CourtListener 10350554•Lee v. Antelope Valley Learning Academy CA2/2
Lee v. Antelope Valley Learning Academy CA2/2
CourtListener 10350554Calctapp5 de mar. de 2025
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Filed 3/5/25 Lee v. Antelope Valley Learning Academy CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
STEVEN LEE, B337734
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV38319)
v.
ANTELOPE VALLEY
LEARNING ACADEMY, INC.,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Barbara A. Meiers, Judge. Affirmed.
Jaurigue Law Group, Michael J. Jaurigue; KP Law and
Zareh A. Jaltorossian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Buchalter, Kevin T. Collins, Phillip Chan and Robert M.
Dato for Defendant and Respondent.
Steven Lee appeals from a judgment entered after the trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of respondent Antelope
Valley Learning Academy, Inc. (AVLA), on Lee’s claims of
retaliation, race discrimination, wrongful termination and failure
to prevent discrimination. The trial court alternatively held Lee’s
complaint and first amended complaint (FAC) were subject to a
motion for judgment on the pleadings because the FAC failed to
state a cause of action. We find no error and affirm the
judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Lee’s employment history
Lee began working for AVLA on October 4, 2004.1 Lee is of
Asian descent. AVLA is a public charter high school in Palmdale.
Lee held the position of English teacher until his termination on
January 21, 2022.
Lee received a copy of AVLA’s Employee Handbook, which
describes AVLA’s policies and procedures. The handbook
identifies the following conduct as violating the standards of
conduct: “[u]nprofessional” conduct and “[a]ny other conduct
detrimental to other employees or [AVLA’s] interests or its
efficient operations.”
1 While Lee’s complaint asserts he began working for AVLA
on October 4, 2004, it appears from October 2004 until June
2012, Lee worked for Desert Sands Charter High School, which is
an affiliate of AVLA. Around 2012, Lee was hired as an English
teacher at AVLA. Although the entity “Learn4Life” is referred to
throughout the record, it is never defined in the record.
Learn4Life appears to be an organization that includes several
schools, including Desert Sands Charter High School and AVLA.
2
From September 2018 to the time of Lee’s termination,
Taera Childers was at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy as
the area superintendent. From October 2013 to 2021, the time
period relevant to most material events in this case, AVLA’s
school principal was Marcello Palacios. Lee reported directly to
Palacios.
Over the course of his employment, Lee received
satisfactory performance reviews, often receiving mid-range
marks for “meets standards.” Lee received some “exceeds
standards” marks for categories such as individualized attention
to students, organizational culture, punctuality and creativity.
During his employment at AVLA, Lee applied for various
positions in other schools owned and operated by AVLA. In
approximately 2011, he applied to transfer to a different school.
The principal at that time was a white woman, who made the
decision not to grant his transfer. In 2015, Lee applied to
transfer to another school called Mission View Public Charter.
Childers, also a white woman, was then principal at that school
and decided against his transfer. Lee also attempted to transfer
to a school in 2015, where Jessica Sherlock, another white
woman, was the principal and who also made the decision not to
grant Lee’s transfer.
In 2016 or 2017, Lee learned of two teacher training
opportunities at AVLA that had never been made known to him.
Lee was not allowed to apply for these opportunities. The spots
were filled by a white woman and a Hispanic man, both of whom
had significantly less experience than Lee. Lee missed an
opportunity to advance his career when he was not selected for
these roles. Around the same time, a position opened for athletic
director. Lee felt he was uniquely prepared for the role, but it
3
was never advertised, and he was not allowed to apply. Instead,
a white man was given the position.
On July 12, 2016, Lee e-mailed Palacios and Alexander
Morris, assistant vice-principal, formally requesting to be
considered for the English department chair position. The panel
interview included Childers, Palacios, and Morris. The panel did
not choose Lee and instead chose a white woman.
In around November 2018, Lee began noticing racial
discrimination in the form of disproportionate employee
recognition. He noticed he was not receiving recognition for his
contributions and accomplishments in comparison to non-Asian
employees.
In March 2019, during a meeting between Lee, a student,
and her parents, it was discovered that Lee withheld credits that
the student submitted during one learning period and instead
submitted them in the following learning period. As a result, Lee
received a written “confirmation of conversation,” a written
disciplinary action, to be placed in his file. Lee was informed his
action was “in violation of [AVLA’s] compliance policy, and will
not be tolerated.” Lee was warned, “You are to immediately and
permanently abstain from holding credits to submit during
another Learning Period. You are directed to adhere to
compliance procedures, and notify site Administration if you are
unable to submit credits by the due date. Not being forthcoming
about missing deadlines, and holding credits will not be
tolerated.” Childers testified, “Given the severity of the offense,
AVLA considered terminating Lee’s employment in April 2019,
but given his years of service and that it was his first offense, his
employment was not terminated.”
