CourtListener 10356633•In re N.T. CA4/1
Texto completo
Filed 3/14/25 In re N.T. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re N.T., a Minor.
D084828
S.T.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 23AD000095C)
v.
T.B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Tilisha Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Marcus Family Law Center and Christopher McDonough, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
This is the third1 appeal of T.B. (Mother), after her three attempts to
terminate the parental rights of S.T. (Father) to their minor son N.T. (Minor).
1 The parties in this high-conflict case have been embroiled in litigation
in the family and juvenile courts for about a decade.
In her freedom from parental custody and control (FFCC) petition
(Fam. Code, § 7800 et seq.2), as amended (Petition), Mother contended
Father abandoned Minor between September 2021 and February 2023 for
purposes of section 7822, subdivision (a)(3), which provides a procedure for
termination of parental rights under specified conditions. The juvenile court,
in its 31-page August 8, 2024 final written ruling after trial (August 8 Final
Ruling and Order), denied the Petition, finding Mother failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that (1) Father intended to abandon Minor and
(2) it was in Minor’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights.
On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it (1) refused
to replace San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency)
with a new investigator to investigate what Mother claims were “contested
facts” between the parties bearing on the best interests of Minor; (2) allegedly
applied an incorrect legal standard in determining Minor’s best interest; and
(3) granted the motion to quash the testimony of a family court services
(FCS) counselor from the parties’ stayed dissolution case and to exclude the
counselor’s confidential FCS report.
As we explain, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in refusing to
appoint a new family investigator because the investigator’s report, as
supplemented, met all statutory requirements and any purported deficiency
in the report went to the weight of the evidence. We also conclude the court
did not apply an incorrect legal standard in determining Minor’s best
interests and properly exercised its discretion in granting the motion to
quash. We therefore affirm the August 8 Final Ruling and Order.
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. Overview
Mother and Father married in 2004 and had one child, Minor, who was
born in 2013. Mother filed for divorce in 2015, which proceeded in family
court and resulted in a status-only dissolution judgment in 2016. That same
year, over Father’s objection, the court granted Mother’s request to relocate
from San Diego to Michigan with Minor, and gave Father visitation.
Father was out of contact with Minor from December 2016 through
April 2018, spending much of this time in custody with U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). Upon release, Father sought ex parte relief in
the family court to visit Minor, claiming Mother had prevented contact with
the child. In April 2018, the court granted Father’s request for ex parte
Skype reunification therapy with Minor and ordered the parties to
participate in a high-conflict parenting program. In August 2018, the court
granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of Minor, with Father
continuing to have visitation.
In early 2019, the family court denied Mother’s request to decrease
Father’s Skype visits with Minor. By that time, Father and Minor had
visited about 80 times. Father subsequently filed a motion requesting in-
person reunification therapy with Minor.
B. First Petition
In July 2019, while Father’s motion was pending in the family court,
Mother filed an FFCC petition in the juvenile court seeking to terminate
3 We summarize the facts in the record by presenting them in a light
most favorable to the juvenile court’s August 8 Final Ruling and Order. (See
In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)
3
Father’s parental rights. As a result of the petition, the family court
proceedings were stayed.4
In March 2020, the juvenile court denied the petition based on claim
and issue preclusion. The court relied on findings made by the family court
that Minor had a “good relationship” with Father and that Father had made
efforts to pursue contact and reunification with Minor in 2018 and 2019. The
juvenile court added it was ‘incomprehensible . . . that [it] would find that
[Father] intended to abandon [Minor] and that legally severing his
relationship with his child after five years of litigation during which he
continually sought contact would be in [Minor’s] best interests”; and that
Minor’s “best interests have been at the heart of previous litigation over the
course of years.”
Mother appealed. (Tanya B. v. Steven T. (Nov. 25, 2020), D077580
[nonpub. opn.].) We subsequently dismissed the case due to her untimely
notice of appeal.5
C. Second Petition
Mother filed her second FFCC petition in the juvenile court in
February 2021. Mother again alleged that Father did not communicate with
4 Section 7807, subdivision (b) provides in part: “[A]ny motion or petition
for custody or visitation filed in a proceeding under this part shall be stayed.
The petition to free the minor from parental custody and control under this
section is the only matter that may be heard during the stay until the court
issues a final ruling on the petition.”
5 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our prior opinions in this
case. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d)(1), 459, subd. (a); Epic Communications,
Inc. v. Richwave Technology, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1347, fn. 3
[“ ‘a court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records’ ”].)
4
Minor between December 2016 and April 2018 and claimed that “[t]he
circumstances in this case have not changed.”
The juvenile court appointed the Agency to evaluate the possible
termination of Father’s parental rights. The court also appointed Minor
counsel, who recommended that Minor travel to California and meet with
Father.
