CourtListener 10357668•Maldonado v. Slauson CA4/1
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Filed 3/18/25 Maldonado v. Slauson CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CECILIA MALDONADO, D084256
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2202712)
ALYSSA SLAUSON,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Donald R. Alvarez, Judge. Affirmed. Motion for sanctions denied.
The Vera Law Group and Ronald T. Vera for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd for Defendant and
Respondent.
Cecilia Maldonado appeals from an adverse judgment after the trial
court sustained a demurrer in her lawsuit against Alyssa Slauson,
individually and as the administrator of the estate of Felipe DeJesus
Campiran. Maldonado filed this lawsuit to seek enforcement of an oral
agreement she allegedly entered into with Campiran, under which she was to
have an interest in the real property where she resided with Campiran from
2008 until his death. The trial court sustained the demurrer because
Maldonado failed to file a timely creditor’s claim in the probate proceeding for
Campiran’s estate.
In this appeal, Maldonado contends that, based on principles of due
process, she should have been excused, in this action, from the requirement
to file a timely creditor’s claim because she did not receive proper notice of
the deadline to file a creditor’s claim. We conclude that because Maldonado
had actual notice that Slauson’s petition to administer the estate was
granted, and because Maldonado could have applied to the probate court for
relief to file a late creditor’s claim, but she failed to do so, her due process
argument lacks merit. We accordingly affirm the judgment.
Slauson has filed a motion requesting that we impose sanctions on
Maldonado for filing an objectively frivolous appeal. We deny the motion for
sanctions.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Campiran died intestate on February 5, 2021. According to the
allegations in Maldonado’s complaint, Maldonado and Campiran lived
together from 2008 until Campiran’s death in a house that Campiran had
purchased prior to 2008 (the Real Property).1 According to Maldonado, at the
beginning of their cohabitation, she and Campiran entered into an oral
agreement, under which they “agreed to treat [the Real Property] as joint
property.” Based on that agreement, Maldonado allegedly “made the
monthly mortgage payment on [the Real Property] from her personal income
1 Maldonado acknowledges, in her opening appellate brief, that the Real
Property “was in Mr. Campiran’s name as his sole and separate property.”
2
with the understanding that she would be entitled to the value and
investment of [the Real Property] in making the monthly mortgage payment.”
A. Proceedings in the Probate Court
Slauson, who is Campiran’s daughter, filed a petition to administer her
father’s estate in late February 2021, initiating the probate court proceeding
titled Estate of Felipe DeJesus Campiran (Super. Ct. San Bernardino
County, No. PROPS2100158) (the Probate Proceeding).2 On March 1, 2021,
Slauson was appointed special administrator of her father’s estate, pending
the probate court’s future consideration of her petition to be appointed
general administrator. (Prob. Code,3 § 8540, subd. (a) [“If the circumstances
of the estate require the immediate appointment of a personal representative,
the court may appoint a special administrator to exercise any powers that
may be appropriate under the circumstances for the preservation of the
estate.”].) Temporary letters of administration were issued to Slauson as
special administrator after she posted a bond. In her capacity as special
administrator, Slauson entered the Real Property on March 6, 2021, to
gather her father’s belongings and assets, and in so doing, she took some
items that Maldonado later contended belonged to her.
On March 15, 2021, Maldonado, through her attorney, filed and served
on Slauson a request for special notice pursuant to section 1250. Section
1250 states, “(a) At any time after the issuance of letters in a proceeding
under this code for the administration of a decedent’s estate, any person
2 Slauson has filed an unopposed request that we take judicial notice of
certain documents from the Probate Proceeding. We hereby grant the
request. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [judicial notice of court records].)
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Probate Code.
3
interested in the estate . . . may . . . file with the court clerk a written request
for special notice. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) Special notice may be requested of one or
more of the following matters: (1) Petitions filed in the administration
proceeding. [¶] (2) Inventories and appraisals of property in the estate,
including any supplemental inventories and appraisals. [¶] (3) Objections to
an appraisal. [¶] (4) Accounts of a personal representative. [¶] (5) Reports of
status of administration.” (§ 1250.) Maldonado requested notice of “all
matters for which special notice may be requested.”
