People v. Hinton CA2/7

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Filed 3/18/25 P. v. Hinton CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B330407

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA373704-01)
v.

DANIEL DESHAWN HINTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________
Daniel Deshawn Hinton appeals from the superior court’s
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95)1 following an evidentiary
hearing. Hinton argues substantial evidence does not support
the court’s ruling that he could still be convicted of murder and
attempted murder under current law. We affirm.

RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Prosecution
1. The Crimes
In 2010, Matthew Butcher (Butcher) was a manager and
Urban Jones, Jr. (Jones) was an armed security guard at the
Higher Path Holistic Care Dispensary (Higher Path), a medical
marijuana dispensary in Los Angeles. Higher Path had a
surveillance system that recorded activity both inside and outside
the dispensary. Patients had to ring the doorbell at the locked
front door, and then the security guard would open the door and
let them into the reception area. If the patient presented a
proper medical marijuana license, an employee in the buying
area would press a buzzer to open the door to the buying area,
where the employee would assist the patient.
Higher Path kept a computer database of its patients.
Hinton, whom Jones knew as “Scooter,” was a registered patient
who had been at the dispensary five or six times. Hinton’s cousin

1 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Raymond Lemone Easter (Easter)2 was also a registered patient
and had been at Higher Path with Hinton four or five times.
On June 24, 2010, Jones let a man he did not recognize into
the reception area. The man pulled out a gun and pointed it at
Jones’ face. He took Jones’ gun and ordered Jones and Butcher to
lie on the floor, which they did. He then took the remote control
from Jones and unlocked the front door. Hinton and Easter came
in, both carrying guns.
The first man ordered Jones to take him to the surveillance
system. Jones took him to the back office where the man forced
him to remove the surveillance cameras and recordings.
Meanwhile, Hinton and Easter held Butcher at gunpoint in the
reception area. The first man then called out for someone to
retrieve the office computer. Easter came to the back office,
punched Jones in the eye, threw him against the back door, and
repeatedly threatened to kill him.
The first man and Easter took Butcher to the back office
and ordered Butcher to open the safe, and he did so. They
removed about three to five pounds of marijuana and a cash box
containing $18,000 from the safe. They rejoined Hinton in the
buying area, where Easter ordered Jones and Butcher to lie face
down on the floor.
Hinton went to the reception area and made a call from
Butcher’s cell phone, telling someone, “ ‘Hurry up. Hurry up.’ ”
Jones heard the front doorbell ring, and then heard Hinton
tell the person at the front door “that we were busy and to come
back in an hour.” Easter came into the buying area, took

2 Easter was Hinton’s codefendant at trial. By separate
order dated March 10, 2025, we affirmed the denial of Easter’s
section 1172.6 petition.

3
Butcher’s keys, threatened to kill him, and kicked him in the
stomach.
Jones heard a car pull into the driveway next to Higher
Path. The first man, Easter, and Hinton gathered all the items
they had stolen—the marijuana, the money, the computer, the
DVR, the cell phone, patient files, and Butcher’s flash drive,
which contained an electronic copy of the patient database and
patient files—and put them in trash bags. Then the three men
carried the bags out the back door.
Holding a gun, Easter came back through the back door
and returned to the area where Jones and Butcher were lying on
the floor. Jones heard a gunshot and realized he had been shot
in the head. A few seconds later he heard a second gunshot, and
Butcher stopped moving. Jones exited out the front door.
Sarah Flores (Flores), who lived nearby, heard gunshots
and ran outside to the front of Higher Path. She saw Jones
holding his head and trying to make a call on his cell phone.
Jones said, “ ‘They robbed us. Scooter and the guys robbed us.
They come to the shop all the time.’ ” With Flores’s assistance,
Jones called his mother and told her, “ ‘Scooter and three other
. . . guys robbed us. They live in the apartments next to the
laundromat. They had everything. I told him not to shoot me.’ ”
Flores flagged down a patrol car. Jones told Detective
Michael Arteaga of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
that “Scooter” shot him. Paramedics arrived and transported
Jones to the hospital. Jones survived, but Butcher died from a
gunshot wound to his head.
2. The Investigation
LAPD Detective James King spoke to Jones in the hospital.
Jones described three suspects. The first was a stocky man he

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had never seen before. The second was Scooter, whom Jones had
seen at Higher Path several times before. The third was Easter,
whom Jones also had seen at Higher Path on previous occasions.
Jones said Easter shot him.

