People v. Trowbridge CA1/5

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Filed 3/12/25 P. v. Trowbridge CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169050 & A169872
v.
ADAM TROWBRIDGE, (Solano County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. FCR-367504)

Within the span of two weeks, Adam Trowbridge
committed multiple incidents of domestic violence against his
wife and then, in violation of a protective order, brought a loaded
gun with him to the house where his wife and children lived.
After he was refused entry, Trowbridge fired the gun into the air
and then turned the gun on himself. Trowbridge ultimately pled
no contest to one felony count of unlawful firearm activity (Pen.
Code, § 29825, subd. (a))1 and one misdemeanor count of domestic
violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). He appeals from the trial court’s
order suspending the imposition of sentence and granting
probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in
previously finding him unsuitable for pretrial mental health
diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. We disagree and affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
BACKGROUND

A.

On January 12, 2023, after consuming cocaine and beer,
Trowbridge argued with his wife, accused her of cheating on him,
pushed her, and slapped her multiple times. She suffered
bruising on her upper lip, a scratch on her forehead, and redness
on her nose where her glasses had been pushed into her face.

Eleven days later, Trowbridge renewed his cheating
accusations, looked through their phone bill, and questioned his
wife about numbers he did not know. Trowbridge’s wife
confirmed that one of the numbers belonged to a male friend that
Trowbridge did not know. Trowbridge repeatedly slapped her in
the face—using “a lot of force” such that she fell to the floor
several times, was in “a lot of pain,” and her glasses were broken.
Trowbridge eventually walked away, and his wife called 911.
Her face was red, swollen, and caused her pain for about 30
minutes.

When police arrived, Trowbridge’s wife obtained an
emergency protective order after she reported what happened
that day and on January 12. Trowbridge was arrested and
served with the emergency protective order, but he called his wife
twice from jail.

Two days later, Trowbridge’s wife was home with two of the
couple’s three children, as well as her mother. Trowbridge
knocked on the door and Trowbridge’s mother-in-law answered.
She told him to leave and closed the door. Trowbridge’s wife then
watched surveillance video (live from her Ring camera) as
Trowbridge asked to come in, knocked on the windows and door,
and pulled at the locked screen door.

Next, Trowbridge looked into the Ring camera and said,
“don’t make me do this,” as he pulled out and cocked his gun.
Trowbridge pointed the gun at the sky and fired. Trowbridge’s
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wife was on the phone (with a 911 dispatcher) in her bedroom,
with her mother and children. They screamed when they heard
the gunshot. Trowbridge knelt in front of the Ring camera, said
“please don’t make me do this,” and pointed the gun at his head.
His wife watched him pull the trigger, but the gun did not
discharge.

B.

Trowbridge was charged with discharge of a firearm with
gross negligence (§ 246.3), unlawful firearm activity based on a
protective order violation (§ 29825, subd. (a)), three counts of
misdemeanor disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)), and
two counts of misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)).

Trowbridge filed an application for pretrial mental health
diversion, pursuant to section 1001.36. In support of his motion,
Trowbridge submitted a psychological evaluation report prepared
by a psychologist. The psychologist diagnosed Trowbridge with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) along with several
substance use disorders. As to whether diversion would pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the psychologist
provided a vague, qualified answer that (essentially) left the
issue to the court.

The People opposed Trowbridge’s diversion application,
arguing that he failed to meet his burden to show all the
eligibility and suitability requirements (§ 1001.36, subds. (b)-(c))
were met, and that, in any event, the trial court should use its
discretion to deny the application. The People acknowledged
Trowbridge had no prior criminal record but asserted that the
matter was not just an isolated suicide attempt caused by a
mental health crisis (as the defense asserted). Instead, they
stated the charges stemmed from a series of domestic violence
events that culminated in Trowbridge going to his wife’s house, in
violation of a protective order, and discharging a firearm there in
his family’s presence.
3
The trial court denied Trowbridge’s motion, finding him to
be an unreasonable danger to public safety and that, “[e]ven
without that finding,” mental health diversion was not
appropriate. The court stated that it was exercising its discretion
to reach that conclusion by considering the primary purposes of
the mental health diversion law. It further explained that, while
it was to Trowbridge’s “credit that he [was] trying to seek [mental
health] treatment,” he could receive similar treatment in
probation.

C.