4
In July 2019, Lee received an e-mail announcing a new
class for the fall term called Synthesis of Literature, Art and
Media (SLAM). He felt uniquely prepared to teach the course.
On July 8, 2019, Lee asked Palacios about teaching the class, and
Palacios informed Lee he had already filled the position with a
white woman. Palacios opened a second SLAM position, which
he offered to Lee, but the training for the class was taking place
only two days after Lee was offered the position and Lee was
unable to make arrangements to be there.
In October 2019, Lee sent a letter to Jeri Vincent, an officer
of Lifelong Learning Administration Corporation (LLAC), which
provides human resources and other administrative services to
AVLA. In the letter, Lee detailed the reasons why he felt the
need to change his work environment. He described a “culture of
fear and apathy” leaving teachers feeling “if they speak up, they
will face retaliation.” Lee described the problem in five
categories, which he titled “Hiring Practices, Teacher Workload,
Statistics/Data, Fairness and Equitable Compensation, and Work
Conditions.” He noted that schools should provide equal
opportunities for everyone to apply for jobs and the importance of
making sure candidates have “the proper qualifications and
experience to do the job.” Lee’s detailed description of the
problems with hiring practices at AVLA did not mention race or
racism. Lee described some teachers having more students than
others, detailed problems with AVLA being a “data-driven
school,” and offered an explanation for the “Confirmation of
Conversation” he received in April 2019. In the section of his
letter entitled, “Work Conditions,” Lee described the problem
with teaching pods and mentioned being passed over for the
5
position of English department chair. However, there was no
mention of race or racial discrimination in the entire letter.
In November 2019, Lee met with Chad Gray of LLAC, who
was LLAC’s chief human resources officer. Vincent had
forwarded Lee’s October 2019 letter to Gray. Lee asserts he
“raised concerns about racial discrimination in the company’s
hiring and promotions process, but nothing else ever came of this
conversation.” Gray investigated Lee’s complaint immediately
but concluded there was no evidence of any discrimination
against him. Gray informed Lee of his findings at the time.
Lee’s 2021 performance review and complaints of racial
discrimination
In May 2021, Lee received his 2021 performance review
from Palacios. He was given six ratings for exceeds expectations;
17 ratings for meets expectations, and an overall rating of meets
expectations. Lee “felt [his] review significantly
underrepresented” what he felt was his “best performance to date
and surpassing my own previous performance records and that of
many other teachers at AVLA.” He complained to Palacios that
he felt his review underreported his performance.
Palacios invited Lee to provide an additional explanation
and evidence for his consideration. Lee did so. On June 28, 2021,
Palacios sent a revised 2021 performance review for Lee’s
signature. He had changed two of the ratings that were
previously “meets” expectations to “exceeds” expectations.
Palacios added some, but not all of the information Lee had
provided. Lee refused to sign his review and expected Palacios to
discuss it with him further, but that did not happen.
In July 2021, “after receiving an email ‘from the desk of
Chad Gray’ regarding a new Performance Management
6
Framework, and still feeling [his] 2021 Performance Review was
still disproportionately low and not reflective of [his] actual
performance,” Lee made another complaint of racial
discrimination. In an e-mail to Gray,2 Lee noted, “I have faced
discrimination at this company, and even though I provided
documentation of evidence to you a few years ago, it just keeps
happening to me.” Lee noted his “numbers” during the 2020-
2021 school year were the best he had ever achieved, and he was
“99% sure, these are the best numbers a teacher has ever had in
the history of Learn4Life.” Lee again complained that his
evaluation consisted of “meets expectations” ratings rather than
“exceeds expectations” ratings and that Palacios had not reached
out to him to discuss the situation further. Lee noted, “Whether
or not the blatant professional discrimination was because I’m
Asian or for some other reason, the administrators have
continued to overlook the facts when it comes to evaluations.”
In Gray’s August 2, 2021 acknowledgement of Lee’s e-mail
he observed the organization takes all allegations of
discrimination seriously and offered to meet with Lee regarding
his concerns. Lee declined to meet with Gray but on August 9,
2021, sent an e-mail with more detailed allegations describing his
belief that his June 2021 evaluation was inadequate and that he
has been the victim of racism during his years with AVLA. Gray
responded that Attorney Adam Miller had been hired to handle
the investigation into Lee’s claims.
On October 4, 2021, Miller provided Gray with a
memorandum describing the results of his investigation of Lee’s
2 Lee’s e-mail was directed to Gray, Colby Thornton, and
Peter Faragia, all of whom worked at LLAC.
