People v. Edwards CA4/1

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Filed 2/28/25 P. v. Edwards CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083087

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE411118)

BRYAN LUTHER EDWARDS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Frank L. Birchak, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Bryan Luther Edwards appeals the judgment entered after a jury
convicted him of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) for
killing his brother, Derick Edwards. Bryan raises three main challenges on
appeal, but he has failed to establish error.
First, contrary to Bryan’s claim, substantial evidence supported the
instruction on mutual combat. Bryan accepted his brother’s challenge to
“knuckle up,” and a reasonable jury could view Bryan’s move from shooting
at Derick in the backyard to shooting at him in the front of the house as
pursuit rather than withdrawal from the fight. Bryan forfeited his other
challenge to the mutual combat instruction by not providing any supporting
authority.
Second, the court correctly instructed the jury that, to succeed on his
self-defense claim, Bryan must have acted only because of his fear of
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. Bryan cites no authority
that obligated the court to independently instruct the jury that he could have
mixed motives for shooting his brother so long as fear was the but-for causal
factor. And Bryan forfeited his claim the prosecutor erroneously described
the meaning of the instruction by not objecting at trial or showing an
objection would have been futile.
Third, Bryan seeks a remand for resentencing. Because it was lawful
for the court to (1) impose a firearm enhancement under a different code
section than the one the jury found true; and (2) dismiss the enhancement
and instead use the underlying fact the jury found true—that Bryan
personally used and discharged a firearm—as an aggravating factor to
impose the upper term for voluntary manslaughter, Bryan forfeited his
related claim of error by not objecting at trial. Next, he fails to show
prejudice based on the court’s reference to an assault weapon when
considering a sentence on an enhancement the court eventually dismissed.

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Lastly, the court did not, as Bryan asserts, rely on criminal protective order
violations when imposing the upper term for voluntary manslaughter.
Thus, we affirm.
I.
A.
Derick had a long history of drug abuse. He lived in a trailer in the
backyard of the home where Bryan and their mother lived. Derick was not
supposed to have drugs or “bad company” while living there.
One day, after smoking methamphetamine, Derick and some friends
gathered in the backyard to paint a van. Witnesses described Derick as
“agitated” and yelling and “screaming at the top of his lungs.” Bryan thought
“something was off” with Derick.
According to one witness, Bryan told Derick he was not allowed to have
friends over and to take their activity elsewhere. Derick responded with
“colorful language” and challenged Bryan, telling him to “knuckle up or kick
rocks.” Witnesses agreed Bryan walked away at this point, though accounts
differ as to how long. Bryan testified he took his pregnant wife to the dentist
and returned several hours later. Another witness testified Bryan returned
within 15 minutes.
Bryan reentered the backyard and told everyone to leave. According to
Bryan, Derick called him names and said it was “time to fight.” As Bryan
approached Derick, Bryan wrapped his wrists and hands to stabilize them so
he could fight. A witness characterized the ensuing fistfight as “a mutual
fight.”
Before long, the brothers wielded more than fists. Derick escalated
things first. As Bryan was getting the better of him, Derick grabbed a
screwdriver and “lunged” at Bryan, stabbing him “right in the chest.” In that

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moment, Bryan felt “extreme pressure” in his left lung and saw blood
“squirting out” of him. According to Bryan’s wife, Derick screamed at Bryan,
“[y]ou got stuck.”
In response, Bryan ran into the house, where he retrieved and loaded a
semiautomatic rifle. While Bryan was inside, Derick grabbed the keys to a
van parked in the backyard. Bryan returned to the backyard with the rifle
less than one minute later. He fired three rounds. Bryan claimed Derick was
approaching the house, so he fired warning shots in the dirt to ward him off.
Two other witnesses, however, including Bryan’s wife, testified Derick was
already getting into the van to flee when Bryan fired. One witness saw the
rifle pointed at Derick and the van.
Derick drove down the street, only to return a minute or two later.
Bryan and his wife went to the front of the house to get into his truck and go
to the hospital to treat Bryan’s stab wound. Bryan still carried the rifle. To
the witness in the backyard, it appeared as though Bryan was following
Derick.
Bryan testified Derick was driving in circles in front of the house and
“screaming . . . he’s going to fucking kill me.” Bryan claimed he shot into the
dirt as Derick turned towards the driveway. According to Bryan, he begged
Derick to leave, but Derick kept screaming about killing him. Bryan saw
Derick sprint from the van towards him, so Bryan fired the rifle a final time,
aiming for Derick’s shoulder.
A bystander witness shared a different account. The witness saw
Derick first exit the van, crouch by a tire, and call for help before Bryan came
out of the house. The witness testified Bryan exited the house, pointed the
rifle at Derick, and “immediately fired.”