B. Defense
Jones’ mother, Victoria McCullough, testified that when
Jones called her on June 24, he did not identify who shot him.
When she spoke to him in the hospital, he said “there were three
male Blacks that all had guns. Scooter was there. There was a
male Black with braids that . . . shot him.” However, according to
Detective King, McCullough told him that Jones said Scooter shot
him.
Cory Couch also worked as an armed security guard at
Higher Path. He visited Jones in the hospital on June 26. Jones
told him that Scooter stole his gun, held the gun to Jones’ head,
and said, “ ‘I’m going to kill you. I’m going to blow your head
off.’ ” However, Jones did not know if Scooter was the one who
shot him. Jones also said that Scooter’s girlfriend drove the
getaway car.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2013, a jury found Hinton guilty of first degree murder
of Butcher (§ 187, subd. (a)) and attempted willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder of Jones (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664).3 The
jury found true a felony murder special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)) and that in the commission of the murder and
attempted murder, Hinton personally used a handgun

3 Easter was a codefendant.

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(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). We affirmed the judgment on appeal.
(People v. Hinton et al. (Aug. 24, 2015, B253708) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, Hinton filed, in pro. per., his first petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. After appointing
counsel for Hinton and holding a prima facie hearing, the
superior court denied the petition in 2020. Hinton timely
appealed, and his counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, raising no arguable issues on appeal.
Because Hinton did not file a supplemental brief, under People v.
Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496, 503, we dismissed his
appeal as abandoned. (People v. Hinton (Aug. 13, 2020,
B304929).)
In 2021, still in pro. per., Hinton filed a second petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. The superior court
summarily denied the petition, finding Hinton was procedurally
barred from filing a second petition.4 Hinton did not appeal the
court’s denial order.
In 2023, Hinton filed, in pro. per., the instant petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel
for Hinton, issued an order to show cause, and held an
evidentiary hearing. The clerk’s transcript from Hinton’s direct
appeal and the trial transcript were admitted into evidence.5
Hinton attempted to introduce the transcript from Easter’s

4 We augment the record on our own motion with the
superior court’s minute order from August 10, 2021. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
5 Although these transcripts were not transmitted to this
court as part of the record on appeal, we augment the record with
the transcripts on our own motion. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

6
section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, but the court excluded it as
inadmissible hearsay. No witnesses were called.
The court denied the petition, finding beyond a reasonable
doubt Hinton was guilty of both murder and attempted murder
as a direct aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill.6
The court found that while Hinton “did[ not] shoot the two
people,” “was[ not] the leader,” and “was[ not] present [inside the
dispensary] when the shooting occurred,” he “shared Easter’s
intent to kill” and facilitated the murder and attempted murder.
Specifically, the court determined the following circumstances
were relevant: Hinton was armed; he “witnessed Easter being
violent”; he witnessed Easter say “half a dozen times, ‘I should
kill you’ ”; he helped “remove the surveillance equipment and
cameras so they couldn’t be identified”; and he witnessed his
cohorts tie up the victims7 and place them on their stomachs on
the floor. Further, the court found particularly important that
“both . . . Butcher and . . . Jones knew and had seen . . . Hinton as
a client at the Higher Path Dispensary.” Based on those
circumstances, the court concluded “the plan was to execute the
witnesses” and “eliminate any identification of the robbers.”
Hinton timely appealed.

6 The court further determined that, as to the murder,
Hinton was guilty under a theory of felony murder as a major
participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
7 We found no evidence in the record that the victims were
tied up.

7
DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and narrowed the
felony-murder rule (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449 (Curiel); People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis)). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now
prohibits imputing malice based solely on one’s participation in a
crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of
murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule in section
189, subdivision (e). The latter provision now requires the People
to prove that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1)); an aider and abettor to murder who had the intent
to kill (id., subd. (e)(2)); or a major participant in an underlying
felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), who acted with
reckless indifference to human life as described in subdivision (d)
of section 190.2. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see Curiel, at p. 448; People
v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869; Strong, at p. 708;
Gentile, at pp. 842-843.) Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (SB 775) subsequently clarified the amendments to
sections 188 and 189 also applied to attempted murder
convictions. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544.)
SB 1437 also provided a procedure (codified in
section 1172.6) for “[a] person convicted of felony murder[,]
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or

8
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, [or] attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine” to
petition the superior court to vacate the convictions and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if the petitioner could not
now be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The
resentencing procedure begins with the filing of a petition
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are
met. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) The trial court must then determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c); Strong, at p. 708.)
If the petitioner has made this prima facie showing, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the convictions and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing the court may consider
evidence “previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony. (Id.,
subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the prosecutor may also offer
new or additional evidence. (Ibid.)
On appeal from an order denying a petition under section
1172.6 after an evidentiary hearing, we apply the substantial
evidence standard of review. (People v. Montanez (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270 (Montanez); People v. Guiffreda (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) “ ‘[W]e . . . “ ‘ “examine the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a

9
rational trier of fact in finding [the necessary fact] beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” . . . While the trial judge must review all
the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable
doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 414; see Montanez,
at pp. 270-271.) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339; see
Montanez, at p. 271.)