7
allegations of racial discrimination. The investigation included a
review of over 300 documents, most of which were provided by
Lee. Miller noted, “Although the initial complaint prompting this
investigation revolved around racial discrimination, it appeared
that the nature of the complaints are across the board, from
dissatisfaction of business decisions, to disapproval of selection of
the English Department Chair, to not being selected as the
SLAM poetry teacher.” Lee “did not identify any witnesses that
would know of the racial discrimination.” Miller concluded,
“There was not enough evidence to establish the veracity of any
of the claims, much less any claims of racial discrimination.
What was clear was that Mr. Lee believes that he is the best
teacher in the school and perhaps in the entire Learn4[L]ife
network. Therefore, no action is recommended at this time.”
After Miller completed his report, Lee provided the
telephone number of Lori Johnston, a witness Lee said Miller
should contact. Johnston denied that Lee “had ever experienced
any racial discrimination in her presence.”
Still believing his 2021 performance review failed to
accurately reflect the strength of his performance, Lee e-mailed
area superintendent Childers in late October 2021 and reiterated
his belief his numbers were a “20-year company record” and
noted Palacios did not put “most of this stuff in my teacher
evaluation.” Lee stated, “If you truly want your region to do
better, then I hope you will agree to meet with me. [M]any
people know what kind of numbers I get, . . . and yet, my voice is
ignored and has been ignored for many years.” He claimed that if
he had been appointed athletic director, he could have made the
school “millions” of dollars from the sports program. Lee
8
attached a document he created entitled “Commendations,”
highlighting his purported achievements at AVLA.
On November 5, 2021, Childers met with Lee. In
preparation for the meeting, Childers and a colleague spent
approximately eight hours “analyzing and compiling data from
AVLA’s Student Information System . . . to evaluate the data
supporting Lee’s apparent achievements in the ‘Commendations’
document. The data showed Lee’s achievements were
misrepresented and inaccurate.” When Childers met with Lee,
she informed him that his representations were inaccurate, and
his performance was “average to slightly above average.” While
Lee was a good teacher, others were also doing great work.
Childers informed Lee “his negative attitude was detrimental to
his success and that his negativity was affecting others.”
Childers stated that Lee never said anything in the meeting
about race discrimination, retaliation based on race, or any union
activity. Lee testified he raised the issue of racial discrimination
at the meeting. Childers’s handwritten notes from the meeting
contain one line stating: “favor[i]tism, racism, nepotism→only 1
example.” Childers testified Lee was “just throwing out” reasons
he thought the school was bad, and when she asked him to give
specific examples of such things, Lee only provided one example,
and it was an example of nepotism, not racism.
On December 2, 2021, Lee e-mailed Childers, stating they
had a discussion about a union, but they did not discuss a union.
Following the meeting, Childers decided to terminate Lee’s
employment. Childers testified Lee was terminated because “Lee
had made false and groundless claims about his job performance
in his ‘Commendations’ document and in our meeting. His
unsupported claims required me and my staff to conduct
9
unnecessary research into his claims which wasted several hours.
Lee’s conduct was unprofessional and detrimental to AVLA’s
interests and efficient operations. Lee’s conduct violated AVLA’s
policies. Also, Lee had a negative attitude in the workplace
which was affecting others.” When she made the decision to
terminate Lee, Childers was not aware he made any complaints
about race discrimination, and such complaints were not a factor
in her decision.
Lee’s termination
Although Childers made the decision to terminate Lee after
their November 2021 meeting, she did not want Lee to be
unemployed during the holidays. She therefore decided to
terminate his employment in January 2022. Although she
planned to tell Lee herself, her father became ill with COVID and
passed away during this time period. Childers asked Miller and
a human resources employee, Nicole Perkins, to meet with Lee,
which they did in January 2022. Lee was informed his
employment was terminated. No reason for his termination was
given.
Lee contends the manner in which he was terminated
deviated from normal procedures for termination. In Lee’s 17
years of service, every teacher he had seen terminated was given
a warning, had at least one write-up on their work record, had an
educational supervisor present at the termination, was fired at
the school site, and was given the opportunity to collect his or her
belongings immediately after termination and before leaving the
school building. Lee was terminated at the corporate building
and was asked to collect his belongings at a predetermined time
when no one else was present.
10
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 8, 2022, Lee filed an administrative
complaint with the Civil Rights Department (formerly known as
the Department of Fair Employment and Housing). He received
a notice of closure and right to sue letter, and filed his original
complaint the same day.