In September 2021, the juvenile court denied Mother’s second petition
based on claim and issue preclusion, finding it was “simply an attempt to get
a different ruling on the same facts.” As before, the court lifted the stay and
returned the case to the family court. Mother appealed and we affirmed the
dismissal, concluding Mother was barred from relitigating the same
abandonment issues in her successive petitions. (T.B. v. S.T. (July 15, 2022),
D079696 [nonpub. opn.].)
In May 2022, Mother filed a motion in a Michigan court to change
Minor’s legal name. Father traveled to Michigan to contest the motion. In
early 2023 the Michigan court denied Mother’s request.
D. The Petition and the Juvenile Court’s Ruling
Mother filed her third Petition in February 2023. She alleged that
between September 24, 2021, and February 15, 2023, Father had voluntarily
abandoned Minor for purposes of section 7822, subdivision (a)(3). Mother
amended her Petition in March 2023.
In April 2023, the juvenile court appointed Father counsel. Later that
year and as discussed in more detail post, the court denied Mother’s request
to appoint a new investigator to replace the Agency. The court set trial for
mid-November 2023.
As also discussed post, in early November Mother filed a notice of
lodgment regarding a confidential FCS report generated in the parties’
5
stayed dissolution case. In addition to seeking the report’s admission into
evidence, Mother served a civil subpoena on the FCS counselor who prepared
the report. In response, counsel for the FCS counselor and the Superior
Court of California, County of San Diego, filed a motion to quash, leading to a
trial continuance. In December 2023 the juvenile court granted the motion to
quash the subpoena.
Trial commenced in January 2024, and took place over multiple days.
In late June Mother submitted a 29-page request for statement of decision
that included 55 contested issues. Over Father’s objection and to promote
judicial expediency, the juvenile court in its August 8 Final Ruling and Order
considered the principal controverted issues Mother raised, but did not
consider any evidence or argument that was not presented during the trial.
In its August 8 Final Ruling and Order, the juvenile court found
Mother failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Father intended
to abandon Minor. It thus denied the Petition, lifted the stay, and ordered
the parties to return to family court to address any request for modification of
the existing custody and visitation orders.
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory Framework
“Section 7822 provides a separate and distinct mechanism for
terminating parental rights based on a parent’s voluntary abandonment of a
child.” (In re Aubrey T. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 316, 325 (Aubrey T.).) Under
this statute, if “[o]ne parent has left the child in the care and custody of the
other parent for a period of one year without any provision for the child’s
support, or without communication from the parent, with the intent on the
part of the parent to abandon the child,” a court may declare the child free
from the parent’s custody and control. (§ 7822, subd. (a)(3); In re E.M. (2014)
6
228 Cal.App.4th 828, 839 (E.M.) [“ ‘ “ ‘In order to constitute abandonment
there must be an actual desertion, accompanied with an intention to entirely
sever, so far as it is possible to do so, the parental relation and throw off all
obligations growing out of the same.’ ” ’ ”].) “A declaration of freedom from
parental custody and control . . . terminates all parental rights and
responsibilities with regard to the child.” (§ 7803.)
“[A] section 7822 proceeding to terminate parental rights is appropriate
‘where three main elements are met: (1) the child must have been left with
another; (2) without provision for support or without communication from the
parent for the statutory period; and (3) with the intent on the part of the
parent to abandon the child.’ ” (Aubrey T., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 326.)
The court must act in the best interest of the child in a section 7822
proceeding. (§ 7890; see § 7801 [“This part shall be liberally construed to
serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child.”].)
“ ‘ “ ‘[The] question whether [an] intent to abandon exists and whether
it has existed for the statutory period is a question of fact for the trial court,
to be determined upon all the facts and circumstances of the case.’ ”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] In making this determination, the court ‘must
objectively measure the parent’s conduct, “consider[ing] not only the number
and frequency of his or her efforts to communicate with the child, but the
genuineness of” the parent’s efforts.’ ” (Aubrey T., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
p. 327.) The “failure to provide support[ ] or failure to communicate is
presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon. If the parent or parents have
made only token efforts to support or communicate with the child, the court
may declare the child abandoned by the parent or parents.” (§ 7822,
subd. (b).)
7
The party who files a section 7822 petition has the burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that all elements of section 7822 have been
met. (E.M., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at pp. 838–839.) “ ‘Clear and convincing’
evidence requires a finding of high probability.” (In re Angelia P. (1981)
28 Cal.3d 908, 919 [noting courts have also described this standard “as
requiring that the evidence be ‘ “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt” and
“sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable
mind” ’ ”].)
II. Standards of Review
“ ‘[T]he decision to terminate parental rights lies in the first instance
within the discretion of the trial court, “and will not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of that discretion.” ’ ” (Adoption of A.B. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
912, 924 (A.B.).) “ ‘When applying the deferential abuse of discretion
standard, “the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial
evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of
the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” ’ ” (Ibid.;
accord, Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712.)