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Bryan, “thinking the situation [wa]s over,” drove to the hospital to treat
his stab wound.
Derick died from a gunshot wound to his chest after a bullet punctured
his heart and lung.
B.
A jury found Bryan not guilty of murder (Pen. Code, § 187) but guilty of
the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)). The
jury found true that Bryan intentionally and personally discharged a firearm
and proximately caused great bodily injury and death under
section 12022.53(d).
The court sentenced Bryan to the upper term of 11 years in prison.
Because section 12022.53(d) does not apply to voluntary manslaughter, the
court contemplated imposing a firearm enhancement under
section 12022.5(a) as a replacement. Ultimately, however, the court
dismissed the firearm enhancement and instead used the underlying facts to
justify imposing the upper term.
II.
We address the two claims of instructional error before turning to
Bryan’s claims of sentencing error.
A.
Bryan challenges the factual basis for the jury instruction on mutual
combat or initial aggressor. We conclude substantial evidence supported it.
Even if an instruction correctly states a principle of law, it is error to
give an instruction that “has no application to the facts of the case.” (People
v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.) As a result, “instructions not
supported by substantial evidence should not be given.” (People v.
Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1050.) In this context, evidence is

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substantial if it is “sufficient to deserve jury consideration.” (People v.
Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 39.) Thus, “we must determine whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt” that
Bryan engaged in mutual combat or was the initial aggressor. (People v.
Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1206.)
At issue is an instruction that limits the right to self-defense. The
court instructed the jury that a person who “engages in mutual combat” or
“starts a fight” has a right to self-defense only if the defendant:
(1) actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting;
(2) communicated to the opponent “by word or by conduct” this
intent to stop fighting; and
(3) gave the opponent a chance to stop fighting.
(See CALCRIM No. 3471.) If Bryan met those requirements, the court
explained, he had a right to self-defense if his opponent continued to fight.
Yet Bryan did not have to meet those requirements if he used only nondeadly
force and his opponent “responded with such sudden and deadly force” that
Bryan could not withdraw from the fight. Lastly, the court defined mutual
combat as a fight that “began or continued by mutual consent or agreement”
that could be “expressly stated or implied, and it must occur before the claim
to self-defense arose.”
Substantial evidence supported the instruction because the fight began
as mutual combat. In response to his brother’s challenge to “knuckle up or
kick rocks,” Bryan prepared to fight by wrapping his wrists. This action
reflected Bryan’s preexisting intention to engage in combat with Derick.
(See Ross, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045.)
Bryan concedes there is sufficient evidence the brothers “engaged in
mutual combat in the backyard.” He argues it ended, however, when he went

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into the house and his brother drove away because they were no longer
“exchanging blows” and the “battle was over.” According to Bryan, that
“lapse of time” created two separate events: (1) “the mutual combat in the
backyard” and (2) “the shooting in the front of the house.” We disagree.
Although Bryan characterizes his return to the house after shooting the
rifle as withdrawing from the fight, on this record a reasonable jury could
find otherwise. The evidence supports viewing the entire event as a single
bout during which Bryan pursued Derick from the backyard to the front of
the house. Bryan fired on Derick in the backyard—either warning shots, as
he claims, or at Derick, as a witness testified. Not long after, Bryan moved to
the front of the house—following Derick, per a witness—and continued
shooting. A witness saw Bryan “immediately” fire on Derick upon reaching
the front yard. On these facts, a reasonable jury could reject Bryan’s
characterization.
Bryan argues the confrontation in the front yard was not mutual
because he was begging Derick to leave before firing the fatal shot. But “[i]t
is well settled that the jury has wide latitude to believe or disbelieve
witnesses, or even specific portions of their testimony.” (In re Lopez (2023)
14 Cal.5th 562, 591.) Bryan acknowledges the jury was not required to
believe this testimony. Nor did the jury have to believe his testimony he was
done fighting and intended only to go to the hospital after the backyard shots.
Instead, the jury could have believed a bystander’s version of events, which
saw Bryan shoot Derick while he was calling for help and cowering by a tire.
Thus, “the jury could reasonably find that both combatants actually
consented or intended to fight before the claimed occasion for self-defense
arose.” (Ross, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047, some italics omitted.) As a result,
substantial evidence supported giving this instruction.