On April 21, 2021, Maldonado filed, in the Probate Proceeding, a
petition under section 850 (the 850 Petition).4 In the 850 Petition,
Maldonado sought (1) the return of certain items that she alleged Slauson
had taken from the Real Property, and (2) an order establishing that “all or a
portion of” Campiran’s interest in the Real Property “should pass to and is an
asset of [Maldonado].”
By the time of the hearing on the 850 Petition on July 28, 2021, the
items of personal property were apparently no longer a significant issue, as
they were not discussed,5 but Maldonado still sought an interest in the Real
4 As relevant here, section 850 provides that an “interested person” may
file a petition for an order directing the conveyance or transfer of property
“[w]here the decedent died in possession of, or holding title to, real or
personal property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to
belong to another.” (§ 850, subd. (a)(2)(C).) As also relevant here, however,
section 856.5 states that “[t]he court may not grant a petition under this
chapter if the court determines that the matter should be determined by a
civil action.”
5 With respect to the items of personal property, Slauson submitted a
declaration explaining that she had located and returned the items that
belonged to Maldonado. Further, on March 30, 2021, the probate court had
already ordered “any items of personalty including personal papers of Cecilia
Mald[o]nado to be returned to her within 24 hours.”
4
Property. Maldonado and her attorney, Ronald Vera, were present at the
July 28, 2021 hearing. The probate court denied the 850 Petition, explaining
that Maldonado currently lacked an interest in the Real Property, but that
she could take certain steps to attempt to establish such an interest. The
court explained, “At this particular point in time, Ms. Mald[o]nado has no
interest, no claim to the property. Now, there are other ways she can go
about this that might give her or lead to a claim or an interest in the
property[.] [S]pecifically, of course, she could file a creditor’s claim, and
there’s also the possibility of filing a Marvin claim, but today she has no
claim to any of this property. So the 850 petition is going to be denied.”6 The
court later reiterated, “[T]here are a number of claims that can be made, just
not in the manner in which they got made in the 850 petition.”
At the July 28, 2021 hearing, with Maldonado and her attorney still in
attendance, the probate court decided that it would advance and consider the
hearing on Slauson’s petition to administer the estate. At the hearing, the
court printed out the relevant order and signed it, granting Slauson’s
petition. The order prominently states, “WARNING: THIS APPOINTMENT
IS NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL LETTERS HAVE ISSUED.” At the close of the
hearing, Vera suggested to the court that a mediation between Maldonado
and Slauson may be fruitful in resolving Maldonado’s claim to an interest in
the Real Property. The probate court endorsed the idea and directed the
6 In referring to a “Marvin claim,” the probate court was referencing
Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 (Marvin) and subsequent case law,
which established that, in certain circumstances, a person may successfully
pursue a lawsuit to obtain an interest in property acquired during
nonmarital cohabitation. “A Marvin agreement is enforceable against an
estate when one of the parties to the agreement dies.” (Byrne v. Laura (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1064.)
5
parties to contact his judicial assistant to schedule a mediation. It is not
clear from the record whether a mediation ever occurred.
A week later, on August 5, 2021, after Slauson had fulfilled the
requirements of obtaining a bond and signing an oath (§§ 8403, 8480), letters
of administration were formally issued to Slauson by the clerk of the court,
appointing her as administrator of her father’s estate. After the issuance of
the letters of administration, Slauson was required by section 9050,
subdivision (a), to “give notice of administration of the estate to the known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors of the decedent.”7 (§ 9050, subd. (a).)
Slauson does not dispute that she failed to send a notice of administration to
Maldonado.8
7 The required form of the notice of administration to the estate’s known
or reasonably ascertainable creditors is set forth in section 9052. The notice
should state that the “[a]dministration of the estate” of the deceased has
commenced and that creditors must file and serve their claims by a specific
statutorily determined deadline or, alternatively, must file a petition for
leave to make a late claim.