“ ‘Substantial evidence is “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the
requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.” ’ [Citation.] When
reviewing a finding made under the clear and convincing evidence standard,
we review the entire record to determine whether it contains ‘substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.’ (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th
989, 1011.) We ‘view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have
8
evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.’ (Id. at pp. 1011–1012.)
‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but
merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the
trial court.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re K.M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 910, 914
(K.M.).)
III. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Postpone the
Trial and Appoint a New Investigator
Mother contends we must reverse the juvenile court’s August 8 Final
Ruling and Order because the report of the Agency’s investigator, Tina Jako,
was flawed for two reasons: first, Jako did not consider the best interests of
Minor or investigate Mother’s claims against Father, due to what Mother
contends is the Agency’s policy of recommending denial of an FFCC petition
when there is no pending adoption; and second, the report did not satisfy the
requirements of section 7851, subdivision (b).
A. Governing Principles
Sections 78506 and 7851 require the juvenile court to notify a qualified
investigator to investigate the circumstances of the child and the facts that
may justify termination of parental rights under section 7822. The
investigator then files a report with the court for its consideration in ruling
on a petition for termination of parental rights.
6 Section 7850 provides: “Upon the filing of a petition under
Section 7841, the clerk of the court shall, in accordance with the direction of
the court, immediately notify the . . . qualified court investigator . . . , who
shall immediately investigate the circumstances of the child and the
circumstances which are alleged to bring the child within any provision of
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7820).”
9
As relevant here, section 7851, subdivision (a) provides that an
investigator “shall render to the court a written report of the investigation
with a recommendation of the proper disposition to be made in the proceeding
in the best interest of the child.” Subdivision (b) of this statute requires the
report to include statements: (1) explaining the nature of the proceeding to
the child; (2) conveying the child’s feelings and thoughts concerning the
proceeding and (3) attitude towards the parent or parents; and (4) informing
the child of his or her right to attend the hearing on the petition.
Subdivision (d) requires the court to receive the report into evidence and
consider it in ruling on the petition. (§ 7851, subd. (d).)
“The ‘statutory purpose of the report is to inform the court of the best
interests of the child, and the interests of the children are fundamental to the
proceeding,’ so it is ‘the trial court’s obligation to read and consider the report
sua sponte.’ ” (In re Noreen G. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1380
(Noreen G.).) “ ‘Deficiencies in an assessment report surely go to the weight
of the evidence, and if sufficiently egregious may impair the basis of a court’s
decision to terminate parental rights[,]’ but are not prejudicial per se.” (In re
Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (Valerie W.); accord, Noreen G., at
p. 1381.)
B. Additional Background
During a hearing in August 2023, Mother argued the juvenile court
should replace the Agency with a new investigator because of the Agency’s
policy of recommending dismissal of an FFCC petition when there is no
pending adoption. Father argued the court should reappoint Jako. Minor’s
counsel agreed with Father, noting Jako had done “hundreds” of reports
concerning FFCC petitions, was “very reliable” and “very honest,” and
understood the statutory requirements when preparing such reports.
10
In reappointing the Agency and Jako to conduct the section 7851
investigation and prepare the report, the juvenile court noted it would be the
ultimate “decision-maker” regarding any potential bias. The court ordered
Minor’s interview to be conducted in-person in San Diego, after Jako
“strongly” objected to Mother’s request for a virtual interview.
1. The October 30 Report
At a hearing on October 31, 2023, Mother renewed her objection to the
Agency acting as the investigator, one day after Jako filed her 13-page report
recommending denial of the Petition. Mother argued the report was
“essentially a statement of the history of the proceedings, the statement of
what each parties’ position is, and then a blanket statement” of the Agency’s
policy recommending denial of an FFCC petition when not accompanied by
an adoption proceeding. Father argued Jako’s October 30 report complied
with section 7851 and contained “excellent information that will be very
beneficial to the court.” Minor’s counsel agreed with Father.
The October 30 report included a chronology of events beginning when
the parties met in 1999 through the date of the report; lengthy summaries of
interviews of the parties; a summary of Minor’s interview; and a
recommendation by the Agency. The October 30 report stated: “This Agency
does not support terminating a parent’s parental rights when there is no
pending adoption. This Agency believes the intent of . . . section 7822 is in
relation to a pending adoption and not to simply take a parent’s parental
rights away.”
During the in-person interview with Jako, Minor stated he lived at
home with Mother. When asked if Father lived there, Minor responded, “ ‘I
don’t have a dad in my life.’ ” In follow-up questioning, Minor stated he did
not know who his father was and had never received a “card, gift or letter”
11
from him. Based on these answers, Jako did not ask Minor any further
questions about Father.
The juvenile court ruled it would accept and consider the Agency’s
October 30 report, and reiterated it would make its decision on the Petition
based on the totality of the evidence.