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
Finding Hinton Directly Aided and Abetted, with the Intent
To Kill, Murder and Attempted Murder
1. Relevant legal principles
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice “may be express
or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).) “It is express when there is a
manifest intent to kill.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 844; see
§ 188.) “ ‘Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill,’ ”
like express malice murder, “ ‘and the commission of a direct but
ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ”
(People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 457.)
“A person is guilty of a crime whether he or she committed
it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator.” (CALCRIM
No. 400; see § 31.) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in
three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a
crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and

10
abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s
unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those
unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the
achievement of the crime.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1219, 1225.) As to the means rea element, the defendant must
not only know the direct perpetrator’s intent but also share that
intent. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.) Thus, to be
guilty of directly aiding and abetting express malice murder and
attempted murder, the aider and abettor must share the direct
perpetrator’s intent to kill. (See ibid.)
Aiding and abetting may be shown by circumstantial
evidence. “ ‘Among the factors which may be considered in
making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at
the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and
after the offense.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015,
1054.) Motive is also a relevant factor. (See People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741 [“evidence of motive is often probative
of intent to kill”].)
Because a direct aider and abettor of murder and
attempted murder shares the criminal intent of the perpetrator,
he or she is ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing relief as a
matter of law. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848 [“Senate Bill
1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for
murder, because a direct aider and abettor to murder must
possess malice aforethought”]; People v. Jenkins (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 924, 931 [“Senate Bill 1437 did not change
accomplice liability for murder under direct aiding and abetting
principles. [Citation.] ‘One who directly aids and abets another

11
who commits murder is thus liable for murder under the new law
just as he or she was liable under the old law.’ ”].)
2. Analysis
Hinton challenges the superior court’s findings that he
shared Easter’s intent to kill Butcher and Jones and that his acts
assisted Easter in committing the murder and attempted
murder.8 He points to evidence that he did not “explicitly”
assault or threaten the victims; was not present during the
shootings; prevented a customer from entering the dispensary
during the robbery; and made a phone call, telling someone,
“Hurry up. Hurry up.” This evidence, he claims, “suggest[s] an
intention to manage the situation with minimal escalation” and
contradicts the superior court’s findings. We are not persuaded.9
By pointing to evidence that would support a contrary
conclusion, Hinton misconstrues the substantial evidence
standard of review. (See People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th
1354, 1379.) A defendant “does not show the evidence is
insufficient by citing only his own evidence, or by arguing about
what evidence is not in the record, or by portraying the evidence
that is in the record in the light most favorable to himself.”

8 Hinton does not dispute that Easter, with the intent to kill,
murdered Butcher and attempted to murder Jones.
9 Hinton also contends the superior court erred in finding
him guilty of murder under a felony-murder theory as a major
participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Because we conclude there is
substantial evidence of Hinton’s guilt for the murder under a
different and still-valid theory (direct aiding and abetting express
malice murder), we need not discuss the superior court’s findings
regarding the felony-murder theory.

12
(People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) Rather,
under the substantial evidence test, “ ‘we accept reasonable
inferences in support of the judgment and do not consider
whether contrary inferences may be made from the evidence.’ ”
(People v. Cunningham (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1056; see
People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261 [“The focus of the
substantial evidence test is on the whole record of evidence
presented to the trier of fact, rather than on ‘ “isolated bits of
evidence” ’ ”].)
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
superior court’s determination, Hinton’s presence at the scene of
the crime, companionship with Easter, and conduct before and
after the crime, as well as evidence of Hinton’s motive, all
support the conclusion he not only was aware of Easter’s intent to
kill but also shared that intent and acted to assist Easter in his
commission of the murder and attempted murder. (People v.
Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1054; People v. Smith, supra,
37 Cal.4th at p. 741.)
First, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that Hinton and
Easter shared a common purpose to kill Butcher and Jones given
Hinton and Easter’s close companionship. They were cousins
who arrived at the dispensary together. They also appeared to
work as a team—they played separate, but complementary roles:
Hinton guarded Butcher at gunpoint while Easter gathered
items; they bagged stolen items together; and they carried the
items out of the dispensary together. (See People v. Glukhoy
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599 [in deciding whether defendant
aided and abetted murder, court considered that defendant was
the actual perpetrator’s brother]; cf. People v. Lara (2017)
9 Cal.App.5th 296, 322 [companionship factor was “a wash”