8 Slauson disputes in her respondent’s brief whether she was required to
send a notice of administration to Maldonado pursuant to section 9050. She
contends that in ruling on the 850 Petition, the probate court decided that
Maldonado was not a creditor with an interest in the estate, and therefore no
notice was required. We are not persuaded. The probate court expressly
stated at the July 28, 2021 hearing that Maldonado could take the step of
filing a creditor’s claim at the appropriate time and that there were “a
number of claims that can be made, just not in the manner in which they got
made in the 850 petition.” From these statements, we infer that the probate
court perceived Maldonado’s asserted interest in the Real Property to qualify
her as a creditor who could file a creditor’s claim. Section 9050, subdivision
(a) states that for the purpose of determining whether someone is a known
creditor who should receive a notice of administration, “a personal
representative has knowledge of a creditor of the decedent if the personal
representative is aware that the creditor has demanded payment from the
6
On January 28, 2022, more than five months after the letters of
administration were issued, Maldonado filed a creditor’s claim, through her
attorney Vera, claiming an interest in the Real Property. In the creditor’s
claim, Maldonado indicated that she intended “to file a ‘Marvin’ Complaint,
to enforce her contract rights, but must first file this Creditor’s claim to file a
lawsuit.”
Section 9100, subdivision (a), sets forth the deadlines for filing a
creditor’s claim. “A creditor shall file a claim before expiration of the later of
the following times: (1) Four months after the date letters are first issued to
a general personal representative. (2) Sixty days after the date notice of
administration is mailed or personally delivered to the creditor.” (§ 9100,
subd. (a).) Maldonado’s creditor’s claim alleged that it was timely filed
because “[t]he estate’s personal representative has failed to give notice of
administration of the estate to Creditor, but Creditor is filing this before the
one-year death [anniversary] of Campiran of February 5, 2022.”9
decedent or the estate.” (§ 9050, subd. (a).) Here, by virtue of the 850 Petition
and the probate court’s statement that Maldonado could file a creditor’s
claim, Slauson was aware Maldonado was “demand[ing] payment from the
decedent or the estate.” (Ibid.)
9 In stating that her claim was timely because it was filed before the one-
year anniversary of Campiran’s death, Maldonado was apparently relying on
Code Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a), which sets forth a statute
of limitations for a cause of action that survives the defendant’s death.
According to that provision, “If a person against whom an action may be
brought on a liability of the person, whether arising in contract, tort, or
otherwise, and whether accrued or not accrued, dies before the expiration of
the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action
may be commenced within one year after the date of death, and the
limitations period that would have been applicable does not apply.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 366.2, subd. (a).)
7
On February 1, 2022, Slauson served Maldonado with a notice rejecting
her creditor’s claim. (§ 9250.) The notice explained that the claim was
untimely because it was filed more than four months after the issuance of
letters of administration.
In appropriate circumstances, a creditor may seek leave from the
probate court to file a creditor’s claim after expiration of the deadlines set
forth in section 9100, including when the estate’s personal representative
failed to send proper and timely notice of administration of the estate to the
creditor. (§ 9103.) However, the probate court may not grant a petition to
file a late claim if a creditor obtained “actual knowledge of the administration
of the estate” more than 60 days prior to filing the petition.10 (§ 9103, subd.
(a)(1).) Maldonado did not seek leave to file a late claim pursuant to section
9103 in the Probate Proceeding.
10 Section 9103 states,
“(a) Upon petition by a creditor or the personal representative,
the court may allow a claim to be filed after expiration of the time
for filing a claim provided in Section 9100 if either of the
following conditions is satisfied:
“(1) The personal representative failed to send proper and timely
notice of administration of the estate to the creditor, and that
petition is filed within 60 days after the creditor has actual
knowledge of the administration of the estate.
“(2) The creditor had no knowledge of the facts reasonably giving
rise to the existence of the claim more than 30 days prior to the
time for filing a claim as provided in Section 9100, and the
petition is filed within 60 days after the creditor has actual
knowledge of both of the following:
“(A) The existence of the facts reasonably giving rise to the
existence of the claim.
“(B) The administration of the estate.” (§ 9103.)
8
B. The Litigation of the Instant Lawsuit
On February 3, 2022, Maldonado instituted the instant lawsuit against
Slauson in San Bernardino County Superior Court, purporting to sue Slauson
individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of Campiran’s
estate.11 The complaint alleged causes of action for (1) breach of oral
agreement; (2) an accounting; (3) fraudulent concealment; (4) quantum
meruit; and (5) unjust enrichment. The complaint collectively labeled all of
the causes of action as “Marvin claims.” Maldonado sought enforcement of
her alleged oral agreement with Campiran regarding the Real Property,
including the recovery of a portion of the proceeds from Slauson’s sale of the
Real Property in late 2021.
