Stroj v. Brill CA4/3

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Filed 3/12/25 Stroj v. Brill CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ROBERT J. STROJ,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063834

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01342585)
MARTIN BRILL et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Melissa R. McCormick, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert J. Stroj, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Klinedinst, Heather L. Rosing and Amy P. Chambers for
Defendant and Respondent Martin Brill.
Michel Miller Park, Allen L. Michel and Won M. Park for
Defendant and Respondent Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Golubchik L.L.P.
Plaintiff and appellant Robert J. Stroj appeals from an order
granting special motions to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16 (all undesignated statutory references are to this code). Known as the
anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16 was enacted to address “‘a disturbing
increase’ in strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs):
‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’” (Geiser
v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1242 (Geiser).) Stroj argues section 425.16
cannot apply in the instant case because the communications by defendants
and respondents Martin Brill, a lawyer, and the law firm Levene, Neale,
Bender, Yoo & Golubchik, L.L.P. (Levene) fell within the illegality exception
under Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299 (Flatley). In the alternative,
Stroj contends Brill and Levene did not engage in protected activity under
section 425.16, and Stroj can show a probability of prevailing on the merits
on his causes of action for extortion, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
We affirm. We conclude the trial court properly found Brill and
Levene engaged in protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2),
and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47 barred Stroj’s claims.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
COMPLAINT
Stroj is a lawyer, although he is suspended from the practice of
law in California. In August 2023, he filed a complaint against Brill, Levene,
and Does 1 through 10. Stroj alleged the following facts in his complaint.
Stroj invested $180,000 in a business called American Patriot
Brands (APB) in late 2019 and early 2020. In March 2023, he learned the

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United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed charges
against APB, alleging APB of defrauding investors between 2016 and 2023.
That prompted Stroj to conduct a “due diligence investigation.” Stroj
discovered members of APB made false statements to him regarding APB’s
assets, financial condition, scope of operations, and the value of its cannabis
farm.
Thereafter, Stroj discovered Brill, a partner at Levene, was APB’s
corporate counsel between 2016 and 2022. At all relevant times, Brill and
Levene were “agents of each other.” Therefore, they were: “liable for the acts
of the other through said agency, respondeat superior and vicariously liable
for the acts of the other.” Stroj learned Brill knew APB was misrepresenting
investors and potential investors regarding APB’s financial condition. Stroj
believed, because Brill was aware of these misrepresentations, Brill and
Levene breached their fiduciary duties owed to Stroj. Stroj also discovered
Brill, together with APB’s chief executive officer Robert Lee, established a
business called Southern California Injured Workers (SCIW), and that SCIW
was under a criminal investigation by the Orange County District Attorney.
Stroj drafted a complaint against APB, Brill, Levene, and others.
In May 2023, he e-mailed the complaint to them along with a settlement
demand of $240,000. A few hours later, Brill, using his Levene e-mail
address, replied to Stroj:
“I have read the complaint and I am shocked and dismayed at
your total disregard of the truth concerning the allegations you make against
me and my firm. It is obvious that you have failed to do any investigation or
due diligence before drafting the complaint. Your allegations are spurious
and libelous and I will hold you accountable if you continue to name me in
the complaint. Specifically, neither I nor my firm was ever corporate counsel

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for APB. We were its insolvency counsel and were specifically engaged to
work with creditors as issues arose. I was never involved in, nor did I ever see
any of the investor decks which you claim are false and which you claim I
(and my firm) had reason to believe were false. That was never part of my
firm’s engagement. Upon what evidence do you base your claims? I was never
part of the fundraising of which you complain. I didn’t even know that you (or
others) had invested in APB until after you started working for APB and
made a claim for your unpaid fees. Also, your claim about me and Robbie
using APB funds to fund SCIW is . . . completely unfounded and without
merit. I funded SCIW with my own funds and not a penny from APB. I can
provide you with proof of every advance I made. Robbie never contributed any
funds. It is reprehensible that you would make such allegations without any
due diligence or investigation. Furthermore, I was merely a lender to SCIW
and never was involved in any of its operations.
“If you don’t immediately remove me from the complaint, I will
report you to the State Bar for your unauthorized practice of law, your
threatened extortion and misuse of the judicial system. I’m sure the State
Bar will be happy to investigate given your history. Also, you can expect me
to sue you for the return of the over $100,000 that I paid you for your
‘consulting services’ relating to PI marketing. Notwithstanding the payments,
not one referral was made. I see this as a scam and a fraud which you[]
perpetrated on me to fraudulently induce me to pay you for services that were
never performed.
“Govern yourself accordingly.” (Italics, underscoring, and boldface
omitted.)
This e-mail “put [Stroj] in extreme fear” for several reasons.
First, Brill “threatened to accuse [Stroj] of two separate crimes . . . [:] the

