CourtListener 10356664•People v. Roblero CA4/1
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Filed 3/14/25 P. v. Roblero CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083019
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE406206)
GUILLERMO CHRISTIAN ROBLERO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Elizabeth M. Renner, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Guillermo Christian Roblero of a second degree
Watson1 murder and other crimes for driving drunk on the wrong side of the
freeway in the middle of the night, hitting an oncoming vehicle, and killing
the other driver. He appeals from the judgment, asserting two claims of
instructional error relating to the implied malice element of a Watson murder
and one claim of sentencing error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We briefly summarize the facts of the accident, focusing our attention
primarily on the evidence relevant to the implied malice issues raised on
appeal.
On April 10, 2021, Roblero got off work at midnight and went to the
Study Lounge bar in El Cajon to meet two friends. They were regulars at the
Study Lounge and knew the bar was a “heavy pour,” meaning that the
bartenders served more alcohol than customers paid for. Roblero arrived at
the bar at 12:24 a.m. and stayed until 1:48 a.m. His credit card receipts
showed that he purchased eleven drinks before leaving.
When they were ready to leave, one of Roblero’s friends called his sister
to come pick him up because he had a prior conviction for driving under the
influence (DUI) and did not want to risk driving drunk. The friend and his
sister both offered to give Roblero a ride home, but Roblero declined.
Surveillance video outside the bar showed Roblero swaying back and forth
with an unsteady gait and appearing to stumble. Roblero got into his car and
drove out of the parking lot.
Roblero initially got onto the I-8 freeway driving east in the eastbound
lanes. He then made a sudden left turn, crossed both eastbound lanes, and
drove onto the center median. He drifted back and forth from the roadway to
1 People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson).
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the median several times. The driver of another eastbound vehicle called 911
and continued observing Roblero. Roblero crossed over the entire center
median and began driving the wrong way in the westbound lanes of I-8,
narrowly missing several oncoming vehicles. After Roblero’s vehicle got stuck
on a guardrail for a few minutes, he continued driving the wrong way in the
westbound lanes for about a mile and eventually collided head on with the
victim’s vehicle, killing the victim. Roblero appeared to be going in and out of
consciousness before the collision.
When a CHP officer arrived at the scene, Roblero was unconscious and
there was a strong odor of alcohol emanating from his car. On the way to the
hospital, he went in and out of consciousness. His speech was slurred and
unintelligible, his eyes were red and watery, and there was a strong odor of
alcohol on his breath and person.
Based on blood draws taken at the hospital, Roblero’s blood
concentration range at the time of the collision was between .27 and .35
percent. To reach this level, Roblero would have had to consume about 14 to
19 standard drinks over the course of approximately an hour and a half.
At the hospital the next morning, Roblero told a police officer that he
knew it was dangerous to drink and drive, and a close friend of his had died
after driving drunk. He admitted he had a prior DUI conviction.
At the time of the accident, Roblero was on probation for the prior DUI,
which occurred less than two years earlier in November 2019. When Roblero
was arrested for the 2019 DUI, a CHP officer gave him a Watson warning
that if he drove drunk again and killed someone, he could be charged with
murder. The judge gave him a similar Watson warning twice when he pled
guilty to the DUI. As a result of this DUI conviction, Roblero attended a four-
month DUI program in 2020, which included information about the dangers
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of drinking and driving. He received Watson warnings during the program
orientation and in the exit interview. A search of Roblero’s cell phone
disclosed that friends and family members had also warned him not to drink
and drive.
Roblero testified in his own defense. Both of his parents abused alcohol
when he was growing up, and he suffered mental and physical abuse from his
mother’s boyfriends. Roblero admitted having a serious alcohol problem and
a prior DUI. He knew that drinking and driving was dangerous to human
life. His friend had died from a DUI while he was on the phone with Roblero.
Roblero remembered drinking at the Study Lounge on the night of the
accident but had no memory of anything that happened afterwards.
Roblero was charged with murder (Pen. Code,2 § 187, subd. (a); count
1), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (c)(1);
count 2), driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (a); count 3), driving with a measurable amount of blood
alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 4), and disobeying
a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4); count 5). The information further alleged
enhancements for personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)), a prior DUI conviction within the past 10 years (Veh. Code,
§§ 23540, 23626), and driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.15 percent or
more (Veh. Code, § 23578).