Slauson filed a demurrer on June 13, 2022. Among other things,
Slauson argued that Maldonado’s lawsuit was time-barred and the trial court
lacked jurisdiction because Maldonado failed to file a timely creditor’s claim,
which she argued was a prerequisite to filing a lawsuit to seek recovery from
Campiran’s estate. Slauson requested that the trial court take judicial notice
of documents from the Probate Proceeding, including the reporter’s transcript
from the July 28, 2021 hearing, showing that Maldonado had actual notice
that the trial court had granted Slauson’s petition to administer the estate.
In opposition, Maldonado argued, among other things, that her lawsuit
should be allowed to proceed, despite Slauson’s contention that Maldonado
failed to file a timely creditor’s claim, as Slauson did not send Maldonado a
11 More specifically, Maldonado erroneously identified Slauson as the
“Special Administrator” of Campiran’s estate, even though Slauson’s powers
as special administrator terminated by operation of law when letters of
administration were issued to her, as a general personal representative of the
estate, on August 5, 2021. (§ 8546, subd. (a).)
9
notice of administration of the estate to let her know that the deadline for
filing a creditor’s claim had commenced. Maldonado contended she was
entitled to such notice because she had, at the inception of the Probate
Proceeding, filed a request for special notice and because she was a creditor
who had asserted an interest in the Real Property through her 850 petition.
According to Maldonado, due to Slauson’s failure to provide her with notice of
administration of the estate, she should not be barred from proceeding with
her Marvin claims due to the lack of a timely creditor’s claim. Maldonado
relied on constitutional principles of due process to support her argument.
The trial court sustained the demurrer, without leave to amend, on
July 12, 2023.12 The trial court explained that “[a]ll causes of action in this
complaint against the Administrator Slauson are based on the same Marvin
fact pattern,” under which Maldonado claimed an interest in Campiran’s
estate, but Maldonado “did not timely file a creditor claim against the Estate
and therefore she is preempted from bringing this action against the moving
party, Administrator Slauson.” The trial court also stated that “any claims of
lack of notice are belied by the fact [Maldonado] had actual notice of the
proceeding.”
The trial court subsequently entered judgment against Maldonado.
12 The ruling on the demurrer was delayed while the trial court
determined whether the timeliness of Maldonado’s creditor’s claim should be
assessed in the Probate Proceeding or by the trial court in the instant action.
Ultimately, the trial court issued the ruling in the instant action.
10
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in sustaining
Slauson’s demurrer. “ ‘ “On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we exercise our
independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action
as a matter of law.” ’ [Citation.] In reviewing the complaint, ‘we must
assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiffs, as well as
those that are judicially noticeable.’ [Citation.] We may affirm on any basis
stated in the demurrer, regardless of the ground on which the trial court
based its ruling.” (Inns-by-the-Sea v. California Mutual Ins. Co. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 688, 696–697.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Sustained the Demurrer Because Maldonado
Did Not File a Timely Creditor’s Claim
In analyzing Maldonado’s appeal, we begin with the rule that a creditor
may pursue a lawsuit against a decedent’s estate only if the creditor has first
filed a timely creditor’s claim with the estate’s personal representative. “A
timely filed claim is a condition precedent to filing an action against a
decedent’s estate.” (Dobler v. Arluk Medical Center Industrial Group, Inc.
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 530, 536.) “ ‘In an action at law for damages . . . , the
plaintiff is a creditor and must file his claim against the estate of the
deceased promisor or be forever barred.’ . . . [¶] A party with a remedy at
law against a decedent . . . is subject to the provisions of the Probate Code
requiring the presentation of claims to the executor or administrator.”
(Wilkison v. Wiederkehr (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 822, 833–834; see also § 9351
[“An action may not be commenced against a decedent’s personal
representative on a cause of action against the decedent unless a claim is
11
first filed as provided in this part,” italics added]; § 9002, subd. (b) [“A claim
that is not filed as provided in this part is barred.”].) Maldonado does not
dispute this fundamental principle. Nor does she dispute that the demands
for relief in her lawsuit constitute claims within the meaning of the Probate
Code. (§ 9000, subd. (a) [defining “claim” as “a demand for payment for any
of the following, whether due, not due, accrued or not accrued, or contingent,
and whether liquidated or unliquidated: [¶] (1) Liability of the decedent,
whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise.”].)