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unauthorized practice of law and extortion.” Second, Brill “threatened to
accuse [Stroj] of misuse of the judicial system which, while not a crime in
itself, was an allegation of wrongdoing that would impute disgrace,
humiliation and embarrassment on” Stroj. Third, Brill knew Stroj was
suspended from the practice of law and was petitioning the State Bar of
California for reinstatement. Fourth, “Brill is a well[-]respected member of
the State Bar” whose complaint to the State Bar would likely be credible.
Fifth, Brill implied he had information, which he planned to send to the State
Bar, showing alleged criminal activity by Stroj, and his e-mail demonstrated
“Brill intended to fabricate information to the State Bar relating to [Stroj’s]
marketing services to show an alleged unauthorized practice of law.”
Stroj filed his complaint in Orange County Superior Court. He
later filed a first amended complaint.1 In June 2023, he e-mailed a copy of the
first amended complaint to Brill, Levene, and other defendants and offered to
resolve the case for $300,000. One hour after Stroj sent that e-mail, Brill,
using his Levene e-mail address again, e-mailed APB representative David

1 We will refer to this litigation as the APB case. In the first

amended complaint in the APB case, Stroj alleged causes of action for fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, professional
negligence, aiding and abetting, civil conspiracy, and violations of the
Corporations Code sections 25400 and 25401. He alleged APB, Brill, Levene,
and other defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to induce Stroj to
invest in APB. Stoj alleged, among other things, Brill and Levene breached
fiduciary duties to him and other shareholders. Stroj alleged Brill and Lee
“secretly engaged in a business venture whereby they created a company
named [SCIW] for which SCIW was to provide managed medical services to
doctors and their patients.” Stroj alleged, “[I]n order to hide their secret
business venture, [Levene] agreed that Defendant Lee would be the sole
owner of the business with no duties while [Levene] would handle all the day
to day operations, Defendant Brill would fund the business[,] and Defendant
Brill/Defendant Lee would share the profits from the business.”

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Fish, stating: “I see you got yourself out of the lawsuit. If you want my
cooperation you better get me out of the suit. New allegations concerning free
rent must have come from you. I thought you were going to help me get out.
Tell [Stroj] my first business this morning is to file my complaint with the
[S]tate [B]ar and I expect you to back me up on it.” (Italics, underscoring, and
boldface omitted.)
This e-mail also “placed [Stroj] in extreme fear” for additional
reasons as well as those stated above. First, Brill was threatening Fish: if
Fish did not assist Brill with a State Bar complaint alleging Stroj
“commit[ed] the crime of unauthorized practice of law,” Brill would not work
with Fish “on other matters.” If Fish relented, Stroj “would be faced with two
separate fabricated [S]tate [B]ar complaints.” Second, Brill was seeking to
use “other people in presenting an untrue and false narrative to the [S]tate
[B]ar.” Third, because Brill was admitting wrongdoing in his June 2023 e-
mail, Stroj recognized “Brill would do just about anything, including
extorting others, in order to accomplish his goal of getting removed from” the
first amended complaint in the APB case.
Following the June 2023 e-mail, Brill called Fish several times,
requesting information showing Stroj engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law. After learning about the telephone conversations between Brill and Fish,
Stroj “experienced an extremely high degree of fear that . . . Brill was
preparing to file a false and fabricated [S]tate [B]ar complaint against” Stroj.
As a result, Stroj suffered from “great anxiety, depression, worry, concern,
apprehension and paralysis to the point where [Stroj] was no longer able to
sleep.” Because of this emotional distress, Stroj informed the State Bar he
was withdrawing his petition for reinstatement.