Trowbridge then entered a no contest plea to felony
unlawful firearm activity and one count of misdemeanor domestic
violence. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court granted
the People’s motion to dismiss the remaining charges, suspended
the imposition of sentence, and placed Trowbridge on probation
for three years with various conditions—including that he serve
364 days in county jail (with credit for 456 days served) and that,
upon release, he commit himself to a substance abuse and mental
health residential treatment program.

Trowbridge filed a timely notice of appeal but his request
for a certificate of probable cause was denied. After this court
issued an order for a peremptory writ of mandate (Trowbridge v.
Superior Court (Feb. 2, 2024, A169523) [nonpub. opn.]),2 the trial
court granted Trowbridge’s request for a certificate of probable
cause.

2 We deny as unnecessary Trowbridge’s request for judicial
notice of the exhibits and petition he filed. (See In re Reno (2012)
55 Cal.4th 428, 484 [“[p]etitioners need not separately or
specifically request judicial notice of all documents connected
with their past appeals”].)
4
DISCUSSION

A.

Trowbridge maintains the trial court abused its discretion
by finding him unsuitable for mental health diversion. We
disagree.

1.

In 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and
1001.36, thereby creating “a pretrial diversion program” for
certain defendants with mental health disorders. (People v.
Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624.) Section 1001.36 gives the trial
court discretion, if the defendant meets six eligibility and
suitability requirements, to grant either temporary or permanent
postponement of prosecution to allow the defendant to undergo
mental health treatment. (§ 1001.36, subds. (a)-(c), (f)(1); Frahs,
at pp. 626-627.) “Diversion can be ‘viewed as a specialized form
of probation, . . . [that] is intended to offer a second chance to
offenders who are minimally involved in crime and maximally
motivated to reform.’ ” (People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 879, 886 (Qualkinbush).)

“As presently enacted, section 1001.36, subdivision (b)
provides that a defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if two
criteria are met. First, the defendant has been diagnosed with a
mental disorder . . . within the last five years by a qualified
mental health expert. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) Second, the
‘defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) ‘If
the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the
court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor,
causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s

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involvement in the alleged offense.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. Graham
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795.)

“If a defendant meets these eligibility requirements, the
court also must find that the defendant is suitable for pretrial
diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: ‘(1) In the
opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or
motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health
treatment. [¶] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant
agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . .
[¶] [and] (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated
in the community.’ (§ 1001.36, subds. (c)(1)–(4).)” (People v.
Graham, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.)

Section 1170.18, in turn, defines “ ‘unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety’ ” as “an unreasonable risk that the
petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning
of” section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1170.18, subd. (c);
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149 (Whitmill).)
Thus, a trial court must determine whether “the defendant is
likely to commit an offense . . . known colloquially as a ‘ “super
strike.” ’ ” (People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 851, fn. 11
(Bunas).) Qualifying super strikes include homicide, attempted
homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine
gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass
destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or
life imprisonment, and any sexually violent offenses or sexual
offense committed against minors under the age of 14. (§ 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); Whitmill, at pp. 1150-1151.)

Mental health diversion is discretionary, not mandatory,
even if all the requirements are met. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); People
v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080; People v. Oneal

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(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 581, 588.) But this “ ‘residual’ ” discretion
must be exercised consistently with the principles and purpose of
the law, which includes a strong legislative preference for
treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of
such treatment to both the offending individual and the
community. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th
882, 892-893; accord, § 1001.35; Qualkinbush, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at p. 891.)3

We review the trial court’s ruling on mental health
diversion for abuse of discretion. (See Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1147; Bunas, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 848.)
“ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or
capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard
[citations], or bases its decision on express or implied factual
findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ”
(Whitmill, at p. 1147.)

2.

We reject Trowbridge’s assertion that the trial court
applied the wrong standard—by purportedly relying on his
general risk of violence rather than his specific risk of committing
a super strike offense—in finding that his diversion would
present an unreasonable risk to public safety.

True, trial courts cannot use their discretion to deny
diversion using a different definition of risk to public safety than
that set forth in the statute. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 895-896; accord, Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1150-1151, 1155-1156; but see Qualkinbush,

3 The purposes of the legislation are to increase diversion of
people with mental disorders to mitigate their entry and reentry
into the criminal justice system “while protecting public safety,”
to allow local discretion in developing and implementing
diversion across a continuum of care settings, and to meet the
needs of those with mental health disorders. (§ 1001.35.)
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supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 891.) And risk that a defendant is
likely to “ ‘commit[] crimes like kidnapping, robbery, assault,
spousal abuse, torture of small animals, carjacking or felonies
committed on behalf of a criminal street gang’ ” is not
determinative. (People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304,
1310-1311.)