2. Jako’s Initial Trial Testimony
Jako has been investigating FFCC cases for about 22 years, as she is a
social worker in the adoption section of the Agency. In this capacity, she has
written “thousands of reports and testified hundreds of times.”
Jako reviewed “everything” given to her by trial counsel in preparing
the October 30 report, but noted her practice was not to “provide specifics
when a case is contested and is going to trial.” Instead, her report provides a
“foundation,” leaving it up to the attorneys to try their own cases and the
juvenile court to decide what was in a child’s best interest.
In explaining her recommendation of dismissal, Jako noted the
Agency’s philosophy is that section 7822 “is intended for purposes of an
adoption” and that without such a companion proceeding dismissal was
appropriate. Despite the Agency’s view, Jako testified that her October 30
report included “all the same information” she normally includes when she
does an investigation in a case with a pending adoption.
At the conclusion of Jako’s testimony, the juvenile court took a recess to
review the applicable statutes. The court noted that, in light of her
testimony, it was “concerned” because the October 30 report did not appear to
include a recommendation based on Minor’s best interests. Minor’s counsel
and Mother agreed with the court’s assessment, and asked the court to
postpone the trial and appoint a new investigator.
12
Father disagreed, arguing the section 7851 investigation and report did
not require the investigator to address the portions of section 7822 regarding
“abandonment, the intent to abandon, and what is in the best interests of the
minor” in that context; and that Jako conducted a “full investigation” and her
report met all the requirements of section 7851 in determining Minor’s best
interests.
The juvenile court then questioned Jako, noting that although Jako
may have done a proper investigation, her purported failure to opine on the
best interests of Minor was concerning. Jako clarified she “might have
got[ten] a little tripped up on some of the questions” asked by the attorneys
and it was her position and that of the Agency that dismissal of the Petition
was in Minor’s “overall best interest.”
The juvenile court ruled it was “uncomfortable going forward without
an independent investigator to actually do an investigation in line with
[section] 7851[, subdivision] (a) and identify the disposition related to the
investigation.” The court ordered counsel to meet and confer to identify
another investigator, and set a new hearing date.
3. The Agency Agrees to Supplement the October 30 Report
At the follow-up hearing held about a week later, counsel for the
Agency made an appearance to address the Agency’s investigation and
report. Counsel represented the Agency had in fact considered the best
interests of Minor in preparing its October 30 report; suggested there “was
some confusion” regarding Jako’s testimony “and where any analysis and
best interest considerations fell”; and stated the Agency would agree to
supplement the report “with any additional information the Court might
request that it deems is relevant to the minor’s best interest.”
13
The juvenile court heard additional argument, including from Minor’s
counsel, who represented he had contacted the parties during the week and
recommended they agree to supplement the October 30 report rather than
retain a new investigator and start from scratch. Minor’s counsel argued
that the “real question” before the court was whether Father was an “asset”
or a “detriment” to Minor; that the answer to that question did not depend on
Minor but instead on Father; that Minor has a half-sibling, and thus
terminating Father’s parental rights would also result in Minor losing a
sibling relationship; and that with Father’s counsel’s permission, Minor’s
counsel had met with Father and concluded Father had the potential to make
a “positive” impact in Minor’s life.
Minor’s counsel further argued that Jako was in a position to answer
these questions; that these type of cases—in which one parent moves under
section 7822 to terminate the rights of the other parent—were “outlier[s]”
because the Agency’s position was it was “better” to have a father “than no
father unless he is a [section] 7825[7] father”; that in counsel’s 40 years of
practice, this was only the third time he had been involved in a case involving
termination of parental rights when no adoption was pending; that in his
7 Section 7825 provides in part: “(a) A proceeding under this part may be
brought where both of the following requirements are satisfied: [¶] (1) The
child is one whose parent or parents are convicted of a felony. [¶] (2) The
facts of the crime of which the parent or parents were convicted are of such a
nature so as to prove the unfitness of the parent or parents to have the future
custody and control of the child.” Subdivision (b) of this statute applies when
a child is conceived as a result of rape and the father is convicted of that
violation. (§ 7825, subd. (b).) Other provisions also allow for a proceeding to
be brought under the FFCC. (See e.g., §§ 7823 [neglected or cruelly treated
child]; 7824 [parents suffering from disability due to alcohol or controlled
substances]; & 7826 [parent declared developmentally disabled or mentally
ill].) None of these provisions apply in this case.
14
view, Mother had a “big” hill “to climb to show this father is, per se, a
detriment to the child”; and that if Mother had evidence of detriment, he
would “welcome” its presentation.
In light of the Agency’s agreement to supplement the October 30 report,
the juvenile court reconsidered its previous order, found that Jako was
“competent” and “qualified” to provide additional information to meet the
requirements of section 7851, and ordered her to “follow up and address the
points laid out in sub[section] (b), section (1) through (4)” of the statute. Jako
agreed to supplement her report, noting her next interview of Minor would
likely be “very delicate” because it was obvious from the first interview that
Minor did “not know about these proceedings, per se, the very specifics of
them.” The court repeated that whatever recommendation the Agency made
in its supplemental report was “just that, a recommendation”; and that the
court would decide the case based on the totality of the evidence.