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Based on these factual allegations, Stroj alleged three causes of
action against Brill, Levene, and Does 1 through 10: (1) civil extortion; (2)
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) intentional interference
with prospective economic advantage.
II.
ANTI-SLAPP MOTIONS
In September 2023, Levene moved to strike the three causes of
action in the complaint against it under section 425.16. It argued Brill
engaged in protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), which
covers “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an
issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” It contended the
complaint was based on Brill’s May 2023 e-mail to Stroj and June 2023 e-
mail to Fish, and these communications fell within the ambit of section
425.16, subdivision (e)(2). Levene asserted the Flatley exception did not
apply. It argued Stroj would be unable to show a probability of prevailing on
the merits because the litigation privilege applied.
In support of its motion, Levene provided a declaration of one of
its attorneys, Beth Ann R. Young. She averred Brill was a partner at Levene
until his retirement on December 31, 2021. She asserted, after his
retirement, Brill lacked the authority to act for Levene, and he billed a
minimal number of hours in 2022 and 2023. She declared she was unaware
Stroj existed until June 2023, when Stroj e-mailed the first amended
complaint in the APB case to the partners at Levene.
In October 2023, Brill also moved to strike the three causes of
action in the complaint under section 425.16, presenting similar arguments
as Levene. In support of his motion, Brill filed declarations by APB’s chief
operating officer, Lee, and Brill. Of relevance here, Brill stated in his

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declaration: “At the time I sent the May 11, 2023 e[-]mail, I knew [Stroj]’s
license to practice law had been suspended. However, I suspected that [Stroj]
had been providing to SCIW legal services requiring a valid law license.
Based on my review of the complaint in this case, I understand that [Stroj]
believes my reference to a State Bar complaint in the May 11, 2023 e[-]mail
referred to marketing services that he provided for me. [Stroj] is wrong. That
is not what I was referring to. Rather, it was my understanding that Mr.
Fish, SCIW’s consultant, on behalf of SCIW had engaged [Stroj] to prepare
and edit legal documents, and conduct legal research and analysis, for SCIW.
I believed that if [Stroj] filed the complaint against me, I would have no
choice but to report this conduct to the State Bar as it was relevant to the
wide-ranging claims in the draft complaint, and would certainly come up in
the course of that litigation.”
Stroj opposed both anti-SLAPP motions, notably arguing the
Flatley exception applied. In support of his oppositions, he provided his and
Fish’s declarations. Levene and Brill replied.
The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motions. It concluded:
Brill’s communications were related to the litigation in the APB case and
thus protected, the Flatley exception was inapplicable, and the litigation
privilege barred Stroj’s claims. Stroj timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
ANTI-SLAPP LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The anti-SLAPP statute aims to shield defendants from “lawsuits
brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.” (§ 425.16, subd.
(a).) To curb such abuses of the civil justice system, “the statute authorizes a

8
special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 884.) “The anti-SLAPP statute does not insulate defendants
from any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or
speech. It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early
stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) The statute must “be construed broadly.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (a).)
Courts evaluate anti-SLAPP motions through a two-step process.
(Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).)
First, “the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park), quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1);
see § 425.16, subd. (e) [defining protected activity].) Second, if the defendant
satisfies the first step, the plaintiff must show “there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff must
establish the claim has “at least ‘minimal merit.’” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1061.)
“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) “‘“Thus, we apply our
independent judgment, both to the issue of whether the cause of action arises
from a protected activity and whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of
prevailing on the claim.”’” (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671.)

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II.
STEP ONE: PROTECTED ACTIVITY
A. Brill and Levene’s E-mails and Telephone Calls Were Protected Activity
At step one, “the critical consideration is whether the cause of
action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning
activity.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89.) To carry its burden at
step one, the moving defendant must establish “that the ‘conduct by which
plaintiff claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories
described in subdivision (e) [of section 425.16]’ [citation], and that the
plaintiff’s claims in fact arise from that conduct.” (Rand Resources, LLC v.
City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620 (Rand Resources).) The four
categories of protected activity “describe conduct ‘“in furtherance of a person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States or California
Constitution in connection with a public issue.”’” (Ibid., quoting § 425.16,
subd. (e).) Only one category is relevant here, section 425.16, subdivision
(e)(2). Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) protects “any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a . . . judicial body.”
“‘[C]ourts have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what
constitutes litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.”’”
(Trilogy Plumbing, Inc. v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
920, 931.) “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under section
425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive issues in the
litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.”
(Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 (Neville).) At the
first step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, “courts ‘look[] to the litigation privilege
[(Civ. Code, § 47)] as an aid in construing the scope of section 425.16,