Accordingly, Maldonado’s lawsuit cannot proceed unless (1) she filed a
timely creditor’s claim; or (2) she has identified a meritorious ground for the
trial court in this action to excuse her failure to file a timely creditor’s claim.
We discuss each issue in turn.
1. Maldonado Did Not Timely File a Creditor’s Claim
We first consider whether Maldonado did, in fact, file a timely creditor’s
claim. The timeliness of a creditor’s claim is governed by section 9100: “A
creditor shall file a claim before expiration of the later of the following times:
(1) Four months after the date letters are first issued to a general personal
representative. (2) Sixty days after the date notice of administration is
mailed or personally delivered to the creditor.” (§ 9100, subd. (a).) Here,
Slauson did not serve a notice of administration on Maldonado. Accordingly,
the applicable deadline was four months from the August 5, 2021 issuance of
letters of administration to Slauson. Four months from August 5, 2021 is
December 5, 2021. Maldonado failed to meet that deadline because she filed
her creditor’s claim on January 28, 2022.
The Probate Code allows a creditor to seek leave from the probate court
to file a creditor’s claim after expiration of the deadlines set forth in section
9100. (§ 9103.) Maldonado did not petition the probate court for leave to file
12
a late claim. It is doubtful that the probate court would have granted relief if
Maldonado had filed such a petition. A petition to file a late claim may not be
granted if a creditor obtained “actual knowledge” of the “administration of
the estate” more than 60 days prior to filing the petition. (§ 9103,
subds. (a)(1), (a)(2)(B).) Maldonado and her attorney were present at the
hearing on July 28, 2021, when the trial court granted Slauson’s petition to
be appointed administrator of the estate, which the probate court would
likely have found to be significant in assessing Maldonado’s actual
knowledge.
In sum, Maldonado’s January 28, 2022 creditor’s claim was untimely.
2. Maldonado’s Reliance on Constitutional Principles of Due Process
Do Not Entitle Her to Proceed With Her Lawsuit In the Absence of
a Timely Filed Creditor’s Claim
We next consider whether Maldonado has identified any meritorious
ground for excepting her from the requirement to file a timely creditor’s claim
as a prerequisite to pursuing this lawsuit.
In arguing that this lawsuit should have been allowed to proceed
despite her failure to file a timely creditor’s claim, Maldonado relies on
principles of due process. Maldonado explains that her “main contention on
appeal is that, because she filed a Request for Special Notice and she was a
known creditor, [Slauson] was required to send a Notice of Administration of
the probate proceedings as to the deceased.” (Italics added.) She states that
“[a]t the core of this appeal is whether [Maldonado’s] due process right was
violated by [Slauson] failing to provide actual notice as required and then
seeking the trial court to curtail her ‘Marvin’ claim by contending her
creditor’s claim was untimely filed in the Probate Proceedings.” According to
Maldonado, “she should be excused in filing a late claim as no notice was
13
provided to her as required by the Probate Code,” and that the “failure to give
proper notice has due process implications.”
As an initial matter, we reject Maldonado’s contention that she was
entitled to receive a notice of administration by virtue of the request for
special notice (§ 1250) she filed on March 15, 2021. Even assuming, without
deciding, that a request for special notice served after the issuance of letters
to a special administrator remains valid after the issuance of letters to a
general administrator, as occurred here, a notice of administration is simply
not one of the documents for which special notice may be requested. (§ 1250,
subd. (c) [“Special notice may be requested of one or more of the following
matters: (1) Petitions filed in the administration proceeding. [¶]
(2) Inventories and appraisals of property in the estate, including any
supplemental inventories and appraisals. [¶] (3) Objections to an appraisal.
[¶] (4) Accounts of a personal representative. [¶] (5) Reports of status of
administration.”].) Maldonado’s request for special notice therefore gave her
no right to be served with a notice of administration of the estate.
We do, however, agree that, due to her 850 Petition, Maldonado was a
known creditor who should have received notice of administration from
Slauson pursuant to section 9050. (See fn. 8, ante.)
Accordingly, the question is whether, under the circumstances of this
case, Slauson’s failure to send a notice of administration to Maldonado
pursuant to section 9050 excuses Maldonado from filing a timely creditor’s
claim.