However, Trowbridge does not meet his burden of
demonstrating that the trial court used the wrong standard here.
(See People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 213 (Pacheco)
[appellant bears burden to demonstrate abuse of discretion];
People v. Jacobo (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1430 [reviewing
courts presume that trial court knew and applied correct law,
unless appellant affirmatively demonstrates otherwise].) He does
not cite any portion of the record that affirmatively demonstrates
the court decided that the public safety requirement was unmet
merely because Trowbridge was generally dangerous or that the
court analyzed the risk to public safety under any standard other
than that described above.

In fact, both Trowbridge’s counsel and the People explicitly
cited the correct standard in arguing their opposing positions.
Specifically, the People argued that Trowbridge’s charged
offenses—which involved multiple and escalating instances of
violence against his wife and his taking a firearm to her house (in
clear violation of a court order) and firing it—demonstrate that
he poses an unreasonable risk to public safety because, if treated
in the community, he was at unreasonable risk to commit a super
strike (homicide). In announcing its public safety finding, the
trial court specifically acknowledged the primary authority relied
on by Trowbridge (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138)—which
applied the correct standard for making a danger to public safety
finding (id. at pp. 1150-1151)—distinguished Whitmill factually,
and explicitly stated that it was exercising its residual discretion

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by considering the primary purposes of the mental health
diversion law (not traditional sentencing considerations).

In short, we have no basis for concluding that the trial
court applied an incorrect legal standard.

3.

Nor do we agree with Trowbridge that substantial evidence
does not support the trial court’s implicit finding that mental
health diversion presents an unreasonable risk that he will
commit a super strike.

In assessing that risk, the trial court may consider the
opinions of the district attorney, the defense, and qualified
mental health experts, as well as the defendant’s treatment plan,
the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the circumstances of
the charged offense, and any other factors the court deems
appropriate. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4); Bunas, supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at pp. 861-862.)

Here, Trowbridge has not been previously convicted of a
super strike, nor was he charged with one in the instant case.
However, that is not determinative. (See People v. Hall (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [rejecting argument that trial court
may only exercise its discretion to find an unreasonable risk to
public safety when considering an offender who has previously
committed a super strike].) In fact, Trowbridge has no prior
criminal history. Nonetheless, our description of the
circumstances of the charged offenses shows that they are
particularly concerning (not only because of the danger
Trowbridge presents to himself).

Trowbridge angrily attacked and injured his spouse on two
different occasions. Although he did not manage to inflict serious
injuries, his violence escalated (over a relatively brief period) and
appears to have been motivated—at least in part—by jealousy
and a desire to dominate and control his wife. We can infer that
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the trial court was implicitly concerned that “ ‘ “there [is] a great
likelihood that any one battering episode is part of a larger
scheme of dominance and control [and] that scheme usually
escalates in frequency and severity.” ’ ” (People v. Kerley (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 513, 535; accord, United States v. Castleman
(2014) 572 U.S. 157, 160 [“[d]omestic violence often escalates in
severity over time”].)

Indeed, the trial court had ample grounds for such
concerns. After he was arrested and served with a protective
order following the second charged instance of domestic violence,
Trowbridge violated the order almost immediately. Most
seriously, he went to his wife’s house in violation of the protective
order, with a loaded gun, and tried (somewhat forcefully) to
enter, even after he had been told to leave. Trowbridge
ambiguously threatened (via the Ring camera) to shoot
somebody—“ ‘don’t make me do this’ ”—then fired a warning
shot, and finally tried to shoot himself. Although he fired the
warning short into the air, by doing so he endangered the lives of
people in the residential neighborhood. And by attempting to
shoot himself while his family watched, he tried to escalate the
conflict to a violent end and traumatized his wife and two
children.

It is not unreasonable for the trial court to have considered
the level of violence and trauma that he was willing to inflict or
alternative scenarios if, for example, he had gained entry to the
house. (Cf. Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 209-210, 213-
214 [trial court did not abuse discretion in considering possible
casualties to residents or firefighters that could be caused if
defendant were again to intentionally start a brush fire]; People
v. Brown (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237 [“murder is ‘the
ultimate form of domestic violence’ ”].)