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subdivision [(e)(2)] with respect to the first step of the two-step anti-SLAPP
inquiry.’” (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263, second bracketed
insertion added.) Courts have equated the “in connection with” standard of
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) with the reasonable relevancy standard of
Civil Code section 47. (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1097
(Bassi).) “Put differently, the statement must ‘“be connected with, or have
some logical relation to, the action, i.e., . . . not be extraneous to the action.”’”
(Id. at p. 1097.) “‘Both section 425.16 and Civil Code section 47 are construed
broadly, to protect the right of litigants to “‘the utmost freedom of access to
the courts without [the] fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative
tort actions.’”’” (Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc. (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 1043, 1055.)
“There is no question that communications sent in anticipation of
litigation or as part of ongoing litigation constitute legitimate speech or
petitioning activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Geragos v.
Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1023 (Geragos).) “Settlement
negotiations while a suit is pending are . . . protected” under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2). (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1024.)
“We review the parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other
supporting documents at this stage of the analysis only ‘to determine what
conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine whether the conduct is
actionable.’” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 481, 491.) “By
requiring that a moving defendant demonstrate that the targeted cause of
action is one arising from protected speech or petitioning (§ 425.16, subd. (b)),
our anti-SLAPP statute utilizes a reasonable, objective test that lends itself
to adjudication on pretrial motion.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause,

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Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 65; accord Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1254–
1255 [“the touchstone is objective reasonableness”].)
We begin by considering what conduct forms the basis for Stroj’s
claims. All three causes of action are based on the following communications
by Brill (who allegedly acted on behalf of Levene): (1) Brill’s May 2023 e-mail
to Stroj; (2) Brill’s June 2023 e-mail to Fish; and (3) Brill’s subsequent
telephone conversations with Fish.2 We therefore turn our attention to
whether these communications were protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2).
As the trial court correctly concluded, the communications were
related to ongoing litigation or settlement negotiations in the APB case. First,
in May 2023, Brill sent an e-mail to Stroj in response to Stroj’s prelitigation
demand. Brill denied the allegations in Stroj’s complaint in the APB case,
characterizing them as “spurious and libelous.” Brill also demanded Stroj
remove Brill from the lawsuit: “If you don’t immediately remove me from the
complaint, I will report you to the State Bar for your unauthorized practice of
law, your threatened extortion and misuse of the judicial system.” (Italics,
underscoring, and boldface omitted.)
Second, in June 2023, Brill e-mailed Fish about the APB case,
after receiving Stroj’s e-mail regarding the first amended complaint in the
APB case and a settlement offer. Brill wrote, “If you want my cooperation you
better get me out of the suit.” Brill, referring to his prior demand, instructed
Fish: “Tell [Stroj] my first business this morning is to file my complaint with

2 As Stroj alleged Brill and Levene were agents of each other,

Brill’s protected communications were also Levene’s protected
communications for purposes of the step-one analysis.

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the [S]tate [B]ar and I expect you to back me up on it.” (Italics, underscoring,
and boldface omitted.)
Third, Brill’s telephone calls to Fish related to the APB case. As
the trial court properly found: “Brill’s communications regarding Stroj’s
alleged unauthorized practice of law, i.e., allegedly providing legal services to
SCIW, were reasonably connected to Stroj’s breach of fiduciary claims against
Brill and [Levene] in the APB case. Stroj alleges in the APB case, inter alia,
that Brill and [Levene] breached fiduciary duties to him and other
shareholders by ‘secretly engaging in a business venture wherein they
created a company named [SCIW] for which SCIW was to provide managed
medical services to doctors and their patients,’ and that ‘in order to hide their
secret business venture, [Levene] agreed that Defendant Lee would be the
sole owner of the business with no duties while [Levene] would handle all the
day to day operations, Defendant Brill would fund the business[,] and
Defendant Brill/Defendant Lee would share the profits from the business.’
[Citations.] Stroj also alleges in the APB case that Brill and [Levene] wrongly
‘employed APB’s accountant to handle SCIW financials thereby leading to
commingling certain related ABP funds/obligations with SCIW
funds/obligations’; used APB Newport Beach office space to perform SCIW
business; sold ‘several hundreds of thousands’ of Brill’s APB shares to SCIW
for inflated amounts and did not report the sales to the SEC; assisted APB
executives in selling ‘several hundreds of thousands’ of APB shares to SCIW
for inflated amounts and did not report the sales to the SEC; and used APB
funds to pay for defense attorneys related to an alleged Orange County
District Attorney investigation of SCIW. [Citations.] As evidenced by these
allegations, the APB case clearly involves SCIW and the parties’ respective

