of 2024, father reported that he was on a waiting
list for unspecified classes. At that time, father remained
incarcerated and was housed in a restricted unit for disciplinary
reasons, and the unit did not offer the classes father had
requested.
On May 15, 2024, the court held a judicial review hearing.
Citing mother’s progress, it found that the conditions justifying
dependency jurisdiction over N.F. no longer existed, terminated
jurisdiction, and ordered that mother have sole legal and physical
custody over the child.
The court also found that father was N.F.’s biological father
based on the results of a paternity test.3 Father recognized that,
as a biological father, he was not entitled to visitation. He also
acknowledged that a criminal protective order barred him from
contacting N.F. until 2033. Father nonetheless asked the court to

3 “A biological or natural father is one whose biological
paternity has been established, but who has not achieved
presumed father status” under the requirements set out in
Family Code section 7611. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th
435, 449, fn. 15 (Zacharia D.); In re Jason J. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 922, 932.) Father does not argue on appeal that the
juvenile court erred in finding that he was N.F.’s biological father
and not her presumed father.

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exercise its discretion to order visitation with N.F. subject to the
protective order, noting that “things often do change.” Father
also asked to receive photographs of N.F. every three months.
The court rejected father’s requests and ordered that any
potential visitation permitted by mother must be monitored.
On May 16, the court entered a final judgment and
visitation order consistent with the rulings described above.
Father timely appealed the juvenile court findings and orders
entered on May 15 and 16, including the order that father have
no visitation with N.F.
DISCUSSION
When the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction over a
minor previously adjudged a dependent of the court, it has
discretion to issue exit orders, including visitation orders.
(§ 362.4, subd. (a); In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799.) A
biological father is not entitled to visitation. (Zacharia D., supra,
6 Cal.4th at p. 451 [“only a presumed, not a mere biological,
father is a ‘parent’ entitled to receive reunification services”];
§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A) [visitation is part of reunification
services].) However, “the juvenile court may order services for
the child and the biological father, if the court determines that
the services will benefit the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).)
We review a juvenile court’s exit orders for abuse of
discretion. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
285, 300.) “ ‘The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two
or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
that of the trial court.’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
318–319 (Stephanie M.).)

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Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in denying his request for visitation with N.F. We disagree.
Father was in prison for N.F.’s entire life except for a six-month
period, during which time father got into two violent fights with
mother in the child’s presence. Father reported that he took N.F.
to get chips before one of the fights, but the record does not reflect
that father otherwise ever visited or interacted with N.F. (Cf.
Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 451 [declining to interpret
“ ‘parent’ to include a strictly biological father . . . who had never
demonstrated any commitment to the child’s welfare”].) Father
also had a larger history of violent conduct, including one
incident in which he reportedly struck a child. Father signed up
for classes, but there is no evidence that he ever engaged in any
of the reunification or enhancement services offered by the
juvenile court. Finally, a criminal protective order prohibited
father from contacting N.F. until 2033, meaning any visitation
order would be meaningless until that order expires or is
modified.4 Based on the overall circumstances, the court’s order
was well supported and did not exceed the bounds of reason.
(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319; In re Elijah V.
(2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 589 (Elijah V.) [juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in denying reunification services to a

4 If the protective order is modified, or after it expires, father
may seek modification of the visitation order “in a proceeding or
action described in Section 3021 of the Family Code” if he can
establish “that there has been a significant change of
circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and
modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.”
(§ 302, subd. (d); In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 165,
fn. 7.)

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biological father who “had no relationship with” the child and
was being investigated for child abuse].)
Father argues that visitation was warranted because he
showed “commitment” to N.F. by attending “most” hearings in
the dependency proceedings, requesting services, and seeking a
paternity test. Yet, father fails to explain how these minimal
efforts justify visitation in the context of the entire record. For
example, while the fact section of father’s briefing describes his
violent fights with mother, his argument does not address those
incidents or explain how it would benefit N.F. to visit with a man
with whom she had no meaningful relationship. Father also
contends children benefit from having a relationship with a
father. However, father fails to connect that generalization to the
facts of this case. And even if some evidence could support an
inference that visitation might benefit N.F., the record also
supports the juvenile court order, and therefore we must affirm.
(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.)
Father also claims visitation was appropriate because the
facts of this case are distinguishable from In re Joshua R. (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 1020. We disagree. In Joshua R., the appellant
requested paternity testing three and a half years after learning
he was an alleged father, and the juvenile court denied the
request. (Id. at p. 1022.) His request was based on Family Code
section 7551, which requires the court to order genetic testing if
“ ‘paternity is a relevant fact’ ” in the proceeding. (Joshua R., at
p. 1025.) On appeal, the court recognized that paternity testing
could lead to biological father status, which, in turn, would give
the juvenile court discretion to order visitation if it would benefit
the child. (Id. at p. 1026, citing § 361.5, subd. (a).) The appellate
court concluded that the juvenile court, in determining paternity

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was irrelevant, implicitly found that the minor would not benefit
from visitation. (Joshua R., at p. 1026.) The court determined
that this implicit finding was well supported by the record, which
reflected that the appellant delayed requesting a paternity test,
had “no relationship” with the child, did not attend a single
dependency hearing, and was in prison. (Ibid.)
Father asserts the facts of this case are distinguishable
from Joshua R. because he requested genetic testing
“immediately” and attended “most” hearings. He further asserts
those efforts support that visitation would benefit N.F. However,
like in Joshua R., father was in prison and had no meaningful
relationship with N.F. More importantly, while the father in
Joshua R. had no apparent violent history, father’s violent
conduct around N.F. and other children further supports the
juvenile court ruling.
We find equally unpersuasive father’s attempt to
distinguish Elijah V., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 576. In Elijah V., a
biological father seeking visitation was being investigated for
child abuse, had no relationship with the child, and “was in ‘no
position’ ” to assume physical custody. The juvenile court
declined to order reunification services, and the appellate court
affirmed and found no abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 589 [“If he
could not take the child, there was no reason to give him
services”].)5 Similarly, here, father had been investigated several

5 The appellate court also concluded that a juvenile court
may not “order services for the biological father when a
conclusively presumed father exists.” (Elijah V., supra, 127
Cal.App.4th at pp. 782–783.) Father therefore argues Elijah V. is
distinguishable because N.F. had no presumed father. However,
that distinction only means that the juvenile court in this case

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times for violence that may have endangered children, including
a report that he backhanded a child. Father had no relationship
with N.F., and he could not take physical custody of her because
he was in prison indefinitely and prohibited from contacting her
until 2033. Like in Elijah V., these circumstances support that
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
order visitation for father.

had discretion to order reunification services for father; it does
not mean the court was required to do so, nor does it change the
abuse of discretion analysis described ante.

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.*

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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