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Separately, Bryan contends this instruction was too broad because it
also referenced his defense of his wife. As Bryan provides no authority to
support this argument, we deem the point forfeited. (Badie v. Bank of
America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.) He also forfeited it by not
objecting on this specific ground at trial. (People v. San Nicolas (2004)
34 Cal.4th 614, 669.)
In sum, Bryan has failed to show the court erred in instructing the jury
with CALCRIM No. 3471. We therefore need not address prejudice.
B.
Next, Bryan argues the court erred in instructing on self-defense.
The court instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 505. Relevant here,
to justify killing Derick, the court stated Bryan “must have acted only
because of th[e] belief” he or his wife was in imminent danger of death or
great bodily injury.
Bryan contends (1) his right to self-defense was not subject to the
“‘must have acted only because of that belief’” limitation; (2) instead, the
standard should be a but-for causation test related to mixed motives for a
killing referenced in People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015; and (3) even if
the instruction was correct, the prosecutor “erroneously described the
meaning” of it in closing arguments.
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We address forfeiture before concluding
the self-defense instruction correctly stated the applicable law.
1.
The People say Bryan forfeited this claim by failing to object at trial.
We consider the merits of the purported instructional error, however, because
such a claim is not forfeited if it affected the defendant’s substantial rights

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(Pen. Code, § 1259) and deciding that question “necessarily requires” us to
examine the merits. (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.)
But Bryan forfeited his claim the prosecutor “erroneously described the
meaning of the ‘must have acted only because of that belief’ language.” To
preserve a prosecutorial misconduct claim, the defendant “must make a
timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish the jury to
disregard the improper argument” unless doing so would be futile. (People v.
Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1205 [cleaned up].) Bryan’s trial counsel did
not object. Although Bryan claims objecting would have been futile “because
the prosecutor’s argument superficially tracked the jury instruction,” that
position is at odds with the substance of his argument premised on the
prosecutor diverging from the instruction. When the prosecutor said, “when
Bryan Edwards pulled that trigger and shot his brother, the only thing that
was going through his mind you have to find was self-defense,” for example,
Bryan could have objected and asked the court to admonish the jury that
“[t]hose other thoughts . . . simply could not be the reason appellant shot
Derick.” Bryan does not explain how such an admonishment would have
been futile. As a result, that claim of error is forfeited.
2.
On the claim of instructional error, Bryan first argues the requirement
to kill out of fear alone did not apply. We disagree. We also decline Bryan’s
invitation to deem the People’s purported “failure to make any substantive
argument” about the “sole reason” language in the instruction is a correct
statement of law a concession to error.
As relevant here, under Penal Code section 197, one can justifiably kill
another person when:
(1) Resisting an attempt to do great bodily injury upon any person;

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(2) Committed in defense of a person against someone who
“manifestly intends or endeavors” to (a) commit a felony or
(b) enter someone’s home “in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous
manner” to do violence; or
(3) Committed in the lawful defense of a person “when there is
reasonable ground to apprehend a design to . . . do some great
bodily injury” and “imminent danger” of that injury; but if the
person was engaged in mutual combat, then the person must
have “really and in good faith” endeavored to end the struggle
before it became a homicide. (§ 197(1)-(3).)
Bryan relies on Penal Code section 198—which specifies that “the party
killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone” in the
scenarios described in subdivisions (2) and (3)—to argue his act of
self-defense was not so constrained because it fell within subdivision (1).
(§ 198.) Even if we were to put aside Bryan’s concession that his conduct also
“arguably fell within subdivisions (2) and (3),” the very cases Bryan cites for
subdivision (1) undercut his position. (Citing People v. Trevino (1988)
200 Cal.App.3d 874 and Nguyen, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1015.) Trevino rejected this
same argument and instead concluded “an instruction [that] states that the
party killing must act under the influence of such fears alone[ ] is a correct
statement of the law.” (Trevino, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 879.) Our Supreme
Court endorsed Trevino in Nguyen. (Nguyen, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1045.)
Bryan contends the “practical effect” of the instruction deprived him of
the right to self-defense “if he harbored any degree of frustration or ill will
towards Derick when he shot him.” (Italics added.) Not so. Neither the law
nor the instruction “require an absence of any feeling other than fear[ ] before
the homicide could be considered justifiable.” (Trevino, 200 Cal.App.3d at