In a jury trial, the court instructed the jury with the version of
CALCRIM No. 520 then in effect on the elements of murder. This version of
CALCRIM No. 520 stated in relevant part:
“The defendant acted with implied malice if:
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
specified.
4
“1. He intentionally committed an act;
“2. The natural and probable consequences of the act
were dangerous to human life;
“3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was
dangerous to human life;
“AND
“4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for
human life.”
The court also instructed the jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 252
which stated that all the charged crimes, including second degree murder
with implied malice, were general intent crimes requiring not only the
commission of the prohibited act, but also a wrongful intent to do the
prohibited act.
The jury convicted Roblero as charged on all counts and found true the
charged enhancements. Although the verdict form did not specify the degree
of the murder, the jury instructions stated: “If you find the defendant guilty
of murder, it is murder of the second degree.”
The court sentenced Roblero to 15 years to life for second degree
murder (count 1) and an upper term of 10 years for vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated (count 2), with the latter sentence stayed under section 654.
The court dismissed counts 3 and 4 and sentenced Roblero to credit for time
served on count 5.
DISCUSSION
I
Roblero first argues that his murder conviction must be reversed
because the version of CALCRIM No. 520 given on implied malice murder did
not require the jury to make findings that (1) he committed an act that
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objectively involved a “high probability” of resulting in death; and (2) he
subjectively knew the act involved a “high probability” of death. We disagree.
Initially, the Attorney General contends that Roblero has forfeited this
contention by failing to request any such clarifying instruction at trial. As
the Attorney General notes, “[a] party may not argue on appeal that an
instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed
clarification, without first requesting such clarification at trial.” (People v.
Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503 (Hillhouse).) At the same time,
however, a failure to object does not prevent a defendant from challenging an
instruction on appeal if the asserted error affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. (§ 1259; People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.)
We agree with the Attorney General that Roblero’s challenge to the
version of CALCRIM No. 520 given at trial appears to fall within the former
category. He does not assert that the instruction as given was legally
incorrect. Rather, he argues that its use of the phrase “dangerous to human
life” was too imprecise because it “did not describe what this meant in terms
of the degree of the danger.” Roblero complains that the instruction “did
not . . . define what the phrase ‘dangerous to human life’ means” and should
have stated more specifically that it requires “a high degree of probability” of
death. This amounts to a contention that the instruction given at trial,
though legally correct, was “too general or incomplete, and thus needed
clarification . . . .” (Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 503.) Because no such
request for clarification was made in the trial court, the issue is forfeited.
(See, e.g., People v. Covarrubius (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 877 [“Defendant’s
failure to request clarifying language forfeits the issues on appeal.”]; People v.
Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 153 [“Because the instruction given was correct, it
was incumbent on defendants to request clarifying language.”].)
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Even if the issue were preserved, however, we would reject it on the
merits because it is foreclosed by binding Supreme Court precedents. As for
the objective component of implied malice, the Supreme Court rejected the
same argument Roblero makes here in People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4
Cal.4th 91, 110–111 (Nieto Benitez). The defendant there argued that
CALJIC No. 8.31 “misstates the law because the instruction omits a
requirement that defendant commit the act with a high probability that
death will result.”3 (Id. at p. 111.) The Supreme Court disagreed and
concluded that “the present CALJIC No. 8.31 correctly distills the applicable
case law.” (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the court noted it had
previously concluded in Watson “that the two linguistic formulations (‘an act,
the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life’ and ‘an act
[committed] with a high probability that it will result in death’) are
equivalent and are intended to embody the same standard.” (Nieto Benitez,
at p. 111; see also People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219, 1221–1222
[approving CALJIC definition of implied malice without any “high
probability” language and noting that Watson “made it abundantly clear that
the two definitions of implied malice” in the case law “articulated one and the
same standard”].)
As for the subjective component of implied malice, the Supreme Court
rejected Roblero’s argument in People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139.
There, the trial court granted a new trial to a defendant who had been
3 The version of CALJIC No. 8.31 given in Nieto Benitez stated in
relevant part: “ ‘Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of
a human being when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶]
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶]
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and
conscious disregard for, human life.’ ” (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 100.)
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convicted of second degree murder on an implied malice theory. The trial
court based its ruling on a finding of insufficient evidence that the defendant
subjectively knew “her conduct involved a high probability of resulting in the
death of another.” (Id. at p. 142.) But the Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court had erred in granting a new trial on this basis because subjective
knowledge of the high probability of death is not an element of implied
malice. (Id. at p. 157.) The court reasoned that “high probability of death” is
part of the objective component of implied malice, not the subjective
component. (Ibid.)