Lee subsequently filed the operative FAC, in which he
asserted five causes of action: race discrimination in violation of
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov.
Code, § 12940 et seq.); retaliation in violation of FEHA; failure to
prevent discrimination, harassment, and/or retaliation in
violation of FEHA; retaliation for reporting illegal violation under
Labor Code section 1102.5; and wrongful termination in violation
of public policy.
On November 3, 2023, AVLA moved for summary judgment
or, in the alternative, summary adjudication. AVLA argued Lee’s
racial discrimination claims based on the alleged denial of
positions were time-barred because those acts occurred no later
than 2019, and Lee’s complaint was not filed until 2022. AVLA
also argued Lee failed to show a discriminatory motive, and it
terminated Lee for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons—
specifically, Lee’s misrepresentations in his “Commendations”
document he presented to Childers prior to their November 5,
2021 meeting.
Lee opposed the motion, arguing he established a prima
facie case of discrimination and retaliation and that none of his
claims were time-barred under the continuing violations doctrine.
He further argued AVLA had not provided evidence of a
nondiscriminatory motive for terminating him, and he presented
evidence of pretext.
11
On January 25, 2024, the trial court filed a detailed order
granting AVLA’s motion for summary judgment in full. The
court found there was no triable issue of fact as to any of Lee’s
causes of action. As to Lee’s claim for racial discrimination, the
court found no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could
infer the employer’s motivation was discriminatory. The court
noted “there is no evidence showing that AVLA had a
discriminatory motive based on Lee’s race with respect to any
decision.” Even if Lee had met his burden of showing a prima
facie case, AVLA met its burden of asserting legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Further, the
continuing violations doctrine did not apply to Lee’s claims that
he was passed over for various positions.
As to Lee’s claim for retaliation in violation of FEHA, the
trial court found AVLA offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for Lee’s termination, and Lee’s argument that temporal
proximity between his meeting with Childers and his termination
was insufficient to create a prima facie case of retaliation. Even
if it were sufficient, Lee failed to show AVLA’s legitimate reasons
for terminating him were pretextual.
Having concluded Lee did not establish a triable issue of
fact as to his claims for discrimination or retaliation, Lee’s cause
of action for failure to prevent discrimination, harassment and/or
retaliation also failed.
Lee’s cause of action for violation of Labor Code section
1102.5 failed because there was no evidence any of Lee’s
complaints were a contributing factor in AVLA’s decision to
terminate his employment. Having determined Lee failed to
establish a triable issue of material fact as to his FEHA and
Labor Code claims, the court concluded there was no triable issue
12
of material fact as to his claim of wrongful termination in
violation of public policy.
The court filed a second order on January 25, 2024, stating,
“In addition to there being grounds stated on this Court’s ‘Order
Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment’, it is also
the law that a Court may grant a summary judgment in any case
where a judgment on the pleadings under Code of Civil Procedure
could also be granted. That is the case here . . . .” The court
found Lee’s complaint “at all times failed to state a cause of
action. It set forth nothing more than opinions and speculation
with no facts supplied that would . . . serve to . . . support a basis
for this Plaintiff’s subjective conclusions that what has been
alleged transpired in the workplace, such as not receiving a
desired job assignment, has been motivated by or in any way
based on the discriminatory factors he relies upon.”
On March 25, 2024, Lee filed his notice of appeal from the
judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable law and standard of review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if all the papers
submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) On appeal
from an order granting summary judgment, we independently
review the record in order to determine whether triable issues of
fact compel reinstating the action. (Wiener v. Southcoast
Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) In
performing this review, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the losing party. (Ibid.) “There is a triable issue of
13
material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable
standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)
Our role is to “determine with respect to each cause of
action whether the defendant seeking summary judgment has
conclusively negated a necessary element of the plaintiff’s case,
or has demonstrated that under no hypothesis is there a material
issue of fact that requires the process of trial, such that the
defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Guz v.
Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334 (Guz).)
California has adopted a three-stage burden-shifting test to
analyze claims of retaliation or discrimination under FEHA.
(McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802–806
(McDonnell Douglas); Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 354.) Under
this framework, the “plaintiff has the initial burden to make a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing that it is more
likely than not that the employer has taken an adverse
employment action based on a prohibited criterion. A prima facie
case establishes a presumption of discrimination. The employer
may rebut the presumption by producing evidence that its action
was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. If the
employer discharges this burden, the presumption of
discrimination disappears. The plaintiff must then show that the
employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was actually a
pretext for discrimination, and the plaintiff may offer any other
evidence of discriminatory motive.” (Harris v. City of Santa
Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 214–215 (Harris).)