The trial court could also properly consider that Trowbridge
had received mental health treatment before the charged

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offenses. (See People v. Hall, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 [“
‘[t]he critical inquiry . . . is not whether the risk is quantifiable,
but rather, whether the risk would be “unreasonable” ’ ”].)

Trowbridge argues that his is not the type of case where we
should uphold the trial court’s dangerousness finding. (Cf. People
v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 451 (Moine) [recognizing
reviewing courts “have affirmed denials of resentencing under
section 1170.18’s ‘dangerousness’ prong where the petitioners had
long criminal histories involving violent felonies”].) He relies on
Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, Moine, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th 440, and People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
990).

We have no dispute with any of these cases, wherein
reviewing courts concluded the trial courts abused their
discretion, in the mental health diversion context, by finding
those defendants posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety. (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1143-1144, 1146,
1150-1151 [no substantial evidence to support finding
defendant—charged with discharge of a firearm with gross
negligence—posed unreasonable risk of danger when he fired gun
only into the air in a parking lot, did not injure anyone, threw the
gun away and tried to avoid confrontation, cooperated with
police, and criminal history involved only drug offenses and
theft]; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 444-445 & fn. 2, 450-
451 [abuse of discretion to find defendant in case involving
charges of assault (fist fight) and criminal threats (against other
victims) posed unreasonable risk of danger because no evidence
he had access to guns, two psychiatrists opined he posed a low
risk of committing future assaults, his criminal history included
no violent felonies, and trial court previously released defendant
on bond]; People v. Williams, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 993-
994, 1002-1003 [abuse of discretion to find defendant in felony
stalking case posed unreasonable risk of danger because

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underlying charges involved disturbing threats but were not
super strikes, mental health experts opined he posed a low risk to
public safety, there was no evidence he had access to weapons,
and trial court previously released defendant on bond].) Trial
courts must consider carefully the facts of each case and the
purpose of the statute when exercising the discretion that the
Legislature granted them.

All three cases are readily distinguishable because, here,
Trowbridge’s charged offenses involve actual, repeated, and
escalating violence (not mere threats) targeted at his wife, his
personal possession and firing of a firearm outside his wife’s
home after he was thwarted from entering, his willingness to
shoot himself and traumatize his family, and no clear opinion
from a mental health expert that Trowbridge poses a low public
safety risk. In fact, the psychologist’s report in this case
explicitly leaves resolution of this issue to the trial court and fails
to squarely address important questions. Trowbridge’s refusal to
abide by the terms of the protective order also supports the trial
court’s finding that treating Trowbridge in the community would
present an unreasonable risk that he would commit a super
strike. (See People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 245.)
“[T]here is nothing in section 1001.36 . . . that precludes a trial
court from relying primarily, or even entirely, on the
circumstances of the charged offense or offenses in denying a
motion for diversion.” (Bunas, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 862,
italics added.)

The trial court ultimately granted Trowbridge formal
probation after the parties reached a plea agreement and several
of the charged offenses were dismissed by the People. Contrary
to Trowbridge’s belated assertion in his reply brief, we see no
irreconcilable conflict. It is not unreasonable for the trial court to
decide formal probation, with its inherent threat of prison,
provides greater motivation and supervision than mental health

12
diversion. (See Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 214.) We
agree with Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155, that this
reasoning, if applied in every case, would “moot the statute.”
That is precisely why the Legislature entrusted courts with
discretion to weigh the competing interests.

At the trial court level, reasonable minds might differ as to
whether Trowbridge is likely to commit a super strike. On
appeal, however, we cannot determine the trial court abused its
discretion simply because evidence in the record could support
either conclusion. (See People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
113, 124.) Trowbridge has not shown that the trial court’s
finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. (See People v.
Jefferson, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 238-239, 245 [finding that
defendant convicted of commercial burglary for theft of ink
cartridge was likely to commit a super strike was supported by
his prior convictions for assault, and battery, and a robbery
involving personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily
injury, in combination with multiple rule violations in prison and
multiple parole violations].) No abuse of discretion has been
shown.

DISPOSITION

The order denying mental health diversion is affirmed.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

SIMONS, ACTING P. J.
CHOU, J.

People v. Trowbridge (A169050, A169872)

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