People v. Meier CA4/1

CourtListener 10354156Calctapp11 de mar. de 2025

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 3/11/25 P. v. Meier CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084099

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD274701)

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL MEIER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Brendon Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Christopher Michael Meier appeals the denial of his motion for

resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75. Under the plain language
of the statute, we conclude that Meier was ineligible for resentencing.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2018, a jury convicted Meier of two counts of first degree
burglary of an inhabited dwelling (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), with another
person present as to one count (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), and of one
misdemeanor count of resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). Subsequently,
Meier admitted to having one prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), one
serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and one
strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668, 1170.12). The court imposed a prison
term of 15 years eight months, consisting of eight years on the first burglary
count (the middle term, doubled for the strike) and a consecutive two years
and eight months on the second burglary count (one-third of the middle term,
doubled for the strike), plus a five-year serious felony enhancement. The
court stated, “I will not impose the [one] year enhancement for the prison

prior pursuant to the People v. Jones [(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1142] decision.”2
Meier appealed to this court. In People v. Meier (Oct. 10, 2019,
D074589, [nonpub. opn.]), we reversed the judgment and remanded for
consideration of eligibility for mental health diversion under section 1001.36.
Otherwise, “[i]f the court declines to grant Meier diversion or if Meier is
placed on diversion but is unsuccessful in completing his diversion program,”
we directed the court to “reinstate Meier’s convictions and . . . resentence

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Despite the court’s oral pronouncement, the abstract of judgment
showed the prison prior enhancement as stayed.
2
Meier.” (People v. Meier, supra, D074589.) The further sentencing
proceedings would be “as appropriate” and would include the “exercise [of]
discretion . . . under sections 667, subdivision (a) and 1385, subdivision (b), to
either strike or reimpose the five-year prior serious felony enhancement.”
(People v. Meier, supra, D074589.)
Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section 667.5,
subdivision (b), to impose a one-year enhancement only for a prison term
served for conviction of a sexually violent offense, rather than for any felony.
(Sen. Bill No. 136 (2018–2019 Reg. Sess.) effective Jan. 1, 2020; Stats. 2019,
ch. 590, § 1.)
In April 2021, pursuant to our 2019 opinion, the trial court held the
hearing to determine Meier’s eligibility for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36 and, if not eligible for or placed on diversion, to resentence
him. The court found him ineligible for the mental health diversion program
and declined to strike the serious felony enhancement. The court
resentenced Meier with the “conscious exercise of [its] discretion and as of
this moment in time” to “exactly the same sentence,” including the
section 667.5, subdivision (b), prison prior, even though the prison prior was
not for a sexually violent offense.
Following that sentencing hearing, the amendment to section 667.5,
subdivision (b), was given retroactive effect through Senate Bill No. 483
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3), which added what is now section 1172.75. With
the exception of sexually violent offenses, section 1172.75 provides that
prison prior enhancements “imposed prior to January 1, 2020” pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b), are “legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
The statute directs the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify those persons in custody “currently serving

3
a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a) . . . to the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.”
(Id., subd. (b).) Upon receiving this information, “[i]f the court determines
that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).)
In 2023, CDCR identified Meier as an individual serving a prison term
with a section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement. The trial court issued an
order noting CDCR’s identification, appointing counsel, and tentatively
denying resentencing. After holding a hearing in March 2024, the court
concluded Meier was ineligible for resentencing because of the April 2021
resentencing and “correct[ed] the record by ordering the prison prior stricken”
because the enhancement was invalid at that prior resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Meier argues the trial court erred by finding him ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.75 because: (1) the April 2021 resentencing
did not render him ineligible for section 1172.75 resentencing, and (2) the
statute affords relief to all defendants whose sentences include a prior prison
term enhancement, whether it was imposed and executed or imposed and
stayed, following People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, review
granted February 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson). The People contend the
court did not err because section 1172.75 applies only to those defendants
whose prior prison term enhancements were imposed and executed.
On our de novo review of this issue (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 961), we conclude Meier is ineligible for resentencing under the plain
language of section 1172.75 based on the April 2021 judgment. Moreover,
even if the August 2018 sentence were the relevant judgment, Meier would

4
not be eligible for resentencing because the court specifically ruled that it was
not imposing the prison prior.
Under section 1172.75, the trial court must “verify that the current
judgment includes a sentencing enhancement” “that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5.” (Id. at
subds. (a) & (c), italics added.) Although Meier was originally sentenced in
2018, including a stayed prison prior enhancement, we reversed and
remanded that judgment for resentencing in 2019. Following remittitur, the
trial court resentenced him in April 2021. Thus, the April 2021 sentence
replaced the August 2018 judgment and was the “current judgment”
operative at the time of Meier’s March 2024 resentencing. (See People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“We have held that when part of a sentence
is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all
counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion
in light of the changed circumstances.’ ”].) The April 2021 judgment, not
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, did not entitle him to resentencing by the
plain language of section 1172.75.
By imposing “exactly the same sentence,” the court in April 2021
included the section 667.5, subdivision (b), enhancement in the abstract of
judgment. At that time, section 667.5, subdivision (b), had been amended to
invalidate all prison priors except for sexually violent offenses, which Meier’s
was not. Accordingly, the trial court properly corrected the judgment by
striking the invalid enhancement. (See People v. Codinha (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 976, 990 [“A trial court that imposes a sentence unauthorized by
law retains jurisdiction (or has inherent power) to correct the sentence at any
time the error comes to its attention.”].)

5
Furthermore, even if the August 2018 judgment were the “current
judgment,” section 1172.75 would not permit resentencing. In its oral
pronouncement of sentencing at that time, the court stated, “I will not impose
the [one] year enhancement for the prison prior pursuant to the People v.
Jones decision.” Therefore, the prison prior enhancement was not a “sentence
enhancement that was imposed” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a)) entitling Meier to
resentencing. A section 667.5, subdivision (b), prior, once found true, must
either be imposed or stricken. Given the prior was not imposed, it was
necessarily stricken and not part of the 2018 judgment. Therefore, Meier
could not receive relief under section 1172.75. Even though the abstract of
judgment states that the enhancement was merely stayed, the oral
pronouncement controls. (People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070
(Delgado) [“the abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction,
and cannot prevail over the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment to the
extent the two conflict”]; People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 244
[“where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment
and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls”].)
This scenario is unlike the facts in Christianson, where the trial court
specifically stated in its oral pronouncement that it would “ ‘stay the prison
priors.’ ” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 307.)

6
DISPOSITION
The order denying Meier’s motion for resentencing is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

RUBIN, J.

7

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.