14
II. Retaliation3
Lee asserted a cause of action for retaliation in violation of
FEHA as well as a cause of action for retaliation in violation of
Labor Code section 1102.5. We discuss each cause of action for
retaliation below.
A. FEHA retaliation claim
FEHA prohibits employers from deciding to “discharge,
expel, or otherwise discriminate against” an employee for
“oppos[ing] any practices forbidden under [Government Code
section 12900 et seq.].” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h); see Jones
v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1158,
1162.) The employee can establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under FEHA by showing the employee “‘engaged in a
protected activity, his employer subjected him to adverse
employment action, and there is a causal link between the
protected activity and the employer’s action.’” (California Fair
Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp. (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1018 (Gemini).) While timing alone is
generally insufficient to prove unlawful retaliation (Chen v.
County of Orange (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 926, 930–931),
“‘temporal proximity, together with . . . other evidence, may be
sufficient to establish pretext’” (Diego v. Pilgrim United Church
of Christ (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 913, 932).
1. Prima facie case
Lee argues that he engaged in protected activity
(complaining about racism) and suffered an adverse employment
action (termination). The issue in this appeal is whether Lee has
3 We discuss Lee’s causes of action in the order in which he
has presented them in his opening brief on appeal.
15
presented evidence suggesting a causal link between his
complaints of racial discrimination and his termination.
We find that he has not. Lee has failed to present evidence
that Childers, who made the decision to terminate Lee, had any
knowledge of his prior complaints of racial discrimination, which
were made directly to LLAC. Childers testified she was unaware
of Lee’s complaints of racial discrimination, and Lee presents no
evidence to the contrary. While Lee contends he raised the issue
of racial discrimination in his conversation with Childers on
November 5, 2021, which precipitated his termination, Lee’s
declaration states: “During this meeting, I also informed
Ms. Childers that there were significant issues at AVLA,
especially with hiring practices and advancement opportunities.
I told her I felt that AVLA primarily hires White and Latino
people and complained of ‘favoritism.’ I also specifically
complained of racism at AVLA and explained that I believed race
was playing a role in many of these hiring practices and had
negatively affected me over the course of my employment.”
Childers’s handwritten notes from the meeting contain one line
reading: “favor[i]tism, racism, nepotism,” then specify: “only 1
example.” While Childers acknowledged that Lee “thr[ew] out”
the term racism generally, she testified the only specific example
he gave was nepotism. Lee’s declaration does not state that he
raised any particular instance of purported racism that he
experienced, nor that he put Childers on notice as to any specific
conduct.
Even if a jury believed Lee’s statements about what he said
in the meeting with Childers, his vague, nonspecific reference to
racism is insufficient to constitute a protected activity. “Although
an employee need not formally file a charge in order to qualify as
16
being engaged in protected opposing activity, . . . complaints
about personal grievances or vague or conclusory remarks that
fail to put an employer on notice as to what conduct it should
investigate will not suffice to establish protected conduct.”
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1047, fn.
omitted (Yanowitz).) The employee’s words must “‘sufficiently
convey the employee’s reasonable concerns that the employer has
acted or is acting in an unlawful discriminatory manner.’” (Ibid.)
Lee’s nonspecific statements that race “was playing a role” in
hiring practices and had “negatively affected” him are too vague
to put the employer on notice of reasonable concerns of unlawful
discrimination. Lee did not raise specific examples of alleged
racism, nor did he mention any specific race, nor any specific
employment decision giving Childers notice that his complaints
were anything more than conclusory accusations.
Other than Lee’s vague reference to racism in their
meeting, he has presented no evidence that Childers, who made
the decision to terminate Lee’s employment, had any knowledge
that Lee had previously raised the issue of racial discrimination
with LLAC. “‘Essential to a causal link is evidence that the
employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the
protected activity.’” (Morgan v. Regents of University of
California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 70.) Lee has presented no
such evidence. Without knowledge of Lee’s specific accusations of
racism, Childers cannot be charged with a retaliatory motive.
An employer is entitled to summary judgment “‘if,
considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its actions,
the evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational
inference that the employer’s actual motive was discriminatory.’”
(Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830,
17
861.) “It is not sufficient for an employee to make a bare prima
facie showing or to simply deny the credibility of the employer’s
witnesses or to speculate as to discriminatory motive.” (Id. at
p. 862.) The evidence in this case is insufficient to permit a
rational inference that Childers’s motivation was retaliatory.
Lee argues the temporal proximity between his expression
of his concerns of racial favoritism to Childers and her decision to
terminate him is sufficient to show a retaliatory motive. Childers
made the decision to terminate Lee immediately following the
November 5, 2021 meeting. Lee cites Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc.