As the trial court recognized, the discussion in Venturi v. Taylor (1995)
35 Cal.App.4th 16 (Venturi) is on point. In Venturi, as here, the plaintiff’s
lawsuit against the decedent’s estate was dismissed because he did not file a
timely creditor’s claim. (Id. at p. 20.) On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the
14
“claim against the decedent’s estate was timely made, or alternatively, the
time limits in which to do so were not triggered, because respondents failed to
serve him with notice of administration of the decedent’s estate as required
by section 9050.” (Ibid.) Venturi rejected the argument, holding that “a
potential creditor with actual notice of the pendency of estate proceedings
cannot excuse the untimely filing of a creditor’s claim on the ground that the
administrator failed to send a formal notice of administration of the estate, as
required by Probate Code section 9050.” (Venturi, at p. 18.) Venturi stated,
“If, as here, the personal representative fails to give the required notice, the
remedy is not to judicially engraft upon the statutory scheme an open-ended
period in which to file a claim against the estate. The creditor’s remedy,
when its claim is denied as untimely, is to petition the court to file a late
claim under section 9103.” (Id. at p. 25.) Further, as Venturi pointed out, a
petition brought under section 9103 will not be granted if the creditor had
actual knowledge of the administration of the estate. (Venturi, at p. 25.)
Venturi explained that its focus on actual knowledge was consistent
with the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of due process
requirements in Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope (1988)
485 U.S. 478. Tulsa held that a state’s laws setting forth deadlines for a
creditor’s claim in probate proceedings must meet constitutional due process
requirements. (Id. at p. 488.) To satisfy constitutional due process
principles, Tulsa adopted “a requirement of actual notice to known or
reasonably ascertainable creditors.” (Id. at 490, italics added.) “If a
[creditor’s] identity was known or ‘reasonably ascertainable,’ then
termination of [the creditor’s] claim without actual notice violate[s] due
process.” (Id. at p. 491.)
15
Here, the record supports the trial court’s determination that
Maldonado had actual notice of the administration of Campiran’s estate.13
As we have explained, both Maldonado and her attorney were present at the
July 28, 2021 hearing when the trial court signed the order granting
Slauson’s petition to administer the estate. Further, after Slauson’s petition
was granted, Maldonado’s counsel specifically stated that he wanted his
client to pursue mediation with Slauson. Under those circumstances, the
record establishes that Maldonado had actual notice that the estate was
being administered regardless of Slauson’s failure to send Maldonado a notice
of administration. (See Venturi, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 23 [discussion of
“possible settlement of the claim” with the co-administrators showed actual
knowledge of “administration of the estate”].) Therefore, as in Venturi,
Maldonado “could not excuse timely filing of a claim when [she] had actual
knowledge of the administration of the estate by other means.” (Id. at p. 23.)
Maldonado attempts to distinguish Venturi by pointing out differences
between the facts of Venturi and this case, but we find those distinctions to be
irrelevant. The most important distinction that warrants discussion is that
that the plaintiff in Venturi had actual knowledge that letters of
administration had been issued, whereas, in this case, Maldonado knew only
that Slauson’s petition to administer the estate had been granted, with
letters of administration likely to follow on a future date. In other words,
what occurred at the hearing on July 28, 2021, did not conclusively begin the
administration of the estate on that date. As prominently noted on the order
13 In her opening appellate brief, Maldonado contends the trial court
relied on the concept of “constructive notice,” rather than actual notice. She
is incorrect. The trial court based its ruling on Maldonado’s actual notice of
the administration of the estate, stating that “any claims of lack of
notice are belied by the fact Plaintiff had actual notice of the proceeding.”
16
that the trial court signed on July 28, 2021, although Slauson’s petition to
administer the estate had been granted, the appointment was not effective
until letters of administration were actually issued by the clerk of the court.
Specifically, by law, an approved administrator must post a bond and sign an
oath before the clerk issues letters of administration. (§§ 8403, 8480.)
Here, the letters of administration did not issue until August 5, 2021, a
day after Slauson posted the required bond. There is no indication that
Maldonado knew of, or was served with, the letters of administration
themselves. In our assessment, however, the trial court’s granting of
Slauson’s petition on July 28, 2021, was sufficient to provide actual notice to
Maldonado that the estate was being administered. Because Maldonado
knew that the trial court had granted Slauson’s petition to administer the
estate, Maldonado was on actual notice that letters of administration would
issue imminently and that she would soon be required to take action on her
creditor’s claim.
