CourtListener 10357294•People v. Araujo CA4/1
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Filed 3/17/25 P. v. Araujo CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D081682
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD291755)
RAFAEL MENDES ARAUJO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Aaron H. Katz, Judge. Affirmed.
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Rafael Mendes Araujo appeals the order suspending imposition of
sentence and placing him on probation for two years after a jury found him
guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and fleeing the scene of an accident in
which someone was injured. He claims two errors in the pattern instruction
the trial court gave the jury on the assault charge require reversal of the
conviction on that charge. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Zachary Overson was pedaling his bicycle up Mount Soledad one
morning when he encountered a line of vehicles obstructing the bicycle lane
as drivers crossed the lane to make a turn. He tapped the vehicles as he
passed them to alert the drivers to his presence. Araujo was driving one of
the vehicles Overson tapped. Araujo asked whether Overson had hit the
vehicle, and he responded he had done so to avoid a collision.
Overson continued up the road, noticed Araujo was following him, and
made a U-turn to go down the road. Araujo also made a U-turn and
continued pursuing Overson. To get way from Araujo, Overson changed
directions again and proceeded back up the road.
When Overson later rode his bicycle down Mount Soledad, he again
encountered Araujo. Araujo followed Overson and, according to Overson,
twice tried to drive into him. The second time he succeeded in knocking
Overson off his bicycle onto a pile of construction materials. Overson suffered
abrasions, contusions, and a concussion. Araujo drove away without stopping
or speaking to Overson.
Araujo claimed he pursued Overson to get information from him
because he had damaged Araujo’s vehicle. He denied trying to drive into
Overson or actually doing so.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Araujo with assault with a deadly weapon
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and fleeing the scene of an accident in which
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someone was injured (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)). They alleged the deadly
weapon used in the assault was a vehicle. (Id., § 13351.5.)
The trial court instructed the jury on assault with a deadly weapon in
part as follows:
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that:
“1. The defendant did an act with a deadly weapon other than a
firearm that by its nature would directly and probably result in
the application of force to a person;
“2. The defendant did that act willfully;
“3. When the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would
lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature
would directly and probably result in the application of force to
someone;
“AND
“4. When the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply
force with a deadly weapon.
“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it
willingly or on purpose. It is not required that he or she intend to
break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any advantage.
“The terms application of force and apply force mean to touch in a
harmful or offensive manner. The slightest touching can be
enough if it is done in a rude or angry way. Making contact with
another person, including through his or her clothing, is enough.
The touching does not have to cause pain or injury of any kind.
“The touching can be done indirectly by causing an object to
touch the other person.
“The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually
touched someone.
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“The People are not required to prove that the defendant actually
intended to use force against someone when he acted.”
(CALCRIM No. 875.)
The jury found Araujo guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and of
fleeing the scene of an accident in which someone was injured, and found true
the allegation the deadly weapon was a vehicle. The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed Araujo on formal probation for two years.
DISCUSSION
Araujo claims two portions of the pattern instruction the trial court
gave the jury on the mental state required for conviction of assault with a
deadly weapon misstated the law. We review such claims de novo (People v.
Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900; People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218)
and consider each in turn.
Araujo first challenges the portion of the instruction requiring the
People to prove “he was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to
realize that his act by its nature would directly and probably result in the
application of force to someone.” (CALCRIM No. 875.) He complains “this
formulation of this mens rea element is inherently unfair and should be
changed because the focus should be on the awareness of the defendant, not
the awareness of a reasonable person.” Araujo contends the instruction “did
not comport with the case law recognizing that the mens rea of assault
consists of the general intent to commit a battery.” He further contends that
because evidence was presented from which the jury reasonably could have
found he did not realize his driving would directly and probably lead to the
application of force to Overson, the instructional error requires reversal of the
conviction of assault with a deadly weapon. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court set out the mental state required for an assault
conviction in People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 (Williams). In that
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case, “[t]he trial court instructed the jury that defendant was guilty of assault
only if he ‘willfully and unlawfully committed an act that by its nature would
probably and directly result in the application of physical force being applied
to the person of another.’ ” (Id. at p. 783.) “The Court of Appeal found this
instruction erroneous because it described a mental state of negligence,” and
“held that assault requires either a desire to cause an application of physical
force or substantial certainty that such an application would result.” (Id. at
pp. 783–784.) The Supreme Court reversed. (Id. at p. 791.) It explained that
“a specific intent to injure is not an element of assault because the assaultive
act, by its nature, subsumes such intent.” (Id. at p. 786.) Rather, the mental
state for assault “is established upon proof the defendant willfully committed
an act that by its nature will probably and directly result in injury to another,
i.e., a battery.’ ” (Id. at p. 787.)1 “In other words, a defendant guilty of
assault must be aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person to
realize that a battery would directly, naturally and probably result from his
conduct. . . . He, however, need not be subjectively aware of the risk that a
battery might occur.” (Williams, at p. 788.) The Supreme Court thus held
the required mental state for assault is “actual knowledge of those facts
sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly
result in the application of physical force against another.” (Id. at p. 790.)