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 353 (Arteaga) for the proposition that
“the temporal proximity between an employee’s disclosure . . .
and a subsequent termination may satisfy the causation
requirement at the first step of the burden-shifting process.”
Lee’s temporal proximity argument fails because there is
no evidence Childers was aware of Lee’s protected activity of
making complaints of racism to LLAC. His vague reference to
racism, along with other “-isms,” in the November 2021 meeting
was insufficient to constitute a protected activity. Thus, there
was no connection between any protected activity and Lee’s
termination.4
4 Further, even if Lee could make out a prima facie case, the
Arteaga case makes it clear that “temporal proximity alone is not
sufficient to raise a triable issue as to pretext once the employer
has offered evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
the termination.” (Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.)
AVLA offered evidence that Lee’s termination was because of the
false and misleading claims made in his “Commendations”
document, his negative attitude in the workplace, and his
unprofessional conduct, which was time consuming, detrimental
18
Where an employer’s reasons for termination are
“manifestly unrelated to intentional . . . bias,” they are “legally
sufficient to establish [a plaintiff’s] FEHA cause of action had no
merit.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 360.) Lee has failed to show
a causal link between his complaints of racial discrimination to
LLAC and Childers’s decision to terminate him. Absent such a
causal connection, Lee’s claim for retaliation under FEHA fails.
2. Pretext
As we have found Lee has failed to set forth a prima facie
case of retaliation under FEHA, there is no evidence from which
a reasonable trier of fact could infer a causal link between his
complaints of racism to LLAC and his termination by Childers.
Therefore, we need not address the issue of pretext. However, we
note Lee’s evidence of pretext is also insufficient.
In support of his argument that AVLA’s reasons for
terminating him were pretextual, Lee points to the timing of the
termination coupled with his employment record. Lee cites
Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at page 1023 for the proposition
that pretext “‘may also be inferred from the timing of the
company’s termination decision, by the identity of the person
making the decision, and by the terminated employee’s job
performance before termination.’” Lee asserts again that
Childers was aware of his complaints of race discrimination and
points out that Lee was an 18-year employee who had garnered
consistently strong performance reviews during his long career at
AVLA.
to AVLA, and violated AVLA’s policies. The temporal proximity
between the November 5, 2021 meeting and Lee’s termination
does not rebut ALVA’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
his termination.
19
Gemini is distinguishable in several respects. In Gemini,
the plaintiff asked his supervisor for time off for his religious
observation. His request was denied, but he took the time off
anyway. The plaintiff’s supervisor, who had denied the request,
was also a member of the management committee, which
ultimately made the decision to suspend and then terminate the
plaintiff’s employment. (Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1010.) Thus, unlike the facts of this case, the individual to
whom the plaintiff made complaints of religious discrimination
was responsible for the adverse employment actions that
followed. The Gemini court noted, “the employer’s awareness of
the protected activities and adverse action that followed within a
relatively short time” showed a sufficient causal connection. (Id.
at p. 1020.) As set forth above, no such causal connection has
been shown here.
Further, the Gemini plaintiff’s job performance was “[m]ost
telling” in establishing pretext. The employee “had perfect
attendance in the fifteen months that he worked at Gemini. He
worked a double shift when necessary. [He] was originally hired
to supervise all three extrusion shifts, and would voluntarily put
in 12-hour days . . . .” (Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1023.) There was testimony the plaintiff “was the most
qualified and experienced individual” the manager “had ever
hired in his 45 years in the extrusion business.” (Id. at p. 1024.)
While Lee’s employment record was good, the majority of his
marks were consistently “meets expectations.” In addition, there
was some concern with Lee’s tendency to criticize the school and
his failure to be a team player. He had one disciplinary action on
his record. Lee also “continuously made comments that he was
one of the best teachers at AVLA,” a statement Childers found
20
untrue. The record shows that Lee’s superiors did not praise
Lee’s job performance as much as Lee praised his own
performance. Thus, Lee’s job performance was not comparable to
the plaintiff in Gemini.
Lee insists pretext is shown because AVLA provided
trumped up reasons for his termination. He cites Reeves v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 112, footnote 12
(Reeves), for the proposition that when an employer’s stated
reason for termination is “trumped up or is ‘unworthy of
credence,’” there is sufficient evidence for a finding that the
employer was motivated by discriminatory animus. In Reeves,
there was “no evidence that any of [the plaintiff’s] other conduct
was sufficient to warrant dismissal.” (Id. at p. 112, fn. 13.) That
is not the case here, where the AVLA manual specifically
prohibited “[u]nprofessional” conduct and “[a]ny other conduct
detrimental to other employees or [AVLA’s] interests or its
efficient operations.” Lee has presented no evidence that AVLA’s
reasons for his termination were trumped up or unworthy of
credence. He admits to all of the actions leading up to his
termination, including creating the “Commendations” document
and requesting the meeting with Childers.