Moreover, if Maldonado believed that her lack of actual knowledge of
the letters of administration was significant, she should have filed a petition
with the probate court for leave to file a late claim pursuant to section 9103,
arguing that her lack of actual knowledge of the issuance of those letters
provided good cause to allow her to file a late claim. Because Maldonado had
recourse to the probate court under section 9103, she was provided with
ample due process. She simply failed to take advantage of it. We accordingly
find no merit to Maldonado’s contention that principles of due process
required that her lawsuit be permitted to proceed despite her failure to file a
timely creditor’s claim or to take steps, in the probate court, to obtain leave to
file a late claim.
17
Finally, Maldonado argues, for the first time on appeal, that Slauson
should be equitably estopped from contending that the creditor’s claim was
untimely. “The fundamental rule that a reviewing court does not consider
arguments or theories that could have been but were not raised below ‘is
especially applicable to the doctrine of estoppel, which includes factual
elements that must be established in the trial court.’ ” (Rogers v. County of
Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 480, 490, fn. 6.) Because Maldonado did
not raise the issue of equitable estoppel in the trial court, we decline to
consider it.
C. Mootness
As an alternative argument, Slauson contends that we should not
afford Maldonado any relief and should dismiss this appeal because it has
become moot. Specifically, Slauson has requested judicial notice that, on
January 17, 2024, prior to Maldonado’s filing of her opening appellate brief,
the probate court ordered final discharge of Slauson as administrator of the
estate, following the trial court’s approval of the “First and Final Account and
Report of Administrator and Petition for Its Settlement; For Allowance of
Compensation . . . , and for Final Distribution.” The final distribution was
approved over Maldonado’s objection and request that the probate court hold
back $125,000 to cover any eventual relief that might be ordered in this
action on her Marvin claims.
“ ‘ “An appellate court will not review questions which are moot and
which are only of academic importance.” [Citations.] A question becomes
moot when, pending an appeal from a judgment of a trial court, events
transpire that prevent the appellate court from granting any effectual relief.’
[Citation.] The legal test for effective relief is whether there is a ‘prospect of
a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or
18
legal status.’ ” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014,
1053.)
Slauson argues that this appeal is moot because, even were we to
reverse the judgment resulting from the demurrer and remand to the trial
court, Maldonado would eventually be unable to obtain any effective relief in
the trial court because Slauson “would immediately bring another motion, be
it a demurrer, summary judgment motion or motion for judgment on the
pleadings, based on the overruling of Maldonado’s objection to the final
account and the final orders in the probate case.” Slauson does not elaborate
on what that motion would entail, but she assumes it would be granted.14
Therefore, according to Slauson, although the relief that Maldonado seeks in
this appeal is to reverse the trial court’s order and “allow her civil case to
proceed,” the ultimate result in the trial court, after further motion practice,
will be a ruling that “the case cannot proceed.”
We understand Slauson’s argument, but we decline to dismiss this
appeal on the ground of mootness because the eventual dismissal in the trial
14 Maldonado argues in her reply brief that, on remand, her action would
be allowed to proceed, despite the final distribution of the estate, because she
“may seek ‘clawback’ recovery from [Slauson] if she was the recipient of
assets that were not hers.” Maldonado does not develop her argument, but
we assume she is referring to section 9392, under which, if certain
requirements are met, a creditor who was not on notice of a probate
proceeding may pursue a lawsuit to establish the personal liability of a
person to whom the estate’s property was distributed. (§ 9392.) Notably,
however, a creditor may seek relief under section 9392 only if “neither the
creditor nor the attorney representing the creditor in the matter has actual
knowledge of the administration of the estate before the time the court made
an order for final distribution of the property.” (§ 9392, subd. (a)(2), italics
added.) That provision would appear to defeat any “clawback” attempt by
Maldonado under section 9392, as Maldonado actively participated in the
Probate Proceeding and attempted to file a creditor’s claim prior to the order
for final distribution.
19
court, after motion practice, is contingent and remote. Were we to have found
merit to Maldonado’s appeal, we could have granted her immediate effective
relief in the form of a remand to the trial court. It is beyond the scope of this
appeal for us to determine whether, in eventual motion practice, Slauson
would succeed in obtaining a dismissal based on the fact that the Probate
Proceeding has concluded.
