In re L.N. CA4/2

CourtListener 10352176Calctapp7 de mar. de 2025

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Filed 3/7/25 In re L.N. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.N., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E084751

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPIN2300071)

v. OPINION

J.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Elizabeth Tucker,

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Law Office of Robert McLaughlin and Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by

the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Jamila T. Purnell,

Deputies County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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The sole claim in this juvenile dependency appeal is that the social services

department did not fulfill its initial inquiry duty under California’s version of the Indian

Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) because some of the

child’s paternal relatives, who never spoke with the department, were not asked about

possible Indian ancestry. Those relatives were never identified as ones possessing

additional information about the issue, and when the child’s father asserted “Navajo

Blackfoot” ancestry, the department contacted three tribes, two of which said the child

was not eligible for enrollment in their tribe and one of which never responded. On this
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record, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The sole issue here is Cal-ICWA compliance, so we need not detail the

circumstances leading to L.N.’s removal from her mother, defendant and appellant J.C.

(mother), or mother’s actions after removal. Plaintiff and respondent Riverside County

Department of Public Social Services (the department) petitioned for L.N. under section

300 in April 2023, and in October 2024 the juvenile court determined that Cal-ICWA did

not apply and terminated mother’s parental rights to L.N. L.N.’s father, M.N. (father),

was also named in the petition and had his parental rights terminated, but he has not

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Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code, and
undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court. Also, “we use the term
‘Indian’ throughout to reflect the statutory language.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1112, 1125, fn. 1.) No disrespect is intended.

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appealed. Mother’s appeal, however, focuses solely on father’s relatives, so our focus is

on the department’s contacts with father.

The April 2023 detention report stated that father “reported having Navajo

Blackfoot Tribe Indian Ancestry. However; he denied himself or any paternal relatives

being registered tribal members, ever living on a reservation/community, attending

school, or receiving any benefits from a tribe available to Indians by the Federal

Government.” The department then sent inquiries to the Navajo Nation, Blackfeet Tribe

of Montana, and Colorado River Indian Tribes. The inquiries listed the names and

known dates of birth for several relatives, including father, father’s mother, and father’s

father. The Colorado River Indian Tribes responded that, based on the information

submitted, L.N. was “not eligible for enrollment” with the tribe. The Navajo Nation sent

two responses, first stating that it was trying to verify L.N.’s enrollment or eligibility for

enrollment and then stating it was “unable to verify” L.N.’s eligibility for tribal

membership enrollment. The Blackfeet Tribe of Montana did not respond.

In its May 2023 jurisdiction/disposition report, the department stated father

“reported having no known Indian ancestry.” Father also submitted a form with the court

in May 2023, indicating that neither he, any of his lineal ancestors, nor L.N. is or was a

member of a federally recognized tribe and that neither he nor L.N. is eligible for

membership in such a tribe.

Mother’s appeal centers on a separate portion of the jurisdiction/disposition report,

where father described his relatives. Father “reported to have four siblings, three younger

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sisters and a younger brother,” and he “reported to have a great relationship with his

mother. He stated that she is supportive and they remain close, continuing to spend time

with each other weekly. . . . He reported that his father died from cancer in 2020. [He]

reported to have a good relationship with his siblings.” Father’s mother was also

identified for potential placement, although L.N. was placed with her maternal aunt

throughout the dependency. Mother has not referred us to anything in the appellate

record showing that the department contacted, or received contact information for, any of

these relatives.

II. DISCUSSION

The federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) establishes minimum standards “for

the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in

foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.” (25

U.S.C. § 1902.) Cal-ICWA, California’s counterpart to ICWA, imposes on juvenile

courts and county welfare departments “an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire”

whether a child subject to a section 300 petition may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd.

(a); see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 (D.F.).) “This continuing duty can be

divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the

duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (Ibid.) Only the initial duty is at issue here.

The initial duty applies in every dependency. (In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th

678, 686; see former § 224.2, subd. (b).) The initial duty expands under section 224.2,

subdivision (b), when a child is removed from their home. Under that provision as it read

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at the time L.N. was removed, “[i]f a child is placed into the temporary custody of a

county welfare department pursuant to Section 306,” the department’s obligation includes

asking the “extended family members” about the child’s Indian status. (former § 224.2,

subd. (b).) The Judicial Council revised rule 5.481 to implement section 224.2,

subdivision (b), by requiring inquiry of extended family in every case in which the
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department seeks to place the child. (Rule 5.481(a)(1).)