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conduct with respect to SCIW. Brill’s communications thus had a reasonable
connection to the underlying dispute.”
B. The Flatley Exception Does Not Apply
Stroj resists our conclusion. He argues section 425.16’s protection
does not cover Brill’s communications because Brill committed the crime of
extortion.
“[N]ot all speech or petition activity is protected by section
425.16.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 313.) Protection under section 425.16
“does not extend to communication or conduct that is, as a matter of law,
illegal.” (Geragos, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1023.) This illegality exception
under Flatley is narrow. (Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 361, 378.) When “either the defendant concedes, or the
evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or
petition activity was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is precluded
from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s action.” (Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.)
“Extortion is the obtaining of property or other consideration
from another, with his or her consent, . . . induced by a wrongful use of force
or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 518, subd. (a).) Fear, for purposes of extortion, “may be
induced by a threat of any of the following: [¶] 1. To do an unlawful injury to
the person or property of the individual threatened or of a third person. [¶] 2.
To accuse the individual threatened, or a relative of his or her, or a member
of his or family, of a crime. [¶] 3. To expose, or to impute to him, her, or them
a deformity, disgrace, or crime. [¶] 4. To expose a secret affecting him, her, or
them. [¶] 5. To report his, her, or their immigration status or suspected
immigration status.” (Pen. Code, § 519.) “Every person who, with intent to
extort property or other consideration from another, sends or delivers to any

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person any letter or other writing, whether subscribed or not, expressing or
implying, or adapted to imply, any threat such as is specified in [Penal Code]
[s]ection 519 is punishable in the same manner as if such property or other
consideration were actually obtained by means of such threat.” (Pen. Code, §
523, subd. (a); see Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 326.)
“Extortion has been characterized as a paradoxical crime in that
it criminalizes the making of threats that, in and of themselves, may not be
illegal. ‘[I]n many blackmail cases the threat is to do something in itself
perfectly legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled
with a demand for money.’” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 326.) “Moreover,
threats to do the acts that constitute extortion under Penal Code section 519
are extortionate whether or not the victim committed the crime or
indiscretion upon which the threat is based and whether or not the person
making the threat could have reported the victim to the authorities or
arrested the victim.” (Id. at p. 327.) “Attorneys are not exempt from these
principles in their professional conduct.” (Ibid.)
In Flatley, a famous performer, Michael Flatley, sued an attorney
for civil extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful
interference with economic advantage. (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 305.)
The lawsuit was based on a demand letter by the attorney, whose client
alleged Flatley raped her, and on subsequent telephone conversations in
which the attorney demanded a seven-figure payment to resolve the lawsuit.
(Ibid.) The attorney moved to strike Flatley’s complaint under section 425.16,
arguing the “letter was a prelitigation settlement offer and therefore Flatley’s
complaint arose from [the attorney’s] exercise of his constitutionally protected
right of petition.” (Ibid.)

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The California Supreme Court analyzed the demand letter: “At
the core of [the attorney’s] letter are threats to publicly accuse Flatley of rape
and to report and publicly accuse him of other unspecified violations of
various laws unless he ‘settled’ by paying a sum of money to [the attorney’s
client] of which [the attorney] would receive 40 percent.” (Flatley, supra, 39
Cal.4th at p. 329.) “The key passage in [the attorney’s] letter is . . . where
Flatley is warned that, unless he settles, ‘an in-depth investigation’ will be
conducted into his personal assets to determine punitive damages and this
information will then ‘BECOME A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD, AS
IT MUST BE FILED WITH THE COURT . . . . [¶] Any and all
information, including Immigration, Social Security Issuances and
Use, and IRS and various State Tax Levies and information will be
exposed. We are positive the media worldwide will enjoy what they find.’”
(Ibid.) The last paragraph of the letter “warns Flatley that, along with the
filing of suit, press releases will be disseminated to numerous media sources
and placed on the Internet.” (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court held: “[T]he letter and subsequent phone
calls constitute criminal extortion as a matter of law. These communications
threatened to ‘accuse’ Flatley of, or ‘impute to him,’ ‘crime[s]’ and ‘disgrace’
(Pen. Code, § 519, subds. 2, 3) unless Flatley paid [the attorney] a minimum
of $1 million of which [the attorney] was to receive 40 percent.” (Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 330.) The evidence was uncontroverted, as the
attorney did not deny sending the letter or challenge Flatley’s account of the
telephone calls. (Id. at pp. 328–329.) “Moreover, the threat to disclose
criminal activity entirely unrelated to any alleged injury suffered by [the
attorney’s] client ‘exceeded the limits of respondent’s representation of his
client’ and is itself evidence of extortion.” (Id. at pp. 330–331, italics added.)