D. Slauson’s Motion for Sanctions
Slauson has filed a motion requesting that we assess sanctions against
Maldonado and her counsel, Vera. Slauson argues that “[t]his appeal is
indisputably without merit, warranting sanctions to compensate Slauson for
the expense incurred and to deter future conduct.”
Our authority to impose sanctions is set forth in Code of Civil
Procedure section 907, which provides, “When it appears to the reviewing
court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the
costs on appeal such damages as may be just.” Further, California Rules of
Court, rule 8.276(a) states that on motion of a party or our own motion,
we “may impose sanctions . . . on a party or an attorney for: [¶] (1) Taking a
frivolous appeal or appealing solely to cause delay.”
Under the well-settled standard adopted by our Supreme Court, “an
appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an
improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse
judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable
attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without
merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.) “Thus, we
may impose sanctions either when an appeal indisputably has no merit, or
when it is filed for an improper purpose.” (Foust v. San Jose Construction
Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 188, italics added.) Under this dual
20
approach, “[t]he subjective standard looks to the motives of the appealing
party and his or her attorney, while the objective standard looks at the merits
of the appeal from a reasonable person’s perspective. [Citation.] Whether
the party or attorney acted in an honest belief there were grounds for appeal
makes no difference if any reasonable person would agree the grounds for
appeal were totally and completely devoid of merit.” (Kleveland v. Siegel &
Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 556–557 (Kleveland).)
“[S]anctions should be used sparingly to deter only the most egregious
conduct.” (Kleveland, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 557.) “ ‘[A]ny definition
[of a frivolous appeal] must be read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect on
the assertion of litigants’ rights on appeal. Counsel and their clients have a
right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely
unlikely that they will win on appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit
is not by definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions.’ ” (In re Reno
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 513.) “An unsuccessful appeal, . . . ‘ “should not be
penalized as frivolous if it presents a unique issue which is not indisputably
without merit, or involves facts which are not amenable to easy analysis in
terms of existing law, or makes a reasoned argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.” ’ ” (Kleveland, at p. 557.)
Here, Slauson’s motion for sanctions relies solely on the theory that
Maldonado and her attorney filed an appeal that indisputably has no merit,
not that the appeal was brought for an improper purpose. In contending that
sanctions are warranted, Slauson reiterates her the arguments on the merits
of the appeal, as well as her contention, which we have rejected, that the
appeal is moot.
We conclude that Maldonado’s pursuit of this appeal does not rise to
the level of the type of egregious conduct that warrants the imposition of
21
sanctions for a frivolous appeal. Although we have ultimately concluded that
Maldonado’s appeal lacks merit, the issues are relatively complex.
Further, we perceive that the source of Maldonado’s procedural
confusion, which has persisted throughout this appeal, was Slauson’s original
failure to comply with her own duty, under section 9050, to serve Maldonado
with a notice of administration of the estate, which arose because Slauson
knew, due to the litigation of the 850 Petition, that Maldonado was asserting
an interest in the estate. Certainly, Maldonado was present at the hearing
when Slauson’s petition to administer the estate was granted, but Section
9050 does not excuse an administrator from serving a notice of
administration on persons whom the administrator believes to have actual
knowledge of the probate proceedings.
Moreover, although Maldonado indisputably had actual knowledge that
Slauson’s petition to administer the estate was granted on July 28, 2021,
there is no indication she knew that letters of administration were eventually
issued on August 5, 2021. As we have explained, that distinction is not
legally relevant. But it was not objectively unreasonable for Maldonado to
attempt to obtain relief based on the distinction.
Finally, although the probate court, rather than the trial court in the
instant action, was the forum in which Maldonado was required to exercise
her due process rights, under section 9103, to seek relief from a late-filed
creditor’s claim based on alleged lack of actual knowledge of the letters of
administration, we acknowledge the procedural complexities caused by the
intersection of the Probate Proceeding and the instant action. In that light,
Maldonado’s continued attempt, in this appeal, to obtain relief in this action
even though she failed to seek relief in the Probate Proceeding does not
amount to sanctionable conduct.
22
We accordingly deny Slauson’s motion for sanctions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Slauson’s motion for sanctions is denied.
Slauson shall recover her costs on appeal.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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