Our Supreme Court recently held “that error resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-

ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare agency

to comply with the inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in

compliance with rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice provision

of section 224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is impossible to ascertain

whether the agency’s error is prejudicial.” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1136

(Dezi C.).) Although the Court did “not have occasion to decide what constitutes an

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L.N. was removed under a protective custody warrant. There is a split within
this court as to whether a social services agency has a duty to question extended family
members about potential Indian ancestry when a child is removed by warrant. (In re
Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, 970-971, review granted September 27, 2023,
S281447; In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 504, review granted July 26, 2023,
S279743.) The issue remains pending before our Supreme Court. (See In re Ja.O.
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 672, review granted July 26, 2023, S280572.) The Legislature has
recently amended Cal-ICWA to provide that social services agencies have a “duty to
inquire,” including questioning extended family members about potential Indian ancestry,
whenever a section 300 petition “may be or has been filed.” (§ 224.2, subds. (a) &
(b)(1); see Stats. 2024, ch. 656, § 3.) To the extent the legislation does not moot the
issue, it does not matter to our disposition, as we would affirm whether or not the
department had a duty to question extended family members in this case. It either
satisfied the duty (as we hold) or did not have one in the first place.

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adequate and proper inquiry necessary to satisfy section 224.2,” it noted that “the juvenile

court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is

‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of

review.” (Id. at p. 1141.) “‘“On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad

discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly

diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the

more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.”’” (Ibid.) Failures “to obtain

meaningful information or pursue meaningful avenues of inquiry—by, for example, . . .

failing to inquire further after a parent identified an extended family member with more

information about the child’s potential Indian ancestry” are relevant in assessing the

adequacy of initial Cal-ICWA inquiry. (Id. at p. 1151.)

Here, we are not reviewing a trial court’s resolution of an evidentiary conflict, but

the trial court’s implied finding that the department’s “inquiry and due diligence were

‘proper and adequate.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134.) We thus are “not

concerned with the outcome” as to the likelihood of whether the child is an Indian child.

(Id. at p. 1144.) We do not limit our review to “[e]nforcing the requirement of an

adequate inquiry only in cases in which the record affirmatively demonstrates a reason to

believe the child is an Indian child.” (Id. at p. 1147.) Instead, we must “ensur[e] that

tribal heritage is acknowledged and inquired about in dependency cases.” (Id. at p.

1148.) This requires us to engage in a searching review to protect the tribal interests that

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Dezi C. explained are compelling and legally protected. (Ibid.) Yet the deferential

standard means an inquiry need not be perfect to be adequate.

We find no error in the juvenile court’s determination that the department’s initial

inquiry was adequate, which is implied in its conclusion that ICWA (and therefore Cal-

ICWA) did not apply. (See In re Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567.) Mother

claims that the department’s initial inquiry was inadequate because it did not ask father’s

siblings or mother about L.N.’s potential Indian ancestry. However, such an omission

was not the kind of failure our Supreme Court identified as relevant. Dezi C. noted that

“failing to inquire further after a parent identified an extended family member with more

information about [a] child’s potential Indian ancestry” affects the adequacy of an initial

inquiry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1151.) Here, father was forthcoming about his

knowledge of possible Indian ancestry and never informed the department that any of

these relatives had relevant information. Additionally, the department was never given

contact information for any of these relatives, and Cal-ICWA “‘does not require the

agency to “find” unknown relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely

to make reasonable inquiries.’” (Id. at p. 1140.) Taken in consideration with father’s

ultimate denials of Indian ancestry and the department’s inquiries to three tribes father

initially identified, we are satisfied that the department conducted an initial inquiry

“adequate to reach a reliable conclusion about the applicability of ICWA.” (Id. at p. 1153

(conc. opn. of Kruger, J.); accord, id. at p. 1169 (dis. opn. of Groban, J.) [“‘the focus of

the court’s analysis should not be on the number of individuals interviewed, but on

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whether the agency’s [Cal-ICWA] inquiry has yielded reliable information about a

child’s possible tribal affiliation’”].) Accordingly, we find no error in the juvenile court’s

determination that Cal-ICWA did not apply.

III. DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights to L.N. are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAPHAEL
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
J.

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