Roblero does not dispute that his arguments on appeal run contrary to
both Nieto Benitez and Knoller. He acknowledges that the Supreme Court in
Nieto Benitez “rejected a prior attempt to add the high degree of probability of
death to the instruction defining implied malice” but argues that its “analysis
is questionable.” Likewise, he concedes that the Supreme Court in Knoller
“said that a high probability of death applied only to the objective element of
implied malice and not to the subjective element” but suggests that Knoller
was “incorrect on this point.” As Roblero admits, however, we are not at
liberty to deviate from these controlling Supreme Court precedents. (Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
To the extent Roblero is suggesting that these cases have been
impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes), we disagree. There, the court was reviewing a trial
court’s denial of a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The
Supreme Court concluded there was insufficient evidence to support a theory
that the defendant was guilty of murder as a direct perpetrator who harbored
implied malice. The court based its decision primarily on the lack of
substantial evidence of proximate cause, but it also took issue with the trial
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court’s conclusion that the defendant’s conduct was “ ‘dangerous to human
life.’ ” The Supreme Court explained: “To suffice for implied malice murder,
the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or
speculative sense; it must ‘ “ ‘involve[ ] a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 989 [quoting Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 152].) The court found that the defendant’s conduct in traveling to rival
gang territory with other gang members did “not by itself give rise to a high
degree of probability that death will result.” (Reyes, at p. 989.)
Reyes did not involve a jury instruction issue and the court did not
suggest that either Nieto Benitez or Knoller was wrongly decided. The Reyes
court’s reference to the “high probability of death” standard in deciding a
sufficiency of evidence question under section 1172.6 does not amount to a
holding that trial courts must include such language in the jury instructions
defining implied malice. Reyes did not call into question the Supreme Court’s
own prior holdings that the “high probability” and “natural consequences”
standards of implied malice are one and the same, and that it is proper to
instruct the jury solely on the latter. (Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at
p. 111; Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1219, 1221–1222.) Because the
Supreme Court in Reyes did not decide this issue and did not overrule or
disapprove any of its own prior case law, we remain bound by its decisions in
Nieto Benitez and Knoller. We therefore find no error in the implied malice
instruction given at Roblero’s trial.4
4 We recognize that since Roblero’s trial, CALCRIM No. 520 has been
modified to state in relevant part: “The natural and probable consequences of
the (act/[or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/[or]
failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it would result in
death.” (Italics added.) In making this modification, however, the CALCRIM
committee did not suggest that it was legal error to give the prior version, the
substance of which was approved in Nieto Benitez and Dellinger.
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II
Roblero next argues that the trial court committed reversible error by
instructing the jury with a version of CALCRIM No. 252 which stated that
second degree murder with implied malice is a general intent crime. Even
assuming any error, we would find it to be harmless under any standard.
California’s appellate courts have been somewhat divided on whether
implied malice murder is better characterized as a general intent crime or a
specific intent crime. (Compare People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 450
[implied malice does “not fall literally within the [standard] formulation of
specific intent,” but it is “closely akin to [the] definition of specific intent,
which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly
culpable mental state”], superseded by statute on another point as stated in
People v. Timms (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1297–1298, and Ho v. Carey
(9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3d 587, 592–593 [general-intent instruction improper
for implied malice murder charge]; with People v. Reyes (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 975, 984 [“ ‘[T]he criteria of specific intent for [the voluntary
intoxication statute] are not necessarily the same as the criteria of specific
intent as a measure of the scienter required for an offense.’ ”], and People v.
Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 380 [“[S]econd degree murder based on
implied malice is a general intent crime but with the requirement of a certain
mental state[.]”].) We need not resolve the issue because, regardless of
whether implied malice murder is better categorized as a specific intent
crime or a general intent crime with a required mental state, it is not
reasonably likely the version of CALCRIM No. 252 given at trial caused the
jury to misapply the law of murder.
As we have noted, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
murder using CALCRIM No. 520. This instruction correctly informed the
10
jury that “the People must prove” malice aforethought as a necessary element
of murder and correctly defined express and implied malice. The court
further instructed the jury that “[w]henever I tell you the People must prove
something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.” These
instructions in combination clearly informed the jury of the prosecution’s
burden of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt as a necessary element
of murder.