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p. 879.) “Instead, the law requires that the party killing act out of fear
alone.” (Nguyen, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1045 [cleaned up].) The causal factor must
be fear rather than any other emotion.
In sum, Bryan gives us no reason to deviate from longstanding caselaw
on this point. (See Nguyen, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1045 [collecting cases].)
3.
Next, Bryan contends that, even if the acting out of fear alone
limitation applies, the instruction is still defective because it does not include
Nguyen’s but-for causation language. Again, we disagree.
This argument comes from dicta in which Nguyen noted the defendant
did not argue—at trial or on appeal—“the jury should have been instructed
that acting based on mixed motives is permissible so long as reasonable fear
was the but-for cause of [the] decision to kill.” (Nguyen, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 1046.) As a result, our Supreme Court had “no occasion to consider
whether such a rule would be consistent with section 198 as interpreted in
Trevino.” (Ibid.) Like the Nguyen defendant, Bryan never asked the trial
court for this but-for instruction. Although Bryan believes CALCRIM
No. 505 “should include” such language, he does not provide any authority
obligating a trial court to so modify the instruction absent a request from a
party. Consequently, he has failed to establish error.
C.
Lastly, seeking a remand for resentencing, Bryan argues the trial court
erred by (1) substituting the section 12022.53 firearm enhancement for one
under section 12022.5 and then dismissing the enhancement and instead
using the underlying facts to justify the upper term for voluntary
manslaughter; (2) using the fact Bryan possessed an assault weapon as an
aggravating factor for the sentence it considered but did not impose on the

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enhancement; and (3) imposing the upper term for voluntary manslaughter
by purportedly relying on violations of a criminal protective order that were
neither stipulated to nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The People
argue forfeiture. We agree the first point is forfeited. We discern no
reversible error on the other two points.
1.
Bryan concedes the law permits the trial court to impose (1) the
section 12022.5 enhancement and (2) the upper term for voluntary
manslaughter based on the underlying facts instead of imposing a sentence
for the enhancement. (Citing People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015,
1030.) Yet he argues the procedure violated his due process right to notice.
A defendant forfeits appellate claims by not objecting to sentences that,
“though otherwise permitted by law, were imposed in a procedurally or
factually flawed manner.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) As
Bryan admits the law permits his sentence, his failure to object forfeits the
issue on appeal.
2.
Bryan advocates for resentencing because the court “viewed [his]
possession of an assault weapon as a factor in aggravation” in considering a
sentence for the firearm enhancement despite no corresponding jury finding.
Yet the court ultimately imposed no sentence for the enhancement and
instead dismissed it. And the record reflects the court did not use the nature
of the firearm as a factor for the sentence it imposed for voluntary
manslaughter, as it recognized the fact the firearm was an “assault weapon
could not justify an upper term because it was not proven or found true . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.” Accordingly, Bryan cannot—and does

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not—identify any resulting prejudice. And without a showing of prejudice,
we will not remand for resentencing.
3.
Bryan’s last argument—that the court erroneously relied on criminal
protective order violations in imposing the upper term for voluntary
manslaughter—rests on a faulty factual premise. The record does not
indicate the court did so. To the contrary, when discussing whether to depart
from the lower term, the court first mentioned aggravating factors “other
than the criminal protective order.” (Italics added.) And in the end, the court
cited only one aggravating factor as the basis for imposing the upper term—
that Bryan used and discharged a firearm. Thus, this point does not justify a
remand for resentencing.
III.
We affirm the judgment.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.

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