People v. Prokopowicz CA1/1

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Filed 3/7/25 P. v. Prokopowicz CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A166800
v.
(Contra Costa County
GREGORY PROKOPOWICZ, Super. Ct. No. 05002014058)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, Gregory Prokopowicz pleaded
guilty to the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of his wife. Under
Penal Code2 section 1026, Prokopowicz also pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity and proceeded to a bench trial on that issue, contending that at the
time of the murder “he was operating under the delusional premise that his
wife had been planning his death and that he was at risk for being burned to
death where he was living.” The trial court found that Prokopowicz had

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California

Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. We provide a limited
factual summary because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or
should know, “the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v.
Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
failed to prove he was legally insane at the time of the murder, and
Prokopowicz was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. (§ 25.) In this
appeal, he argues “the court erred by relying on” People v. Leeds (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 822 (Leeds), which examined self-defense principles in the
context of an insanity defense. We conclude there was no prejudicial error
and affirm the judgment accordingly.
“Judgments and orders are presumed correct, and the party attacking a
judgment or order has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error.
(People v. Neilson (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1529, 1534.) On appeal, the
substantial evidence test applies. (People v. Powell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 921,
957.) When the error is “legal” and “not merely factual” in nature, prejudice
is presumed and reversal is required “absent a basis in the record to find that
the verdict was actually based on a valid ground.” (People v. Guiton (1993)
4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.) As we explain below, there is such a basis in the
record here, so we cannot presume prejudice; instead, we conclude that the
purported error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.
Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1296.)
“In any criminal proceeding . . . in which a plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only
when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he
or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of
his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the
commission of the offense.” (§ 25, subd. (b).) Under this standard, “if a
person is incapable, because of a mental disease or defect, of understanding
that his actions are morally wrong—that is, in violation of generally accepted
standards of moral obligation—then that person is legally insane, regardless

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of whether he knows his actions are illegal.” (People v. Severance (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 305, 323.)
Here, the trial court issued a 21-page written decision explaining why
Prokopowicz had not made that requisite showing. In part I., the court set
forth the case’s procedural history. In part II., the court outlined the
applicable legal principles and framed the issue: “whether the evidence
demonstrates that” Prokopowicz “did not appreciate or understand that the
killing of [his wife] violated generally recognized moral standards of
behavior.” Part III. is devoted to the court’s discussion of that issue, and its
first subheading, A., is entitled “Application of Legal Principles to the Facts.”
In this subsection, the court noted that four expert witnesses for the defense
testified that Prokopowicz was insane at the time of the killing and only one
expert witness for the prosecution testified that he was not. As the court
observed, a “fact finder . . . is not required to adopt the opinions of one or
more experts even in the absence of any contrary expert opinion.” (See also
People v. Skinner (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1059 [on appeal, agreement
between expert witnesses is not determinative; appellate court’s inquiry is
limited “ ‘ “to a determination whether there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the [trial court’s] verdict of sanity” ’ ”].) In Prokopowicz’s
case, it was prosecution expert, Dr. Paul Good, “a clinical psychologist, whose
opinion [the] court [found] particularly persuasive on the issue of whether the
defendant appreciated that his conduct was contrary to generally recognized
moral standards or values at the time of the offense (emphasis added).”
Whereas defense counsel in closing argument had contended that “[a]t
the moment [Prokopowicz] killed [his wife] he was terrified and frantic,”
“[c]onvinced death was closing in” and the “woman he loved so desperately
. . . was going to kill him,” the trial court in its written decision disagreed

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with this characterization of the evidence. Instead, the court concurred with
Dr. Good’s opinion that other “facts establish . . . the primary reason for [the]
killing.” Under this alternative theory advanced by Dr. Good, Prokopowicz
killed his wife because she “had rejected [his] entreaties that she live up to
her marital vows, return to their marital relationship,” and “fully act as his
wife.” Thus, on the trial court’s reasoning, Prokopowicz’s capacity for
distinguishing right from wrong was not impaired at the time of the offense
by his delusions concerning his wife’s plans to kill him, because he was not
being influenced by those delusions in the commission of the offense. It was
for this reason, explained in part III.A. of the written decision, that the trial
court was persuaded by Dr. Good’s opinion, which held that Prokopowicz
knew his conduct was wrong at the time of the offense. Under the
circumstances, that conclusion dispositively ruled out Prokopowicz’s insanity
defense.
The trial court did not, therefore, decide this case based upon a
misunderstanding that the defense theory relied on proof that Prokopowicz
killed because his delusion caused him to fear he was in immediate danger at
the commission of the offense. It was not persuaded that Prokopowicz’s
delusions caused him to believe he was morally justified to kill, even in the
absence of an identifiable imminent danger. Throughout the written
decision, the court concentrates on the key question whether Prokopowicz
was able to appreciate or understand that the killing of his wife violated
generally recognized moral standards of behavior.
Importantly, the court’s straightforward logic does not depend on
Leeds, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 822, or the principles of self-defense in any

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way—even if Leeds is invoked in later subsections of the decision.3 Because
the trial court’s finding with respect to Prokopowicz’s sanity rested
independently on a valid ground that was unrelated to the alleged error
concerning Leeds, and was supported by substantial evidence (People v.
Powell, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 957), any such error was necessarily harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.

SMILEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

BANKE, ACTING P. J.
LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

A166800
People v. Prokopowicz

3 We observe that after identifying factual similarities with Leeds, the

written decision cites Leeds to support its position that Prokopowicz’s
behaviors after the shooting—attempts to evade police apprehension,
including disposing of clothing and fleeing the scene—are relevant to a
finding that Prokopowicz appreciated the moral wrongfulness of his behavior.
A majority of the trial court’s discussion of the facts concentrates on
Prokopowicz’s awareness that society might view the killing of his wife as
immoral, a reflection of his understanding of moral standards of conduct
external to him that apply to his conduct. Our review does not find, as
Prokopowicz argued, that the trial court incorrectly applied the guilt phase
law of self-defense to Prokopowicz’s sanity phase trial.

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