4. The Agency’s April 9, 2024 Supplemental Report
The Agency’s supplemental report continued to recommend dismissal of
the Petition. Jako conducted a second, in-person interview with Minor on
March 15. The day before the interview, at Jako’s request, Mother talked to
Minor about Father. To facilitate this discussion, Jako provided Mother with
a copy of section 7851.
During the interview, Jako confirmed that Minor understood what the
word “ ‘termination’ ” meant. Jako explained every child has two biological
parents. At that point Minor referred to Father as his “male parent,” and
stated he did not plan on meeting the “male parent” or having any
relationship with him. When Jako reminded Minor of Skype visits he had
had with Father for “several year[s],” the Minor responded he could not
remember talking to anyone on Skype.
15
Jako next explained the nature of the Petition. Minor responded he
was “okay with the termination process,” adding he did not like to see Mother
“stressed out” like this. Jako informed Minor he had an attorney who was his
“voice in court” and whose job was to represent him and his best interests.
She also informed Minor he could attend the trial if he wanted.
Minor then asked Jako several questions including whether she had
met the “male parent” and what she knew about the “male parent.” During
their conversation Minor ostensibly learned for the first time that he had a
half sibling. The interview ended with Minor stating it was a “good idea to
terminate the male parent’s rights.” Jako concluded Minor had a good
understanding of the proceedings, but she was unable to explain to Minor
“why” Mother had filed the Petition.
5. Minor’s Testimony
Minor testified remotely without either parent being present, although
each parent’s counsel was present and his testimony was read to the parties
at its conclusion. Minor’s understanding of Father’s “rights” was that Father
wanted to “meet” him; and Minor thought it was “great” and “the best thing
that could happen” if the “male parent’s” rights were terminated. When
asked why, Minor explained the “male parent” was “a scary stranger that
tried to kidnap me” and “maybe would have taken me away from my mom
forever, and he didn’t listen to the police when they were there.”8 Minor also
described the “male parent” as a “monster,” and said he was having trouble
8 Minor apparently was referring to an incident in August 2015 when he
was two years old, after Mother and Minor traveled to Michigan and Father
missed visitation time. On their return and to make up this time, Father told
Mother he was keeping Minor overnight. Mother called the police, who
allowed Minor to remain with Father. He returned Minor the next day.
16
falling asleep at night because he lived in “fear” of what was going to happen
to him if the “male parent” tried to kidnap him again.9
Minor testified the “male parent” did not “pay” for him, did not “love”
him, and instead “hate[d]” him. When questioned how he knew these things,
Minor stated Mother had told him this the day before. Minor claimed to have
a “vague” memory of his alleged kidnapping, explaining he was “really
scared” and “crying a lot” when it happened; and that the day before, Mother
had confirmed it was the “male parent” who was responsible.
Minor did not know his legal name included the “male parent’s” last
name. Minor also did not recall moving from San Diego to Michigan, and the
only thing he remembered about San Diego was the “kidnapping” incident,
which memory “still remain[ed] strong in [his] heart.” Mother never shared
with Minor any nice things about the “male parent” or any other details, and
Minor was unaware that the “male parent” loved him and wanted to spend
time with him. Minor, however, had no interest in seeing what kind of
person the “male parent” was, and refused to keep an “open mind” if they met
because Minor would be “traumatized.”
6. Other Testimony
Jako retook the witness stand and was questioned about the April 9
supplemental report. Jako testified it was in Minor’s best interest to dismiss
the Petition, which opinion she claimed was similar to her original
recommendation. She found the second interview with Minor “enlightening,”
as he now referred to Father as his “male parent” and made clear he had no
interest in meeting Father.
9 The juvenile court found there was no evidence to support Minor’s
statements that Father did not care about him and/or tried to kidnap him.
17
Jako opined that Mother had influenced Minor’s testimony. Jako noted
that during the second interview Minor never used the words “hate” or
“kidnap” when referring to Father. This was all new information to Jako
that came out in testimony after this interview.
Jako further opined that Minor has experienced trauma, as he had
learned only a few weeks ago about Father and was still processing this new
information; that as a result, she recommended therapy for Minor for him to
“create his own opinions and feelings about it”; and that, while in the short
term the trauma he’s been exposed to might be diminished if the juvenile
court granted the Petition, in the long term that could change and potentially
lead to “disaster” for Minor.