To define the mental state the People had to prove for the jury to find
Araujo guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, the trial court used the same
1 In the context of assault and battery, the term “injury” refers to “ ‘ “ ‘the
least touching’ ” ’ ” that is offensive to the recipient. (People v. Colantuono
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 214, fn. 4.) A battery requires application of some force,
but the force need not cause bodily harm or pain or even leave a mark. (Ibid.)
For assault “[n]o actual touching is necessary, but the defendant must do an
act likely to result in a touching, however slight, of another in a harmful or
offensive manner.” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55 Cal.4th 694, 702.)
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language the Supreme Court used in Williams. (Compare CALCRIM No. 875
with Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 788, 790.) Araujo acknowledges we
must follow Williams. (See People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 13; Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) He invites us to
write a critique of the decision, as did the Court of Appeal in People v. Wright
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 703, “to make it more likely the Supreme Court will
change and correct the law on this point.” We decline the invitation. The
Supreme Court denied the petition for review in Wright (id. at p. 725) and
has repeatedly followed Williams (see, e.g., In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528,
533–534; People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1066 (Perez); People v. Wyatt,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 702; People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 507–508;
People v. Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th 776, 781). Araujo must address his request
for a change in the law to the Supreme Court or to the Legislature. Until any
such request is granted, we must follow Williams and reject his first claim of
instructional error.
As his second claim of error, Araujo contends the trial court misstated
the law of assault when it instructed the jury as follows: “The People are not
required to prove that the defendant actually intended to use force against
someone when he acted.” (CALCRIM No. 875.) Araujo argues: “Like simple
assault, assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime, and the
general intent consists of the intent to use force against someone when
committing the assaultive act.” According to Araujo, the court omitted an
essential element of the crime when it told the jury the People did not have to
prove he intended to use force against someone, and that omission requires
reversal of the conviction because he presented evidence he intended not to
run into Overson but merely to get him to stop. We are not persuaded.
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Assault is a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime. (Perez,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1066; Williams, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 788; People v.
Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899.)2 The intent required for assault with a
deadly weapon “is the general intent to wilfully commit an act the direct,
natural and probable consequences of which if successfully completed would
be the injury to another.” (Rocha, at p. 899, fn. omitted.) “The intent to
cause any particular injury [citation], to severely injure another, or to injure
in the sense of inflicting bodily harm is not necessary.” (Ibid., fns. omitted.)
“[B]ecause the law seeks to prevent the wrongful application of physical force
upon the victim ‘irrespective of any actual purpose to cause it,’ the mens rea
element of assault is established by proof of general criminal intent.” (In re
Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, 198.) In other words, assault “does not
require any intent to cause an application of physical force” (People v.
Aznavoleh (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1186–1187), “because the assaultive
act, by its nature, subsumes such an intent” (Williams, at p. 786). This
means Araujo “did not have to intend to hit [Overson] to be guilty of assault.”
(People v. Golde (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 101, 109.) The only intent the People
had to prove was Araujo’s intent to do an act with a deadly weapon (his
vehicle) that by its nature would directly and probably result in the
application of force to Overson. (Williams, at p. 790; Rocha, at p. 899.) The
trial court therefore did not err by instructing the jury the People need not
prove Araujo intended to use force against someone.
2 “When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a
particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a
future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the
proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent.
When the definition refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act or
achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of
specific intent.” (People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 456–457.)
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Given our conclusion the trial court did not commit the instructional
errors claimed by Araujo, we need not, and do not, consider his related claims
the errors were prejudicial and require reversal of the conviction of assault
with a deadly weapon. (See People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 860, fn.
28; People v. Lewis (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 267, 281.)
DISPOSITION
The order suspending imposition of sentence and granting probation is
affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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