Lee points out he had always been vocal about his teaching
record and his criticisms of AVLA, and it was not until he
complained of racial discrimination that his supposedly inflated
self-assessment and criticism of his superiors became an issue.
Lee cites Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 570, in which the plaintiff alleged she was
terminated due to disability discrimination. The employer relied
on declarations from the plaintiff’s supervisors to support its
proffered legitimate reasons for termination, several of whom
21
mentioned the plaintiff’s tardiness. In reversing summary
judgment, the Court of Appeal emphasized that Soria’s tardiness
had been occurring for several years but did not become an issue
until she lodged a complaint about disability discrimination, and
she had never been disciplined for being late until then. (Id. at
p. 596.) However, the Soria court noted not only were there
inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence of the
plaintiff’s tardiness, it was undisputed some of her late arrivals
were for medical appointments related to her disability. (Id. at
pp. 595–596.) Thus, the court concluded “a finder of fact could
reasonably infer at least some of the tardiness observed by
Univision employees in 2011 was due to Soria’s medical
appointments and, as a result, Soria was improperly terminated,
at least in part, as a direct result of protected activity.” (Id. at
p. 596.) Significantly, in contrast to the present case, Soria
presented evidence her employer was aware of her disability (id.
at pp. 592–593), while Lee failed to present evidence that
Childers was aware of Lee’s complaints of racial discrimination.
Lee cites several cases he claims support his argument that
summary judgment is inappropriate where evidence of favorable
performance reviews and temporal proximity is combined with
evidence that the employer’s stated reasons are unworthy of
credence.5 Again the critical element Lee is missing is knowledge
by the individual responsible for the adverse action. This
element is present in each case Lee cites. (See Yanowitz, supra,
36 Cal.4th at p. 1046 [“when the circumstances surrounding an
employee’s conduct are sufficient to establish that an employer
5 As set forth above, Lee has presented no evidence
Childers’s reasons were unworthy of credence.
22
knew that an employee’s refusal to comply with an order was
based on the employee’s reasonable belief that the order is
discriminatory, an employer may not avoid the reach of the
FEHA’s antiretaliation provision”]; Diego v. Pilgrim United
Church of Christ, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 919 [finding cause
of action existed for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy where employer believed employee engaged in protected
activity]; Gemini, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1020 [inference of
causal connection raised where there was evidence of the
employer’s awareness of protected activities and adverse action
that followed within a relatively short time]; Flait v. North
American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 478 [same
highly placed officer who made offending comments to female
employee was responsible for terminating plaintiff, who had
opposed the harassment].) Lee has presented no evidence
suggesting Childers was aware, at the time she made the decision
to terminate Lee’s employment, that Lee had made complaints of
racial discrimination. As previously explained, his passing
comment to her at the meeting was insufficient.
Lee raises two additional factors: deviation from ordinary
personnel procedures and inadequate internal investigation.6
6 Lee cites Moore v. Regents of University of California (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 216, 239, and Caldera v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31, 45, for the
proposition that “‘[a]n employer’s failure to follow its own policies
and procedures is not illegal in and of itself, but may be evidence
of pretext.’” Lee cites Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 243, 278–283, and Reeves, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at
page 117 in support of his argument that an inadequate
investigation is evidence of pretext.
23
Neither can show pretext where, as here, there is no evidence
Childers knew of Lee’s complaints of racial discrimination.
Further, the evidence Lee cites is unconvincing. Although
Lee argues AVLA deviated from its normal procedures when
terminating him, Childers presented evidence her father was
dying of COVID-19 during the time in question. That evidence,
which is uncontradicted, presents a reasonable explanation for
the deviation from ordinary procedures.
Lee’s contention that Miller conducted an inadequate
investigation of his claim of racism to LLAC in 2021 is
groundless. Lee claims Miller finished his investigation and
reached his conclusion in a mere seven days. More importantly,
Lee argues, even though Miller claimed to have interviewed
school principal Palacios, Palacios testified he had no recollection
of the interview. Palacios testified he had not heard of any
discrimination complaint and could not remember if he had been
contacted by someone named Adam Miller. Lee also raises
Miller’s role as the individual tasked by Childers to terminate
him in Childers’s absence. Lee argues this raises questions as to
whether Miller was truly unbiased in performing his
investigation.