Mother testified she did not tell Minor about Father until Jako asked
her to do so, and previously did not mention Father “because the youth never
asked about his father.” When asked what Mother shared with Minor,
Mother testified she merely asked Minor questions from section 7851.10
Father testified between 2016 and 2018 he was in custody with ICE,
after Mother attempted to have him deported; that during his detention he
and paternal grandmother attempted to contact Minor; that between
September 2021 and February 2023, he attempted to send Minor cards, gifts,
10 In its August 8 Final Ruling and Order, the juvenile court found
Minor’s testimony about Father was based on what Mother had told the
child, as opposed to what she had asked him; that Mother’s testimony she
never said anything “bad” about Father was “false”; that Mother felt it was
an “attack on her” when Father sought to visit Minor; that Mother was
“primarily focused on her needs as opposed to the youth’s needs”; that
“Mother’s perspective has contributed to the difficulty of the youth having a
relationship with the father”; and that it had “concerns” about Mother’s
credibility given that Minor learned about “a ‘male parent’ from the mother,
the night before he was to testify,” leading the court to conclude she had
“coached the youth in his testimony.”
18
and letters; that every time he attempted to modify custody and visitation
Mother responded by filing an FFCC petition; that he has a pending request
for order to modify custody and visitation in the stayed dissolution case and
was willing to participate in conjoint therapy; that he decided to terminate
the Skype calls with Minor because they were counterproductive, as Minor
would not look into the camera and appeared disinterested; and that he
needed a court order to obtain Minor’s medical information and only learned
Minor was being homeschooled when he traveled to Michigan to oppose
Mother’s petition to change Minor’s name.11
Amrita T., the mother of Father’s second child, testified Father was
“dedicated and devoted” to their daughter. Amrita hoped there could be a
sibling relationship between Minor and her daughter, and confirmed Minor
would not meaningfully participate in the Skype calls with Father. The
juvenile court found Amrita credible.
C. Analysis
Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to replace the
Agency with a new investigator to prepare a new section 7851 report. She
claims the Agency’s supplemental report did not remedy the error because:
(1) its investigation was allegedly inadequate, as Jako merely spoke to the
parties and took down their positions “rather than conducting any sort of
investigation into contested facts” (italics added); (2) Minor’s best interests
were not considered due to its policy of recommending the denial of a
section 7822 petition when there is no pending adoption; and (3) the reports,
11 The juvenile court found Father to be credible in trying to establish
contact with Minor; and his testimony provided “context as to the procedural
posture of the family law proceedings as well as his participation in said
proceedings.”
19
in any event, did not meet the requirements of section 7851. We are not
persuaded.
First, the law is clear that before a child’s best interests are considered
in a section 7822 petition, there first must be a finding—based on clear and
convincing evidence—that the non-petitioning party voluntarily intended to
abandon the child. (In re Baby Boy S. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 925, 933
(Baby Boy S.) [this court concluded the juvenile court did not err in failing to
consider the best interest of the child in the adoptive parents’ petition to have
the child freed from parental custody and control due to abandonment
because, “[a]bsent intent on the part of the parents to abandon the child, as
the court found here, the best interests and welfare criteria are simply not
applicable” (italics added)].)
Here, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding Father had
no intention of abandoning Minor. And even if she had, we would conclude
the court’s finding on this issue was amply supported by the record,
including: (1) the 46-page register of actions in the dissolution case, and
Father’s pending request for order seeking to modify custody and visitation in
that action; (2) his attempts to visit with Minor and agreement to engage in
conjoint and/or reunification therapy; (3) his efforts to access Minor’s medical
information, which required a court order; (4) his decision to travel to
Michigan to oppose Mother’s petition to change Minor’s name; and (5)
Mother’s ongoing attempts to thwart his relationship with Minor, among
other evidence. (See K.M., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 914; A.B., supra,
2 Cal.App.5th at p. 924.)
Second, we conclude from the plain language of section 7851 that an
investigator is not required to investigate “contested facts,” as Mother argues,
in order to comply with the statute, including what is in a child’s best
20
interest. (See In re Brandon H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1282 [in
interpreting a statute to ascertain the Legislature’s intent, “ ‘ “[w]e begin our
inquiry by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning” ’ ”; “ ‘ “[i]f the language is clear, courts must
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result
in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend” ’ ”].)
As noted, a section 7851 report requires the following statements:
(1) the child was informed of the nature of the proceedings to end parental
custody and control; (2) the child’s feelings and thoughts concerning the
proceeding and (3) attitude toward his or her parent or parents; and (4) the
child was informed of the right to attend the hearing. (§ 7851, subd. (b)(1)–
(4).)
Based on our independent review of the record (see A.B., supra,
2 Cal.App.5th at p. 924), we conclude the Agency’s October 30 report, as
supplemented, satisfies section 7851, subdivision (b)(1) through (4). In fact,
we note the Agency reports go beyond what is statutorily required, inasmuch
as the October 30 report includes long summaries of Jako’s interviews of the
parties, in addition to Minor’s two interviews that are the subject of
subdivision (b)(1) through (4). (See Noreen G., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1380 [section 7851 focuses “on obtaining the ‘child’s feelings and thoughts’
on the proceeding”].)