13
because while defendants were “gang member companions” of
actual perpetrator, the evidence suggested the defendants “were
loyal to each other before they were loyal to [the actual
perpetrator]” and one of the defendants expressly discouraged the
actual perpetrator in committing the crime by telling him to calm
down].)
Second, Hinton was inside the dispensary during the entire
robbery, putting him in a position to witness and appreciate
Easter’s intent to kill. Hinton would have witnessed Easter
punch Jones, kick Butcher in the stomach, and repeatedly
threaten to kill both Jones and Butcher.10 Although using
threats or force is inherent in a robbery (§ 211) and does not
necessarily, on its own, lead to a reasonable inference that all
participants know and share the perpetrator’s intent to kill, such
an inference is reasonable here in light of the other probative
factors. (Cf. People v. Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 314
[holding it was not reasonable for court to infer that actual
perpetrator’s threat to victim of robbery, “ ‘give me the wallet or
I’ll kill you,’ ” showed defendant knew and shared perpetrator’s
intent to kill “in light of other facts,” including the lack of

10 Even if Hinton was not present in the same room as Easter
when Easter exhibited this violence, the court could reasonably
infer, based on Jones’ testimony, that Hinton heard Easter’s
physical violence and threats. Jones testified that while he was
in the back area with the unidentified man and Easter was in the
buying area, the unidentified man “called out for someone to
come” to the back area and “out of nowhere” Easter arrived.
Jones also testified that while he was in the buying area and
Hinton was in the reception area, he heard Hinton say, “ ‘Hurry
up. Hurry up.’ ” Thus, the court could reasonably infer that the
dispensary was small enough for sound to travel between rooms.

14
evidence that (1) defendant knew perpetrator had a weapon,
(2) there was “any motive other than to obtain money,” and
(3) there was companionship between defendant and
perpetrator].)
While the court found Hinton was not inside the dispensary
during the shooting, the court reasonably inferred Hinton was in
the getaway car “just outside” the dispensary, waiting for Easter.
And, because the evidence showed the getaway car was in the
dispensary’s driveway, close enough for Jones to hear it, the court
also reasonably inferred that Hinton was close enough to the
shooting to hear the gunshots . Hinton’s presence at every stage
of the crimes supports the court’s finding that he aided and
abetted the murder and attempted murder with the intent to kill.
(See People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1066
[substantial evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for
murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory where
defendant drove the shooter to the scene of the shooting; the
shooter’s gun “would have been very conspicuous when carried [in
the car]”; before the shooting, defendant and the shooter
surveilled the scene; defendant waited in the car while the
shooting took place; and defendant drove the shooter away
afterwards]; In re Gary F. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1081
[even though defendant did not go inside house where accomplice
committed burglary, substantial evidence supported conclusion
defendant was direct aider and abettor given he waited nearby,
and he and the actual perpetrator “were companions acting in
concert”].)
Third, Hinton’s conduct before and after the shootings
further supports the superior court’s findings. Before the
shootings, Hinton was armed with a gun and according to

15
Couch’s testimony, Hinton pointed Jones’ gun at Jones’ head,
threatening to kill him. By using a gun, Hinton “considered the
possibility of a violent encounter.” (People v. Lee (2011)
51 Cal.4th 620, 636 [evidence defendant brought a loaded
handgun “makes it ‘ “reasonable to infer that he considered the
possibility of homicide from the outset” ’ ”].) His “verbal
expressions of malice made so close in time to the shooting”
likewise supported the finding he harbored an intent to kill.
(People v. Felix (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1618, 1627.) In addition,
Hinton acted as a lookout, turning away a potential patient at
the front door, and helped bag and remove items from the
dispensary. (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402,
409 [watching for others who might approach is a “textbook
example of aiding and abetting”].) After the shootings, Hinton
fled with Easter and did nothing to help the victims. Thus, his
actions, both before and after the shootings, encouraged the
murder and attempted murder and demonstrate an intent to kill.
Finally, a reasonable factfinder could infer from the
evidence that Hinton shared Easter’s motive to kill Butcher and
Jones to prevent them from naming Hinton and Easter as the
robbers. Hinton and Easter did not wear masks at any point
even though Jones, and presumably Butcher, knew them as
Higher Path patients. And before Hinton left the dispensary, he
helped take the items that could identify the robbers, including
the entire surveillance system, computer, and patient files.
Because Hinton and Easter did not attempt to hide their
identities and made a point of removing anything that could
identify them as robbers, the court reasonably concluded that
both Hinton and Easter intended to leave no witnesses alive.
(See People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1019 [jury could

16
infer defendant killed victim to avoid detection for the crimes he
committed against her].) Substantial evidence thus supports the
superior court’s finding that Hinton aided and abetted, with the
intent to kill, the murder and attempted murder.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying Hinton’s petition
under section 1172.6.

STONE, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

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