Lee fails to cite any evidence that Childers was aware of
Lee’s complaint to LLAC, or Miller’s investigation of it, when she
made the decision to terminate Lee. Any flaw in Miller’s
investigation therefore has no bearing on Childers’ decision.
Lee also fails to cite any evidence suggesting Miller’s
investigation was flawed. The record shows the investigation
lasted nearly two months. It opened on August 13, 2021, and
concluded on October 4, 2021. Further, even after completion of
the investigation, Miller interviewed another witness, referred by
24
Lee, who denied that Lee had ever experienced racial
discrimination in her presence. There is no evidence suggesting
Miller’s investigation was insufficient.
Lee’s contention that Miller’s role as the individual tasked
with terminating Lee somehow affected Miller’s investigation is
unreasonable. The investigation took place months before the
termination. Any suggestion that Miller’s role in Lee’s
termination serves to undermine the integrity of the
investigation is illogical.7
Lee’s efforts to show pretext fail. In the absence of a
fundamental causal link between his complaints of racial
discrimination and his termination, Lee cannot raise a
reasonable inference that Childers had a retaliatory motive.
B. Retaliation in violation of Labor Code section
1102.5
Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) prohibits an
employer from retaliating against an employee for disclosing
information to a government or law enforcement agency or to a
person with authority to “investigate, discover, or correct the
violation or noncompliance . . . if the employee has reasonable
cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state
7 We decline to address Lee’s brief, insufficient argument
that he showed disparate treatment based on race. Lee claims
whenever he was denied an employment opportunity with AVLA,
the job went to a non-Asian person. Lee fails to provide any
evidence of intentional discrimination or any circumstance
suggesting a discriminatory motive. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
pp. 354–355.) Further, the statute of limitations has run on Lee’s
unsuccessful attempts to secure other positions at AVLA, and Lee
has not appealed the trial court’s determination that the
continuing violations doctrine is not applicable in this case.
25
or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local,
state, or federal rule or regulation . . . .” “This provision reflects
the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace
whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts without fearing
retaliation.” (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th
66, 77.)
The McDonnell Douglas8 burden-shifting standard does not
apply to whistleblower claims under California law. (Lawson v.
PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 718.)
However, whistleblower plaintiffs still must “show that
retaliation was a ‘contributing factor’ in their termination,
demotion, or other adverse action.” (Id. at p. 713.) Thus, “[e]ven
if the employer had a genuine, nonretaliatory reason for its
adverse action, the plaintiff still carries the burden assigned by
statute if it is shown that the employer also had at least one
retaliatory reason that was a contributing factor in the action.”
(Id. at p. 716.)
As explained above, Lee has failed to meet this burden.
The evidence is uncontradicted that Lee’s complaints about race
discrimination were unknown to Childers at the time she made
the decision to terminate his employment. Thus, Lee cannot
meet his initial burden of showing his complaints of race
discrimination were a contributing factor in the termination of
his employment. The absence of this causal connection is fatal to
Lee’s claim under Labor Code section 1102.5.9
8 See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U.S. at pages 802–806.
9 Lee argues that because his causes of action for retaliation
are viable, his claim for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy is also viable. As we have determined his causes of
26
III. Race discrimination and failure to prevent
discrimination
Lee does not challenge the trial court’s determination that
his claims for race discrimination based on events occurring
between 2015 and 2019 are time-barred. Instead, he argues his
claim for race discrimination is not premised exclusively on what
happened in 2019 and before. It is also based on his termination,
which occurred in January 2022.
In order to show that his termination in January 2022 was
based on racial discrimination, Lee was required to make a prima
facie showing that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2)
he was qualified for his position and performing competently; (3)
he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) “some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” (Guz, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 355.) It is the final element of the prima facie case
that Lee is lacking.
There is absolutely no evidence from which racism or
discriminatory animus can be inferred as the motivation for Lee’s
termination. Lee presents pure speculation, which is insufficient
to survive summary judgment. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
action for retaliation are not viable, we find his claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy also must fail.
(Wilkin v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 806, 831 [where there are no triable issues of
material fact as to plaintiff’s FEHA claims, plaintiff’s claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy fails as a matter
of law].)
27
pp. 864–865 [“Speculation . . . is not evidence. . . . Neither does it
even support an inference implying as much.”].)10
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. AVLA is awarded its costs of
appeal.
________________________
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
_______________________________
RICHARDSON, J.
10 Because we have determined the trial court properly
granted summary judgment on Lee’s claims against AVLA, we
decline to discuss Lee’s argument that the trial court improperly
granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings. We review the
court’s ruling, not its reasoning, and may affirm on any ground
supported by the record. (Frayo v. Martin (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
1025, 1033.)
28
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