Third, Jako admitted during her first round of testimony that she may
have gotten “tripped up” when testifying regarding the Agency’s policy of
recommending denial of an FFCC petition when there is no pending adoption.
Although the juvenile court initially found this testimony concerning, the
court ultimately concluded the Agency could supplement its October 30
report to ensure compliance with section 7851, after the Agency’s counsel
21
represented that the Agency had in fact considered Minor’s best interests in
recommending denial of the Petition. (See § 7851, subd. (a).) And, when
Jako retook the stand, she reiterated that the Agency had in fact considered
the best interests of Minor in its original and supplemental reports. The
court found Jako credible and credited her revised testimony, as was its right
as trier of fact. (See In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372 [“it is
the exclusive province of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a
witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends”].)
Fourth, we note the Agency’s “policy” is not without support. Indeed,
the overarching purpose of the FFCC is “to serve the welfare and best
interest of a child by providing the stability and security of an adoptive home
when those conditions are otherwise missing from the child’s life.” (§ 7800,
italics added.) We recognize Mother had standing as an “interested person”
to bring a section 7822 petition. (See e.g., T.P. v. T.W. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1428, 1430 [reversing judgment denying the mother’s petition to terminate
the parental rights of the child’s father for lack of standing because the
mother was an “interested person” within the meaning of section 7841,
subdivision (a)12].) But in the current case we question whether the purpose
of the FFCC is furthered when Minor already was living in a “stable and
secure” home with Mother and, as the Agency recognized, no adoption was
pending (§ 7800); and when the sole purpose of the Petition was her third
attempt to terminate Father’s parental rights in the juvenile court while his
12 Section 7841, subdivision (a) provides: “An interested person may file a
petition under this part for an order or judgment declaring a child free from
the custody and control of either or both parents.” Subdivision (b) of this
statute further provides an “ ‘interested person’ is one who has a direct
interest in the action.”
22
pending request for order to modify custody and visitation was stayed in the
family court. (See In re Kristine H. v. Lisa R. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 156, 166
[“public policy favor[s] that a child have two parents rather than one”].)
Fifth, even assuming the Agency investigative reports did not comply
with section 7851, as Mother argues, no prejudice is apparent from the record
and she demonstrates none. (See Noreen G., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1380 [noting a court is “not stripped of jurisdiction if an incomplete report
is filed,” as compared to when no report is filed or no investigation was done];
Valerie W., supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 14 [deficiencies in an assessment
report go to the weight of the evidence].)
We note the juvenile court repeatedly indicated that the Agency reports
were just part of the totality of the evidence it would consider in ruling on
Mother’s Petition, and that the Agency’s recommendation regarding the
disposition of the case was “just that, a recommendation.” Based on its
detailed 31-page August 8 Final Ruling and Order, which included myriad
findings and credibility determinations, as well as an extensive summary of
each of the nine witnesses who testified, it is abundantly clear that the court
considered all the evidence, as opposed to just the Agency’s reports and
recommendation, in determining Minor’s best interests.
Mother, however, suggests that if the juvenile court had appointed a
new investigator the outcome of the case “could have” been different. But in
the absence of facts from the record, we are relegated to merely speculating
what “might have meant,” which we cannot and will not do. (See K.M.,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 914; accord, In re Rashad D. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 156, 164 [potential adverse consequences that are “too
speculative ” will not justify appellate review].) And the record shows that
the court did not place any restrictions on Mother to present all relevant
23
information in support of her Petition. For all these reasons, we reject this
claim of error.
IV. The Juvenile Court Properly Considered Minor’s Best Interest In
Denying the Petition
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it considered the “least
detrimental alternative” standard in determining Minor’s best interests. We
disagree.
First, as we have noted, the juvenile court was not even required to
consider the best interests of Minor as a result of its finding that Father had
no intention of voluntarily abandoning Minor. (See Baby Boy S., supra,
194 Cal.App.3d at p. 933 [“[a]bsent intent on the part of the parents to
abandon the child, . . . the best interests and welfare criteria are simply not
applicable”].) Thus, we conclude any purported error regarding the best-
interest standard used by the court is harmless.
Second, the juvenile court, in any event, considered the best interests of
the Minor based on the totality of the evidence and the credibility of the
parties. The court took into account Minor’s “social, emotional, physical and
mental well-being,” found he was “well-adjusted” “with adequate family
support, but burdened by his mother’s feelings toward the father having
contact.” The court “also found the youth was heavily influenced by the
mother regarding his father,” referring to him as his “male parent,”
“noncaring,” and a “monster”; and that this testimony was from the view of
Mother and not Minor.