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The Supreme Court stressed: “[O]ur conclusion that [the
attorney’s] communications constituted criminal extortion as a matter of law
are based on the specific and extreme circumstances of this case.” (Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 332, fn. 16.) It cautioned “our opinion should not be
read to imply that rude, aggressive, or even belligerent prelitigation
negotiations, whether verbal or written, that may include threats to file a
lawsuit, report criminal behavior to authorities or publicize allegations of
wrongdoing, necessarily constitute extortion.” (Ibid.)
In Geragos, a case involving an alleged threat to file a State Bar
claim, the Second District Court of Appeal held the Flatley exception did not
apply. A client sued his former attorneys, alleging they accepted fees from
him without performing the promised legal services. (Geragos, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 1011.) In telephone calls and e-mails with the client’s
former attorneys, the client’s attorney discussed the possibility of filing a
State Bar claim regarding the fee issue. (Ibid.) The former attorneys filed a
cross-complaint against the client and his new attorney, asserting several
causes of action, including extortion. (Ibid.) The client and his new attorney
moved to strike the cross-complaint. (Ibid.)
The appellate court held the new attorneys’ communications did
not fall within the Flatley exception. (Geragos, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1028.) It did not “find a threat to file a State Bar claim coupled with a
demand for money” in the e-mails, and determined the evidence pertaining to
the telephone calls was controverted. (Id. at pp. 1025, 1027.) It concluded:
“Misappropriation of client funds is the gravamen of the civil action against
the [former attorneys]. If a threat to report such conduct to the State Bar was
made, it had a reasonable connection to the underlying dispute and therefore

17
is not comparable to the ‘extreme’ conduct found unprotected by Flatley.” (Id.
at p. 1028.)
Here, the trial court properly reasoned and concluded the Flatley
exception did not apply. As in Geragos, Brill did not make a demand for
money in his communications. Brill threatened to file a State Bar claim
coupled with a demand to remove him from the complaint in the APB case.
Even if Stroj’s causes of action against Brill and Levene in the APB case
could be “property or other consideration” within the meaning of Penal Code
section 518, subdivision (a) (see People v. Baker (1978) 88 Cal.App.3d 115,
119; People v. Cadman (1881) 57 Cal. 562, 564), Brill’s communications were
“reasonably related to the underlying APB dispute,” as discussed above.3
Contrary to Stroj’s assertions, the present case is distinguishable
from Flatley, Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 506 (Falcon Brands), and Stenehjem v. Sareen (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 1405 (Stenehjem). As discussed, ante, the court in Flatley found
“the threat to disclose criminal activity entirely unrelated to any alleged
injury suffered by [the attorney’s] client ‘exceeded the limits of respondent’s
representation of his client’ and is itself evidence of extortion.” (Flatley,

3 Although Brill’s communications do not amount to extortion as

a matter of law, we deplore the lack of professional civility in his
communications. “[C]ivility is a professional requirement of the practice of
law, not a mere matter of good manners.” (Young v. Hartford (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 730, 742.) “Incivility slows things down, it costs people money—
money they were counting on their lawyers to help them save. And it
contravenes the Legislature’s directive that ‘all parties shall cooperate in
bringing the action to trial.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.130.)” (Masimo Corp. v.
The Vanderpool Law Firm, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 902, 911.)
Accordingly, we urge the parties, who are lawyers, to practice civility in their
communications going forward.