Nothing in CALCRIM No. 252 contradicted these instructions or could
reasonably have been construed to relieve the prosecution of the burden of
proving malice. As given, CALCRIM No. 252 said that Roblero had to act
with a wrongful intent to do the prohibited act, and CALCRIM No. 520 said
that he had to act with the mental state of malice for a murder conviction.
CALCRIM No. 252 did not in any way suggest to the jury that it could convict
Roblero of murder without the malice element required by CALCRIM No.
520. Notably, even the prosecutor told the jury in closing argument: “In
order to prove the defendant committed murder, I have to prove
that . . . when he acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought.”
(Italics added.) She conceded Roblero did not act with express malice but
argued at length why the prosecution had met its burden of proving each of
the elements of implied malice. In response, defense counsel similarly
emphasized the malice requirement of CALCRIM No. 520 and devoted nearly
his entire argument to the elements of implied malice. Neither side
suggested to the jury that the wrongful intent language of CALCRIM No. 252
relieved the prosecution of the burden of proving malice as required by
CALCRIM No. 520.
Given the totality of the jury instructions, and the parties’ closing
arguments focusing extensively on the malice requirement and the elements
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of implied malice, the jury could not have found the defendant guilty of
second degree murder without necessarily finding that he acted with implied
malice by intentionally committing an act, the natural and probable
consequence of which were dangerous to human life, with knowledge that his
act was dangerous to human life. There was also ample evidence presented
at trial to support such a finding. Under either the Watson standard of
prejudice for state law errors (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836–
837) or the Chapman standard for federal constitutional errors (Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24), we would therefore find any error in the
version of CALRIM No. 252 given at trial to be harmless.
III
The final issue Roblero raises is a sentencing issue. The trial court
imposed a concurrent upper term of 10 years (stayed under § 654) for the
count 2 conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.
(§ 191.5, subd. (c)(1).) Roblero argues that the trial court erred when it found
true two of the four aggravating factors it relied on in imposing the upper
term for this count. The two factors Roblero contests are: (1) that “[t]he
crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm,
or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); and (2) that “[t]he victim was
particularly vulnerable” (id. at subd. (a)(3)).5 Roblero contends that these
factors were: (1) inapplicable as a matter of law because they were inherent
in his commission of the offenses; and (2) not supported by substantial
evidence.
5 The other two aggravating factors the trial court found true that
Roblero does not contest are: (1) Roblero was on probation at the time of the
offense (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (2) Roblero’s convictions
were “of increasing seriousness” (id. at (b)(2)).
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We disagree. As to the first of these factors, the crime of gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated can be committed with varying
degrees of “cruelty, viciousness, or callousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1).) The fact that it was committed with a “high degree” of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness is not inherent in the commission of the crime.
(Ibid.) Moreover, substantial evidence supported a finding that Roblero acted
with a high degree of callousness because he knew he had a serious drinking
problem, he had a prior DUI, he had been warned repeatedly about the
dangers of driving drunk, he decided to drink an enormous quantity of
alcohol and drive home anyway, he knew his friend had decided not to drive
home drunk but declined a ride from his friend’s sister, and he continued
driving the wrong way on the freeway in the middle of the night even after
colliding with the guardrail and coming to a stop for several minutes. The
trial court could reasonably find that these facts demonstrated a higher
degree of callousness than that required just for the conviction. We therefore
conclude the trial court did not err by finding this aggravating factor true.
As to the second of these factors, a victim of gross vehicular
manslaughter who has no advance warning or ability to take evasive action
may be characterized as “particularly vulnerable” within the meaning of
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3). (People v. Nicolas (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182; People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1321.)
Moreover, there is substantial evidence to support such a finding here. The
victim was driving on the freeway in the dead of night when Roblero’s vehicle
suddenly crashed into him head on with both vehicles traveling at freeway
speeds in opposite directions. Although it is true that all victims of drunk
driving may be vulnerable in some sense (People v. Piceno (1987) 195
Cal.App.3d 1353, 1358), it does not necessarily follow that they are all
13
“particularly” vulnerable within the meaning of California Rules of Court,
rule 4.431(a)(3). “ ‘[P]articular vulnerability’ is determined in light of the
‘total milieu in which the commission of the crime occurred.’ ” (People v.
Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1694.) We conclude that the trial court
did not err by finding this aggravating factor to be true either.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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