Confronted with the unique circumstances of this case—in which a 10-
year-old child has just learned he has a half-sibling, the identity of his father,
and his father’s longstanding desire to reunite with him as opposed to
“kidnap” him—we applaud the juvenile court for suggesting alternatives to
24
termination of Father’s parental rights when considering Minor’s best
interest.13 (See A.B., supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 924 [whether to terminate
parental rights “ ‘lies in the first instance within the discretion of the trial
court, “and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that
discretion” ’ ”].) We thus reject this claim of error.
V. The Juvenile Court Properly Excluded Evidence From the
Dissolution Case
Mother next contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
quashed the civil subpoena and excluded the FCS counselor’s February 16,
2023 report (FCS Evidence). We disagree.
A. Additional Background
In their motion, the FCS counselor and the Superior Court of
California, County of San Diego (Nonparties) argued the law limited
disclosure of the FCS report to “only certain statutorily authorized
individuals”; there was “no right to examine an FCS counselor outside of a
child custody proceeding”; and such a proceeding was “entirely different” than
an FFCC proceeding.
Father argued the FCS report was irrelevant and based on hearsay,
and the parties, in any event, were set to testify, rendering the FCS Evidence
cumulative. Mother argued the report was relevant to show Father’s alleged
lack of efforts to engage Minor during the relevant time period and could be
filed under seal, but admitted the FCS Evidence would not “resolve” the case.
13 The juvenile court’s suggestions included “requiring the parents to
complete a high-conflict parenting course, trauma-informed individual
therapy for the youth outside the presence of the mother to help the youth
process the recent knowledge that he has a father and a sibling, and conjoint
therapy by a therapist other than the youth’s individual therapist.”
25
In granting the Nonparties’ motion, the juvenile court found the FCS
Evidence was irrelevant, ruling the child custody and FFCC proceedings were
“entirely different”; that even if somewhat relevant, the FCS Evidence would
lead to confusion of the issues and would be “cumulative” to the live
testimony of the parties, which it found would be the “best evidence”; and
that custody and visitation provisions in the family code were not to be
considered in an FFCC proceeding.
B. Guiding Principles and Analysis
“In ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the trial court is vested with
broad discretion. ‘ “[T]he court’s ruling will be upset only if there is a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion.” [Citation.] “ ‘The appropriate test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason. . . .’ ” ’ [Citation.].” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 911
(Cole C.).)
We conclude the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion when it
granted Nonparties’ quash motion and excluded the FCS report. (Cole C.,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.) Although sections 3000 et seq. and 7800
et seq. both require a court to make orders in the best interest of a minor
(§§ 3020, subd. (a) [custody and visitation] & 7800 [FFCC]), the purpose
behind the two statutory schemes are vastly different: section 3020 governs
the “physical or legal custody or visitation of children” (§ 3020, subd. (a)),
with the aim of ensuring that “children have frequent and continuing contact
with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their
marriage” (id., subd. (b), italics added). In contrast, the purpose of an FFCC
proceeding is to have “a minor child declared free from the custody and
control of either or both parents.” (§ 7802, italics added.)
26
“The issue of the relevance of evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be reversed absent
a showing of abuse. That discretion is only abused where there is a clear
showing the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.” (People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1,
32.) Based on the different purposes of the two statutory schemes bearing on
a child’s best interest, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its broad
discretion in ruling to exclude the FCS Evidence. (See ibid.; accord, Cole C.,
supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 911.)
In addition, we conclude even if marginally relevant, the juvenile court
properly exercised its discretion when it found the FCS Evidence would lead
to confusion in the FFCC proceeding (see § 7807, subd. (a) [section 3020, and
arguably an FCS report generated under that section, do not apply in an
FFCC proceeding]); and would be cumulative to the parties’ testimony (see
Horn v. General Motors Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 359, 371 [citing Evid. Code,
§ 352 in concluding the trial court “has discretion to refuse to admit
cumulative evidence”]; accord, Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774,
785 [trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit certain
evidence when the defendant testified to the same evidence]).
Finally, even if the juvenile court erred in failing to admit the FCS
Evidence, we conclude it is not “reasonably probable” a result more favorable
to Mother would have been reached absent the purported error. (See In re
Jordan R. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 111, 134 (Jordan R.) [“To the extent an
alleged error violates state evidentiary law, ‘even where evidence is
improperly excluded, the error is not reversible unless “ ‘it is reasonably
probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached
absent the error.’ ” ’ ”].)
27
As we have noted, in denying the Petition the juvenile court considered
the totality of the evidence, including the testimony of Mother and Father
and many other witnesses, myriad exhibits, and extensive argument of
counsel, including Minor’s counsel, who, in advocating for his client, argued it
was “not even close” that Minor’s best interest was to have Father in his life.
For this separate reason, we conclude any error in failing to admit to admit
the FCS Evidence was harmless. (Jordan R., supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at
p. 134.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s August 8 Final Ruling and Order.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
DATO, J.
28
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