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supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 330–331.) The additional cases cited by Stroj that
apply the Flatley exception similarly find the threat was entirely unrelated to
any injuries alleged in the claims. In Falcon Brands, the court concluded an
attorney’s “threat to disclose criminal activity entirely unrelated to her
client’s damage claim ‘“exceeded the limits of respondent’s representation of
his client.”’” (Falcon Brands, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 522.) And Stenehjem
held “the alleged criminal activity that Stenehjem threatened to expose in a
qui tam action was ‘entirely unrelated to any alleged injury suffered by’
Stenehjem as alleged in his defamation and wrongful termination claims.”
(Stenehjem, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1423.)
Stroj contends the trial court misapplied case law by focusing on
the relatedness of the threat to the APB case. But Flatley, Falcon Brands,
and Stenehjem rested their holdings on relatedness. So have other cases
involving the Flatley exception—whether or not they apply it. (See, e.g.,
Flickinger v. Finwall (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 822, 838 (Flickinger) [Flatley
exception did not apply because the court “view[ed] defendant’s implied
threat to make public allegations that plaintiff was involved in illegal
kickback schemes and money laundering as reasonably connected to the
parties’ dispute”].) Thus, this argument is unconvincing.
Stroj suggests Brill provided a post hoc justification for
threatening to file a State Bar claim. Stroj questions Brill’s asserted rationale
that the State Bar claim concerned Stroj’s purported unauthorized practice of
law for SCIW and was therefore related to the APB case. Instead, Stroj
implies we should give greater weight to Stroj’s and Fish’s declarations, in
which they averred Fish never engaged Stroj to perform legal work for SCIW.
But Stroj’s “subjective and self-serving interpretation cannot establish
extortion as a matter of law.” (Flickinger, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 837.)

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III.
STEP TWO: PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING ON THE MERITS
“If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations
arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached.
There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged
claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually
substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must
determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact,
would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is
stricken.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.)
“A plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits
for anti-SLAPP purposes where the claim is barred by the litigation privilege
codified in Civil Code section 47.” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1102.)
Under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), “‘[t]he litigation privilege
. . . provides that a “publication or broadcast” made as part of a “judicial
proceeding” is privileged. This privilege is absolute in nature, applying
“to all publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.” [Citation.] “The
usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication
(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and
(4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” [Citation.]
The privilege “is not limited to statements made during a trial or other
proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.”’”
(Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 648, 661–662.)
“The litigation privilege is a statutory protection that has been
interpreted expansively. . . . Its purpose is to ‘afford litigants and witnesses
free access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by

20
derivative tort actions, to encourage open channels of communication and
zealous advocacy, to promote complete and truthful testimony, to give finality
to judgments, and to avoid unending litigation.’ [Citation.] These policy
considerations are paramount, and courts recognize that guarding them by
adhering to the privilege will ‘result[] in some real injuries that go
uncompensated.’ [Citation.] This is ‘simply part of the price that is paid’ for
free access to the courts. [Citation.] If the privilege applies, it cannot be set
aside for any tort claim except malicious prosecution.” (Dziubla v. Piazza
(2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 140, 155 (Dziubla).)
Here, Brill’s communications to Stroj and Fish were in the
context of ongoing litigation in the APB case. Brill and Stroj were parties in
that litigation. Fish was a defendant before Stroj removed him from the
lawsuit, and Fish entered into a cooperation agreement with Stroj. The
purpose of Brill’s communications was to resolve the litigation in the APB
case. And the communications had some connection to the APB case. The
trial court correctly found: “Brill’s communications relate to Stroj’s threat to
file the APB case if Brill did not settle with him, to Stroj’s filing of the . . .
first amended complaint [in the APB case], and to Stroj’s breach of fiduciary
duty allegations against Brill and [Levene] in the ABP case. Brill’s
communications bear a connection or logical relation to the APB case
initiated by Stroj, to Stroj’s allegations in the APB case, and to Stroj’s
communications to Brill regarding the APB case.”
“Because the privilege ‘attaches to any publication that has any
reasonable relation to [a court] action and is made to achieve the objects of
the litigation,’” we conclude the communications fall within the litigation
privilege’s “broad scope.” (Dziubla, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 155.) The

21
litigation privilege bars Stroj’s claims. He therefore cannot show a probability
of prevailing on the merits on his claims.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to costs on
appeal.

MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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